Oral History Interview

with

ROY GREENAWAY

California Political Activist, 1952-1968

Washington, D.C.

By Amelia R. Fry
Regional Oral History Office
University of California, Berkeley
RESTRICTIONS ON THIS INTERVIEW

None.

LITERARY RIGHTS AND QUOTATIONS

This manuscript is hereby made available for research purposes only. No part of the manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of the California State Archivist or Regional Oral History Office, University of California at Berkeley.

Requests for permission to quote for publication should be addressed to:

California State Archives
1020 O Street, Room 130
Sacramento, California 95814

or

Regional Oral History Office
486 Library
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720

The request should include information of the specific passages and identification of the user.

It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows:
Roy Greenaway, Oral History Interview, Conducted 1990 and 1991 by Amelia Fry, Regional Oral History Office, University of California at Berkeley, for the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program.
PREFACE

On September 25, 1985, Governor George Deukmejian signed into law A.B. 2104 (Chapter 965 of the Statutes of 1985). This legislation established, under the administration of the California State Archives, a State Government Oral History Program "to provide through the use of oral history a continuing documentation of state policy development as reflected in California’s legislative and executive history."

The following interview is one of a series of oral histories undertaken for inclusion in the state program. These interviews offer insights into the actual workings of both the legislative and executive processes and policy mechanisms. They also offer an increased understanding of the men and women who create legislation and implement state policy. Further, they provide an overview of issue development in California state government and of how both the legislative and executive branches of government deal with issues and problems facing the state.

Interviewees are chosen primarily on the basis of their contributions to and influence on the policy process of the state of California. They include members of the legislative and executive branches of the state government as well as legislative staff, advocates, members of the media, and other people who played significant roles in specific issue areas of major and continuing importance to California.

By authorizing the California State Archives to work cooperatively with oral history units at California colleges and universities to conduct interviews, this program is structured to take advantage of the resources and expertise in oral history available through California’s several institutionally based programs.
Participating as cooperating institutions in the State Government Oral History Program are:

Oral History Program
History Department
California State University, Fullerton

Oral History Program
Center for California Studies
California State University, Sacramento

Oral History Program
Claremont Graduate School

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library
University of California, Berkeley

Oral History Program
University of California, Los Angeles

The establishment of the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program marks one of the most significant commitments made by any state toward the preservation and documentation of its governmental history. It supplements the often fragmentary historical written record by adding an organized primary source, enriching the historical information available on given topics and allowing for more thorough historical analysis. As such, the program, through the preservation and publication of interviews such as the one which follows, will be of lasting value to current and future generations of scholars, citizens, and leaders.

John F. Burns
State Archivist

July 27, 1988

This interview is printed on acid-free paper.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERVIEW HISTORY .......................................................... i

BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY ...................................................... iii

SESSION 1, November 29, 1990

[Tape 1, Side A] ................................................................. 1

Growing up around the U.S.--Family--High school and debating--Korean War.

[Tape 1, Side B] ................................................................. 24

Starting in politics--Teaching in Kerman--Two head-on collisions--Young Democrats

SESSION 2, December 4, 1990

[Tape 2, Side A] ................................................................. 43

Family background--College political activities and influences--Evolution of Young Democrats--The CDC in the 1950s.

[Tape 2, Side B] ................................................................. 66


SESSION 3, December 10, 1990

[Tape 3, Side A] ................................................................. 94

Candidate for vice president, CDC--1958 convention of CDC--Dick Tuck--Alan Cranston runs for state controller--Stanley Mosk--The Knight-Knowland switch--Tom Winnett.
SESSION 4, December 12, 1990

[Tape 4, Side A] ................................................................. 139


[Tape 4, Side B] ................................................................. 163

Sam Yorty--Resigning from CDC vice presidency--Minorities in CDC--Running for CDC president--Becoming state chair of CDC Political Action Committee--Voter registration techniques, 1962--Jesse Unruh.

[Tape 5, Side A] ................................................................. 186

1962 assembly race--More on Unruh--Politics in Fresno.

SESSION 5, December 20, 1990

[Tape 6, Side A] ................................................................. 192


[Tape 6, Side B] ................................................................. 216

1965 convention--Si Cassady--The Vietnam War issue--Cranston's 1966 campaign for state controller--More on the two accidents--Tax appraiser activities.

SESSION 6, January 4, 1991

[Tape 7, Side A] ................................................................. 240

CDC Program Planning Committee--Johnson's War on Poverty--Cesar Chavez and the Farm Workers Union--Rise of the right wing--1964 Cranston senate campaign--1968 senate campaign.
Cranston's support--Issues of the 1968 campaign--Structure in the club movement.
INTERVIEW HISTORY

Interviewer/Editor

Amelia R. Fry
Principal Editor, University of California at Berkeley State Archives State Government Oral History Program
B.A. University of Oklahoma (Psychology and English)
M.A. University of Illinois (Educational Psychology and English)

Interview Time and Place
November 29, 1990
Session of one and one-half hours
December 4, 1990
Session of one and one-half hours
December 10, 1990
Session of one and one-half hours
December 12, 1990
Session of two hours
December 20, 1990
Session of one and one-half hours
January 4, 1991
Session of one and one-half hours

All sessions took place in the Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Editing

The interviewer/editor checked the verbatim manuscript of the interview against the original tape recordings; edited for punctuation, paragraphing, and spelling; verified proper names and prepared footnotes. Insertions by the editor are bracketed.

Mr. Greenaway reviewed the transcript and approved it with minor corrections.

Staff of the Regional Oral History Office prepared the introductory materials.
Papers

There are no private papers which the interviewer was able to consult for this interview.

Tapes and Interview Records

The original tape recordings of the interviews are in The Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. Records relating to the interview are at the Regional Oral History Office. Master tapes are deposited in the California State Archives.
BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

Roy Greenaway was born in Takoma Park, Maryland in 1929 and lived in various parts of the country, as his father was a career U.S. Coast Guard officer. In 1940, the family moved to Fresno, California, where he finished high school. He received his B.A. from the University of Chicago in 1950 and did further graduate work in English literature there. In 1951, Greenaway married Carol Wagle and moved back to the Fresno area. After two years in the army, Mr. Greenaway attended Fresno State College and received a master's in linguistics. He taught high school English in Kerman, as he began to get involved in the California Democratic Council. Later he was appointed an inheritance tax appraiser by then-Controller Alan Cranston and held several different positions in the CDC. Greenaway was involved in political campaigns throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including Cranston's 1968 campaign for the U.S. Senate. In 1969, the Greenaways moved back to Washington, D.C. where Mr. Greenaway has served as chief of staff to Senator Cranston up to 1992.
FRY: This is testing. It's November 29; I'm about to interview Roy Greenaway in the [Senate Majority] Whip office of Senator [Alan] Cranston in the U.S. Capitol. This is Amelia Fry.

[Interruption]

I want to start out by getting a little bit about Roy Greenaway, like where were you born, and where did you grow up, and how did you grow up?

GREENAWAY: I was born, actually, in Takoma Park, Maryland. I was a service brat. My father was a U.S. Coast Guard officer and was stationed here at coast guard headquarters in Washington when I was born. I think I lived in Washington, D.C. for about a year, so I have no recollection of it. I then lived in New London, Connecticut, until about 1937, when I was about in second grade; then lived in New Orleans, Louisiana, for three years. Then in 1940, I lived briefly in New York City on Staten Island, and then later in 1940 moved to Fresno, California. My father retired from the coast guard in 1940 only to be called back a year later from
retirement because of World War II, but I stayed in Fresno and grew up there, went from the sixth grade through high school, graduated from high school in Fresno, and then went off to college.

FRY: So you're a mix of . . . . We won't count Takoma Park because you were too young, I guess, but Connecticut, which is New England; New Orleans, which is the South; then Staten Island in New York; and finally made it out to California.

GREENAWAY: Right.

FRY: How did you pick up on these different places as you grew up?

GREENAWAY: My biggest problem, I think, was that when I went to New Orleans as a second grader, I had a sort of New England accent, and when I moved to New York, I had a Southern accent, so I was sort of dogged as a kid, growing up with the fact that I didn't speak right. That was the biggest impression, I think, that living in these different places made.

FRY: Did it really make you an outsider, though, or did you compensate for it?

GREENAWAY: Yes, more of an outsider. There wasn't nearly as much movement before World War II, I don't think, as there was following World War II, of people. Radio hadn't established a national dialect to the extent that it has now. I think Southern dialect was more pronounced at the time. I think that a New York dialect, which I had picked up a bit by the time I got to California, was also more pronounced. So I think there was a certain stigma associated with it, and a
certain amount of prejudice against people--in the South, particularly, against people from the North.

FRY: You didn't find New Yorkers feeling that people with a Southern accent in Staten Island were a little less intelligent?

GREENAWAY: I remember, as I was about between fifth and sixth grade. . . . I only lived in Staten Island for about four months, but between fifth and sixth grade I remember going into a Staten Island store, for example, and being unable to buy a bottle of Royal Crown Cola because I couldn't say it the way they said it. They didn't know what I was saying. It was really strange.

FRY: It was more than just a social disapproval. They really couldn't understand you.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: So when you finally made it to Fresno, did this problem disappear?

GREENAWAY: It disappeared fairly quickly.

FRY: Because California was . . .

GREENAWAY: California at that point. . . . See, Fresno, of course, was where people from the South had been coming during the 1930s, so that was one part of it. Southern accents, or at least Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas accents, were quite common, particularly in the San Joaquin Valley, during that period. We had come out to visit California, driving out in 1935, and I can remember seeing the so-called Okies in their old cars with the mattresses on top à la Grapes of Wrath, coming across the desert. (We came across the same route, 66.) So I knew a bit more about California; I had been
there before by the time I moved there, and I spent a couple of summers there, and so on, so it wasn't quite as much of a problem.

FRY: You had traveled a lot by the time you got to Fresno in sixth grade because you made these moves by car, right?

GREENAWAY: Yes. And we would drive across country and back, as we did in 1935. We drove to California. As a matter of fact, I can never remember going anywhere other than by automobile, curiously enough, until I got to California, with the exception of the trip when we moved from New Orleans to New York. We went by train, but that was the only time that I had ever moved by train. It was always by automobile.

FRY: Do you remember what your childhood impressions were of the relative conditions in these places?

GREENAWAY: I remember in the South seeing chain gangs and blacks with black-and-white striped prison uniforms, with their legs chained together, working in fields, working in sugar plantations and so on. Of course, when I was living in New Orleans the schools were totally segregated, and the only time that a young person, young white, would ever see a black would be the mailman. The mailmen were black because they were federal employees and they had eliminated discrimination literally. It was about the only time you'd see a black, except where you get the fruit merchants coming through with the huge sort of wagons that were pulled by horses and selling fruit. Those drivers would be black, and they would chant. The Library of Congress has recorded
that; it's fascinating; but I remember hearing those chants as a kid. They'd call out the food that they had and so on, but it was almost music.

FRY: Did you have any trouble finding playmates after school?
What did you do after school?

GREENAWAY: To some extent, but it would usually be that after a while, after a year, kids wouldn't have that sort of problem. You'd play with kids in the neighborhood.

FRY: What were your favorite subjects in school as time went on, and also, what did you like to do best outside of school?

GREENAWAY: I was not a good student in elementary school, and I'm not sure why, but it could well have been the moving from place to place and the problem of being something of an outsider there, but I didn't do well in school until I got to California.

The thing I liked to do, obviously, during this period was to read. I had taught myself to read. I could read before I entered kindergarten. So I read a lot, and when I came to California, during the period that I was like in junior high school, I would read a book a day.

FRY: That's really unusual. So maybe your problem in school was that you were out of phase with it.

GREENAWAY: It could be. I remember school in New Orleans, elementary school, because it was the same thing, sort of ahead. We had much more math, for example, in the third grade in New Orleans schools than any of the kids in California had had when I got to California.

FRY: So when you got to California you were not only ahead in reading but you were ahead in math.
I was always ahead in reading. Insofar as I'm concerned, the education really began when I got to California and when I entered junior high school.

But the New Orleans schools were really fascinating. For example, we moved from class to class. We had seven-period days starting in the third grade in school there, and it wasn't on a daily schedule, it was on a weekly schedule. We wouldn't necessarily have the same schedule on Monday that we'd have on Tuesday or on Wednesday or on Thursday or on Friday. As a consequence of that, a third grader would never know where he was going next.

I wonder how they managed to herd all of you around.

You would stand up and march from class to class in formation. All the kids went to the same class. You were always with the same students, but you were not. . . . It isn't like high school in that sense, or junior high school, but you were moving from classroom to classroom seven times a day--we had seven periods a day--and on a weekly rather than a daily schedule, so it was really incredible.

Were your classes smaller there than at Fresno where they had this influx of people?

No, they were larger there.

In New Orleans.

OK, now, so tell me about Fresno when your interests really started to develop.

In Fresno, I got back into the San Joaquin Valley, which is where my mother's family had come from. We went to Fresno, and my grandmother lived there, and my aunt Nell,
who was a high school teacher, lived there. My mother's family had settled in California in about 1900.

FRY: Roy, tell us now about your mother's family and who it was, and give us the names and everything.

GREENAWAY: There was my grandfather, whom I never met; my grandmother, Mina Bartlett. They settled in Laton, which is a little town, oh, probably twenty-five miles south of Fresno. It's right on the border of Fresno in Kings County. It's just north of Hanford. They settled in Laton, and my grandfather was a carpenter who built houses and did that sort of thing.

They grew up there; they worked in fruit. There were twelve children, of whom my mother was the third eldest. The kids picked grapes in the summer and did the kinds of things that kids in the San Joaquin Valley would do. They all got malaria, all had malaria all their lives, because that was what would happen; you'd be bitten by mosquitoes when you worked in the fields, and so on.

There were nine girls and three boys in the family, and all of the girls went to college. All but one went to college. My mother [Lila F. Bartlett] graduated from the University of California in about 1915, I would think, taught school, was principal of an elementary school when she was twenty-two, for example, the Laton elementary school. They all were quite bright. There's only one of them still alive now, the youngest one. They're all dead.

They were pretty adventuresome. My mother and her sister, Emma, for example, in about 1918, 1919, went off to
Hawaii and taught school on Ewa Plantation on Oahu for two years.

FRY: Really? How did they happen to do that, do you know?  
GREENAWAY: Don't know. Then they both went up to Alberta, Canada, and taught, and this is right during and after World War I. It was there that my mother met my father, although they were married a couple of years later.

FRY: In Hawaii?  
GREENAWAY: Yes. So anyway, it was a real California family.

He had been a... He had an interesting, if deprived, life. He was born in 1890 in Ohio of a coal-mining family, of a Welsh coal-mining family. His father died when he was about three years old. My father became a glassblower when he was eight so he wouldn't have to go down in the mines, and he didn't become a miner until he was twelve, which was quite old at that point to go down into the mines. Usually they went down when they were five or six, and went down originally as water boys and carried water, and then they got into mining and so on.

His mother died in 1906, so he had neither parent, and they wanted to put him in a Catholic school. He ran away from home and joined the army, lied about his age. He was sixteen years old. This was in 1906. In those days, when you joined the army you went in and they burned your civilian clothes and you got a uniform. There was no basic training or anything like that. All of the sergeants were Indian war veterans, and you moved into a position in a unit
GREENAWAY: when you went into the army, so it was very much unlike the way it is now.

They sent him off to Fort Lewis, Washington, and then sent him to Hawaii, where he was stationed at Schofield Barracks before World War I. He played football for the army when he was at Schofield Barracks. He had only gone to third grade. He had one year of education, and that was the third grade. He played football, and in 1912 he was All-Hawaii quarterback, which is something he never forgot. In those days, when you played football they didn't have a forward pass, and you had three downs to make five yards, and it was all run, and it was a very different kind of game from what it is now.

Then he was sent. . . . I don't know what year, but during World War I he was one of the 5,000 American troops that were in Siberia. That was a Siberian expeditionary force that the U.S. government sent 5,000 American soldiers to Siberia. This was during the Russian Revolution, and the idea was to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Communists destroying it. It was actually to be a deterrent from Japan invading Russia during the Russian Revolution.

Anyway, he was up there. He was in combat while he was there; I mean, people were shooting and so on. He got a commission as a lieutenant, a battlefield commission, while he was in Siberia.

Following that, he got out of the army at the end of World War I and worked for a couple of years sort of
bumming around the Far East. He drove a motorcycle on a pineapple plantation in the Philippines as a guard, and he sort of did that sort of thing. It didn't work. He just simply was unfit for civilian life.

About the time, I think, that my parents got married--somewhat before, but not much before--he joined the coast guard. He was then sent on the old Bear, which was the coast guard vessel that Admiral [Richard E.] Byrd later took to Antarctica. He was stationed on that and was on the Nome run, which was when they'd go up to Nome, Alaska and come back on these coast guard vessels and so on. So he spent some time in Alaska. My parents were married about 1922 or '23.

FRY: I'm sorry, I missed where he was based.
GREENAWAY: He was stationed on the ship, and the ship would be it.
FRY: So it wasn't based in San Francisco?
GREENAWAY: No, no, it was based in Alaska. But that was before they were married, I believe, because after they were married, he then got sent to New York, and this was during Prohibition; so he was on the harbor patrol in New York City, New York Harbor, to catch the rum-runners and so on, and that kind of thing. So he spent some time there and then was sent to Washington, D.C., and that was when I was born. So it was kind of a... He had a sort of fascinating life.

FRY: Yes. And it's interesting how he kind of developed it himself, because he couldn't use any of the examples from a father before him or anything.
GREENAWAY: Exactly. Yes. He became very anti-Catholic as a consequence of his boyhood. He had grown up in a Catholic family, he became a Mason, a thirty-second degree Mason, and I grew up in a very anti-Catholic background, as a consequence of that.

FRY: I was going to ask you if your family had any church life.

GREENAWAY: No. They had none, except they don't like Catholics.

FRY: [Laughter] That was their religion.

GREENAWAY: When I was a kid they would take me to Sunday school for one reason or another, and I recall it being Methodist, but it made absolutely no impression on me and I have never been the least bit religious, although there was a period much later in my life where I was president of the Unitarian Church in Fresno.

FRY: Oh, you did?

GREENAWAY: We didn't have a minister, so it was a lay-led fellowship, and I was president of the church, so I spent about two years there.

FRY: We may have met, Roy. [Laughter]

GREENAWAY: Really?

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: Were you in Fresno?

FRY: I made a speech there once.

GREENAWAY: You know that church that they have, the little white wooden church and so on? When I was president, we bought that church from some other denomination and moved it there to the place where it is now on Millbrook. Just now it's south of that irrigation ditch. There's an
irrigation ditch just north of it. That was my contribution to the church. We bought the building and moved it there; so we were really unique because it was the Unitarian fellowship that didn't have a minister but did have a church, and it's usually, if anything, just the opposite.

And then I figured out a way of using the members of the church to finance the purchase; so we had a system when we bought the church with each of the members putting up the money instead of getting bank financing.

FRY: Oh, I see. So that the mortgage was held by members.
GREENAWAY: Yes, that's right. I think we got thirty members each to put up $1,000, and we bought it and got it moved for $30,000. We had owned the land. The land preceded my involvement, but buying the church was my big deal.

FRY: OK. So I get some intimation here of organizing work that you did later on. We've left out a large paragraph of your life here, somewhere between sixth grade and the Fresno Unitarian Fellowship.

GREENAWAY: I went through Roosevelt Junior and Senior High School. In addition to being college prep, I was in student government and I was student body president of my high school in my senior year.

Secondly, I was very much involved in debate and public speaking. I started that out in ninth grade, debated, and in those days it was a pretty wild and woolly on discipline kind of thing, where kids would travel to debate tournaments without coaches, without any chaperon or discipline at all, and could speak in almost unlimited events.
They don't allow it anymore, but when I was doing it, we'd go to a tournament and enter four or five different speaking events. I've given twenty-two speeches in a day, for example, in competition, in some of those tournaments. I did debate, original oratory, extemporaneous speaking, oratorical interpretation (which is where you give somebody else's speech) impromptu, and those all would be separate events. I won various things.

The biggest thing I ever won was in 1947, when I won the American Legion National Oratorical Contest, which was the biggest scholarship at the time. I won a $4,000 scholarship, which was huge in those days. That was enough to get you through four years of college.

I took second in the Knights of Pythias International Contest, which was $1,000. In addition to doing those things, I was a state champion in the regular leagues that the state sponsored.

But the Legion obviously had a big impact on my life because it pretty much enabled me to pick the college that I wanted to go to, with the help that my parents gave me and all of that. In the Legion contest you had to win the state, and then I went to quarter-finals in Salt Lake City, and this was all one trip. Then I went to the semi-finals in Pocatello, Idaho, and then the finals in Charleston, West Virginia. So I came clear back here and I started on the train. I didn't know whether I'd go on or go back.

FRY: You didn't know whether you won.
GREENAWAY: Yes, right. I wound up in Charleston, West Virginia and I won, and then came to Washington and they recorded or filmed our presentations, and we flew back.

FRY: What were your topics? Anything that was dear to your heart?

GREENAWAY: The Legion is an interesting contest. It still exists. Winning the national is an honor that I share with Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the late senator. He won it about 1942. It's a big contest.

But the subject is the Constitution. There are two parts to it. It isn't all just a straight original oration, but you first get up and give your original oration. In all, let's say there are four people competing. Each one of them does that. Then you draw out of a hat a sentence or a section of the Constitution, and they hand that to you, and you have six minutes, and then you have to speak from four to six minutes on that section, so it's kind of an impromptu speech that you give on the Constitution. You're obviously judged for both the original speech and the impromptu speech that you give.

FRY: I see.

GREENAWAY: So it's really kind of, you know, it's a little intimidating, because, for example, at the national finals in Charleston we were before an entire high school student body, like 3,000 students sitting in an auditorium, and that's a little intimidating, for a seventeen-year-old anyway.

FRY: It is, and that's not the world's most appreciative audience.
GREENAWAY: Yes. So anyhow, so that was a big thing, but as I say, I was speaking all the way through high school, and we would go to tournaments all over California. I got to know a good deal about the state as a consequence of that, which helped later when I was more involved in politics.

FRY: My impression is, and tell me if this is true, that that was part of the heyday of the art of oratory and the art of debate.

GREENAWAY: Yes. Very much so.

FRY: Because I've noticed that other political figures have that background.

GREENAWAY: Yes. When I said I'm disciplined, I mean, for example, when you do original oratory, you're supposed to have prepared the speech and memorized it. Extemporaneous speaking is where you would get a half an hour to prepare. You'd draw a subject and you'd get a half an hour, and then you would have to speak five to seven minutes, normally, in competition.

Oratorical interpretation occurs when you give a speech somebody else gives. For example, I gave William Jennings Bryant's "Cross of Gold" at one point. That would be an example of that.

FRY: Oh, that's what you meant.

GREENAWAY: Yes, where you give somebody else's speech.

FRY: A very well-known speech, yes.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

What kids were doing in these tournaments, because they were really good, would be to extemporize an original
interpretation. Make up a subject, make up an author, and make up the speech as you go along, and pass it off as somebody else's speech that you had given and memorized.

FRY: As though it were William Jennings Bryant or Abraham Lincoln or somebody!

GREENAWAY: Yes. So as I say, they no longer allow that kind of thing, but it's what we were doing back then.

FRY: When time came on the program to give someone else's speech, you would make up one?

GREENAWAY: You'd make up one, yes.

FRY: A fictional speech from a supposedly real person?

GREENAWAY: Exactly.

FRY: That's really giving yourself an extra problem.

GREENAWAY: Yes. But it was kind of a world of its own, and as I say, it's no longer there. I later coached debate during a period when I taught high school, and even by then they clamped down and weren't allowing that kind of thing to happen anymore. But that was an interesting twist.

As a coach, I actually invented a speaking event which we used in competition in high school. I think it's still being done. It was called extemporaneous poetry criticism. What you do is you would get a poem, and you'd draw that out of a hat, say, like, Robert Frost's "Mending Wall." You get a half an hour, and you would have to start out by reading the poem, and you'd be judged on your ability to read and interpret the poem, and then you'd have to give five minutes of criticism on it. It was a fascinating event. As I said, we did use that, and I think it's still being used in California.
FRY: This was on the high school level?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: Other than the ability to speak, what were your favorite fields of reading at that time?
GREENAWAY: I read everything. I'd read current books. I read fiction, primarily.
FRY: What kind of fiction?
GREENAWAY: I remember reading *Forever Amber* when I was sixteen, for example.
FRY: Ah ha. [Laughter]
GREENAWAY: I read whatever was there.
FRY: Did you read biographies?
GREENAWAY: Not a whole lot.
FRY: What about nonfiction things like history, or something like that?
GREENAWAY: I read a lot of English history. I was mainly interested because I was a coin collector at the time, and I had found a company in London that I could buy coins from, so I'd ship off by mail and buy things like a Queen Elizabeth shilling dated 1569, for example, which I still have, which I bought at that point. I was very interested in British history, I think from reading Charles Dickens's *A Child's History of England*.
FRY: Oh, yes.
GREENAWAY: I think reading that set me off on it. I was going to try to get a coin with every British king or queen on it. I was interested in that.

I had not developed interests which later in my life I developed. One of my best subjects, for example, in high
school was math, and that was not a good subject for me in college. I took three years of Latin in high school, which is unusual, because usually they didn't even offer a third year in Latin. That helped begin to formulate what eventually was my major when I got out of college, which was grammar. A master's [degree] in linguistics, that's my graduate degree.

FRY: Where did you go to college?
GREENAWAY: Since I could go anyplace I wanted, just totally by accident—you know, it's one of those fortuitous things that has an enormous impact on your life and you don't have the faintest idea what you were doing when you did it—somehow or another I went to the University of Chicago. The University of Chicago in 1947 was perhaps the most stimulating intellectual environment that's ever been created at an American university. [Robert M.] Hutchins was still there. All of the men who ran the first controlled chain reaction; as you know, that was done at the University of Chicago campus in 1944. This is three years later. They were still all there: Enrico Fermi, Harold Urey, Leo Szilard, the men who actually did the controlled chain reaction. They all lectured to us. Hutchins was still there; he didn't leave until I was, I think, in the third year.

It was still a Great Books [of the Western World] institution. Every student who entered took placement exams, and then you had to take a series of courses, and once you finished the courses, you got a B.A. There were no majors, no electives; you all had to take the same courses.
Fry: Every student took courses in every field?

Greenaway: Yes, that's right.

Fry: And then you had some courses designed to help you bring all this knowledge from different fields kind of into some kind of . . .

Greenaway: Yes. The final course, the course that you took as the last course was called "Observation, Interpretation, and Integration," O.I.I. That was really kind of an incredible experience, because you learned how to think, or you learned the methods of thinking in the various disciplines that you were taking. So if you took a history course, you were learning theories of historical causation and learning different theories, and how that all worked. If you took a humanities course, you were learning theories of criticism.

Fry: You developed some of your own, probably, along the way, is that right?

Greenaway: Yes. But I think it was mastering the disciplines, the scientific methodology, which was really what the education was all about. It was an incredible sort of an experience.

Fry: I remember reading at that time that the scores made by University of Chicago graduates, who didn't major in a specific field, were way up in the higher percentiles when put up against those of other universities' students who majored in specialized fields; that was pretty impressive.

Greenaway: When I took the Graduate Record Examination after I left Chicago, I did much better in the general than I did in the specific major area, which is what you would expect from a Chicago graduate.
Fry: Where did you go for your graduate work? Did you go straight into graduate work?

Greenaway: No. I got my B.A. at the end of my third year, and most of my third year, actually, was doing graduate work in economics. Then I decided, basically because an economics major in Chicago was so heavily oriented toward math, that it just wasn't what I wanted to do. Calculus was a prerequisite before you could take the first course. What they were interested in in Chicago was to teach you how to draw supply and demand curves, and that wasn't really what I was interested in, although I did have a chance, while I was there, to take a course from Milton Friedman in money and banking, which I liked, and I liked him, and he was very sharp.

Fry: Wasn't he the campus conservative?

Greenaway: Yes.

Anyhow, then I did a year's graduate work in Chicago after I got my B.A.--that would be my fourth year in college--in English literature.

At that point I had gotten married, so then we moved back to Fresno, Carol and I.

Fry: We're in about what year here?

Greenaway: We're in about 1951. In 1951 I took a year... I'd never taken an education course, so I took the whole thing to get a secondary credential in one year. My wife, who was an elementary school teacher, taught during that year. That was the year in which I first began to make the contacts in California politics. I met some of the people who were later...
to play a real role in terms of my life in terms of getting into politics.

Then, after that year, after I got my general secondary credential, I was drafted. This was in October of 1952. I went to Fort Ord for basic training and went through clerk typist school and then was sent off to Japan. The Korean War, of course, was on then. So I got landed in Tokyo and issued a rifle and all that kind of thing with the idea that I was going to be somewhere in combat.

Then one of those fortuitous things happened. I was pulled out of what was called "pipeline," which was the route from Fort Ord to the front. I got pulled out of that and assigned to a Casual Officers' detachment as permanent personnel. What happens in the military is in replacement depots, which is where everybody goes to be assigned to the units that they go to, in replacement depots they go through the personnel forms and pull out the good cooks, so you always would get much better food in a replacement depot than you do in a permanent assignment because they get the good cooks.

FRY: They get the cream of the cooks.

GREENAWAY: That's right. They also pull out the people who are very smart, and assign them. I got pulled out, as I say, I think because I had the educational background, and assigned to what was called the Casual Officers' detachment. This would be where officers would come to be assigned, and what we did in that unit was to handle the movement of the officers
to their unit, often in combat in Korea. We would arrange for them to take trains or to take airplanes and so on.

FRY: The logistics?
GREENAWAY: Yes. The logistics of getting there. I wound up the troop movement NCO at the Casual Officers' detachment at Camp Drake outside of Tokyo. This was where all the officers who were taken to the front in Korea would go to be assigned there.

It was a wonderful life because it was, I say, in a suburb of Tokyo. Even though this was 1952. . . . Actually, I was there from April '53 until August of '54, so I was there when the Korean cease-fire occurred. But I got to live in the bachelor officer's quarters, which means that I didn't have to sleep on a cot. We had a bed with an inner spring mattress on it, a real bed. We would hire servants, so you'd have Japanese who would come in and polish your shoes and do things like that. So I went through the Korean War with that kind of luxury.

FRY: What was your rank or your ranks?
GREENAWAY: Corporal. I was a corporal when I got out.
FRY: That was pretty good for a corporal.
GREENAWAY: Well, I had been drafted. The only way you can become a sergeant is to reenlist. You're right, it was a great life for a draftee. We got to see a lot of interesting people who came through—generals, baseball players, a lot of celebrities, and that kind of thing. Plus there were sixteen nations who were part of the United Nations forces in Korea, remember. Probably fourteen of those nations sent their officers and
troops through this replacement depot, so we had the experience of dealing with foreign officers—everybody but the English and the French. The English and the French had their own military bases in Tokyo, so they didn’t go through this, but everybody else did.

They would come in and have little miniature wars among the nations. I remember one night, for example, when the Turks and the Colombians decided to try to kill each other, and they did, out in the field near where we were sleeping, in this battle. They were fighting with knives, and it was just horrendous. But I mean that kind of thing is something you would see a lot of. So it was really kind of a fascinating life.

FRY: Which countries’ forces were at odds?
GREENAWAY: In this?
FRY: Yes.
GREENAWAY: The Colombians and the Turks were fighting each other in the field, but they were on the same side.
FRY: But I mean even if they didn’t come to actual blows-and-knife battles . . .
GREENAWAY: They didn’t get along very well.
FRY: But were there other countries where the army personnel had a hard time getting along because of differences?
GREENAWAY: They all seemed to have difficulties getting along with each other for one reason or another. I have no idea why. We had Greeks and we had people from Thailand and India. And the South Koreans, of course.
I'm asking you that, I guess, because as we sit here, there's a
debate going on about the different nationalities of troops
that we're going to deploy in the desert [in Operation Desert
Storm against Iraq].

The interesting thing about this was that they were really
there and they were really on the front, and they were really
all participating in a battle. It was really a United Nations
force.

You said that just before you went into the army, you had
gotten started in politics a little bit in Fresno.

Yes. I met some of the people who... Probably the two
most important... And this we'll get into. This is almost
the beginning of the second phase. I don't how long you
want to go on this, but...

It's up to you. It's usually...

Let me just do this and then go on for a little bit.

OK. Let me turn the tape.

I'll cover just what happened to me up to the point at which
I come back here, and then go back to what I will begin to
talk about right now as part of this session's section, give
you sort of a history of politics as I got into it, all right?
But let me just touch on the individuals and then say what
happened when I got out of the army.

The two most important people I think that I met at
that point were a Dr. Earl Lyon, who was an English
GREENAWAY: professor at Fresno State. My wife, Carol, and I met him because he had a graduate course in which you do nothing but read *Hamlet* and criticisms of *Hamlet*, so we signed up and took that. We met him through that course. He was kind of the mentor of the liberals in the Democratic Party in California, in Fresno, at that point. Through him we met the chairman of the Fresno County Democratic Central Committee, whose name was Lionel Steinberg.

Steinberg played a very important role in my evolution politically, and I want to get back to him when we begin the second session, just to say how he got into this and where he came from. He was a very wealthy farmer who, as I say, was a chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, was one of the real leaders of the liberal movement, which at that point included people like [Congressman Phillip] Phil Burton and like Richard Richards, like a number of other names who went on to become well known in the history of the fifties and sixties in California Democratic politics.

Anyhow, so I met them then, and I went to a state convention of the Young Democrats in Stockton during that year before I went into the army. At that convention I met Phil Burton for the first time. He was not yet at that point married to Sala. I met some of the other leaders in the party, so I had made those contacts. When I went off to the army and was gone for almost two years, we kept up contact, including people in Fresno whom I had met as part of this operation, who later were to become very close to me. When I came back I almost immediately fell into an
important position in the Democratic Party locally. Again, let me talk about that later, when I get into that.

FRY: I just want to ask you one thing. Did you participate in elections at this time, or what were you actually doing?

GREENAWAY: That was in the 1952 election. That was the election where we lost our senate candidate in the primary. That was where Clinton McKinnon of San Diego had been nominated, ran for the Democratic nomination, and [Republican William] Knowland actually won the Democratic nomination against McKinnon. So in the general election there was only a Republican on the ballot for the United States Senate, and that, of course, was the first year Adlai Stevenson ran. We were all for him. Although we carried Fresno County in both '52 and in '56, he lost the state and of course lost the election. So we were in that.

Now, I had not been very active in '50, where [Democrat James] Jimmy Roosevelt ran for governor against [Governor] Earl Warren and [Helen Gahagan] Douglas ran for the senate against [Richard M.] Nixon. Both Democrats lost. Anyhow, in '52 before I went into the army, that was about it. I was in basic training, I remember, when hearing one night that Stevenson lost to [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.

FRY: Did you have many friends around who could commiserate with you?

GREENAWAY: Yes. I did know people. I was in the army. I had been drafted with kids I went to high school with. It made it a little easier.
But while I was still at Ford Ord, the Asilomar meeting in which the CDC [California Democratic Council] was first formed, was held. That was in . . .

FRY: . . . in '52. I mean early '53, right after the '52 elections.

GREENAWAY: Yes, that's right. I was on the Monterey Peninsula, but I was on the other side of the hill and not able to participate.

FRY: But you knew about it?

GREENAWAY: I knew about it. CDC was actually formed without my being there, which was interesting because when I got back, I got into it immediately. But I was not at these formative meetings and I was not at the 1954 convention of the CDC, which was in Fresno. That was the one that nominated [Congressman Samuel] Sam Yorty to be the candidate for the United States Senate.

FRY: You were not in that one?

GREENAWAY: I was not there. I was still in the army at that point. That was in March of 1954. So when I came out of the army, I came back with the consequences of the first pre-primary endorsing convention, and all the Democrats that were endorsed, I think with one exception, had won the primary. The first time that we had ever done that was in 1954. [Richard] Dick Graves was the candidate for governor who won the endorsement. Ed Roybal for lieutenant governor. George Collins [Jr.] for controller, [Edmund G.] Pat Brown [Sr.] attorney general.

FRY: I think everything but . . .

GREENAWAY: I think the secretary of state is the one who lost.

FRY: The secretary of state incumbency is just impossible to beat.
George Johnson for treasurer. And Sam Yorty was the candidate for United States Senate against . . .

[Thomas] Tom Kuchel?

Kuchel, who had been appointed to take [Senator Richard] Nixon's seat when Nixon became vice president. That's how Kuchel first came to run.

Kuchel stepped up from the controller.

Yes, that's right. And [Robert C.] Bob Kirkwood became the controller. He was the one who [Senator Alan] Cranston later defeated.

So you first entered CDC . . .

. . . when I got out of the army.

When you got out. Which was . . .

That was in October of 1954, just before the election. I'll cover what I did. That's really the beginning of another story, but I need to start up the next session by giving you background now, and then that. So let me just go through the sort of nonpolitical parts of my life.

I got back from the army, and I went back to Fresno State [College] for a year on the G.I. Bill, and there I'd been taking education courses in the previous year. This would have been my sixth year in college. I took courses to get a master's in linguistics, and my area was descriptive linguistics. In other words, I became in effect a grammarian. It was under Dr. Lyon and others who were there. I also worked as the secretary for the English Department. I was a department reader. I read all the student essays in the English department.
You had to be the grader and so forth?
Yes, all of that.
And that was one year.
That was one year.
And then you got your master's degree.
Got the master's. Then I was sort of recruited to teach high school. The principal came to me and said, "I'll let you teach high school, teach English, and I will relieve the guy who's coaching debate now and give you the job if I have to do that. . . ." He actually was recruiting me.

So I went to teach in a little high school outside of Fresno at a place called Kerman. Carol continued to teach in a Fresno elementary school. I taught there for four years. I was one of two English teachers. The second year I was there I brought in a friend who had been teaching in the Fresno city school system, and he and I ran the English department. I started out . . .

Who was your friend?
His name was Richard Guerin. I had met him in Dr. Lyon's courses, and he was sort of a partner of mine in politics during all this period.
I see.
For whatever reason, he didn't get tenure at the Fresno city school system, so I said, "Come out with me to Kerman," in the second year. He did, and he and I ran this English department.

It was kind of a fascinating phase of my life, because Kerman was a school consisting of farmers, of just entirely
farm kids. They were basically German Russian, sort of Mennonite background, who had been in the Ukraine, the ones who went from Germany in the early--I guess in the eighteenth century, and then migrated to the United States during the kulak purges during the Stalin years. So there were the German Russians, there were the Russians.

The Russians in Kerman were the Molokans. The Molokans are the Children of the Sun, the people who were migrating to Australia. They bought themselves a ship and they were just convinced the United States was going to be destroyed, so they were all going to Australia as a group. They were sort of an eighteenth-century schism from the Russian Orthodox Church. These people obeyed the Jewish dietary laws, they practiced communal farming, they bribed their kids to leave school when they were sixteen by giving them new cars. They were a very strange group of people. The Doukhobors up in Canada were related to these people. So that was the second group.

The third were Portuguese, of whom there were a large number, and the rest were what were called Okies. And that was the school.

It was a very low I.Q. school. We only had one kid in the school with an I.Q. much above 100, which was kind of astonishing. The average I.Q. was somewhere around 75 in this school. I don't quite know how it happened, but that's the way it was.

Fry: Was that because of the cultural differences, do you think?
GREENAWAY: It could have been the language. I don’t know why, but you know, I had in this same school, incidentally, these soldiers of fortune. You know the Soldiers of Fortune magazine? Remember when we had troops in the sixties of soldiers of fortune who were fighting in Africa?

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: Some came from the Kerman area. I had a kid, a fifteen-year-old boy, in one of my classes, who got picked up and thrown in the drunk tank in the Fresno City Jail who supposedly killed a man with his bare hands, a twenty-seven-year-old man. That was sort of typical of the way they were. There was a family out there often mentioned in Soldiers of Fortune magazine. I had these kids in classes. I mean, I would get called up at night by the police, who would say, "We arrested this kid, and the only identification he had on him was a spelling list, which he had stuck in his back pocket, and he had your name on it." It was really strange.

FRY: So there was a lot of violence around.

GREENAWAY: There was a lot of violence, yes. But it was a rural school, so there wasn’t violence in the school.

FRY: There wasn’t?

GREENAWAY: No. I mean, you know. I intimidated people anyway, but there was no violence.

FRY: You could intimidate these people?

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure.

FRY: How?
I didn't know how the first year I taught, but I learned very quickly that you simply do it by giving orders, by telling people what to do, by being smart. No, I never have had any trouble with that, ever.

You found yourself improvising on some of John Dewey's tenets there of finding out what the kids are interested in and connecting their studies to it?

No. I made them be interested in what I was interested in. I just said. . . . As a matter of fact, I took the position that if they couldn't read and if they couldn't write, if they couldn't do that well enough, that I was going to flunk them. I had a class of eleven boys I was teaching in junior English. They were all seniors and they were all repeating it. I decided at the end of the year they couldn't read or write, despite what I tried, so I flunked twelve of them and gave one a "D."

Those kids loved me.

They loved you? Why?

Because I treated them like adults. I told them ahead of time what I was going to do, and they knew they couldn't read or write. I had one kid--at one point I told him, "Look, you go home and you write the alphabet out, and you bring it back. If you get it right, I will give you a passing grade for the week." He came back with it and he had it wrong. He had asked his father to help him, and his father got it wrong. All they had to do was write the alphabet.

They have a test that they give in about, oh, God, let's see. . . . It's roughly halfway through the tenth grade, so it would be 10.4 or something like that. When I started out,
the kids in that school at 10.4 were averaging something like either 8.9 or 9.2. At that point they were a full year behind their contemporaries. I took them in, and in four years I had them up to 11.6.

How I did that was sort of interesting in and of itself. I don't know whether you know anything about teaching English, but most of the grammar books we have--that we still have in high schools--are based upon traditional English grammars, which were based upon grammars which were basically developed in the eighteenth century. They're based upon Latin. They're basically Latin grammars. What we teach kids when we teach them that there are eight parts of speech and the various things is Latin grammar. It's not true of English; it's true of Latin. So grammar is useless to kids because it doesn't tell them anything about the language they speak.

I managed to find a book by a guy at San Jose State [College] who had done the first sort of experimental book in writing an English grammar based on English rather than based on Latin. So I called him. I got the books. It was before they were even published. I mean, they were printed, but they hadn't been sold yet. I started teaching from those books.

FRY: Who was this?
GREENAWAY: His name was Paul Roberts. So I started teaching from them. I taught kids how to write, because you could show them how English was put together and so on, and I think
that was the reason for the huge advance this two years and four years, the jump they had made in their learning.

FRY: Was this the one in which parts of the sentence were the basis for developing a knowledge . . .

GREENAWAY: Yes, they're called noun clusters and verb clusters. It was a description. I'll give you a good example of this. In Latin, an adverb could modify either a verb, an adjective, or another adverb, and you learned that in school, OK? And that is true in Latin. In English it's very common usage to use an adverb to modify a noun, but you can't do that in Latin, so you never learn that in school.

In this sentence: "The men inside were laughing," "inside" is an adverb, but it modifies "men." It's an adverb modifying a noun. One useful rule about English is whenever an adverb modifies a noun, it always follows it, because English has a word order, right? What you'd learn when you learn the clusters is the order in which you put things together. There are about twenty-two parts of speech in English, not eight. If you have any real questions about that, just try to figure out how, by conventional grammar, you could ever explain the meaning of the first word "There" in the sentence "There is a dog there," or "There is a boy there," which is a typical English sentence. It's not redundant, incidentally.

FRY: No, it's not.

GREENAWAY: And yet what does the first "There" mean?

FRY: Because the functions are different, of the word "There."
GREENAWAY: Yes. "There" is a separate part of speech. So I did that, so that was a big thing for me in that school.

FRY: Were these kids used to another language at home?
GREENAWAY: Some of them.
FRY: Or was it just a dialect?
GREENAWAY: Russian.
FRY: Some of them Russian?
GREENAWAY: The German Russians tried to learn English. The German Russians are very community minded. They tried to learn English. They wanted to do that, so they would normally be your best students. The Russian Russians would be forced to learn Russian, and as I say, their parents would like buy them a new Oldsmobile when they were sixteen to bribe them, to get them out of school, because they didn't want them learning English, they didn't want them making social contacts in school, and so on. So you had to fight to try to keep those people, particularly the promising ones, in.

But it was kind of wild. I mean, I did what I wanted to do.

FRY: It was quite unique. And you had the same problems, such as violence, that people were having then in the urban schools in New York and the big cities, but yours had an entirely different cause.

GREENAWAY: I was active. See, at that time I had gotten quite active in politics, and so I would have parents coming in and explaining they were Democrats and not Republicans, and don't take it out on their kids because their name may have been in the paper that they supported a Republican.
They were afraid that you would . . .

Yes. I would order people to show up at PTA [Parent Teacher Association] meetings, the parents, because I wasn’t satisfied with the kids. I really terrified that school, and I didn’t do it by being any different from what I am right now. I mean, I just did it.

By being consistent, I guess. Is that what you mean?

Being consistent. Being interested. As I say, I’ve always believed that you should treat absolutely everybody the same, so I was treating these kids like adults. I didn’t talk down to them. If they were too dumb to get it, it didn’t matter; I still didn’t talk down to them. So it was really quite an experience.

Now, between . . . I have to cover two other aspects of my life which are very important. After I taught there for a year, then in 1956 I was elected an alternate to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

Oh, good. Maybe you could talk about that.

Well, I’ll talk about the convention later, too, but I have to explain something that happened to me personally as a consequence of that.

Carol had lived in downstate Illinois. I didn’t mention that to you, but she’s from a little town outside of Danville, Illinois. We drove back to Chicago, and we went to the convention and I voted for Estes Kefauver for vice president instead of [John F.] Jack Kennedy, because Lionel thought Kennedy was bad on agricultural issues, so Kefauver was better and all of that. But we were all for Stevenson, obviously; that was the big thing.
It was a great convention, and I can come back next session and mention that. On the way back, outside of Grants, New Mexico... We'd gone through Albuquerque. We were driving home. I was in a high-speed, head-on collision, and I broke basically my entire right side.

FRY: That's one of the long, straight stretches where the cars...
GREENAWAY: Yes, it was 66. It was a two-lane highway then, and it was a gas truck tank and trailer, one of the great big things in those days, and it just veered over and hit me head-on. My car went up in the air and flipped twice and landed upside down about twenty feet off the road. Neither of us were wearing seat belts. Carol was with me. So they pulled us out of the car and we lay there in the desert for an hour and a half until finally an ambulance came to pick us up and take us into Albuquerque.

So I went there, and the Stevenson group came through, and some of the Californians came to the hospital to see me. I was in the hospital for twenty-nine days. So my second year of teaching, I was in a wheelchair, and taught in a wheelchair. Well, wheelchairs are really intimidating. The kids were really afraid of me when I was in the wheelchair. I don't know why, but it was true. At that point my friend was able to take me to school because he was teaching there then. So we went through all of that, and I was walking with a cane in the 1957 CDC convention in Long Beach.

FRY: How did your wife come out of this?
GREENAWAY: I reached over and grabbed her, and she wasn't hurt at all, but she was in the hospital for three days simply suffering from shock. She had no bodily injuries. It broke all my ribs, it punctured my lung, my left hip, everything on my left side. I'll come back to the wreck later on because there's a second part of the story.

Anyway, so let me just go through a quick sketch of what is to come. In '58 I got involved in the general election, Alan Cranston's campaign for state controller—and I'll tell you more about that; he was elected—so then in 1959 I was appointed an inheritance tax appraiser in Fresno County by Alan. So June 1959 was the end of my teaching. I had taught for four years at Kerman High School. I became an inheritance tax appraiser.

Now, inheritance tax appraisers—and the system doesn't any longer exist—but basically are probate appraisers. The state controller, which Alan was elected to, appoints a panel of appraisers in each county. Then the probate judge appoints one of those panels—in Fresno County we had three of these appraisers—appoints one of them for each estate, and they rotate them. So I would appraise a third of the estates in Fresno County. You have to go out and appraise everything in the estate, so I became an appraiser.

The second thing you had to do was, once you made the appraisal, then you had to compute the inheritance tax, and you did that for the state controller. You'd send up the computation to the inheritance tax division of the state controller's office and they would approve it. You'd file that
in court, and if there was no tax due, you had to issue a certificate saying there was no tax due.

Now, the appraisal was for the purposes of the disposal of the estate, to see what was a fair value, so that an executor of an estate couldn't, for example, sell something for less than what it was worth and thus cheat the heirs and beneficiaries and so on.

So I spent about eight years as an inheritance tax appraiser. It was an interesting job for me because I did learn to appraise. It was part time; it wasn't really full time. I made a decent salary at it, so I was able to be active in politics for that whole period, and that was the big CDC period in terms of my life.

And then when Alan was defeated in 1966, in 1967 the newly elected state controller, Houston Fluornoy, fired me. He fired most of the Democrats. These were all patronage appointments by Alan.

But in . . . Let me. . . . I've got to get the year straight now on this. Yes. In July of 1967 I was still appraising because I was still appointed to some estates. So on July 7, 1967, while I was out appraising, I was in another high-speed, head-on collision, and this one broke the entire right side of my body. The damage was also almost completely the same, except it was the other side of me. In the first one, the left hip; in the second one I broke my right hip. I was in the hospital again. This time I was operated on. I was never operated on in the first: I was just put in traction. But I was operated on. And in that one I had
about forty-five stitches in my face, for example, in that wreck. I mean, I recover well from things like this.

FRY: You certainly do.

GREENAWAY: Anyhow, so that kind of had something to do with my being out of circulation. I was back in a wheelchair again. I couldn't do much appraising at that point, finishing up the inheritance tax appraising, so I did do a little teaching. This isn't usually mentioned in my resume, but one thing you can do in a wheelchair is teach. So I did a little part-time teaching as an instructor, teaching freshman English at Fresno State. That was in the fall and spring of 1967-68.

But in 1968 I began, again through some acquaintances that I had made in politics, to be a condemnation appraiser testifying in court. I did that for about a year, did it part time, but you have to qualify as an expert witness. It's a really fascinating job. In my opinion it's the single hardest job in the world, because what you do is...

See, an appraiser is allowed to express his view as to the value of something, but that's an opinion. So he has to qualify as an expert witness. You can't argue that an opinion is wrong, because an opinion is an opinion. So there's no such thing as a wrong appraisal. It's just different. People don't agree on what the appraisal of something is. So the only way that an opposing counsel can weaken your testimony is by just trying to destroy your credibility in any way that they can. I have been in a situation where I was on a witness stand eight hours a day, five days straight, and the only thing that the attorney who was cross-examining me
was trying to do was to show that I was not credible. If you can go through that, you can do anything.

FRY: Did this get pretty personal?

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure. I mean, you know, it was subtle. I mean, you don't want to appear to be beating up on somebody either. But I was good at that, and as a consequence of that I probably could have continued in that world and made a lot of money at it, but then Alan was elected to the U.S. Senate.

I had been associated with him for a long time, so on Christmas Eve of 1968 he called me and asked me if I would come back and be a legislative assistant on his staff. I said, "Yes," and on January 5, 1969, we were back.

Nothing important has happened to me personally since then. I've not been in any more accidents.

FRY: But I'm not going to ride in a car with you, that's for sure. [Laughter] I was wondering if you were active in politics during '66-67, right after your accident.

GREENAWAY: Yes, I was.

FRY: Still active, OK.

GREENAWAY: I'm going to have to go through that, because that's the breakup of the CDC. I would think probably the start of CDC would be the next session. Well, I'll go back to CDC before I was involved and just tell you what I knew of how the Young Democrats got started, and that's a fascinating story, and then go up through about '59. Then it should break, and we'll talk about CDC and its strength and the whole period when CDC and [Speaker] Jesse Unruh were in the war against each other and so on. And then maybe the
third phase of that is how CDC broke up. The [Simon] Si Cassady incident and so on.

Now, I would think each of those sessions would be about the length of this session. It will go roughly '49 to '59 or '60, then '60 to '65, and then '65 to when I come back here.

FRY: Well, that's fine because that's kind of the way it looked to me, too. We'll just cut this off right now.

[End Tape 1, Side B]
FRY: This is Roy Greenaway on December 4, 1990, being interviewed by Amelia Fry.

[Tape interruption]

GREENAWAY: As I remember our schedule today, we're going to do the period with my involvement going roughly from around 1950 until about 1959, which is really the history of the evolution of the CDC and how it got started.

And incidentally, last time I didn't give my wife's name, so why don't I do that now? It's Carol. Her maiden name was Wagle. She's from a little town outside of Danville, Illinois, called Westville. She graduated from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, in 1950 and was an elementary school teacher when I met her in November of 1950. We were married in Westville, Illinois, in March of 1951 and moved to California that summer.

FRY: Is that Westville or Westfield?

GREENAWAY: Westville.
FRY: Can you also give me your father's parents' names? How far back can you go in giving names of your grandparents?

GREENAWAY: My father was Alfred Roy Greenaway. His father was a Welsh coal miner whose name was Greenaway. His mother's name was [ ] Rossiter, which is a Cornish name. My grandfather had been born in Wales and was an immigrant, and I believe that was also true of my grandmother. Grandmother died in 1906 when my father was sixteen years old, and my grandfather had died in 1893 when my father was three years old.

On my mother's side, her name. . . . Do you want that also?

FRY: Sure.

GREENAWAY: Her name was Lila Frances Bartlett. She was one of a large family. I believe I described that last week. Her father was a carpenter; his name was David Bartlett. Her mother, my maternal grandmother, was Mina MacFarland. My mother was born in Nebraska and came to California around 1900, and they settled, as I believe I said last week, in a town called Laton.

Her mother, Mina MacFarland's mother, was named McKee. My paternal grandfather's father was a wild west sheriff in Wyoming, and his wife's name, which would be my maternal grandfather's mother, was McCoy. The family always believed that they were part of the Hatfield and McCoys, which could well be, because Tennessee wasn't very far from where many of them were living.
Mina MacFarland's father was one of five brothers who immigrated to the United States from Ireland, probably in the 1850s, I would guess. My [maternal] grandfather died in 1930, and my grandmother, my mother's mother, died about 1952, '53.

FRY: You want to say where they died in case anybody ever wants to look up the records?

GREENAWAY: My grandfather, incidentally, committed suicide. He shot himself in Golden Gate Park, of all places. He had cancer and he didn't want to go through it, so he took out his six-shooter and blew his brains out, apparently, in Golden Gate Park sometime in the year 1930. My grandmother died in Fresno. I have no idea where my father's parents died.

FRY: All right. Now let's get down to you.

GREENAWAY: OK. I want to start before me. I had been somewhat active and involved in politics in college. The ADA had just been founded when I was at the University of Chicago—the Americans for Democratic Action. It was a way to have a left-wing group that wasn't Communist-infiltrated, and I was sort of part of that. I supported Harry Truman in 1948, although during the summer of 1948, in Fresno after my freshman year in college, I had gotten to know some of the people who were involved in Henry Wallace's Progressive party candidacy for the president. I, for example, met [Senator] Glenn Taylor, who was Henry Wallace's running mate. He was a senator from Idaho and he ran for vice president on the Independent Progressive party ticket.
GREENAWAY: So I met those people. In the course of the high school debating activities, which I mentioned last week, I had gotten to know a number of kids from San Francisco who were involved with the left. The Students for a Democratic Society, which was an organization following World War II of left-wing students which had been students who prior to then were called the Young People's Socialist League, YPSLs. They were supposedly a Communist-front organization.

There were those organizations around in California and among students and so on, and I had contact with people in them, although I myself always tended to be more in the left-wing of the mainstream Democratic party than I wanted to desert the Democratic party and move further to the left.

Of course, central California was an interesting place also, because there was an old, left-wing movement in the Central Valley, and I knew kids whose fathers had been Wobblies—I.W.W. [Industrial Workers of the World] members—during the twenties and so on. Fresno was the site of the general strike in 1912, for example, where they had 5,000 people who moved in and camped out in the courthouse square and they couldn't put them in jail. This was in 1912, in Fresno. As a matter of fact, the story is—I can't vouch for the accuracy—but that Joe Hill was in Fresno in 1912 and that he wrote his words for "Casey Jones" when he was in jail in Fresno, which is kind of interesting.
FRY: It's worth checking into if somebody's interested in political folk songs.

GREENAWAY: So it's a place with a kind of a fascinating history. Laton was the site of the Mussel Slough Massacre, which was a fight the railroads and the farmers had with each other when the Pinkerton agents for the Southern Pacific Railroad had a shoot-out with farmers locally, and a lot of people were killed. That was just south of Laton and north of Hanford, during the probably late 1870s. Frank Norris's book, The Octopus, has a description of that.

FRY: Oh, that's the one. OK.

GREENAWAY: That occurred fairly close to Laton. So there was a lot of sort of old left-wing. I remember in Fresno, for example, there was, on Van Ness about a block south of Tulare, there was an old soda fountain run by a guy named Carlos Anderson. You could always buy copies of People's World, which was the West Coast version of the Daily Worker, at his newsstand. That was during the forties when I was growing up. Right down the street from him was Mihran Saroyan, who was William Saroyan's uncle, who ran a place called the Mona Lisa Dress Shop. I got to know Mihran quite well. He and Carlos Anderson were very good friends, and I got to be good friends with Carlos.

There was an old book. . . . A Fresno bookstore was owned by a guy named [ ] Edgerton. He was, for some reason or other, very well known in literary circles because when Henry Miller, during World War II, moved to Big Sur,
the sort of precursors of the hippies walked across the United States because Henry Miller was there and they wanted to see him. They all stopped in Fresno at this bookstore because of Edgerton knowing them.

I began reading Henry Miller when I was about sixteen years old, because Edgerton had his books and pamphlets and so on there, and that was... I suppose one could have gotten *Tropic of Cancer*, but I wasn’t, at the age of sixteen, about to try to take that on, but I did read a lot of that. So there was that sort of left-wing influence on me, although at the time my family was Republican and I considered myself a Republican until I went to college.

FRY: Oh, you did?
GREENAWAY: Yes, which was kind of interesting, because I was involved with all of this.

One other interesting influence in Fresno which I should mention only because it doesn’t fit in too well and I want to mention it, but the cantor at the synagogue in Fresno was a guy named Michael Loring. Michael, who I still am a good friend of—he’s retired now—Michael had gone underground during the [Senator Joseph] McCarthy era and become a cantor to hide out, changed his name, but he was a member in the thirties of the People's Chorus that did the little red songbook, that sang the background for Paul Robeson's recordings. He was a great singer, and he sang the national anthem at the 1948 Convention of the Independent Progressive Party Convention in Philadelphia.
Then he was forced to go really underground because of the McCarthy thing, so he became a cantor. He was at Fresno, and folk singers like Earl Robinson would come through Fresno and visit him, and I had dinner with Pete Seeger through his auspices one time.

FRY: Oh, you did?

GREENAWAY: There were a lot of people. The woman, Malvina Reynolds, who wrote "Little Boxes." I met her through Mike Loring.

FRY: A writer in Oakland.

GREENAWAY: Yes, right. There was a lot of liberal left-wing influence that I was conversant with and part of during all of this period.

FRY: In these early days, did you feel embattled in any way, being part of this left-wing group? Or was there a special feeling of warmth and camaraderie that comes from being in a minority group?

GREENAWAY: To some extent. I was always pretty independent, but I was very argumentative about the whole thing.

If I can digress and tell you a sort of an interesting story of something that happened to me in the army. . . . As I mentioned earlier, when I was in Tokyo, I was a troop movement NCO for Far East command, which meant we were sending officers over to units which were fighting the war in Korea during that period. There was classified stuff, so I had to handle classified material.

Well, I had graduated from the University of Chicago, and they simply had a rule in the Far East command that nobody who had attended the University of Chicago could
GREENAWAY: get a security clearance, so they couldn’t give me a clearance. I was working with two other people who handled the same material. One of them’s father was a criminal; he was a gambler who was wanted by the police, and he refused to answer questions, so he couldn’t get a security clearance. And the third one was a kid who had an ulcer. If you have an ulcer on your military profile, your physical profile, they give you a three, which is low, not passing, in the area of stability, so he couldn’t get security clearance because he had that.

The three of us were sending all these troops to Korea and we had this classified material, so what the commanding officer of the unit did, he says, "Put it in a drawer and lock it." So he gave us all a key and we had this classified stuff in the drawer, and if anybody ever showed up, "Put it in the drawer and lock it and say you don’t have the key." So that we had access to this and so on without any security clearance, just the three of us.

During the McCarthy era, McCarthy tangled with a general in the army, a General [ ] Zwicker. (He just died.) Remember that? Anyway, he accused Zwicker of being a Communist or some such thing, and Zwicker was a Republican, if anything.

General Zwicker’s son was a lieutenant who was assigned to the Casual Officers’ detachment. He was from West Point and very. . . . I mean, his father was going through all of this, and we were very hesitant to tell him
[the son] that we had the key to this classified document which gave the location of all the units in South Korea, all the American units. It was really heavy stuff. The sources were classified because the contents were military secrets.

Finally we had been following the McCarthy hearings sufficiently that I was convinced that he would see the foolishness of all of this, so we did at one point show him the fact that we had this document. The commanding officer knew it, but Lt. Zwicker didn't know it. Everything went fine with him, and I suspect in different times, if his father hadn't been attacked by Senator McCarthy, that he would have never countenanced this and would not have allowed us to have these classified documents.

But that's kind of, you know, typical of the time.

FRY: I'm trying to put this in the context that I know. I remember from interviewing someone else that there was a very healthy movement going on of adult education groups all through the Valley by, I think it was like University Extension—I'm not sure it was connected to the university—and with a lot of help from the Communist parties that were up and down through there. It seems to me that would have hooked into these. I just wondered if you had had any experience with that.

GREENAWAY: No, I didn't.

FRY: I think they were providing adult education to those people who hadn't had any.
Anyway, well, let me go back now. What I'd like to do, unless you have more questions about that, I want to go back, and having established that I was sort of on the left wing of the Democratic party during this period, tell you about the evolution of the Young Democrats. This was before my time in the sense that I was not active with the Democratic party really until I moved back to California in 1951. So this was before my being involved.

The Young Democrats of America, as you probably know, were formed by Franklin Roosevelt, and it was a way to get him a kind of political organization, particularly in the South, where it wouldn't be dominated by what was called The Courthouse Gang. It was a way for him to get other people, these bright young people, into the Democratic party. There were no organizations that they could join, and they were driven out by the sort of corrupt cronyism the name, The Courthouse Gang, implies. That's what Democratic party structure was during the thirties in much of the country. So Roosevelt formed the YDs.

The age limit on the Young Democrats was fifty at that point, and the organizations had a sort of inconsistent existence. But following World War II when the veterans came back from the war and wanted to be involved in politics in California, a number of them wanted to go into the Young Democrats because the Democratic party had good candidates. I mean, we had gotten like Will Rogers, Jr. for the United States Senate, 1946 or '48--I can't remember
GREENAWAY: which one, but at any rate, one of those years. The party was good, and it was a way for them to be active.

Well, the Young Democrats in California following World War II were really a pretty corrupt group. For example, I remember hearing that the San Jose Young Democrats existed solely to sell their endorsement to Republican candidates for money, and they would split up the money, and the Republican candidate would be able to announce that he was endorsed by the San Jose Young Democrats, and each of them would take twenty dollars home. Then they'd meet two years later to endorse the next Republicans. That was the extent of the Young Democrats at that point.

Well, obviously, with these veterans coming back, running into organizations like that, there was a movement to take over the Young Democrats. I can't tell you much about the issue that was involved here, but I can give you just what I know about it. The big fight, the takeover, occurred in 1949. I believe the state convention was in San Francisco. They formed a new California Federation of Young Democrats. They abandoned the old one and put together a new one.

The first president was Lionel Steinberg, who I mentioned in the last session as a wealthy farmer from Fresno who was quite liberal. The people who participated in that movement included Phil Burton, included Richard Richards, included Joe Wyatt, included. . . . I'm doing a
blank on the name of the person who. . . . Glen Wilson and
his wife Kay, later a major supporter of Stanley Mosk when
Mosk was attorney general. Toby Osos, who was later
president of the Young Democrats.

All these people were fighting the old political boss of
the Democratic party in San Francisco whose name was [Bill]
Malone. We called him Boss Malone.

FRY: Was that Bill Malone?

GREENAWAY: Yes, Bill Malone. Yes. I don't know what they wanted to
do, but they actually had [President] Harry Truman make a
phone call to Steinberg to try to discourage them from doing
something, and the only thing that saved them is that Drew
Pearson did a column, a nationally syndicated column, about
what was happening in California and about these veterans
trying to come back in and take over the Young Democrats.
That tipped the scale; so they didn't try to kill the new
organization, which is what Truman and Malone and so on
were threatening that they were going to do. The new
organization got formed and in 1950 played a prominent role
in the campaigns of Helen Gahagan Douglas and Jimmy
Roosevelt.

The significance of that is that this was really the first
reform movement that occurred in the California Democratic
party following World War II. There was a whole cadre of
people who had gone through this fight from new YD clubs
and they were the liberals in the Democratic party who were
there when CDC was formed.
CDC comes along three years later. The Young Democrats moved in and occupied many of the positions in CDC when it was first formed, were elected officers and played a major role in influencing the CDC. That had much to do with my getting into CDC, because I was part of the Young Democrats' movement in the CDC at the beginning.

FRY: Where?
GREENAWAY: In Fresno. I have to tell you now about how I got in and what happened, but I want you to understand this Young Democratic thing as a background.

FRY: Could I just ask you a little corollary question? Where was the state Democratic party in all of this?
GREENAWAY: [Ponders question]
FRY: [Laughter] I think your silence may answer the question.
GREENAWAY: No, it isn't that. The party was not bad. Let me get into the party in just a minute, because the party gets in when you start talking about the formation of the CDC.

The Helen Douglas-Jimmy Roosevelt campaigns had real impact in terms of getting good people into the party. In 1952, following the debacle, George Miller, Jr., a state senator from Contra Costa County, who was the father of George Miller III, the congressman now. George Miller, Jr., who was a tremendously influential person in the Democratic party, was elected state chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. He would have been elected in January of '53.
Well, the debacle of '52, which I think I talked about earlier and Clinton McKinnon losing the Democratic primary to Bill Knowland, so we didn't . . .

[Interruption]

Miller, who was state chairman, decided to form some sort of a statewide group that would be unofficial and therefore could do preprimary endorsements. The Republicans had such an organization, the California Republican Assembly, and it had been organized for the purpose of making preprimary endorsements, and the Republicans only would put one candidate in, and he would win their primary, and usually win the Democratic primary, because the Democrats would have three or four people running.

So Miller, meeting with other leaders of the party, decided they needed to put some sort of an umbrella together that would be a way to get around the prohibition on the state central committee for making preprimary endorsements. Under the law, they couldn't do that because it was the official party, and the official party in California is created by the state constitution.

FRY: Were the Young Democrats part of the official party?
GREENAWAY: No, they were not.
FRY: So why didn't they stay with them?
GREENAWAY: I believe the YD's rules prohibited them from making preprimary endorsements--a reform of previous practices. Besides, the establishment of the Democratic party wanted to
make the endorsements. They didn't even want to let the
Young Democrats get their foot in the door in the
endorsements. There are the county [Democratic]
committees in all of the counties, and the state committee.
The state committee was appointed by the elected officials,
so it was totally controlled by incumbents. That was the
Democratic party.

The Young Democrats are out here on the left
somewhere and always hurting incumbents, but it was an
incumbent-oriented state committee. George Miller was a
state senator, you've got to remember. This is all part of the
Democratic establishment that is doing this.

FRY: Miller [Jr.] was a Young Democrat, too, right?
GREENAWAY: No.
FRY: He was not? He was not in the Phil Burton group?
GREENAWAY: No. Burton considered George Miller, Jr. to be his mentor.
Phil would say that he was the person who taught him
politics and so on. But no, George was too old. He was
beyond this at this point. The Young Democrats were young
kids. The convention that I mentioned I went to in Stockton
before I went into the army, which was in the summer of
1952, where I met Phil Burton for the first time and a lot of
these people, really, and it was the first state convention I
had gone to. These were young people. [Rosalind] Roz
Wyman, who at the age of twenty-one was elected to the
[Los Angeles] L.A. city council, was the youngest person to
be elected to the L.A. . . . She was there. That was sort of
the age group. These were people in their early mid-twenties.

FRY: Did they endorse preprimary . . .

GREENAWAY: No. It wouldn't have meant anything if they had. They didn't have any . . .

FRY: . . . clout?

GREENAWAY: They didn't have any clout. They couldn't raise money, but they were good at organizational things, and that was what was involved in this.

FRY: So we have George Miller [Jr.] . . .

GREENAWAY: So George Miller decided to try to put together some sort of an umbrella. The umbrella, then, would consist of the state committee, and of the county committees, and probably the Young Democrats.

Now, during the '52 election, Adlai Stevenson, the Stevenson for President campaign, had formed Democratic clubs, so there were some clubs around. This goes way back, and a lot of people don't know this about how the CDC got going. Back in the thirties, Upton Sinclair had also formed clubs as part of the EPIC [End Poverty in California] movement, and they were called EPIC clubs. Some of them were still in existence in 1953. They had formed district councils. In other words, you'd have a congressional district and maybe four or five clubs in it. The clubs had councils where all of the clubs would get together and coordinate their activities and so on, and the councils were . . . They'd send delegates to the council for the congressional district.
That's where the council idea came from, from the EPIC clubs. There was still a council around from the EPIC era. It was the council in what was Jimmy Roosevelt's district, which was Yorty's district later. It was a very Democratic district . . .

FRY: . . . in L.A.

GREENAWAY: . . . in L.A. And it still had a council.

Anyhow, now I was not at Asilomar, as I told you. I was over the hill at Fort Ord. But what they did at Asilomar was decide, "Since we're going to put this together and since there're some Stevenson clubs, maybe we ought to let the clubs send representatives to the [CDC] state council too."

So they had a fight about it, you know, and they decided that for every twenty members they could send one delegate to the state council.

So that the original CDC was not a reform movement at all. It was organized by the state party, and letting clubs affiliate in CDC or participate in the endorsing convention was an afterthought. It wasn't formed to be a club movement.

FRY: With all of the emotional fervor engendered by both Helen Gahagan's loss to Richard Nixon and Adlai Stevenson's loss, as I recall, those were days of true believers, and the losses were taken hard. If they hadn't allowed these activist groups in, it wouldn't have lasted at all. Did they see that at the time?
I suspect so. Let me point out a couple of things which are further demonstration of what I’m saying. They very specifically decided in the beginning that they would never take positions on issues. That was because the idea was to elect incumbents. The whole purpose of CDC was to abolish cross-filing, to make preprimary endorsements until we could get cross-filing abolished, OK?

OK.

And to help elect Democratic incumbents. Well, if you want to elect Democratic incumbents, they can take the positions on issues. You don’t take positions on issues. So you didn’t. The old CDC steadfastly avoided having a platform. We didn’t have our first issues conference in CDC statewide until 1959, after we won. In 1958, when we swept the state and won and abolished cross-filing, a number of people in the Democratic party said, "CDC has served its purpose. It should be abolished." That was a big move. A lot of people walked out of CDC in 1959, and that’s why we were able to have an issues conference, because a lot of the conservatives, a lot of the incumbents, left.

Felt that it . . .

Felt that it had served its purpose. The people who stayed were the more liberal ones, and they were the ones who wanted to have the issues conferences anyway, so they did.

Which side were you on?

I was on the side on the left.

OK. Still the Young Turk side.
GREENAWAY: Yes, that's right.
FRY: I thought you might have been converted by this time.
GREENAWAY: I eventually left CDC, but that's a long way from where we are right now.

   Anyhow, that was the idea of the old CDC. We had the first convention in Fresno in 1954, and I at that point was still in Japan. At that convention they made their endorsements: Dick Graves for governor and Ed Roybal for lieutenant governor and Sam Yorty for United States Senator.
FRY: The non-battle.
GREENAWAY: Yes. No, there was no battle. The battle came later. That was in '56.
FRY: They avoided a battle because Professor Peter Odegard . . .
GREENAWAY: Odegard. He was later.
FRY: Was that from later? Oh, OK.
GREENAWAY: He was later. Odegard and [Kenneth] Kenny Hahn. So that was a convention that I managed in 1958. Odegard was in '58, when Clair Engle won.
FRY: Yes, but he was also in that early one.
GREENAWAY: Oh, he could have been there, perhaps in '54.
FRY: Yes. And someone talked Odegard into backing down, and Odegard withdrew, and that was what I was thinking about.
GREENAWAY: In '58 it was Clair Engle, Peter Odegard, and Kenny Hahn, were the three candidates seeking endorsement [for U.S. Senator].

   Anyhow, the main significance of what happened in '54 was that all of the Democrats won their primaries except for,
I believe, secretary of state. Although only Pat Brown was elected attorney general in November, at least there was a fight in each one of these things. What that did was send a message out to the world that the CDC endorsement did mean that you would have a crack in getting in the general. You wouldn't get knocked off in the primary if you could get the endorsement. So we were able to get much better candidates who were willing to try to seek the Democratic nomination as a consequence of the fact that we had made this progress.

Anyway, so 1954. I got out of the army in August of 1954, so I was around for the general election to see people like Dick Graves and Sam Yorty and the rest of them lose. I got quite active when I got out, because I had been in the Young Democrats before. In the interim, CDC had been formed, so I came back, and there were Democratic clubs in Fresno County.

Incidentally, just sort of a little historical aside, I first met Pierre Salinger because he was an advance man for Dick Graves, and I met him in the basement of the Hotel California, sometime probably in October of 1954 when he was advancing Graves. Graves was a terrible candidate. He was a disaster. But that wasn't the point. The point of the slate was to show that we could do something.

FRY: Do you know why he was chosen?
GREENAWAY: He was the head of the League of California Cities or something like that. Probably the only one who wanted it.
FRY: A sort of a sign of clout?
GREENAWAY: Yes, I guess. He was ambitious. He wanted it.
FRY: Now, let me see. There were some big donors, too. The Hellers--Ed and Elinor--George Killian. Did they have much of an effect then on who would run?
GREENAWAY: The '54 convention I wasn't at, so I don't know that.
FRY: This is sort of behind the scenes.
GREENAWAY: My sense from... See, Steinberg was wealthy, Lionel was rich, and he was very close to the Hellers and Ellie and Clary and all of those people and so on, and it was sort of a group. Carmen Warshaw I met in Steinberg's home in 1955. She was very rich. Lionel was very, very wealthy, and he and his wife were very much active as... But let me get back to him. I want to try to get to how I got into the CDC.
FRY: Yes, let's get you placed here.
GREENAWAY: And get up to about the 1955 convention, because that's sort of important.

Now, understand that in any community, like Fresno County, you'd have this sort of a dynamic in 1954, '55. You'd have the Young Democrats. You'd have the Democratic clubs, of which the Young Democrats were one. The Young Democrats qualified under the one-for-twenty rule just like the other CDC clubs. They were another CDC club in addition to having their own organization.
FRY: So they were both?
GREENAWAY: They were both. That's right. Then there would be the county central committee. The county [Democratic] central
committees in all the counties in California at that point consisted of twenty-one people who were elected in the primary elections and served for two years. Put your name on the ballot, and you ran.

The first time that I voted. . . . I didn't mention this. I'd forgotten it, as a matter of fact. The first time I ever voted, in June of 1952, I ran for the central committee in Fresno County and won.

FRY: You did?

GREENAWAY: Yes. It was the first time I had ever voted, and my own name was on the ballot, and I was elected to the County Democratic Central Committee. You couldn't vote until you were twenty-one in those days.

So I was elected to the central committee, and then I had to resign when I got drafted in October of 1952. So that helped me when I got back, the fact that I had been on the central committee. I got appointed to a vacancy and served on the central committee until I left California.

FRY: From what I've read, it wasn't always sweetness and light between the central committees and the CDC.

GREENAWAY: That's right. But in Fresno it was reversed, and the reason was that Steinberg knew that for fund-raising purposes he had to build his base. Steinberg always wanted to be the state chairman of the Democratic party, and he got as far as being northern chairman, but he was always in a feud, kind of, with Roger Kent, who was the state chairman for the north—he's a major name in Democratic politics. His
grandfather was a congressman and the man who financed John Muir. The town of Kentfield is named after them in Marin County. He was just a major figure in the Democratic party.

FRY: They're all practically a Democratic center there, and there were a lot of functions.

What was the cause of their disagreement?

GREENAWAY: Basically, Lionel was very aggressive, very liberal. Not that much more liberal, but it was power. You know, it was just one of those things.

FRY: Just because he was challenging Roger again?

GREENAWAY: Exactly. I don't think it was . . .

FRY: No special issue, then?

GREENAWAY: No, I don't think it was a special issue.

OK, so in Fresno, Lionel and the liberals, the Young Democrats like me had taken over the central committee. So unlike in other places where the central committee was dominated by the conservative Democrats, in Fresno the central committee was dominated by liberal Democrats, so there wasn't any place for the conservatives to go except for the Democratic clubs. So the CDC in Fresno County was organized by conservative Democrats, in opposition to the central committee, which Lionel Steinberg was chairman of, and the Young Democrats, who were a very strong organization there.

So the CDC director from the congressional district—that was the old twelfth district in those days, I think—the
CDC director was the editor of the Valley Labor Citizen, which was the AFL-CIO newspaper in central California. And of course, labor is always conservative in the Democratic party in California. Particularly the fifties and sixties. It may be a little further to the left now.

FRY: Was it conservative in the Valley, too?
GREENAWAY: Yes. I mean, you know, the building trades in the '54 election, I believe, the building trades endorsed [Goodwin] Goodie Knight for governor.

FRY: Even in '58, they were split or having a hard time?
GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: But I gather then, that labor in the Central Valley didn't include any migrant workers or anything like that?
GREENAWAY: Oh, no. Nothing like that.

FRY: They were out of the picture?
GREENAWAY: Farm workers were not organized then.

So after the election in November of '54, they had to elect a chairman of the Fresno County Democratic Council. The central committee would send delegates to the council. Each of the clubs would.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

GREENAWAY: The significance of the Fresno County Democratic Council chairmanship is that by some pre-ordained agreement—I don't know for sure how this ever happened—it was agreed that whoever was chairman of the [county] council would be the
manager of the CDC conventions. All the early CDC conventions were in Fresno.

FRY: So he really was in a powerful position.
GREENAWAY: No, the chairman of the council, not the central committee.
FRY: That's what I mean.
GREENAWAY: So I ran for chairman of the council as the Steinberg/Central Committee/Young Democratic candidate, to be chairman of the council, and I ran against the chairman of the Fresno County Building Trades, whose name was Lloyd Myers. See how this all evolved, that the CDC director, whose name was [Charles] Charlie Clough—he was the one who was the editor of the Valley Labor Citizen—had run Myers as his candidate to be chairman of the council, to run the convention, and he was a more conservative Democratic.

Incidentally, his son is the Clough who was married to the woman who was [President James E.] Jimmy Carter's personal secretary. Remember Sally Clough or Susie Clough? Anyway, Charlie was her father-in-law, which shows you what a small world we live in.

FRY: When you ran against him, that really had a lot of ramifications for . . .
GREENAWAY: Sure, because it meant that whoever won it would become the manager of the conventions.
FRY: It might also give more power, then, to the liberal wing of the Democratic party in Fresno County.
GREENAWAY: Yes.
Now, when I came back, I had dealt with these people and had worked with Charlie Clough. We had a Republican congressman in '54 when I got out of the army. The Democratic candidate was B. F. Sisk. He ran. I was his precinct chairman when Bernie Sisk was first elected to Congress. He won in '54 and defeated a Republican incumbent. He was Charlie Clough's candidate. So I had done some things with them. It wasn't that I was totally off the wall insofar as they were concerned. But nevertheless, the battle was really more with Steinberg than it was with me, anyway.

Alan Cranston and Don Bradley. . . . Do you know who Bradley is? He's a name you'll hear as you do these things. He was for years one of the top pros in northern California. He worked for Pat Brown when he was governor. A very bright guy. Very sharp, and knew everything. He would be like the top staff guy for the Democratic party in northern California.

Alan Cranston, president of CDC, and Don Bradley came down to observe the election in December of 1954, between me and Lloyd Myers, because of their concern, because whoever won this was the person they had to work with running this convention.

FRY: What were your jobs as precinct chairman?
GREENAWAY: To put together the precinct organization, get people to go out and ring doorbells, and that kind of thing. It wasn't a big deal, but then, you know. I had worked for Bernie . . .
FRY: That's the typical important first experience in a political campaign, isn't it, for most people?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

Bernie and I were always friends, although over the years he found himself on the other side from me, or I found myself on the other side from him, on a lot of issues. It even carried over to the days of [Congressman] Tony Coehlo, where Tony and I really never got along that well because of the old animosities that went back to the fifties with the same people that were.... The people who were for Bernie Sisk were also the people who were supporting Lloyd Myers, who were against me becoming council chairman. So it's a thing that's hung around over the years.

Anyhow, we had this election. It tied on the first ballot, so they did a second ballot and it tied again, so they went to a third ballot, and on the third ballot Steinberg got one person on the other side to abstain, and I won by one vote on the third ballot. That's how I became county council chairman and how I met Alan Cranston for the very first time. I had never met him before. He came down, of course, to see me defeated, really, because he would be for the CDC person. The CDC person was Charlie Clough, who was a conservative. Even though in most places the CDC would be the liberal force, it wasn't true there. Anyhow.

So all of a sudden I had, in March of 1955, a state convention to manage, and I had never even been to a state convention of the CDC, to say nothing of managing one. We
had no paid help at all. Everything was done with volunteers. Nobody on the payroll to manage it, and we did it all with volunteers, did the whole thing. It would mean we got mimeograph machines that would run twenty-four hours a day, and nobody slept from Thursday night until Sunday night. We just went straight through.

FRY: You were getting in touch, now, with the real leaders?
GREENAWAY: That's right.
FRY: Let me pick up on one thing you mentioned. Don Bradley, who was certainly a kind of a professional kingmaker because he was so active and so competent, you said that he came down and he saw you. He was able to observe you running this race. Was there anything else?
GREENAWAY: For council?
FRY: Did you talk to him? Yes, for council.
GREENAWAY: Oh, I talked to him. I talked to Alan. I mean, they had to talk to me afterwards because I was in charge of the convention, and they had to deal with me.

About a month later, I think it was in about January—it could have been February—in January of 1955, I went to my first CDC board meeting. It was over in Pismo Beach, of all places. There was a veterans' hall about halfway up that hill in Pismo Beach, and it was in that building, so we drove over there and went to this first board meeting. I remember Geneva Cranston, who was Alan's wife, wouldn't let us in. They were closed in secret meetings, and she wouldn't let
anybody in. Somebody had to come out finally and identify me before she'd let me in the place.

But I don't have a whole lot of memories of the first convention that I ran. Paul Butler, who was the national chairman, came out and spoke. He was our main speaker at the convention, and of course we were all enormously impressed with him. Paul Ziffren, who was the Democratic National Committeeman from California, was a strong supporter of Butler's. Remember [President] Lyndon Johnson tried to run Butler out of the Democratic party? I remember that big battle.

Anyway, Butler was out there, and I got to meet him. I met statewide people. They all had to call me because if they wanted hotel rooms they had to go through me to get them. We had all the hotel rooms in Fresno reserved, so it was . . . I just ran the thing. I made the decisions. I had a huge team of volunteers helping, but I ran it.

FRY: You must have been going ninety miles an hour.
GREENAWAY: And I was teaching high school at the time.
FRY: And did all of this with volunteer help.
GREENAWAY: Yes. Exactly.
FRY: I can just imagine all the little glitches that could occur, and you having to take care of a jillion a day.
GREENAWAY: So anyway, we got through the '55 convention, and then the 1956 convention was in Fresno. The first three--'54, '55, '56--were there. The '56 convention . . .
FRY: Could I ask you something about that? When I was reading about it. . . . I think this is . . .

GREENAWAY: Fifty-six is when [Adlai] Stevenson and [Estes] Kefauver [ran for the presidential nomination].

FRY: Why had CDC decided not to endorse national candidates?

GREENAWAY: Because there was no cross-filing in a presidential primary.

FRY: So they weren't interested.

GREENAWAY: That's right. They didn't see any reason to make endorsements. See, there was a big movement, again, in '58, after we abolished cross-filing, for CDC to discontinue endorsements.

FRY: Yes. So it all fits together.

GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: Do you remember anything about the Yorty and Richards machinations going on in that convention?

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure.

FRY: Oh, well tell me.

GREENAWAY: Yes, I was a very strong supporter of Richard Richards [in the U.S. Senate race], as a matter of fact. It's interesting because a lot of the Kefauver people supported Richards. I was the Stevenson delegate and always for Stevenson; I was terribly impressed with him, and as I think I told you before, was a member of the delegation, an alternate to the 1956 convention in Chicago.

   Anyhow, the convention was earlier than that.

FRY: The CDC?
GREENAWAY: Yes. Richards was far and away the hero of the left in the Young Democrats. He'd been in the Young Democrats. He and his wife Bernice were very much activists. He was one of the best platform speakers I've ever heard. He had a voice that was . . . I've always been a public speaker and I'm into that. One of the best voices that I ever heard. . . . The only person I can think of whose voice is better than Richard Richards' was Orson Welles'. I mean, he really was tremendous.

So we were going to run him. Yorty had the support still of conservative Democrats. They didn't like Richards. They thought he was too far left. I mean, issues did influence all of this. So Richards was supported by the Young Democrats, most of the new people in the clubs. A lot of the old-timers in the central committee supported Yorty. After all, we'd endorsed Yorty two years before running against Kuchel; why not endorse him again?

FRY: My reading shows that two years before, the endorsement of him [Yorty] was kind of forced because everybody suspected that whether he was endorsed or not, he would run and cause a big problem.

GREENAWAY: He would run and probably win, and that would mean we would lose the endorsed candidate. They wanted to show that the endorsement process would work.

FRY: Yes. But this time was different.

GREENAWAY: But this time was different. I mean, we were all for Richards. There was no question that Richards was going to
get the endorsement. We didn't even think Yorty would show up at the convention, as a matter of fact. And of course he did show up, and that's when he gave his famous speech that the CDC was "rigged, wired, stacked," and since I was the convention manager, I . . .

FRY: "Stacked, rigged, and wired"--a wonderful quotation.

GREENAWAY: Yes, and since I was the convention manager, I was delighted with that sort of praise.

FRY: Did you ever issue a [rebuttal] statement or anything, or did anybody?

GREENAWAY: No, we really didn't. We just said we were for Richards. Everybody booed Yorty when he walked out on the stage and made that [speech]. You had to admit the guy had guts to stand up before a convention that was totally against him and make that kind of a speech, but he nevertheless did.

FRY: Outside of his strong anti-Communism stance at that time, he had a fairly regular liberal record on other issues, according to what I read.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: So was it just this obnoxious . . .

GREENAWAY: I think it was that people felt he was . . .

FRY: . . . red-baiting he did that . . .

GREENAWAY: I think it was partly that. I think it was . . .

FRY: What was everybody . . .

GREENAWAY: Everybody that you knew that you thought might be a crook supported Yorty. It was sort of that. I think he just personally turned off people. But that was the way it spread
in Fresno. We have a lot of rednecks in Fresno who were old-time Democrats because their mammy and pappy had voted Democratic and so they voted Democratic, and they were members of the clubs. We had clubs that would not allow blacks to belong in the old CDC.

FRY: What did you do about that in Fresno County? Back in those early days?

GREENAWAY: You didn't. I mean, the clubs were pretty much autonomous. Even when we had the . . . As late as '64, when we had the ballot proposition, [Proposition] Prop. 14,¹ which was the repeal of the fair housing [act]. As late as '64, we had Democratic clubs that were supporting Proposition 14 in the Central Valley. So it was always a . . .

Civil rights was a very, very basic problem. Yorty was from Los Angeles and from a district with a lot of minorities in it, but he himself was supported by all of the bigots in the Democratic party. That was felt to be a major issue in all of this, and of course Richards was just extremely good.

FRY: It [civil rights] was certainly an issue of the Democratic convention, as always.

GREENAWAY: Yes. Anyhow, so Kefauver and Stevenson really split, although I think Stevenson, if we had endorsed, would have been endorsed. There was a lot of support for Kefauver, and they both spoke at the [CDC] convention. It was just a marvelous convention. It had a huge press. It was the first

¹ Proposition 14 (November 1964).
time I had had to put on something where we were handling the press.

FRY: You must have had the big networks and everybody in there.

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure. The foreign press. . . . It had Japanese newspapers over there covering this thing. It was really something to run that convention. Again, we were doing it totally with volunteers. We didn't have a single paid person, which meant everybody was doing it in the evening. It would mean that you couldn't do any managerial things during the day--I was teaching school--although I would go down in the teachers' lounge at lunch and talk on the telephone all lunch period to Los Angeles and San Francisco and so on about things. It sort of intimidated the school, too. Anyway, it was really fascinating.

FRY: Did you get any displeasure from school board members about your political activities?

GREENAWAY: No. They were afraid of me. I told you that before. They would come in and explain they were really Democrats and they didn't really mean it when they supported some Republican candidate.

FRY: You were still teaching at Kerman?

GREENAWAY: Kerman. Yes, it's the only high school I ever taught at.

    Anyhow, everybody just let me do my thing, and I did.
But it was really a fascinating, fascinating convention. I ran them well and things worked pretty well. What else can I say about '56?
FRY: At the convention, then, there was no attention paid to delegations to the national Democratic convention that were being talked about?

GREENAWAY: I don't know when the delegations were formed, whether it was before or after, but I think it was before.

FRY: It may have been after.

GREENAWAY: It was before, because it would be. . . . You see, they had to put the names of the delegates on the primary ballot. They closed registration at about the end of March, and that would be the same time that you would have to have filed--they closed the filing period, and you had to file the delegations.

FRY: Yes, all right. You said that you were for Adlai, and I think Pat Brown was his chairman for California in '56.

GREENAWAY: Fifty-six.

FRY: And Ziffren [for southern California].

GREENAWAY: Yes, Ziffren was.

FRY: So did you work any with either one of them outside of your CDC membership?

GREENAWAY: No, no. I mean, we worked in the local campaigns, obviously, and I was the Valley chairman in '56, as I recall, for Richard Richards--a senate campaign. I may have been his Fresno County chairman, now that I think of it. But I was Richards' local chairman, so I focused in '56, in terms of the campaign activities, on Richards' campaign. But I was totally for Stevenson, and Steinberg was.
Another interesting thing happened in 1956. The Young Democrats, of course, had been meeting and having conventions, and I went to them. I had gone to a Young Democrats National Convention in Reno in, I think 1955. I never tried to move up in the Young Democrats in terms of any organizational titles or anything like that because my whole thing is CDC, so I didn’t do that, but I did go to all of it and I was very interested.

So we had our YD state convention and we were all for Stevenson. We have our state convention in the old Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel on Vine in Hollywood. I remember that hotel to this day, but at any rate, we get together, and for the first time we are not going to pass a resolution to call for recognition of Red China and its admission into the United Nations, which we had done at every convention since 1950, all during the McCarthy era. That was the big thing the California Federation of Young Democrats did, and anyone who wanted to attack them would attack them because they wanted Red China recognized.

FRY: Why didn’t they do it in ’56?

GREENAWAY: We weren’t going to do it because we didn’t want to hurt Stevenson, who was running against Eisenhower, so we’re going to have a convention, we’re going to be good, we’re not going to do anything bad. We go into the convention, and the day the convention starts, Eisenhower put the troops in Lebanon. Remember? In ’56?
FRY: Oh, yes.

GREENAWAY: And we went crazy.

FRY: Was that the Suez Canal crisis?

GREENAWAY: No. Yes, it could have been. I don’t know. It wasn’t the later Suez Canal thing, but at any rate, he sent troops into Lebanon, so we had to attack that. So we went the whole gamut and went way to the left and [called for recognition of Red China and] so on at that convention. That was an interesting state convention.

   Anyhow, so then the summer comes of . . .

FRY: Let me ask you the difference in those two conventions--which one was bigger?

GREENAWAY: The CDC convention probably would be about five or six times larger than the YD convention. Of course, all the YDs went to the CDC convention, you understand. The YD conventions were smaller and had a few hundred people. Very, very vital and very moving and all that. They were where the action was in a lot of ways.

   Of course, another thing that helped the YDs when they went to the CDC was that they knew each other because they’d been at the YD conventions.

FRY: Did they make their own little cabal in CDC at all?

GREENAWAY: No, because they would be more. . . . They were oftentimes split, not on issues but on the sort of power bases they were dealing with. You might have Phil [Burton] becoming a power in San Francisco, and he might be at odds with the Ziffren people in Los Angeles, and YDs would filter up that
way with Phil. Ziffren and Phil weren't necessarily going to get along with each other so they didn't, but they did know each other, and that was an important part of all of this.

FRY: What do you mean they knew each other? You mean as friends?

GREENAWAY: They knew each other; they were friends. They could talk to each other. They could negotiate things.

One of the issues--it was a growing issue and it was a big issue in 1958 that I was quite involved in--is the whole issue involving the 160-acre limitation. At that point there had been a new guy come along who I was involved with, curiously enough Charlie Clough's assistant, a young guy named George Ballis. Ballis, who worked at the Valley Labor Citizen for a while at any rate, was a reporter. He and I were very close. There were sort of three of us at that point. Steinberg moved down to the Coachella Valley. He closed his farming operations and he left Fresno. So the three of us who were sort of running the left wing in the Fresno Democratic party were me; Richard Guerin, who I mentioned to you last time who was teaching high school with me at that time; and George Ballis, who was the, as I said, assistant on the Valley Labor Citizen.

FRY: You were kind of a triumvirate for what? Against it, or what?

GREENAWAY: For trying to get the acreage limitation enforced on the west side growers. Of course, that was throwing down the gauntlet to people like Bernie Sisk and the rest of them, so it
was a terrible time. In the period '56, '57, '58, '59, '60, '61, during that period, the issue of acreage limitation was the issue that tore apart the Democratic party in California. It would be the issue that would be the huge fight at the CDC conventions.

And George took the lead on it. George actually was the first guy who sat down and went through all of the deeds and records and so on of who owned the west side. Then we got these huge maps and colored them according to who owned them. Well, of course, Southern Pacific owned alternating sections, and then you had the size of Boswell's holding and the size of Russ Giffen, the big ranchers. Russ Giffen had 11,000 acres, and he was getting subsidized water under the 160-acre limitation. He was getting it for 11,000 acres. That was the kind of thing that we were demonstrating with these maps.

FRY: As I understand it, this was federally-funded water, OK?
GREENAWAY: That's right. From water projects, yes.
FRY: It allowed each person to have 180 acres.
GREENAWAY: One hundred and sixty acres.
FRY: One hundred and sixty acres.
GREENAWAY: A husband and wife could have 320.
FRY: Right. And the way that these large corporate farms did it was to split up everything into 160 acres, is that right?
GREENAWAY: Not necessarily. In those days they simply wouldn't enforce it. They didn't enforce the law.
FRY: Who were the enforcers?
GREENAWAY: The Bureau of Reclamation.
FRY: Did it have a regional office in Fresno?
GREENAWAY: I don't know. It may have, but that wasn't even an area we got into. The point was that the law was not being obeyed. So during the mid- to late-fifties, George got all these maps and brought them back here to Washington and got [Senator] Wayne Morse and [Senator] Paul Douglas involved. Actually, Morse and Douglas tried to do something legislatively, and the maps were actually shown on the senate floor. The Fresno County Young Democrats had drawn these maps, and Morse and Douglas used them on the senate floor. They didn't get anywhere, because you cannot win water fights.

But it was a huge, huge issue when it was where the Young Democrats would be united and the liberals would be united in CDC. We would fight this fight, and usually when I was running for office in the CDC that would be a big issue. Incidentally, I was on the other side from Alan Cranston. Alan Cranston supported Pat Brown, and they were opposed to enforcing the 160-acre limitation.

FRY: I remember something about the oil interests owning a lot of that agricultural land. The Helen Gahagan Douglas campaign was up against a lot of opposition from the oil interests. In fact, Helen said in one of her interviews that they tried to give her money to actually leave, step down and not run. I wondered if any of that happened in your experience.
GREENAWAY: Everybody was upset with what we did. The Chandler interest, who owned the L.A. Times, had major holdings. They owned a major interest in the Kern County Land Company, and that was one of the big violators.

FRY: That was a very conservative Republican paper at that time.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: And they owned land holdings where?

GREENAWAY: Kern County. The Kern County Land Company, which Teneco later bought, was owned by the Chandler interest at that time. Water is the pervasive issue in California, it really is. It's an amazing issue.

Anyway, we were fighting this issue and we brought it out in CDC, and it just tore people apart. We had labor against us, and the conservatives, an awful lot of the incumbents, most of the legal establishment. And today it's still an issue.

But anyway, so we were kind of way out in front on that.

FRY: Was there a movement on it for or against this through this period?

GREENAWAY: No, it was nothing we ever accomplished. We did get these maps shown on the senate floor, but there was nothing ever that was... It wasn't until the seventies that there was any sort of reform in water reclamation law.

FRY: At least you could say it wasn't revoked in that period.

GREENAWAY: Well, no. It still was on the books. The law was on the books, but that was all that you could say about it.
GREENAWAY: We did a trip. George and I put together a tour. There was a guy in Fresno who. . . . Sometime if you want to digress on an interesting character, he was named Speedy Newman, and he was a labor contractor. He had a bunch of buses and he was a promoter. He was very active in the Democratic party.

So [June 17 and 18, 1961] we got a group of about, oh, I’d say seventy to eighty Young Democrats from like Los Angeles and San Francisco. So we got them to Fresno and we got them out of bed at four o’clock in the morning, and we put them on these labor contractor buses and took them to what was called the shape-up. The shape-up was when itinerant farm workers would be on the streets and the labor contractors would come through with their buses and they would bid for them. They’d go to work for a labor contractor for the day--get on the bus, and then they’d go out to the west side, a drive of about maybe a half an hour. They’d work all day and then the contractor would bring them back. The rancher would pay the contractor and the contractor would pay the workers.

So we wanted to show several things. We wanted to show what a day was like for a farm worker, what the heat was like, so we did this twice. We took these seventy or eighty Young Democrats, and we took them out to the fields and showed them. It got hot; it got to be like 130 [degrees] in the shade, and it was incredible. We’d take them out to the west side. Think about Fresno County. You know
Mendota? Firebaugh? That part of the west side of the Valley?

FRY: I know Mendota. What's Firebaugh?
GREENAWAY: Firebaugh. That's a town just north of Mendota.
FRY: It sounds like you're saying "Fireball."
GREENAWAY: No, it's Firebaugh.
FRY: Fireball was just the weather!
GREENAWAY: Right. Cantua Creek, going down toward Coalinga, in that area. Those were the areas with the big farms.

The fascinating thing about this was in those areas, the acreage limitation wasn't enforced and I had all these things [to show]. You would see these towns with agricultural slums--east Mendota was the worst slum I've ever seen in my life anyplace. We'd go out there. We'd drive onto the farms. Sometimes they'd actually get out with guns and chase us off.

FRY: Who?
GREENAWAY: From the farms. The farmers. They had sort of quasi-military operations on these big farms. Guys would carry guns, and they would be the people who'd be stamping out trouble. Take them around there, and then they . . .
FRY: Doing what?
GREENAWAY: They would be keeping troublemakers out, because there were agitators who were trying to organize unions and do things like that.

But at any rate, then we would drive them . . .
FRY: Excuse me, Roy. Did you ever see law enforcement officers join them in this?

GREENAWAY: I didn't.

So we took them in these buses, Speedy's buses, through this area, drive them through, show them what the towns were like, that they were full of poverty, full of broken-down houses, full of. . . . They were just lousy.

FRY: Sanitation?

GREENAWAY: Yes. The whole thing was very bad.

There was a place out there called Three Rocks. Three Rocks was on Highway 33 about fifteen miles south of Mendota. Three Rocks was a sort of a community beside an irrigation ditch, in effect. There were [farm workers'] houses on there that had simply been moved off other land. Because of the housing laws that were coming in, the farmers simply abandoned the houses that they had for farm workers on the farms. So they'd put the house on the back of a truck and take it out and put it in an empty field, so the house would sit there and somebody would come along and rent it or sell it. They didn't have any foundation, they had no water, they had no plumbing, and people were living in them.

Three Rocks was a community like that. It had about probably seventy or eighty houses with anywhere from 300 to 500 people living in them, with no water at all. Probably they had to drive some distance even to get water unless they took it out of the irrigation ditch. Each one of the
houses would have a garbage can out in front which would be clean-looking, and that would be where they keep their water. It would be out in front of the house, this garbage can full of water.

The people who owned the thing would sell them the houses but rent the land the house was on, so they did not have title. Totally illegal to do this, but that way they didn't have to upkeep the houses because the person who bought the house owned it. They were renting the land the house was on, so the farm workers never had title to anything. So they'd pay for the house, the farm workers [would], and live in the house. When they leave, they'd just leave, and then the landowners would sell the house over again to somebody. It's just incredible.

FRY: Who owned and sold these houses? Were these farmers?
GREENAWAY: Sometimes.
FRY: OK. Not the contractors especially?
GREENAWAY: No, this wouldn't be labor contractors. They wouldn't be involved in that. The labor contractors are basically dealing with people living in Fresno who go out there.

At any rate, we'd make this tour. So then, probably about noon, we would stop and have lunch on the west side, you know, a brown bag lunch kind of thing with buses so they really got the full effect of the heat.

Then we would take them to the east side. The east side of Fresno County is a place where the reclamation law is enforced, where you have 160-acre farms. Areas like
GREENAWAY: Sanger, Reedley, Selma, Parlier, and so on. There you had. . . . The communities were pleasant, they didn’t have slums, they didn’t have the kind of poverty that you saw on the west side.

There was a famous study that was done in California called the Dinuba-Arvin study. It was a study of two towns: Dinuba in Tulare County, which is just south of Fresno, just south of Reedley, and that’s in an area where they would enforce the 160-acre limitation and they do have the small-sized farms; and Arvin, which is down in Kern County where it’s all big farms and so on. The study was a study of things like juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, drug addiction, all of the things that are signs of poverty. There was an absolute correlation between family-sized farms and big farms, and those issues. That was the impact of the Dinuba-Arvin study.

What we were doing when we took these Young Democrats around was to show them why we needed the 160-acre limitation, because they could see these communities and could see the difference between a place like Sanger and a place like Mendota. So it was a really tremendously educational kind of a thing, and it really gave us great credibility. People who had done this figured they had been to war, and also we would have people thinking they were going to die of the heat and all that kind of thing too.
But at any rate, so that was part of what was happening during the mid-fifties in CDC and in the Young Democrats.

FRY: Did Fresno County have any way for the kids of the itinerant farm workers to be educated to go to school?

GREENAWAY: Oh, they'd go to school. They would go to school, but they moved. Usually what they do is come into the Central Valley for about six months, and then they'd go down to either Mexico or maybe the Imperial Valley for the other six months. The migrant family didn't follow the crops in the sense that you think of it, but they would have the six months-six months routine. That was the common pattern for the kids I taught, for example.

I taught high school out on the west side. Kerman was out right at the fringe, right at the point at which the small farms ended and the big farms began, this was Kerman. So we had a lot of farm worker kids who would come down to school, but they just didn't have much of a chance at an education.

We're not moving as far as I wanted, and I'm going to have to. . . . So let me just take you up to the 1957 convention, which was in Long Beach. That was the first CDC convention not held in Fresno. At that convention, I ran for regional vice president of CDC. That was the vice president for the four congressional districts that stretch roughly from San Joaquin County through Kern County in
the Central Valley, and from Monterey to Santa Barbara. Actually, Santa Barbara-Ventura on the coast.

I was still walking with a cane in '57 at that convention because of my wreck on the way back from the national convention in Chicago. But at any rate, I was elected, and at that point Alan Cranston was still the president of CDC. I was elected basically because I'd run the conventions, despite the fact that I was a Young Democrat.

Glenn Anderson was a vice president. [Nicholas] Nick Petris, who was state senator from Oakland for many years, was a vice president. So it was really an interesting period, and it meant I would be on the state Executive Committee and would be going to the CDC board meetings, which were held every two months, so usually about five in addition to the convention each year, in various parts of California. You went on your own, paid your own way. Again, it was all volunteer.

Going to the board meetings really was the thing that taught me about California, because as I say, they were all over the state. I went to almost all of the CDC board meetings from 1957 to 1967, for about ten years.

Fry: What an education.

Greenaway: Yes. It was really kind of fascinating.

Fry: Well, let's talk about the political demographics that you found.

Greenaway: At any rate, that leads us into the '58 convention, which was, of course, the big fight in a lot of ways. That's when
we took over the state. I think I pretty much covered everything up to 1957.

FRY: The only thing I had in mind was the actual convention itself and the battles that went on at the 1956 national convention.

GREENAWAY: At the national convention . . .

FRY: I think the main thing was that . . .

GREENAWAY: We were Stevenson delegates, so the fight was when Stevenson threw the vice presidency open at the convention. They said you could vote for whomever you want. It was a fight between [Senator John F.] Kennedy and [Senator Estes] Kefauver. I was an alternate to two delegates, and both delegates were gone, so I got to vote twice. I voted for Kefauver, and the reason that I did was again because of Lionel. Kennedy was very bad in terms of farm policy, and of course we lived in the farming region. Kefauver was much better. So that was the deciding thing in how I voted.

FRY: Besides the 160-acre limitation, what . . .

GREENAWAY: My policy generally was the whole thing that went back to Roosevelt, the New Deal, when Henry A. Wallace was secretary of agriculture . . .

FRY: And the farm subsidies?

GREENAWAY: The farm subsidies, farm programs that would keep the small farmers afloat. That was the sort of issue.

FRY: There was the Lehman amendment to the Civil Rights Act that came up then, and that split the convention too. And I think it was a big platform issue.
GREENAWAY: Which convention?
FRY: In this 1956. My notes say that [Congressman Chester] Hollifield, Mosk, [Paul] Ziffren were for the majority plank. James Roosevelt, Richard Richards, and [Elizabeth] Snyder were for the stronger amendment that Senator [Herbert H.] Lehman had put in. I wondered if . . .
GREENAWAY: I don't remember.
FRY: Well, judging by the people who were for and against, I'd guess that you were for the stronger one, but I don't know.
GREENAWAY: Yes, of course. Oh, yes, we would be for the stronger one.

[Congressman] Hollifield was an interesting figure. He was sort of the dean of the California Democratic delegation, even to the point when we first moved up here [to the senate]. He was still there. He was supposedly the first congressman ever to open a field office in California, kind of interesting.

FRY: Helen Gahagan Douglas talks about him a lot too, for her congressional career. Was he kind of a mentor to some of them?
GREENAWAY: He could be. He was a good guy, but he was finally sort of passed by time.
FRY: At the time you were active, did he help you any in your work?
GREENAWAY: No.
FRY: He was southern California.
GREENAWAY: He was southern California. I had a good deal of contact with him very late, at the very end of his career, when I was back here.

[End Tape 2, Side B]
FRY: This is December 10, 1990, an interview with Roy Greenaway, session number three, with Amelia Fry.

GREENAWAY: [In our previous session I] mentioned about the 1957 convention in Long Beach. That's the time, as I said the last time, when I was elected vice president of CDC for Region 3. There were five regions in CDC, five vice presidents. I described that, but what I didn't say was that prior to the convention.

Let me back up for just a minute. The incumbent vice president was a woman named Catherine Everett, and she was from Modesto. She was an older woman. A few months before the convention--I can't tell you when--Alan Cranston, who was vacationing with his family at a place in Fresno County called the Wonder Valley Dude Ranch, which was outside of Sanger in the foothills--it's still there--he was staying up there. It was a place where he invited me and my wife to come up and spend an afternoon with them. At
that time, confidentially [he] urged me to run for vice 

president of the CDC against Catherine Everett. He was the 

president then. So I ran.

FRY: Why did he want you?

GREENAWAY: I had run two conventions. By that point I had run the '55 

and the '56 conventions. He wasn't too happy with 

Catherine Everett and he wanted somebody else to run, but 

since he was president he had to be neutral, so this was all 

in confidence that he approached me about running.

FRY: Was this unusual?

GREENAWAY: I don't know.

FRY: Not just for you and Cranston, but I wondered if these kinds 

of solicitations frequently happen in CDC, because it happens 

in all the other political organizations I know of.

GREENAWAY: I suspect it did.

   Anyhow, so that's how I came to be a candidate.

Although Alan never publicly did anything to help me in any 

way, he sort of started the thing that got me to run. So I 

was at a fairly young age on the executive committee of 

CDC, and was meeting with the boards and was doing all of 

that. At that point I was in my late twenties.

FRY: Really?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: That was young. And you haven't burned out yet.


GREENAWAY: It was interesting because it was one of the conservative 

areas statewide in CDC, those districts, and yet I was one of
the more liberal vice presidents, and the liberal-conservative issue was one that was a major part of the '59 election where I had to run for re-election as CDC vice president. My opponent was a very conservative Democrat from Tulare County named [Robert] Bob Haden.

Anyhow, so I started going, in '57, to the board [meetings], and then we got to the '58 convention. Everyone, of course, felt this was really big because Pat Brown was going to run for governor, and because we had abolished cross-filing, that we had a chance of winning, so it was a very heavy campaign, and it was a big convention and there was a lot of press. The campaign for the nomination for the senate between Clair Engle and [Kenneth] Kenny Hahn and Peter Odegard was highly contested. Everybody felt that that was the year where the CDC endorsement really meant something. I met all sorts of new people that I'd never met. The first time I ever met Jesse Unruh was at that convention. The first time I met Dick Tuck.

I can tell you a little bit about the convention. The headquarters hotel was the old Hotel Californian in Fresno. Although we had taken all of the hotels, this was the headquarters hotel, and when we weren't in the convention center itself for the convention, then all of the activities and all the action was going on at this hotel. Pat Brown came in with a very highly organized campaign. I had had to assign headquarters rooms.

FRY: For the nomination?
GREENAWAY: For the endorsement.
FRY: I mean the endorsement.
GREENAWAY: Yes, although he had no opposition. It was a big thing. I had assigned all of the people who were seeking the nomination different rooms, and I gave really the best room to Pat Brown, but it wasn't the best room in terms of the hotel because these were like meeting rooms on the mezzanine. It wasn't the best room in terms of the hotel because we had to have the committees--the Credentials Committee and the Rules Committee and so on--had to meet, and those committees consisted of thirty-five or forty people, somebody from each congressional district, plus some other people.

Sort of the long and the short of it was that although Pat Brown was the only one who had a meeting room, he didn't like the meeting room that I had assigned to him because it wasn't as good as some of the rooms that the committees were going to meet in because the committees really needed a larger room because they had to be able to seat more people.

Dick Tuck showed up as part of Pat Brown's campaign, and on Thursday night I was down in the bar at the Hotel Californian around eleven or eleven-thirty. Tuck found me and said, "That room simply isn't satisfactory. We've got to have a better room." I explained I couldn't change it because the room that they were in wasn't big enough for a
GREENAWAY: committee, and the committees had to have those rooms and so on, and went on and on.

I went home, and about seven-thirty the following morning, Friday morning, I got a call that the hotel manager was threatening to call the police because somebody in the middle of the night had switched the names on all of the rooms. That was Dick Tuck. Tuck got up with a screwdriver and he changed all the room names and put Pat Brown in the room that they wanted, which was the room the Credentials Committee was in.

At the same time, the chairman of the Credentials Committee [called]. I believe it was [Richard] Dick Nevins. Incidentally, I haven't mentioned him, but Nevins was a longtime member of the State Board of Equalization. In 1955-56 he was the president of the California Federation of Young Democrats. He was another one of the people who came through the Young Democrats. He's from Altadena, and then in '58 he ran for the State Board of Equalization and was never heard of politically since, but he was one of the bright and coming young guys at that point.

Anyway, at this convention, he was credentials chairman. He called me saying they couldn't meet in the room. So I went down and walked into the Credentials Committee--I mean, into the room that they had set up as the Pat Brown campaign headquarters room, which was supposed to be the Credentials Committee, and sitting there was Dick Tuck and Jesse Unruh and then the whole
hierarchy of Pat Brown's campaign. I had to do something to solve this problem.

FRY: [Laughter] Dick Tuck has a reputation for these things, doesn't he?

GREENAWAY: So what I did was I said, "Look, if you want to set up a booth where everybody's going to see you, why don't you just set it up in the lobby?" They said, "Really? Can we have the lobby?" I said, "Sure. I've just got to get you out of this room. You set up the Pat Brown headquarters in the lobby on the mezzanine," which is the main area. So they moved out there and the Credentials Committee got into their room, and everything worked out fine. But that was my meeting with Jesse Unruh and also with Tuck.

One of the things about that convention in retrospect is the question of why Cranston didn't run for the senate nomination then.

FRY: Had he thought about that?

GREENAWAY: Yes, he did think about it. He was going to run.

FRY: One note I have says he was trying to run up labor support.

GREENAWAY: Yes. See, he was president of CDC at that point, and he therefore worked out of the northern California CDC headquarters, which was also the Democratic State Central Committee headquarters. They shared; it was on Sutter Street.

FRY: Two-twelve?

GREENAWAY: Two-twelve Sutter Street, and then they were later at 444 Sutter Street. But at any rate, 212 Sutter Street was sort of
the center of the whole of northern California Democrats. Alan had [CDC] offices there and Roger Kent had [party] offices. Let’s see, the state chairman and northern chairman, they rotated it back and forth, but for a period of maybe ten, twelve years, he was one or the other, but he was the top central committee person in northern California.

FRY: You’re talking about Kent?
GREENAWAY: Kent, yes. And Don Bradley, who worked for the [Democratic] state committee was there, and so on. There was a little group.

Kent and some others—and I was not in their world so I really don’t know how they made the decision—they decided they wanted Clair Engle to be the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate. Engle represented the old Second Congressional District, which stretched, at that point, from the Oregon border down the Sierras, clear down, touched on San Bernardino County and included Mono, Inyo, and all the counties in all of northern California. It was a huge congressional district. It was, I think, about half the state in terms of land area, but sparsely populated.

FRY: A lot of jackrabbits.
GREENAWAY: Yes. Engle was a popular house member and a very impressive guy. He was an impressive candidate. But the club movement didn’t have any particular reason to endorse Clair Engle. There was no particular club movement in the Second Congressional District. He was more conservative, although not terribly, but again, you’ve got to understand
that the liberals dominated the CDC. If Cranston had
seriously sought the endorsement, I think he could have
gotten it; I think he would have beaten Engle. So Kent and
the others just put a lot of pressure on him to pull out and
not to seek the endorsement at the convention, not to run
for the United States Senate.

FRY: Pressure on Cranston?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

The story—and I don't know if this is true, and Alan's
never told me this—but the story is that they simply shunned
him when he announced that he was going to run. They
wouldn't go to lunch with him, they wouldn't talk to him. It
was as if this office he was working in, suddenly there was
nobody who would talk to him.

FRY: Was this when he announced for senator?

GREENAWAY: This was when he announced that he was interested in
running for senator. It was just part of the pressure that
they put on him to pull out. Roger Kent could be vicious,
and they apparently were. So Alan, ever the good guy, did
pull out and didn't seek the race, and Engle was able to
defeat Odegard and Kenny Hahn, although Kenny Hahn had
a lot of support at that convention.

FRY: On what was his support based?

GREENAWAY: Southern California. I mean, it was Los Angeles. He got a
lot of... He's always had huge minority community
support.

FRY: It was mainly geographical?
GREENAWAY: It was geographical. I mean, I don't think liberals particularly. ... I mean, Odegard was liked by the Bay Area liberals, but nobody really thought Odegard was a serious candidate-type candidate. Again, these people were all very practical politicians who were running . . .

FRY: And asking could he run.

GREENAWAY: Yes, that kind of thing—is he the right sort of a candidate, and this whole party structure [behind him]. And not the most conservative party structure was behind Clair Engle. I voted for Clair Engle at that convention, for example. People pretty much went along.

FRY: It seems like I read that Clair Engle's name recognition in one of the polls was down below 5 percent, so it would seem he wouldn't be a terribly good kind of statewide candidate for then.

GREENAWAY: But the thought was that we probably had as much chance with him as we would have had with anyone. Because nobody would argue that anybody ever heard of Peter Odegard. Kenny Hahn probably was better known than anyone else, and indeed, he did give Engle much more of a race than Odegard did.

FRY: How was Cranston's name recognition at this point?

GREENAWAY: Not at all. Not at all.

FRY: But he had a CDC network.

GREENAWAY: Yes, but we were running an unknown under any circumstances.
GREENAWAY: So Cranston pulls out of the race for senate and runs for state controller. Now, that was an awkward situation, because he had to beat one of the most popular men with liberals in the Democratic party to get the CDC endorsement for state controller. He had to beat George Collins.

Collins was the CDC-endorsed candidate for controller in 1954 and had lost. He had been an assemblyman and he had to give up his assembly seat. He was a very interesting guy. He was considered to be very much of a liberal from San Francisco, and certainly reflected it. He was... I don't know whether you know anything about him. He was short, maybe about five feet tall, and a very pronounced hunchback, so he certainly didn't look like a politician. He was the only member of the California State Legislature to vote against relocating the Japanese during World War II, and that was something that was always a big part of why people should be for George Collins. Everybody enormously respected him for having the courage to stand up against Earl Warren and everybody else for that.

So he was a popular guy, and Alan had to beat him, but again, this was a convention where the party hierarchy were calling the shots. Again, CDC at that convention certainly didn't act like a grass roots organization. It was controlled by power brokers in the Democratic party like Roger Kent, like Alan Cranston for that matter, like Carmen Warshaw, like a lot of the wealthy people who played a role.
So that was the thing, and Alan finally got the CDC endorsement.

Glenn Anderson. Glenn was extremely popular and had a very strong following in the Democratic party because most of the Los Angeles liberals considered Glenn Anderson to be their leader. Glenn's wife, Lee--who used to be Lee Brody--Lee Anderson was very popular, sort of the epitome of the kind of women who were emerging as leadership in the party.

Ziffren. And again, Ziffren was, I think, the intellectual leader of the liberal movement in the CDC. Ziffren liked Glenn Anderson and so-and-so. If Glenn had run for the senate endorsement, he would have gotten it. He would have beaten Clair Engle. I think he may have had more following than Cranston had in the party. Cranston didn't choose to challenge Glenn Anderson when he ran. He could have run for lieutenant governor, but he didn't. He ran for controller.

I think the most popular with the club movement, the person to get the endorsement at that convention, was Stanley Mosk.

FRY: Even more than Pat Brown?

GREENAWAY: Oh, yes. Pat Brown was not part of this. Pat Brown would have been running for governor and probably elected in 1958 if there had been no CDC. He was the guy who was powerful enough that he never really needed CDC. Everybody went along with Pat Brown because they needed
Pat Brown to head the ticket, and maybe they would elect some of these other people whom they wanted to elect.

There was a real fight for treasurer. The endorsement was finally won by Bert Betts, who was for many years the treasurer. That was, interestingly, that was sort of geographic. He was from San Diego, and the idea was that San Diego-Orange County ought to have somebody running. That was the prevailing view and the reason that they went along with Bert Betts, who was not well known in the club movement at all.

FRY: To bring the slate along down there, to fill in that gap.

Wasn't there someone who had been in and his father had been in office for a long time?

GREENAWAY: That was the secretary of state. The Republican secretary of state, who was Jordan. Frank [M.] Jordan. And yes, his father had been and he had been, and that was the one seat that we lost in '58, the only thing we didn't win.

I could be wrong on this, but I believe that that was the year that Henry [P.] Lopez was the Democratic CDC-endorsed candidate. He was Hispanic and he was a very, very interesting guy. He is, I believe, now on the faculty at Harvard, and he's a very, very bright guy and very funny.

He had a totally underfinanced campaign since nobody thought anybody could beat Jordan. Besides, nobody thought an Hispanic could win statewide, so he had a campaign that really ran on a shoestring. He called it the lemonade cavalcade and they traveled around California.
They served lemonade at the rallies because they couldn't afford booze and they couldn't raise money and it was the cheapest thing they could do. Anyway, Lopez was . . .

FRY: How did he happen to run? Lopez.

GREENAWAY: I don't know. The feeling at that point was that we needed an Hispanic on the ticket. See, we'd had Ed Roybal running in 1954 for lieutenant governor, so that was all part of it.

FRY: The Hispanic vote, was that considered a big plus at that time if you could get it?

GREENAWAY: Yes. It was considered Democratic, and it was a question of having somebody to say turn out the vote.

FRY: So Stanley Mosk was the most popular. Did anybody ride on his coattails in the CDC convention?

GREENAWAY: Mosk had a lot of the old Young Democrats very strongly for him. His campaign manager was a guy named Glen Wilson, who was extremely popular in the Democratic party, and he was also a product of the Young Democrats of the '49-50 era in the YDs.

FRY: You were in a position, then, to see kind of the breakdown of factions that showed up in this convention, and you know how they carried on. What were they? Which ones were most significant, and how did they line up?

GREENAWAY: It centered more around the leaders, the way I've been describing this for you. The Burtons were very influential in San Francisco at that point. The San Francisco Young Democrats were maybe the major CDC club in San Francisco because of the Burtons and all sorts of people. They were
quite liberal. There was more apt to be factional fighting between the various regions, and those in turn depended upon who the leaders were.

In other words, Zifiren had a group in southern California. There were people still at the convention who were supporters of Sam Yorty, who still was a live political figure. There was a conservative movement in Los Angeles among the Democratic club people, and those were the people who later would be known as the Unruh group, when. . . . It was '61-62, this huge split in the Democratic party in California between the CDC and Jesse Unruh. I'll get into that later, but those people were there in 1958, and they were again more conservative but Democratic.

FRY: So actually, so far, even though CDC was an ideological organization as I understand it, people were . . .

GREENAWAY: I would not call it an ideological organization until 1960-61.

FRY: OK. What were most people's motivation at this point for being active in CDC? Was it an ideological motivation?

GREENAWAY: They were still there to elect Democrats, to abolish cross-filing. That was still what you talked about.

FRY: So it wasn't civil rights or any of those liberal . . .

GREENAWAY: These were controversial issues in CDC. There were a lot of people there who were opposed to expanding civil rights legislation. There were a lot of people there who were opposed to the fair housing legislation that we were going to enact some four years later. It was not a liberal organization and it was not an organization that represented the left
within the Democratic party, something which it became, but it certainly wasn't that at this point. It was the Democratic party. It represented the whole party in '58.

FRY: It did?
GREENAWAY: Yes. There wouldn't be any faction in the party that you wouldn't find in the CDC.
FRY: I was reading an article that [Professor Eugene] Gene Lee wrote. Actually, his article focuses on 1960, but he was saying that people who were in CDC were drawn to it because they did feel that this was the Democrats' time, and also because they could express their own ideology through this, and they learned that they could work in politics and be active without necessarily being a candidate and without making it a full-time thing. Do you agree with that?
GREENAWAY: Oh, yes. Sure. Again, we didn't have the... This was still in '58; we were all volunteers. It wasn't until 1960 that you began to get campaigns suddenly with people who were paid to be working in a campaign.
FRY: Was Don Bradley paid yet?
GREENAWAY: Bradley was paid.
FRY: He was always a professional.
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: OK, but at this point he was with Pat Brown's campaign, as always?
GREENAWAY: Yes, and the state central committee. Bradley never worked with CDC. He was there, but he was always state party.
FRY: How did... I wish you would give me a picture of the euphoria that must have happened at the behavior of the Republicans at this point.

GREENAWAY: Yes. That big switch. Again, nobody really understood the impact of that until we won, until it was... It was one of those things that when it's happening, you're never really as aware of the implications of it as you are when it's all over and you realize that it was a colossal blunder by doing that.

FRY: This was [U.S. Senator William F.] Knowland switching with [Governor Goodwin J.] Knight, both Republicans.

GREENAWAY: Yes. The Knight-Knowland switch. The governor and the senator. And [Governor] Knight clearly never wanted to do that [run for the senate]. He was forced into it by Knowland. Knowland, of course, made the switch because he wanted to be president, and he could better run for president as governor of California than he could as United States senator. So he in effect forced Knight out.

Knight, who was interested in being governor, was not interested in the senate. Knight was sort of a pleasant, I think kind of lightweight guy, but he was one of those politicians with an absolute photographic memory who could remember the first name of somebody he met thirty years ago. Congressman Norm Mineta is the same way, incidentally. Goodie Knight was like that. He was a real politician type, not a sort of gloomy, serious person like Knowland was.
FRY: But he was able to cash in on some of his labor rapport, don't you think?

GREENAWAY: He had had, in '54, the building trades support. See, he ran for governor, having become governor when Warren went to the [United States] Supreme Court. So he ran, and the building trades endorsed Goodie Knight in that election.

FRY: What interested me was—the view I got from reading, which may not be right—that Alan Cranston began gathering his support [in 1956] by going first to labor. Also, as I recall, the AFL [American Federation of Labor] council and the rank-and-file were split on some of the people they backed in this election. Knowland made a big issue out of what he called right to work, which was against the closed [union] shop. It [that proposition on the ballot] brought out a lot of labor votes, as it turned out, and I wondered if Cranston had some indication that those labor issues were going to be really important in this election.

GREENAWAY: I think people felt that. Labor was always considered much more of a force in the Democratic party than it is now. And moreover, a conservative force. CDC labor people would be among the more conservative CDC directors and so on. The unions would be more conservative, as was the case, see, when I went for [CDC] council chairman. I ran against a labor guy. I was the liberal and he was the conservative. I told you about that before, but that was sort of typical of what was the situation. Certainly, the rank-and-file club members were to the left of labor in CDC.
One interesting event at that convention which, although it doesn't have, I don't think, a great deal of impact on the politics of California, was a good indication of how CDC worked at the time.

The president of the California Federation of Young Democrats at that time was a guy named [Thomas] Tom Winnett. Incidentally, he's somebody who should be interviewed as part of this.

FRY: Should he?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: OK.
GREENAWAY: Tom Winnett was at Berkeley, the owner and publisher of Phi Bete Notes, which of course are . . .

FRY: . . . the backbone of undergraduate education. [Laughter]
GREENAWAY: Exactly. He had been president of the Young Democrats. He was in the Berkeley Young Democrats, which was one of the major clubs in the California Federation of Young Democrats.

The State Board of Equalization was elected, and there were four districts. The four districts were based upon the 1870 congressional reapportionment where California had four districts. They made those four districts the State Board of Equalization districts, but they never changed. So in the 1950s, and it wasn't until, oh God, the late sixties, seventies, probably, before they actually changed them.

As a consequence of that, in 1870 the bulk of the population was in northern California, so three of the four
districts were in northern California, and southern California constituted one district. So the State Board of Equalization member from southern California represented as many people as the entire other three combined represented.

FRY: I'm surprised that it lasted this long.

GREENAWAY: Yes, it was amazing that they didn't change it before. But at any rate, they didn't. Winnett had sat down and analyzed the district that included the San Joaquin Valley and Berkeley—I forget the number of it, but at any rate—and noted that Adlai Stevenson in 1956 had in fact carried that State Board of Equalization district. So since the Young Democrats were always looking for something to run for, and since the CDC endorsing convention was there, he comes down to the convention and announced that he's seeking the CDC endorsement for State Board of Equalization from that district.

Winnett, unfortunately, was labeled as being way on the left. Since he was running for the entire San Joaquin Valley, which was part of that district, a lot of the conservative Democratic clubs down there decided they didn't want Tom Winnett. At the convention, the sort of hotbed of foment against Tom Winnett was in Tulare County. There was a guy in Tulare County who was a retired accountant. He was a guy, oh, probably in his fifties. . . . At any rate, he still worked. Named John Lynch.

Lynch had been an investigator on the Estes Kefauver Crime Committees in the early fifties, and he had come out
apparently to retire and to settle down in Tulare County and open up a business as an accountant. John was a balding guy, a businessman, a pleasant guy.

But at any rate, so everybody was casting around in the Valley to run somebody against Tom Winnett. The thing that they said about Tom Winnett was that somebody had been in his house and had seen that on his mantel over his fireplace he had a bust of Lenin. That just went all through the convention. So Winnett was in real trouble.

Late at night, the night of the endorsement, they got John Lynch to agree to run. He hadn't even told his family, as a matter of fact. They were still back in Tulare, some forty miles to the south. But at any rate, they nominated him, and Lynch got the endorsement.

He beat Winnett, so he had to go down and call his wife the following morning and tell her that he was running for the State Board of Equalization. He won and served in there for probably twenty years. And when he went to the convention, he had no thought of even running for the Board of Equalization.

FRY: Is this an example of how . . .

GREENAWAY: It's an example of CDC conventions and what they work out.

At that same convention, Dick Nevins got the endorsement in the South to run for the Board of Equalization, and he ran. He served until the mid-eighties. He retired not long ago.
FRY: There were still a lot of rumblings about the [Assemblyman William G.] Bonelli [Board of Equalization] scandal at this point, too.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: Did that feed into any of this?

GREENAWAY: Not really. Cranston, later as controller, had some dealings with Bonelli. You know that Bonelli was in Mexico, but he was still on the state payroll getting a paycheck even though he had fled the country. He was avoiding extradition in Mexico, and Cranston as state controller quit paying, stopped payment. That was a big deal for Alan. It was one of the few things he did as controller that caused anybody to pay any attention to him.

Anyhow, but that was so typical of that convention, the Lynch-Winnett situation.

FRY: You mean after everyone gathered, these spontaneous combustions would hit.

GREENAWAY: Yes. But it was a fascinating, fascinating convention. There was a novel written about it called The Ninth Wave, and that was about the '58 convention.

FRY: So that it sounds like it would be hard for somebody to have a grand plan of getting control of that convention.

GREENAWAY: Oh, you couldn't. You couldn't do it, because they were very talented, very dedicated, very smart people. You saw that more, in a sense, going to the state board meetings every two months, which I did at that time of the year. Those people were incredible. It was one of the great periods in
California politics as a consequence of the fact that these people were so good, so bright, and issues on which they disagreed, they disagreed on. A lot of them came to Congress, a lot of them became judges, a lot of them are still prime movers in California politics.

FRY: It seems to be, looking at the historical sweep—and I wondered if you saw it like this at the time—that this was probably the most populist movement in California. Is that really so?

GREENAWAY: We felt it was probably the most populist movement in the nation. In '58-59—nobody ever did an accurate count—but we had somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000 members statewide, and we had between 500 and 600 Democratic clubs. We had probably somewhere between forty and fifty councils. This would be county councils and things like that, so it was really a big and heavily structured operation, but at the same time it was really, totally volunteer. It was an amazing sort of a movement.

You see, the funny thing about CDC, and the reason I think it was able to become so strong particularly in '58-59, when in the '58 elections, we really reversed California because in the span of about four years we had gained control of the California congressional delegation 2 to 1, and we had elected one United States senator. When we started out, all of the statewide constitutional officers were Republican with one exception. After '58 all of them were Democratic with one exception. We gained control of both
houses of the state legislature, control of the State Board of Equalization. I mean, we just won everything in the '58 elections.

FRY: And that was the logical change too, of how a democratic government should be run?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: Let me turn the tape.

[End Tape 3, Side A]

[Begin Tape 3, Side B]

GREENAWAY: After the convention. . . . We can come back if you have any questions about the convention, and I may think of more things about it, but I want to talk about the '58 elections now.

After the convention we immediately had a challenge to one of our endorsed candidates, Stanley Mosk. That was [by] a state senator from northern California named McCarthy, I think it was Robert. There were two state senators from northern California at that time named McCarthy, and they were brothers. One was a Democrat and one was a Republican. The Democrat, I think, was Robert McCarthy, and he had a lot of money. As a matter of fact, in the eighties his daughter was a member of our staff.

But at any rate, he announced against Stanley Mosk. He certainly was considered to be a more conservative candidate. Of course, he was Catholic and Mosk was Jewish and in those days there was still a whiff of anti-Semitism
around, but he had a lot of money and he thought Mosk was beatable. He was from the Bay Area, of course, and Mosk was from Los Angeles.

So like six weeks before the election, probably a month after the CDC convention, a poll came out showing McCarthy beating Mosk. So the entire club movement, I mean everybody, went to work for Stanley Mosk in the primary. I did. That was the only campaign, and that was the thing that we focused on. We didn't pay a whole lot of attention to Pat Brown or to Clair Engle, but Stanley Mosk was the one that we had to work for because he was the only one with a primary challenge.

So we won, but we had never lost a statewide endorsement at that point. We only had lost in the '54 general elections, but we hadn't lost a primary endorsement. We didn't want to lose this, so it was really the flexing of its muscle to make its primary endorsement until the McCarthy threat generated all of this, plus the fact that Mosk, as I said to you before, was extremely popular with the party. His popularity went downhill later, but at this point he was considered to be it.

FRY: Where did you campaign for him?
GREENAWAY: In a local area in Fresno. [Inaudible]
FRY: What kind of a campaigner was he? Was he a good speaker?
GREENAWAY: He was a good speaker, but it was . . .
FRY: . . . and [money-tree] shaker?
GREENAWAY: But you have to understand, at that point the whole CDC was a big precinct-working operation. You’d walk precincts, hand out literature, get out the vote. You do all this with volunteers, but that was the big thing in CDC, because CDC couldn’t raise any money. That was ultimately its failure, that it was not capable of raising any money in politics, so a guy like McCarthy could come in. Although CDC could give an awful lot of pavement-pounding and doorbell-ringing to Stanley Mosk, they didn’t give him any money.

FRY: Was this because the state [Democratic] central committee was doing most of that [funding], or was it just because . . .

GREENAWAY: The state central committee participated with CDC.

FRY: I know, and they also did give out the money that they got to CDC, but why was CDC incapable of raising money?

GREENAWAY: Why would people who could really put a lot of money into the party like, say, Carmen Warshaw or Ed Pauley, for example, why would they do it through CDC?

FRY: Rather than through the state committee, you mean, or to candidates?

GREENAWAY: No, they’d do it directly to the candidates. They want to influence the candidate, so they’d give more money to a candidate than CDC with its 50,000 members could raise with dinners or whatever.

Now, the Ed Pauleys and the Carmen Warshaws would show up at conventions, either the state convention of the central committee or the CDC conventions. They were always there. I met Carmen for the first time, I believe in
the 1955 convention, and we were always good friends--to this day we're good friends. She and I got along, but she didn't like most people in CDC. She did like Glenn Anderson.

But you know, our weakness was that we were not good at fund raising. And of course, I would hear that all the time from Lionel Steinberg, who was himself capable of giving a great deal of money, and saw what the weakness of CDC was, and although he was happy to help me and have me in CDC and so on, he himself never spent any time on CDC and was interested, if anything, in the state [party] central committee. The state central committee could raise money, much more than CDC could.

Anyhow, so the big victory for us in June of 1958 was Stanley Mosk's win. That was the important thing and so on, if [candidate for secretary of state Henry P.] Hank Lopez lost and so on. The interesting thing about it was that incidentally we still had cross-filing then in the '58 election, but the difference was that in '58 you had to put your party designation on it.

FRY: Right.
GREENAWAY: Cross-filing was abolished after the Democratic legislature got in, following that.
FRY: I looked at some figures. It looks like Cranston won in the primary . . .
GREENAWAY: Cranston almost lost the Democratic primary. He only beat [Robert C.] Kirkwood by 60,000 votes for the Democratic primary nomination, so he . . .

FRY: And he didn't win the Republican?

GREENAWAY: Oh, no, he lost the Republican. Kirkwood was the Republican nominee.

FRY: I couldn't believe those figures about Alan, but . . .

GREENAWAY: No, that's what it was. It was that he had almost lost. Of course, none of us conceived that Alan could have lost the primary nomination. Hank Lopez did not cross-file. He was the only Democrat who didn't, and it was widely felt that it hurt him because his opponent could focus entirely on Democrats. All of these guys cross-filed except for Lopez.

Anyhow, so after the primary, I remember probably in June or maybe July of 1958 we had a CDC board meeting and I was in the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. Cranston came up to me and said he was really in trouble and that if he couldn't do better in the general he wasn't going to win, so he asked me if I would work for him in the general election. I agreed that I would be his San Joaquin Valley chairman in the general election in 1958.

It was really the beginning of a connection with Cranston, because although I had been involved with CDC when he was president, I never had any particular connection with Cranston at all. I was not part of his inner circle and not particularly a big supporter of his, but since I had served a year before he resigned as president of CDC in
order to run for state controller. He resigned, I believe, in January of 1958, having been reelected as president of the convention in Long Beach in 1957, the same convention where I was elected. So I had that period in '57 when he was president and I was the vice president, when I had met with him and spent some time with him.

But as I say, there was never any particularly close connection between us prior to his asking me to try to help him out in the general since he had been in such deep trouble in the primary. I became the San Joaquin Valley chairman and we basically encouraged campaigning for him, and of course that was still the same area where I was the CDC vice president. So we'd go around and get the clubs interested and I would speak for him at meetings, and we did what we could to try to help.

FRY: How did that work when... How did you spread out from the CDC?

GREENAWAY: Basically, you didn't. You'd come in and you'd have dinners in a local area. I remember Alan came in to speak in rural Fresno County, in Selma, which is a town down the road from Fresno. You know where Selma is? From Fresno, it's Fowler, Selma, Kingsburg, and then you cross the King's River into Tulare County.

Anyhow, we had a Democratic club in Selma, so we did a dinner. We had probably 150 people in Selma at a Democratic dinner with Alan Cranston and Clair Engle and Stanley Mosk all speaking. You'd suspect, other than the
press coverage, that it was absolutely useless, but I mean, it was the way that you did campaign, and I suppose it got around that we came to Selma. Nobody had ever had a Democratic anything in Selma before, so it was useful.

FRY: That was a big event.

GREENAWAY: But it did work, because when the results came in in November of '58, not only did Cranston win, but we had the biggest increase in the San Joaquin Valley over his primary vote of any part of the state. It was an enormous increase so I got credit for that. That had something to do with his winning.

FRY: And with you being here today, you think? Part of it, maybe?

GREENAWAY: To some extent. Again, but I want to stress this was always volunteer. Nobody ever paid me for anything that was involved in doing this.

Then came the 1959 CDC convention, which was also in Fresno. Following '58--and I mentioned this before and let me talk a little more about it now--following the victory of 1958, a lot of people in the Democratic party, including a lot of state central committee people, said, "OK, we've won. We now have the state legislature, so we'll abolish cross-filing. The purposes of CDC have been accomplished. It should be disbanded." And they left the CDC. That included a lot of state legislators, congressmen, people who didn't see any reason to continue CDC in existence.
Indeed, those of us who thought, "We have all these clubs out here. It's silly to think of abandoning them or abolishing them," nevertheless, we had to think of some way that we could hold CDC together, have a purpose, but with a sense of "We have accomplished our purpose and we need to have new purposes."

FRY: There was some reason that Hollifield and some others felt that at that point that it was better to make a drive for an open primary where every registered Democrat went to the polls and voted.

GREENAWAY: Sure. You didn't have to have pre-primary endorsements once you'd abolished cross-filing, because then it's Democrats, and the Republicans can't run and you can't lose it, so certainly that was an argument that was made at that point.

Now, try to tell that to the Young Democrats, who were devoted to fighting within the party to get more liberal candidates. Our orientation by that point was totally that the important fights are the fights in the party. We can all unite in the general election and try to elect Democrats, but that isn't what we're here for. What we're here for is to try to make sure that we get the most liberal candidates through the primary. So there was no sentiment for abandoning CDC.

When Alan resigned as president of the CDC, he was succeeded by Joe Wyatt, Jr. Joe had been the secretary of CDC and had been active in the Young Democrats. Joe and his wife, Marge Wyatt, lived in Pasadena. Marge Wyatt,
incidentally, who was also very popular and very much of a leader, was in the 1970s elected to the Pasadena Board of Education and was the liberal leader. If you remember, a lot of good things came out of the school system in Pasadena, and it was primarily a consequence of Marge and what she did down there. Incidentally, both of them should be interviewed as part of all of this.

Anyway, Joe became president. He was a former Young Democrat. If you go to a state convention in California, right now Joe Wyatt will always be on the stage because he is the parliamentarian of the Democratic party.

**FRY:** Had he studied this in order to . . .

**GREENAWAY:** Yes. Many YDs were parliamentarians. I mean, you almost had to be. To be active in the club movement, you had to be very good at parliamentary law.

**FRY:** It seems to be an advantage if you're going to attain leadership.

**GREENAWAY:** Anyhow, Joe became the president, and after the convention he started looking forward to the 1959 convention. We elected our officers in the odd years. There wasn't much else to hold the convention together.

We decided that we had to do something around the convention, so we decided to have an issues conference. This was the first issues conference that CDC ever had at its convention.
FRY: Am I following you correctly, that this relates to the fact that the cross-filing was no longer a big issue and a unifying factor?

GREENAWAY: That's right. So the feeling is . . .

FRY: You were kind of groping for a unifying factor.

GREENAWAY: Yes, that's right, and we decided on this issues conference. Well, the issues conference was something else again. A friend of Joe's who was to succeed Joe as president of CDC in 1961, Tom Carvey, who was part of the Ziffren group, but more a Ziffren person than Joe was, became active during Joe's presidency. Steve Reinhart, who was now a judge on the Ninth Circuit, also became active in CDC at that point as part of the Ziffren group. A lot of people came in, and they got a club member from Marin County, I believe from Mill Valley, named Nancy Swadesh, to run the issues conference. She did the planning and all that, and I, in Fresno, did the logistics of doing this issues conference.

Well, the issues conference consisted of picking a series of five or six issues. The convention of some 3,000 people, which is the number of delegates--there were probably a total of about 5,000 people at the convention: 3,000 delegates and maybe 1,000 alternates and other people were there. It divided itself into small groups, and in the morning these small groups would begin to talk about whatever the issue was. We had to have something like between forty and fifty different meetings going on simultaneously. We used the whole of downtown Fresno--all the hotels, the business
offices, and so on, and we divided this entire convention into these small groups.

FRY: You were the one who had to arrange all that, right?

GREENAWAY: Yes, exactly. Small groups, OK. And then they met for like two or three hours to discuss the issue and come up with proposals. These groups then would have to go into larger meetings with other groups that had been discussing these same issues, and they would try to work something out.

Then they had a drafting committee to draft the positions that were decided on. As I say, there were somewhere between eight or ten different big sections that were working.

Then the drafting people had to come back to the group of 300 or 400, which was the large group that had been discussing this issue, and that 300 or 400 had to fight over every word in the draft, and by that time it was like seven or eight at night.

And then we had to bring all of them to the floor and debate them, until we finally voted on every one of them. The entire 3,000 people voted on all eight or ten of these things, and we wound up at four o'clock in the morning.

The fascinating thing about CDC conventions is that they. . . . Somebody said it: They do not meet in the daytime. They met only at night, and that was the idea because they hadn't been meeting in the day because they were in these smaller groups, and then the larger groups and so on. They had the plenary session which started at nine
o'clock at night to bring the drafts in, and they'd go until four o'clock in the morning, with 3,000 people on the floor doing this. They were just unbelievable.

Anyway, that was the first of those conventions, and it was really a sight to behold.

FRY: How did you assess the issues that came out of all of this? Whether it was something that would appeal to all the Democrats in California?

GREENAWAY: No, everybody was there fighting for what they believed in.

FRY: I know, but I mean after it was all over, how did you personally take the results?

GREENAWAY: It's very interesting. I get into this because I have to get up to about 1963 or 1964, but one of these sort of after-the-thought criticisms we had of this whole process was that we adopted these positions and then we let them sit there. We didn't do anything to try to implement what we had decided that we were going to do. Now, neither does anybody else; I mean, it isn't unusual that that's the case. Take the Democratic party. Once they take a position on an issue, what do they do? They mail it to their United States senator or their congressman and that's it. They don't follow up on anything.

Later on we devised a way of following up but I don't want to jump way ahead of myself because that's part of the reevaluation of CDC that occurred in '63-64.

FRY: So there wasn't any effort to use this as a way to unite all the Democrats in California.
GREENAWAY: No. As a matter of fact, many of the Democrats in California felt that what we were doing was dividing them because we passed some resolutions that were very liberal. CDC was [now] more liberal, you see. We had lost the conservatives after the '58 elections, so the '59 convention was much more liberal than the '58 convention. That's why I say CDC didn't become ideological in '59-60. It was with this issues conference that that happened.

FRY: I have a couple of questions along in here, and one may shoot rather wide of the mark. Were you in a position now to lobby? Now that the Democrats had real power in the legislature, I understand that some CDC'ers lobbied issues in the legislature, and you were right there in Fresno. I wondered if you did any.

GREENAWAY: No, I didn't. I didn't pay a whole lot of attention to the state legislature among other things, because we still, being from Fresno, had relatively conservative state legislators. I mean, our state senator was Hugh Burns, who may have been the most conservative, and certainly the most notorious member of the state legislature. He was the president pro tem, and [lobbyist Arthur] Artie Samish lived in his apartment, so Burns was very conservative. Our assemblyman was Bert Delano, and Bert, although he had come out of the club movement, was conservative. He would be part of the wing of the party that would have opposed me, for example. We had a Republican representing the other assembly district in Fresno County.
So I didn't have local legislators to lobby. We did later, when we elected [Assemblyman] Charles [B.] Garrigus to represent the rural area of the county and I ran his campaign.

FRY: Charles who?

GREENAWAY: Garrigus. He was in the state legislature for quite a few years. He was a professor of English at Reedley Junior College. He became and I think still is the poet laureate of California, incidentally.

FRY: You have quite an illustrious link with fellow linguists, I guess you could call him.

GREENAWAY: So anyway. But I didn't do much of that.

FRY: Right at this time your favorite people, who were the candidates and that CDC worked so hard to get in office, were now in office and were rapidly becoming the old-timers.

GREENAWAY: That's right.

FRY: At that point . . .

GREENAWAY: But we were still fighting the issue fights.

FRY: Did any of them attend this issue convention?

GREENAWAY: Oh, yes, but the ones who attended would be to the left.

FRY: Of the CDC?

GREENAWAY: Of the CDC moderates.

FRY: You want to discuss any of the issues? Or since they didn't have a lot of implications, shall we move on?

GREENAWAY: Let me tell what happened to me, then, following the '59 convention, and take it up to the '60 convention, and then it
should be about four-thirty, which is about an hour and a half, if that's OK.

FRY: [Nods]

GREENAWAY: All right. I was re-elected vice president of the CDC in a fairly tough fight against a guy named [Robert] Bobby Haden, who was a more conservative, certainly, than I, attorney from Tulare County. I beat him.

FRY: Were you close?

GREENAWAY: It was fairly close, yes. It was a tough fight, but we won. Anyhow.

FRY: He was from Tulare. He was more conservative than you?

GREENAWAY: Oh, yes. Not that there weren't more liberal people in Tulare, but it was difficult. The Valley was always one of the most conservative areas in CDC, and I don't know how long I could have stayed as the regional vice president at CDC. But then I was still teaching high school at the Kerman High School. That was to be my last year.

In May of 1959, Alan Cranston appointed me as state inheritance tax appraiser. Now, that was what the controller did. There had never been a Democratic controller since 1888 in California. The state inheritance tax appraiser system started in 1912, so there had never been a Democrat in that position appointing these inheritance tax appraisers.

FRY: So Alan got to make a lot of new appointments.

GREENAWAY: He got to throw everybody out and to bring in all these Democrats as a result of his election. Let me say something about his election, but first let me explain. Inheritance tax
GREENAWAY: appraisers were named by the state controller and they formed a panel in each county. They were county jurisdiction. In Fresno County, for example, there were two, and later three inheritance tax appraisers.

Whenever there would be a probate estate, the superior court probate judge would appoint, and they'd simply rotate one of those three appraisers to be the probate appraiser for the estate. The appraiser then would have to go out and appraise the assets of the estate and report to the court as to the value. That would fix what the executor would have to sell the asset for. If you appraised the house for $50,000, the executor would have to be within 5 percent of that, or the court wouldn't approve the sale.

The inheritance tax appraiser would be paid by the court. He had a fee based on the size of the estate. If it was a $50,000 estate, you received fifty dollars for appraising this--one-tenth of 1 percent.

Then, having completed the appraisal, then the inheritance appraiser would compute for the state of California the inheritance tax that was due to the state for the estate. You'd have to get that approved by the inheritance department in Sacramento, and when they approved it, he would file it with the court, and then the judge would sign an order requiring that they pay the tax, and of course the estate couldn't be settled until the taxes had been paid.
So the inheritance tax appraiser basically had two functions. One was to do the appraising; secondly was to do the tax computation for the estate. That was the job. Particularly in big counties like Los Angeles, the inheritance tax appraisers could make a lot of money doing this. If you had an estate of several million dollars, your fee could mount up.

FRY: Did you say your fee was one-fifth of . . .
GREENAWAY: One-tenth.
FRY: One-tenth of 1 percent.
GREENAWAY: Yes. It could mount up, and so on. I made about, in the sixties, about $20,000, $25,000 a year doing this. But it was easily a part-time job. Most people who were appointed were attorneys. They would have their secretaries compute the tax, have somebody in the office do that and do the appraising, or even hire the appraising out. So actually, they could do it and make a profit and not even have it interfere with their regular business.

I, however, since I was interested basically in being active in politics, simply did it myself and that gave me a lot of free time to be active in politics because it was not a full-time job.

So I did that for eight years. The eight years with Cranston as the controller. I quit teaching and I learned how to appraise, and I also learned how to compute the tax. I did all the things myself and I sort of had a great time doing it. I had an office in the Security Bank building in Fresno, one
GREENAWAY: room, one secretary, and I was able, with very little overhead, to do all of this, and it enabled me to travel. You had to go out in the county and look at places and all of that. So it was a great job for me, and I enjoyed doing it.

Let me go back to Cranston's campaign, because there was one interesting aspect of it that ought to be part of this history. The Republican incumbent was named Robert Kirkwood. He was the guy who had replaced [Thomas H.] Kuchel as controller when Kuchel became the United States senator. Kirkwood was a liberal Republican. As a matter of fact, everybody always wanted to attack Alan Cranston during the fifties because he had been president of the United World Federalists in 1949. It turned out that Kirkwood had been a member of the United World Federalists too, so they weren't able to use it against Alan the first time Alan runs for office, which is kind of funny. Kirkwood was a great guy. What I'm going to say sounds terribly critical of him, but in fact it was probably more criticism of the times than anything else.

There had never been a black appointed inheritance tax appraiser, never an Hispanic, never an Asian, and only a couple of women, as a matter of fact. They were all white males. There were about 125 inheritance tax appraisers in California in all of the counties.

So during the campaign at some point, Kirkwood is asked before some audience why there were never any blacks and would he appoint a black inheritance tax appraiser.
Kirkwood responded by saying that he felt that people, when they were bereaved and going through that sort of thing, wouldn't want a black coming into their home. There was a guy in the audience, a black guy named [Joseph] Joe Williams, who was an attorney, later a partner of Willie [L.] Brown [Jr.]. He heard that, made notes on it, and went to Alan, and they gave Alan the only issue he had in the campaign, that Kirkwood had said this.

So Alan immediately starts campaigning by saying the first person he will appoint as an inheritance tax appraiser if he's elected controller will be a black. And he did. That was the first appointment he made. He appointed about four blacks, of whom Joe Williams, the guy who actually found this issue, was one. But it was an interesting sign of the times, and particularly that Kirkwood was really a liberal Republican. I'm sure he said this totally innocently at the time, but it was . . .

FRY: Issues are a little hard to come by in a campaign for controller?

GREENAWAY: Of course. Nobody knows what a controller does. A controller serves on all sorts of boards and commissions. He's on the State Lands Commission, the Franchise Tax Board, and everything else, so it's an important job, but nobody knew anything about the position. But Alan used this issue. Actually, it was the only issue against Kirkwood they had in the campaign, and it was good.
I was, I think, the youngest inheritance tax appraiser when I was appointed in California.

FRY: Were you typical in spending so much time in politics, among the appraisers?

GREENAWAY: No. It was very unusual. Most of them were simply lawyers who contributed to the campaign and didn't spend any time in politics, or didn't spend much. They were more apt to be contributors than. . . . There were a few people like me who were appointed.

Now, a very good friend of mine, [Rudolph] Rudy Nothenberg, who was the guy who had run Phil Burton's first campaign for the assembly when Phil was elected. . . . Rudy, incidentally, is now the CAO [chief administrative officer] of San Francisco. He's a person who you ought to interview. Rudy and I are still close, and we were very close during the CDC period. Rudy ran Phil's first campaign, a successful campaign for the Assembly. Rudy was a 3-by-5 card genius. They actually ran precinct organizations where they had everybody in the entire district on a 3-by-5 card. They knew how many kids they had and if they voted. This was before the days of the computer. Later, Rudy ran Willie Brown's first campaign when Willie was first elected to the assembly.

As a matter of fact, it was interesting. This happened a little later but I might mention it now since it's in sync with what we're talking about. Probably in about 1961, we were trying to recruit blacks, and CDC didn't have many at
that time. Rudy and I went to the main intersection of the Fillmore District, which was the black--I guess still is the black--section of San Francisco, up on the second floor, and met a young attorney to try to convince him to get active in politics, and that was Willie Brown. That's how Willie's first political activity was, what Rudy and I recruited him for. He hadn't been active at all before. And then later Rudy ran his campaign when he first ran for the assembly, so that's how Willie got started.

FRY: What did he do in that campaign?

GREENAWAY: Rudy?

FRY: No, I mean Willie Brown.

GREENAWAY: Oh, you mean . . . No, he ran for the assembly.

FRY: Oh, he ran for it. OK.

GREENAWAY: Yes, he ran. It was his first campaign for the assembly. We recruited him to be active in CDC, to take a statewide position in CDC, but as I say, that jumps ahead a couple of years from where I am right now.

Rudy didn't become an inheritance tax appraiser himself but he worked for two other inheritance tax appraisers: Joe Williams, a black; and then the first Chinese appraiser, whose name was Jackson Hu. Rudy worked half a day for Joe and half a day for Jackson, and did all of the appraisal work for two appraisers, and then did the other things that he. . . . Rudy has always had a lot of jobs. But at any rate, he gets more into play in the sixties than he does during this period.
At any rate, one of the consequences of my becoming an inheritance tax appraiser was that I had to resign as vice president of CDC because Alan didn't want his appraisers to hold any party offices, because people could come to him and pressure him to get them to do things, he thought. I have, in the past, questioned the wisdom of his doing that much more than I do right now. As a matter of fact, eventually, in 1965, I got him to make an exception to that rule. But at any rate, in 1959 I had to resign as CDC vice president. There was a brief period where there was kind of an eclipse of my own activities in CDC statewide as a consequence of that.

FRY: Starting in '59?

GREENAWAY: Fifty-nine. I did, however, manage, run, the 1960 convention. I was active, but in '61 I became... There was a new president elected, and I became state chairman of the CDC Political Action Committee, and that was a major title I had. The state chairmen of the committees went to the state board meetings just like the directors and elected officials did, but it was appointed, it was not elected, so it didn't violate the Cranston rule and it was something that I could do.

Anyway, I continued to be very active in CDC but it wasn't quite the same until 1961, when I did this. I'll get into that once we get through the 1960 convention.

The California 1960 convention was a huge thing. Kennedy spoke, [Senator] Hubert Humphrey spoke, [Senator]
Stewart Symington spoke, and Lyndon Johnson sent [former Secretary of Interior] Oscar W. Chapman to speak in his behalf, although I don't think anybody ever remembered Chapman. But at any rate, the big thing was Kennedy and Humphrey. Symington was not as well known, but he was out there at the convention.

FRY: He was there too.

GREENAWAY: Yes. And it was a wild and wooly convention. Anyway, it's now four-thirty.

FRY: So you were active enough to. . . . Were you a delegate?

GREENAWAY: I was still a tax appraiser. I was on the county council, so I was the convention manager. Oh, sure, I was a delegate to all this, and I was still on the county central committee. I still did. . . . The only thing I'd had to resign was the vice presidency of CDC.

FRY: And the ones where all the candidates spoke, are you talking about the national Democratic party convention or the CDC convention?

GREENAWAY: The CDC state convention in Fresno in 1960.

FRY: OK.

GREENAWAY: Now, the national [Democratic party] convention: I was a delegate to the national convention in 1960. We'll talk about that later, but the convention comes first. So I think that we could sort of start with the 1960 convention when we get to the next step.

[End Tape 3, Side B]
This is December 12, 1990, an interview with Roy Greenaway by Amelia Fry.

I think we started in '59.

OK. At the '59 convention: I did find out who was the speaker at the convention, because we always had somebody coming in. It was Chester Bowles, who was the . . .

. . . ambassador to India?

He was the ambassador to India, but he at that point was a congressman from Connecticut, but of course he had been earlier active, I think in the Truman administration. At one point he was . . .

. . . head of . . .

. . . the Office of Wage and Price Stabilization or something like that.

That's right. Head of OPA? Office of Price Administration?

Price Administration, that was it.
Anyhow, so he came in and spoke, and we were seeing him in the context of his being ambassador to India, and I think he had just written a book that had something to do with foreign policy and so on, so he was a very popular speaker. At that point he was sort of a reputed presidential candidate, so there was thought of him doing that. He made an enormous impression on the convention.

But the convention was really mostly devoted to sort of housekeeping and to the issues conference, and so the '59 convention is not a particular highlight for me except for the fact that, A, it was in Fresno and I ran it; B, that I was reelected regional vice president for CDC and so on.

FRY: So at that time you didn't really think about the California Water Plan?
GREENAWAY: Water was an issue at that point.
FRY: I don't know that the plan was actually drawn up and submitted to anybody yet.
GREENAWAY: I think it was a ballot proposition in '60. I remember President Kennedy came over for the ground-breaking for the San Luis Reservoir, which was the ponding area about halfway down in this joint federal/state plan and so on. That was . . .
FRY: It is awfully dry now [in the drought].
GREENAWAY: Yes. That was back in '61, '62 that that started.
FRY: In my notes, it was a $1,750,000,000 water bond issue on the ballot.
GREENAWAY: In what year?
In 1960.

Yes. A lot of us in CDC opposed it. It was quite controversial.

How were the lines drawn in CDC on that?

It was liberal-conservative pretty much, but we did the first. . . . I need to find some dates. Let me go into the convention, to the extent that I can tell you much about it. We were constantly fighting that fight. I don’t have a whole lot of notes.

I was appointed a state inheritance tax appraiser in 1959, incidentally, in probably May or June, but although Alan then wanted me to resign, I did not resign for a year, so I remained a regional vice president of CDC through the 1960 election—through the primary elections.

He wanted you to resign from your regional vice presidency?

Vice presidency. And eventually I did have to do that. I resigned and a successor was elected on August 22, 1960. During the 1960 convention, which was the twelfth through the fourteenth of February of 1960, I was still a vice president. The idea was to let me stay in the position through the primary, since we always felt the primary was the big fight for CDC and that I would not have to resign until after the primary.

So let me talk about the convention for a little bit. As I say, it was also in Fresno. At that point, all but one of the CDC conventions had been in Fresno. This ’57 convention in Long Beach was the only one that was not in Fresno at that
point. I had managed all the Fresno conventions except for the first one in 1954. I managed '55, '56, '58, '59, '60.

FRY: There were a lot of presidential candidates who were Democrats, a pool kind of beginning to form at that point [1960].

GREENAWAY: At that point there were basically four: Kennedy, [Senator Hubert] Humphrey, [Senator Stewart] Symington, and [Senator] Lyndon Johnson.

FRY: Now, if I have it right, although CDC wasn't going to vote on these, there was a lot of maneuvering going on about delegations and who was for what . . .

GREENAWAY: Yes, exactly.

FRY: . . . by representatives of these candidates, maybe. Is that right?

GREENAWAY: Yes. And of course, the decision was made to do a delegation which would be the sort of official establishment delegation that would not be for any of these candidates. The candidates would not come into California and test their strength in the California primary, so that this delegation which was to nominate Pat Brown was a Pat-Brown-for-President [favorite son] delegation, and it was [for] unity. I think there was another delegation but it didn't win. The Brown delegation did win, and I was on the Brown delegation as an alternate.

FRY: There was a California law that prevented California from having an unpledged delegation.

GREENAWAY: That's right.
FRY: So Pat Brown was put in, as I understand it, as a favorite son [not as a serious candidate].

GREENAWAY: He put himself in, but the idea was not to tear us apart with the kind of fight that would have happened had we had [all four candidates]. See, once a candidate’s name was on the ballot, then he had to file the names of his delegation, and they were also on the ballot. I don’t mean they were on the ballot you actually voted on, but they were on a backup. But when you voted for whoever the presidential name on the ballot was, you were simply voting for delegates who were committed to vote for that candidate, and that was the case with Pat Brown.

Well, if we had had all four of them come in, we would have had four delegations, and the whole party leadership would have been torn apart. That happened in 1952 when [we had] a nonpartisan delegation. . . . I mean nonpartisan in the sense of not committed to a candidate, which was committed to Pat Brown, incidentally; it was also a Pat Brown delegation. When that delegation lost to Estes Kefauver, Kefauver beat the official party delegation in 1952. What that meant was that the Democratic national committeeman and committeewoman, which were tremendously powerful positions within the party, came from the Kefauver delegation. They were considered to be mavericks and outsiders, whereas they were not the party regulars.
The memory of what happened in '52 had something to do with what happened in 1960. They didn't want to have that happen again. They didn't want to have Stewart Symington's delegation elect a national committeeman and committeewoman. That is to say, the sort of the Roger Kents, the official party, didn't want to see that happen, because that would have undermined their strength, as happened in '52.

FRY: One reason I thought maybe that with the pressure coming in and gradually increasing from the Kennedy forces, everybody was jittery to prevent a big battle like '52 because in 1960 they were going to redesign the districts for Congress in the legislature, and the Democrats were very eager not to have a big battle about that. Is that what you picked up?

GREENAWAY: I think possibly that, but I think it was more the sort of party establishment protecting itself, more than anything else.

FRY: What did you see as the party establishment? Pat Brown?

GREENAWAY: The party establishment was Roger Kent, was Pat Brown, was Paul Ziffren, was . . .

And Paul Ziffren, incidentally, had been part of the Kefauver thing in '52, but he was a party Democrat. The leadership of CDC was part of it. They're pretty loyal to that. Because remember, CDC had been organized by the state [Democratic] committee. (The split didn't occur until after the '60 election, where you had the Unruh people on one of the sides and the CDC people on the other side.) But
there was still pretty much unity going into 1960, and the CDC was not particularly interested in running some sort of challenge to the party slate either. Most of the leadership of CDC wound up on the Pat Brown delegation as delegates, so they weren't opposed. CDC don't really become mavericks and outsiders for four or five years, even. It still was pretty much party establishment heading up CDC at that point.

There was one other thing that had to do with it, I think, and that is, many of us were still for [Adlai] Stevenson. Stevenson was not going to enter the California primary even if all the others had, and the reason was that having been the presidential nominee twice, he took the position that if he was going to be the nominee, they were going to draft him. He would not seek it. In fact, after Pat Brown released the delegation at the convention in Los Angeles to vote for whomever they wished instead of having to vote for him (which they were supposed to do on the first ballot), then he endorsed Kennedy, [but] Stevenson had gotten more votes on the first ballot from California than Kennedy did.

FRY: That's interesting.
GREENAWAY: Yes. It was a big thing.
FRY: Yes, because they kept trying to take the polls in the delegation caucuses. Do you think Pat accurately reflected the delegation's votes when he reported on the floor that they were for Kennedy?
GREENAWAY: No.
FRY: Let's back up.

GREENAWAY: Yes. To the convention.

FRY: To the CDC convention. I think that they had an issues battle there too, didn't they?

GREENAWAY: One of the big issues, incidentally, that there was a great deal of acrimony about, was Caryl Chessman. Chessman hadn't been killed yet, hadn't been sent to the gas chamber yet. It happened right after the convention. The delegates tried to introduce a resolution asking Pat Brown not to have Chessman killed. The president of CDC at that time was Joe Wyatt. He ruled the motion out of order for some reason or other. There were two attempts made to bring it to a vote, and both attempts failed because the leadership of CDC didn't let it come to a vote.

FRY: Pat Brown had delayed Chessman's execution.

GREENAWAY: He was very much torn up by the whole thing.

FRY: And the whole issue of capital punishment arose then.

GREENAWAY: Yes. At that time his clemency secretary was Cecil Poole, who is now a judge on the Ninth Circuit, I think the first black ever to be named to the Ninth Circuit, who moved up fairly late. (We had something to do with that. Alan was already senator by the time Cecil Poole moved up. He was a federal district judge earlier.) But he was Pat Brown's clemency secretary. He was fairly popular. He's a black leader, and he was strongly for the death penalty for Chessman. Brown, who was opposed to capital punishment, nevertheless went ahead and did that. To this day, Pat will
say that "That was one of the things I most regret that I did while I was governor, was to kill Caryl Chessman."

But capital punishment was a very big issue with the CDC during that period. I remember probably a couple of years later, I would suspect, around '62, '63, going to a vigil at San Quentin because CDC was establishing a vigil on a night they were going to kill two people, sort of a death watch thing, and going up and standing around San Quentin looking across the fence at the prison like at eight or nine o'clock at night. So it was a big issue at the time.

FRY: At the convention, were you able to gather supporters against the death penalty?

GREENAWAY: That was happening. I wasn't particularly part of that because I was running the convention and working more on logistics, but yes, that was a big operation at that point.

FRY: The other issues, maybe, were . . .

GREENAWAY: Water was one.

FRY: Recognition of Red China in the U.N. [United Nations]?

GREENAWAY: Yes, that was an issue that was talked about. That was the Young Democrats pushing that. Certainly some sort of civil rights.

FRY: Did loyalty come up, or was that later?

GREENAWAY: It was an issue that was being discussed. I can't remember whether it came up specifically at the convention, but there was an awful lot of CDC agitation against the loyalty oath.

Now, let me tell you one thing that happened at the convention which is anecdotal and on the side, but it is
GREENAWAY: something that I have always taken a great amount of pride in. At the convention. . . . You understand the whole press was at that convention; I mean, all the national, political observers. I remember Mary McGrory there, and so on. So they were all at this convention.

Well, it was traditional at a convention, because we had three sessions--a Friday night, a Saturday night since we had an issues conference during the day, and a Sunday session--that we would begin with an invocation. Normally you had a Protestant and a Catholic and a Jew to give the three, so that those would be the three people who would do the three days. Well, I decided that I was going to do something different. I was going to have three invocations, and I wasn't going to have a Protestant or a Catholic or a Jew do any of them.

So it started out the first night, and I had a Buddhist priest come out. A Japanese Fresno priest wearing a white robe. I insisted that these people wear costumes, if they had any, as part of it. This priest comes out, and I insisted that he mention Buddha as part of the invocation. So he comes out. That was the night Kennedy was going to speak, and the whole press corps was there. So we have this Buddhist come out, and he is invoking Buddha's name and everybody's praying because they were very Democratic and liberal at that point; they all liked the idea. The press corps were just wiped out by the whole thing. I was standing next to Sander Vanocur. We were sitting on sort of the side of the
stage. He looked at me. He says, "There isn't a single Buddhist in this hall except for him."

The second day, then, on Saturday, I had a local lay leader of the LDS [Latter Day Saints], a Mormon. I don't consider Mormons to be Protestant, so that fit that. And then Sunday morning I had the archdeacon of the Armenian Orthodox Church, who had his acolyte with a crook walking ahead of him, so they came on the stage and he was in these full, magnificent costumes like they were in the Russian Orthodox Church, and he gave the invocation. He wasn't a Roman Catholic, so I figured that fit that category also. So it was one of my big moments.

FRY: Did people think that you were doing this to defuse this issue about Kennedy being a Catholic?

GREENAWAY: No, they didn't at all. As a matter of fact, they all took it very seriously because again, the liberalism was moving in this sort of a . . .

FRY: . . . ecumenical fashion.

GREENAWAY: Yes. Sure. So nobody. . . . The press thought it was outrageous. I thought it was funny, and everybody else thought it was that. And then for the benediction to close the convention, which wasn't part of this Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, I had Michael Loring, who was the cantor whom I mentioned earlier, who was the guy who had gone underground during the McCarthy era, the singer who had become cantor at the local temple. He came out and he
sang "The House I Live In" as the benediction. It was really a wild convention in that sense.

FRY: Go ahead. Then I have a question I'm just dying to ask you.
GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: I just want to get a good picture of all the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that was being done by the Kennedy forces and Pat Brown trying to . . .

GREENAWAY: They weren't doing a whole lot at the CDC convention. That was still fairly early. Kennedy was to come back later in the state and make his appeal for delegates. I remember . . .

FRY: But he had already made noises about coming in in January, the month before, and Pat Brown had already formally announced that he was going to have this delegation.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: So it was beginning to heat up a little, as I understand.

GREENAWAY: Yes. There was a meeting, I believe in May of 1960, which would have been after the delegation was named, and I think it was a Democratic State Central Committee Executive Committee meeting in San Francisco, and it was at the Fairmont Hotel. Kennedy came to that, and he talked to the entire delegation. They set up a system where he met with all of the designated delegates individually. There would be two of them at a time.

I remember I went in with a guy. I can't think of his name, but he was from Stockton. We walked into the room, and Kennedy was sitting there, and Larry O'Brien was with him. He was the only other person in the room. He sat
down, and I suspect we had all of about a minute that we could say something to Kennedy and Kennedy said something to us.

FRY: In Kennedy's own room?
GREENAWAY: Yes, in Kennedy's own hotel room in the Fairmont. It was a well-organized operation and no other presidential candidate could conceivably have been well enough organized to do that. I remember feeling pleased with the whole thing. Then I met Kennedy again after he got the nomination.

FRY: Did this change your mind about Adlai?
GREENAWAY: No. After he got the nomination, Kennedy came to Fresno and we had some sort of an event for him. That was the year that the new Chevrolets--the Corvair, which is the one with the engine in the back--they came out in 1960. I had bought one of the first ones. I remember we were taking Kennedy from the reception which preceded the dinner. It was at the home of Jack O'Neil.

Jack O'Neil was the head of Producers Cotton Oil and was one of the biggest agribusiness people. As a matter of fact, where the San Luis Reservoir is now, there is a ponding area below it and it's called the O'Neil Forebay, and it's named after Jack O'Neil, who was one of the major movers of getting the California Water Project because again, producers owned a huge amount of the west side.

Anyway, so Kennedy had this reception in Fresno at Jack O'Neil's home. Mine was one of the cars--not the car that was going to take Kennedy, my little Corvair, but I was
taking somebody. I wound up taking Pierre Salinger, as a matter of fact. Kennedy came out and he saw it, and he says, "I've never seen. . . . I like those cars and I've never been in one. Do you mind if I sit in it?" So I said, "Sure." So he sits in the car and handles the steering wheel—the motor wasn't running or anything—and said, "That's great. I'm going to get me one of those," and then got in the other car, and Salinger got in my car.

So I actually owned a car that Jack Kennedy sat in, and I talked about that for a long time. But I was never particularly a Kennedy fan, despite the good sort of personal contacts that I had had with him. Those were the three occasions when I met him: the CDC convention, the San Francisco meeting for the delegation, and then this Fresno event.

All right. Now, having said that, I want to go now beyond the convention. All right. Is there anything you want to ask? That will move us into a little later, in 1960.

FRY: Yes. I picked up some things in my reading that I wanted to ask you about, because these are not first-person accounts that I read, and yours is. Some Democrats were saying that if Kennedy wins in California, if he came into the state for the primary and won, that it would endanger the chances of the Democrats capturing the state legislature again in 1962 because of the resulting fight that would split the Democrats so much. What I don't understand is, why was there all this fear of a primary battle on the delegations?
GREENAWAY: There was a huge primary battle in '62 on the delegation. That was a CDC-Unruh fight.

FRY: I mean in '60.

GREENAWAY: Sixty-two.

FRY: I mean the presidential.

GREENAWAY: Kennedy might bring down the Democratic congressional candidates? That's possible. That's the only thing that would make any sense. That he would hurt . . .

FRY: The literature seems to be insistent that everyone had their eyes on keeping the Democrats very united. I wondered why no one thought that even if we did have two or three delegations for people to vote on in the primary, that they wouldn't all unite afterwards. Was that because of what you were talking about, the 1952 experience that did not unite afterwards, and they voted for Republicans?

GREENAWAY: Yes. No, they didn't vote for Republicans, but they didn't unite. It just sort of tore the party apart. So you had a situation with a national committeeman in '53. And particularly the national committeewoman, whose name was Clara Shirpser. She's from Oakland. I think she's still alive, incidentally.

FRY: Yes, we interviewed her.

GREENAWAY: Clara came in and was really resented by the party and was considered to be more liberal.

FRY: So it was that idea that the committee people--the national committeeman and committeewoman--would not represent the bulk of the Democratic board?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: But there was a fight, I guess you'd call it, to get Ziffren out of the committee, in '59 or early '60, I guess.
GREENAWAY: When was that? That was later.
FRY: It's either '59 or '60.
GREENAWAY: That was at a state convention, and it could have been in '61.
FRY: It was earlier than that. It's in this period.
GREENAWAY: When Stanley Mosk became national committeeman?
FRY: Right. Before the 1960 election, just before.
GREENAWAY: OK, well, I remember I was at the state convention, and that was one of the most outrageous things I had ever seen Pat Brown do. But I didn't know he did it that early. I thought it was a little later.

But at any rate, because he came on stage, after he had endorsed Stanley Mosk for national committeeman. The state party had to elect the national committeeman. They roll-called, and they called all the delegates' names, and Brown sat on stage and made notes of anybody who voted for Ziffren. It was considered to be the most heavy-handed thing that Pat Brown had ever done. The Ziffren people were just outraged by it all, and of course Mosk was useless as a national committeeman anyway because he was the attorney general and he was not himself ever terribly interested in the party.

The parties who wanted Ziffren out were a lot of the congressional delegation. And Ziffren had feuded with
Lyndon Johnson, too, when Lyndon Johnson was the U.S. Senate majority leader. There was a lot of criticism of Ziffren because of that. See, Ziffren had been a backer of Paul Butler, and Butler was anathema to congressional Democrats, although Stevenson thought he was great. So it was part of that fight. It could have been '59, but I thought it was later.

FRY: About the whole role of the elected officials in things like the selection of national committeepersons and also in selecting delegation and so forth: there were more of them by far on this delegation than there had been before, ever?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: One-third of the delegation were elected.

GREENAWAY: And then when you had something like a state convention, you have to remember the only way you could get on the state . . .

[Interruption]

. . . The only way you could go to become a member of the state central committee was if a legislator appointed you. The only other people on the state [central committee] were the chairmen of the county committees, but there were only fifty-odd some of them, because not all counties had county committees. Each incumbent got to appoint three or four members of the state central committee, so there were 500 or 600 of them and only fifty of the county committee chairmen, so it was just totally nominated by the state legislature and by the congressional delegation.
I think at that point, incumbents and nonincumbents had the same appointive power. Later on they added to the number of appointments that an incumbent could make. A nonincumbent could make, I believe, four, and an incumbent could make six. And one of the reasons that nobody ever felt that the state conventions were worth spending a whole lot of time on was that they were so dominated by incumbents that party activists couldn't get appointed to them.

FRY: So the delegation then being heavily weighted by incumbents, this must have taken from CDC [numbers], but then when the numbers came out, CDC really did have a lot of people on the delegation.

GREENAWAY: Yes. But as I say, the CDC leadership particularly was very much a part of the establishment.

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: There were districts that were conservative, and they would have CDC officials who were much more acceptable to the local congressmen.

FRY: Let me throw a sticky question at you here. There was an analytical article written about the 1960 campaign in California by Gene Lee, and he quoted what he called a most influential and knowledgeable Democrat in California, who said, "I think most of the people who were in on the discussion as to how to construct the delegation had never had great confidence in the CDC." They mention that they feared that the CDC didn't have the requisite stability and
that it didn't relate to the California community at large but to a particular ideological base. The idea was if they could keep the CDC from having practically free rein, at least in southern California--this person he was quoting must have been in southern California--it's only natural to fill the vacuum with incumbent legislators. Now, did you pick up on that?

GREENAWAY: Sure. CDC's history is that it moved continually to the left after it was first organized. It was gradual, but certainly it was more liberal in '60 than it was in '58. One of the reasons was the right kept peeling off because the more liberal CDC people won elections because they were better organized, because a lot of them had come up through the Young Democrats and they knew parliamentary procedures. They were more effective, they were more effective at CDC conventions, they were more apt to be on the floor at three o'clock in the morning when resolutions were passed, and some of the conservatives would be back in the hotel drunk or sleeping or something like that.

FRY: So it was evolution by natural selection?

GREENAWAY: Yes, exactly. It finally moved so far to the left that even I left, you understand. That was something that was to continue over the years to what it is now, which is a vestige of what it was. But that's a consequence of this whole movement to the left. There will be more about it in '63-64, and I'll have to talk to you about that, because that was one of the most interesting periods in terms of my involvement in
CDC and what we were doing, because we were facing up to the problem that this was happening, and trying to figure out what to do about it. We knew that it was moving to the left. I knew I was in a stronger position in the '60 convention and '61-62 convention than I had been, say, in the '57 convention and the '59 convention.

FRY: The big decision in 1960 that seemed to emerge in collecting this all-in-one delegation was to put people on it with clout; get as much clout on it as you can. I wondered, did you get your position in the delegation because of your position in CDC, or were you locally . . .

GREENAWAY: Part. No, no. I was selected as part of some kind of statewide selection process. I was an alternate, not a delegate, you've got to remember. And Lionel Steinberg had something to do with getting me on. He was still active and still being helpful to me. Of course, he was powerful in the state committee, so Lionel was never active in the CDC. He was the wealthy grower who came out of the Young Democrats. By that time he had moved to southern California, to Palm Springs, which is where he lives even today. But we were still in touch—indeed, I'm still in touch with him—and he was very much a part of the Stevenson operation but then switched to Kennedy. As a matter of fact, I think in 1960 he may still have been in Fresno. But at any rate, he played a role in getting me into the delegation, which was probably as influential as my being in CDC was.
FRY: I thought maybe locally you would have had opposition from people like [Bernard] Bernie [F.] Sisk.


We were in the midst of a terribly factional local battle which was to burst into the open particularly in 1962, but there was always the local fight that was going on.

FRY: The power of the incumbents on the local county committee?

GREENAWAY: Yes. On the other hand, I did have a local assemblyman, Charles Garrigus, whom I mentioned before, who was extremely loyal to me. I ran his campaign and helped him be elected, and he would appoint me to the state central committee. Now of course, it’s a lot easier to do that with a liberal candidate in San Francisco than it is with a liberal candidate in Fresno. So I think that had I been in San Francisco or even Los Angeles, I might have been a delegate instead of an alternate.

FRY: Because they had. . . .

GREENAWAY: Because they wouldn’t have had the local incumbents be so conservative that they couldn’t go along with these liberals in the organization.

FRY: This was such an unusual delegation because it may have been weighted on the side of clout and on the side of the incumbents. However, it had meticulously gathered in everybody from every faction and every subfaction and every geographical area of California, so in that respect it was representative. So you had a delegation with either no power base or many power bases within it. It must have
been pretty interesting to go to that convention and watch all of this unravel and then eventually hit the end of the spool.

**GREENAWAY:** I was meeting with the Stevenson caucus throughout at the delegation, and it was kind of fascinating because we had some fairly conservative members. The congressman from Sacramento, John Moss. Johnny Moss, which was a surprise to me. He was a congressman for many years from up there, was a Stevenson delegate and he was very anti-CDC, and it was funny to be at meetings with him.

**FRY:** The names I have here to talk to you about are [William] Bill Munnell, maybe; George Miller, maybe; Ann Eliaser.

**GREENAWAY:** She was a vice president or an officer in CDC. She was fairly close to the leadership. She was a wealthy San Franciscan, a good friend of mine, a good friend of Alan's, and she was married to the heir to a local laundry company. Her name was Ann Alanson at this point. And Eliaser was later, a later marriage. Her husband died and she got married again.

    Munnell was an assemblyman. I knew him. I don't have a big recollection of him. He got out of politics shortly after then.

**FRY:** Charlotte and Kenneth Maslen; and W. H. Nelson, and Marie Nelson. Maybe these are southern Californians.

**GREENAWAY:** It could be; I don't know.

[Discussions deleted]
At any rate, we in the Stevenson caucus knew Kennedy was going to get the nomination, but we wanted to get more votes than Kennedy got, for Stevenson. Of course, this was the convention when [Senator] Eugene McCarthy nominated Stevenson.

When he nominated Stevenson at the convention, it was, in many people's view, the finest speech Eugene McCarthy had ever made. It was a wonderful speech, and they all left the convention singing the praises of McCarthy, which was kind of interesting, because I was later to have my opinion of him totally reversed, but at that point I thought he was the greatest thing that had happened.

So it was a fascinating convention.

FRY: Do you know anything about the mysterious way in which the galleries were packed with Stevenson supporters and long demonstrations materialized?

GREENAWAY: They just were well organized. I remember one incident that was just wonderful. Following the nomination—and Kennedy got the nomination—they had a big rally in the Coliseum in Los Angeles. I was in the Coliseum at the time of the rally. The Kennedy people were still very sensitive with how popular Stevenson was and how popular he was in California.

So at any rate, at the point at which Stevenson was introduced, he started to speak and he got about ten words out. At the other end of the field, a band started playing and marching down the field, totally drowning Stevenson out. Then they said, "Stop the band," and there was great
disarray, and the band went back, and everything happened, and it had destroyed the aura for Stevenson’s speech, kept there from being the sort of applause for him and that kind of thing, kept him from getting the ovation and so on.

It later turned out that the Kennedy people had done that intentionally to keep him from getting upstaged. At the time I knew what had happened. That was the kind of thing that Dick Tuck would do. Of course, Tuck was working for . . .

FRY: . . . for Kennedy?
GREENAWAY: . . . for Kennedy at that point. He’d worked for Stevenson before, in ’56.

Some of the most fascinating Dick Tuck stories are stories about some of the things he did during the 1960 election where he would. . . . Oh, the thing where Nixon was on the back of the train waving goodbye on a train trip he was taking, leaving someplace on the Peninsula. Pat Nixon was still out shaking hands, and Tuck had put on an engineer’s cap and was at the back of the train. He started hollering and the train pulled out leaving Pat Nixon there.

That was one example of Dick Tuck in the thing. He was the one who had. . . . Remember one of the issues in ’60 was the [Howard] Hughes loan that Nixon had made? So when Nixon went into Chinatown in San Francisco . . .

FRY: Was this the loan for his house, or am I getting the two mixed up?
GREENAWAY: No, it was a loan for something. [It was a loan to Nixon's brother.] Tuck had all of the Chinese waving signs up and down, and the sign said in Chinese, "What about the Hughes loan?" Nixon didn't know what it meant, of course, and all the Chinese there knew what it meant, and it got on TV. That was typical of Tuck.

If you want, I'll tell you one other Dick Tuck story, which was, in a sense, the biggest classical story that I've heard about Tuck's thing. After the debate in Chicago where

[End Tape 4, Side A]

[Begin Tape 4, Side B]

GREENAWAY: I met Tuck in '58 when he switched the nameplates on the hotel rooms in the Hotel Californian. In '60 he showed up in Fresno, and Nixon was having a rally at night in a shopping center. Tuck somehow or another found the circuit breakers and shorted out the entire shopping center, so this whole area for like six blocks went totally dark while Nixon was trying to give a speech. It was simply Tuck shorting it out. That was the kind of harassment that he was engaged in through the campaign.

FRY: I guess the difference between his tricks and Nixon's tricks is that Tuck's were funny.

GREENAWAY: Yes, they really were.

FRY: And sort of, as you say, harassment type that weren't quite as widely effective as Nixon's were.
GREENAWAY: Yes. At any rate, the election was. . . . It was not a huge thing. I don't know how I can explain why the '60 election wasn't, but there were not big races and big issues that we were involved in. A lot of us weren't that enthused about Kennedy anyway. We had had our shot at the Democratic National Convention to get votes for Stevenson, and we'd done that. So the party was working in local elections in 1960, and that was about it.

FRY: On the ballot, the hot issue was this California Water Plan.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: But during the election, one of CDC's former candidates, Yorty, came out for Nixon. Do you remember anything about that?

GREENAWAY: No. It wouldn't have been a surprise, and I'm sure he did.

FRY: There were people who tried to get him not to.

GREENAWAY: Yorty was considered the worst Democrat. Yorty and maybe Hugh Burns were considered the worst Democrats by CDC at that point. Later Unruh was added because of the battles after the '60 election.

FRY: Unruh looks like he was beginning to gather some weight in this campaign. Do you want to talk about that?

GREENAWAY: I can't tell you much about '60. Unruh was, I believe, Kennedy's state chairman in the campaign, and that was all aimed toward the '62 reapportionment and the election in the new districts. We did control. . . . we reapportioned in 1960; we got the whole thing.
I want to digress now for just a moment and talk about CDC for a while, and then sort of lead up to the '62 elections.

FRY: OK.
GREENAWAY: After the Democratic convention, at a CDC board meeting that was on August 22, 1960, I finally resigned as vice president of CDC. Paul Birmingham, who was from Modesto, was elected the vice president to succeed me. At the CDC board meeting, the state organization, there were the officers, which I had been, and each congressional district had a director and they were called the CD directors--congressional district directors. And then each assembly district had a representative, and they were called AD reps [Assembly District Representatives]. They were appointed by the board or elected at the convention, but they didn't have a vote on the board. The votes were the officers and the directors.

So at the point at which I ceased to be vice president of CDC, I was selected by the board to be the AD rep of the Thirty-second Assembly District, and that gave me credentials to go to the board meetings following this, which I needed in order to be something other than an observer. I could speak, and so on.

FRY: The CDC board?
GREENAWAY: In the CDC. I was very unhappy about having to resign. I wanted to remain active, because at that point the CDC board of directors' meetings every two months were, to me,
GREENAWAY: the most important thing that was happening in politics in California and the place where you could try to influence the party.

At that point we felt that CDC was the one way that the grass roots could have some influence in the Democratic party and have influence on the incumbents and have influence on legislation; that you couldn't do that with the state central committee because it was dominated by incumbents. But this was a way that you could get in, you could rock the boat, you could push positions on issues, and so on. We all were very much caught up at that point in the grass roots aspect of CDC.

It had become the club movement, see, at that point. Remember when I told you that when we started out it was not the club movement, it was simply a way to abolish cross-filing and allow the official party to engage in unofficial activities like preprimary endorsement, which they were precluded from doing by law? And that bringing the clubs in was almost an afterthought.

Well, by the time you get to 1960, the clubs dominated CDC. It was the club movement then, and we all believed in that. We felt it was supposed to be a big tent, that it was supposed to have diverse views, that it was a way for people to have influence. We were beginning at that point to outreach, too, to get out into the black community and the Hispanic community to try to convince people other than what was basically originally an upper-middle-class white, or
middle-middle, with some labor, and that was about it. That would be what it was like in the '57 convention, say, or the '56 convention, a way to do a thing where there really was minority representation and where you did have some effort made to organize among poor people.

FRY: How did you do that? I mean, did you organize organizers to go out and do this?

GREENAWAY: Yes. You would organize. You would do that. The officers, the directors, were supposed to organize. You're supposed to organize clubs. I remember going over to... Oh, there's a little town just south of Monterey, between Monterey and Fort Ord. It's called Seaside.

Well, Seaside at that point was a black community. Seaside was originally the ghetto of Monterey, and they didn't even have paved roads. I remember going over and driving up on the side of a sand dune on a dirt or sand road to go to a house and meet with an all-black group to try to get a Democratic CDC club organized at that area, since Monterey was in my region as vice president and so on.

FRY: What kind of success did you have in this plan?

GREENAWAY: Not a whole lot.

FRY: California had some blacks in positions of local political power, like [Assemblyman] Byron Rumford, at the time. Were you able to bring in people like that?

GREENAWAY: Most people would be... Yes, usually there would be black Democratic clubs in heavily black districts in cities, but we still didn't have blacks working their way up to the officers.
Remember I told you about recruiting Willie Brown? That was after '61, but the idea was to get some minority into the hierarchy of CDC, and there weren't.

FRY: In California, the Jewish community was not a problem in this respect, was it?

GREENAWAY: No. The Jewish community was very active in CDC.

FRY: And always?

GREENAWAY: Always, always, yes.

FRY: Others have told me that in southern California, the Jewish community, too, was very good at fund raising and providing funds for Democratic candidates.

GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: Is that the way you saw it?

GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: More than northern California?

GREENAWAY: Much more. Maybe because of the movie industry, and I don't know for sure why, but obviously there were some major San Francisco Jewish contributors. The Swig family, for example, which own the Fairmont Hotel.

FRY: Oh, Ben Swig, yes.

GREENAWAY: Yes. Notice all of my references at this point have been to the Fairmont Hotel, because everything was done there, because Swig was a major Democratic contributor. There were others, like Roger Kent and so on, but they're not Jewish. But I think it's more so in southern California than in northern California. Certainly the board, a lot of the best people in CDC were Jewish.
FRY: So you went on. You continued on the board, then.

GREENAWAY: I continued on the board, and I continued to do things like. . . . Oh, I would be, like, for example, the 1961 CDC convention was in Santa Monica--the second one that we hadn't had in Fresno. At that point we were expanding the issues conference concept, so for example, before the convention, which was held. . . . I'll give you the dates of that. Let's see. [Checks notes] Yes, March 4 in Santa Monica, the '61 convention.

Before that, in January and February, we had regional issues conferences. The idea was to get people before they went to the issues conference statewide at regional issues conferences to begin to talk about and to develop that. We had one of those in the Valley. For example, statewide, I was the regional issues coordinator for the region that I had been vice president in and so on. Again, all of these things are appointed rather than elected, so it was OK for me to do them even though I was an inheritance tax appraiser.

FRY: You were appointed to the--as chairman of . . .

GREENAWAY: That was later. That was in '61. That was after. This was after. We're in late '60, early '61. I need to talk to you about this period because something else happened that was to impact me.

Everyone knew that Joe Wyatt was not going to run for reelection as CDC president in 1961, so there was a sort of casting about that we were going to have to elect a president to succeed Wyatt. So I in a sense formed an
GREENAWAY: exploratory committee--this is the way you'd put it today--to run for president of the CDC. I began, through supporters who had met me partly through the YDs and partly through my liberal activities in water politics, I started to take trips down into Los Angeles to meet with people, so that if I did run for president, they would begin to get to know me. I went to several different events where they had receptions for me, and I would come in and speak and that sort of thing. Two of them I particularly remember.

One was at the home of Hersch and [Patricia] Pat Rosenthal. Hersch Rosenthal is now a state senator from southern California. They had a reception to help promote my candidacy for president.

The other was at the home of some people I just had met. It was up in Hollywood Hills, and this was the Hollywood Hills Democratic Club, which was one of the major, biggest, and most important Democratic clubs in the state, and that was Jerry and Joyce Fadem. Joyce Fadem was to become the secretary of CDC in 1963, and she and I became very close allies and very good personal friends for a long time after then. She died in, I think, about 1985, but I still am in touch with her husband and their two daughters, and they were to play a role in my life personally, which I'll get into later. But at any rate, they had a reception for me, and that's how I met them.

I was up against the problem that . . .

[Outer noises from movers; door is closed]
... up against the problem of how I could run for president of CDC and remain an inheritance tax appraiser, so I had to deal with that.

FRY: Is that because the controller is supposed to be...

GREENAWAY: He [Controller Alan Cranston] could fire me. He had this policy that he wasn't going to allow ITAs to hold important party posts. See, at that point in my life I had done nothing other than teach high school, and I knew I couldn't do that and engage in the political activity that I wanted to. People still weren't being paid in those days for being active in politics, so if I had done that, then I would have faced the prospect of having to find some other way to make a living, and although it might have been feasible in Los Angeles or San Francisco to do that, it was very difficult in Fresno. That kept me from running for president of CDC.

FRY: You just couldn't talk yourself out of that.

GREENAWAY: It's probably a weakness in me, but I didn't.

So at the state convention, probably in January of 1961, which was in Sacramento--this is the state central committee convention--I sat down and had a long talk with Tom Carvey. Carvey was to become the president of CDC. He ran against Nancy Swadish, who was the woman I mentioned to you earlier from Mill Valley who had been the organizer at the first issues conference in 1959. She was a friend of Joe Wyatt's, and he had gotten her into this and so on, so it was Carvey and Swadish running against each other. They were good friends then; it was not... It was
more, I think, the Bay Area and Los Angeles running candidates against each other than any real great theological difference between them. Carvey was a Ziffren disciple.

So anyway, I sat down with Carvey and I said, "Look. I just can't put this together so I can run, so I'm not going to run, and I'm willing to support you, but I want to be a state chairman of a committee of CDC. I want to be state chairman of the Political Action Committee." He agreed that he would appoint me to that, and that's how that all came about. So at the Santa Monica convention I supported Carvey, and right after the convention he named me the state chairman of the Political Action Committee. That, it turned out, was really a more useful and influential role in CDC than being a vice president had been. I really felt like I accomplished a lot in that position.

At the same time that that happened, Joyce Fadem, who I mentioned, became the state chairman of the organization committee. That was the committee that was involved in organizing clubs. She and I were state chairs, and Joyce was probably one of the best organizers I have ever met. After she left CDC she became the political representative of the California Teachers Association—their representative in Sacramento.

FRY: What clout there!
GREENAWAY: So she was really good at organization stuff.

Then another close friend of mine, Rudy Nothenberg, who I mentioned earlier and who is now the CAO of San
Francisco, became another state chairman—I forget what committee. I think it was the Rules Committee, though.

But at any rate, so we had a group of state chairs starting in '61 who played a very major role. In other words, when there was one of these meetings every two months, they'd meet, they'd talk generally about business, they would have meetings of the committees to the extent they had people there, and then each of the chairmen of the committees would give a report. The board meeting consisted pretty much of reacting to and acting on the reports of the state chairmen.

FRY: You almost were setting the agenda for the board.

GREENAWAY: Exactly. And the Political Action Committee, of course, was the committee that dealt with what CDC was going to try to do in the forthcoming election. In this case it was the '62 election, so that was a very, very important position and one that I enjoyed. It furthermore gave me a statewide responsibility which I'd never had before in CDC, and that was important.

FRY: Did you ever have to pursue issues that you personally didn't like?

GREENAWAY: Oh, no.

FRY: In other words, you had a selective power. A power to select issues.

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure.

But let me tell you what we did in '62, because it was really kind of fascinating. See, we put together. . . . Again,
there would be regional vice presidents of the Political Action Committee, and then they would have the Political Action Committee person in each district.

Now, let me see where we are. It's 2:10 and we've got about twenty minutes left. Let me take a quick look at this and see, because it... [Examines notes] We were doing the YD thing, incidentally, on farm labor. I checked and... Now, I remember I talked to you about the sort of farm labor issues where we got on the farm labor buses and went out at four o'clock in the morning?

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: The date of that labor conference was June 17 and 18 of 1961, so we were doing that at that point. All right, fine.

Well, let me tell you what I did with the Political Action Committee for 1962, then, having gotten this new position. This deals basically with sort of techniques, but you have to realize that in this period, the computer had not yet become a fact of life in politics, so what we did was without a computer. This is for voter registration. We began by organizing people who would go in and get the raw data and analyze each precinct in a county that determined party loyalty.

In other words, you figure out how many Democrats there are--say, 70 percent--and then you figure out how loyal are they to the Democratic party if they vote. You can have districts where loyalty would be very low because a lot of people would swing-vote, so it wasn't enough to register in
districts when it was 70 percent Democratic. We wanted to register in districts that were 70 percent Democratic, but where the Democrats also voted Democratic. So it might be that if you had 100 percent loyalty in a district that was 50 percent Democratic, if you voted Democrats in that district, it would be better than to register in a district that is 70 percent Democratic but you only have 50 percent loyalty, right?

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: So we did an analysis. We worked out a plan statewide for the clubs, see, which had the volunteers go out and get the data, make the analysis of party loyalty, and then do voter registration in the districts that had party loyalty.

FRY: How did these guys on the ground do that? Did they knock on doors?

GREENAWAY: The way you'd register Democrats is. . . . There were several.

FRY: I mean, how could they tell loyal from not loyal?

GREENAWAY: You'd register in a precinct that had a high loyalty, and then your problem was how to register Democrats, not Republicans, in that district. There were various techniques that were developed. One is to register in areas where you know they’re all Democrats--I mean minority areas and so on.

Then they developed. . . . Let me back up a minute. I’d been a deputy registrar of voters. You have to go down, you have to be sworn in, and you’re an official and you have to register on a nonpartisan basis. You can’t register on any
GREENAWAY: sort of partisan basis. You can't refuse to register Republicans. You have to register everybody you get, but you get to go door-to-door. Obviously, if you set up a voter registration operation at a card table in front of the local Safeway, which the League of Women Voters would do, you'd get far too many Republicans, so that didn't suit our purposes at all. We'd go door-to-door in areas where we knew--lower economic areas and so on, where we knew that.

Another technique they used, which was probably illegal but which they did, is you'd have the deputy registrar going down the street. Ahead of him you'd have somebody going who was simply a Democratic club member, not a registrar. He'd go to a door and knock on the door and say, "Are you registered to vote?" They'd say, "No," and he'd say, "If you registered, would you register as a Democrat or Republican?" If they said, "Democrat," he would take a chalk and mark an X in front of the house. If they said, "Republican," he wouldn't. The deputy registrar following him down the street would go only into the houses where they had the chalk mark and therefore register only Democrats. As I say, I think that was probably illegal. Certainly it violated the intent of the law, but that was one other way in which they did that.

Another thing would be to. . . . You know, you'd go up and say, "Do you want to register to vote?" and they would say, "I don't know." "Democrat or Republican?" Or you'd say this: "Do you want to register to vote? You can register
as a Democrat--that's the party of Senator Kennedy or Franklin Roosevelt--or do you want to register as a Republican? That's the party of Herbert Hoover or Richard Nixon." So there were ways of making sure you registered Democrats, but the idea was to register to target districts where loyalty was high.

Now, later, when the computer came along, ten or fifteen years later, that was and is a conventional way of registering, but to do this in a day before there were computers and to do this based on the loyalty factor. Somebody from Berkeley, somebody at the University of California, came up with this as a theory at that time, to do it this way, and nobody had ever heard of doing anything like this--that is to say, calculating party loyalty. And they did it, and then those people wrote the book in explaining how to do it, and we circulated that book as the activity of the Political Action Committee of CDC. We got into other areas, and a lot of places did it. So it was really one of the most successful voter registration drives.

And then you had to follow that with the get-out-the-vote, and you kept track of all the people you'd registered, and then make sure they vote on election day and phone and have cars and go through the whole thing. That's what CDC did. I think probably the 1962 elections were the high point in terms of CDC as a grass roots organization playing a role in an election where they really did make a difference. And we did, although Unruh did beat us in a few districts. We
GREENAWAY: won most of the districts, and we won a majority of the districts where we were having a CDC fight with the Unruh candidates.

Now, let me see. OK. I think we're starting the [Assemblyman Jesse] Unruh thing, right? Jesse didn't want the conventions to make preprimary endorsements, so what he tried to do was in the districts that were important to him, was to have enough of his people. There developed within CDC a second sort of club movement, which was Unruh clubs. Those are club movements that would be devoted to state legislators who were part of Unruh's team. He was on the road to becoming the speaker of the assembly, and he had his people. Some districts were totally Unruh districts, and there the CDC endorsement conventions, the local conventions, endorsed his candidates.

Then, sometime during 1962, a number of the clubs that were devoted to Unruh walked away from CDC and were later to form another organization in 1964. Jesse had his own organization, and he took about--I would say took about 20 percent of CDC away from it. Twenty percent of the clubs and members left with Jesse. This was particularly true in Los Angeles, incidentally. It didn't happen in the Central Valley, although Unruh, in the Central Valley, had some successes, but it didn't lead to a split-up of the club movement like it did in Los Angeles.
GREENAWAY: They separated and formed their own organization, and they made contrary endorsements, for example, in the one race that you have in your notes in there, which was the [ ] Jerry Pacht versus [Charles] Charlie Wilson race for Congress. That was the hardest-fought primary of all of them. Charlie Wilson, an Unruh guy. Jerry Pacht's father was a judge, Ysidor Pacht. His brother, Rudy Pacht, had been a strong CDC director. Jerry was well liked, and all of the club people worked for him. It was the biggest, the dirtiest race, certainly, in that primary, and Charlie Wilson won. The crushing blow that Unruh gave to the CDC was that. But CDC nevertheless won most of them.

But it was a very bitter fight, and it had really to do with who was going to control the state legislature, was Jesse going to be able to be elected to speaker [of the assembly], and a whole lot of other things. Again, it was Jesse representing the incumbents versus the CDC.

Southern California's Ziffren was still loyal to CDC. Now, Pat Brown played a pretty ambivalent role in that. He never was strongly interested in party fights. He yielded to his. . . . I mean, the people who supported Paul Ziffren [for Democratic National Committeeman] were more apt, really, to be friends and supporters of Pat Brown than the people who wanted Ziffren out, and yet he went against Ziffren, which he never should have done. During this whole fight, Unruh was ultimately not as much Pat Brown's friend as the CDC people were, in terms of what he ultimately wanted,
and yet he straddled the fence sometimes with the support of Jesse, sometimes with the support of CDC, during this whole period.

FRY: Did he take a stand on the Charlie Wilson and Jerry Pacht race?

GREENAWAY: I don't know that. Curiously enough, at this period, and I don't know why it happened, but it was Alan Cranston who was more the leader of CDC. He'd been the president of it, and if the press were going to write about Unruh versus the CDC, it would be translated into Unruh versus Cranston.

FRY: How did that fit with his not wanting you to be active?

GREENAWAY: That was a policy for the inheritance tax appraisers. He himself, however . . .

FRY: Was he pretty active?

GREENAWAY: Yes, he was active. There was a lot of continuing residue of good feeling toward Alan because after all, he was the founding president of CDC. A lot of the people were very close to him. The various factions that I've mentioned within CDC--the Ziffren people liked him; the Roger Kent people, Ann Eliaser (who was Ann Alanson) who was part of the Roger Kent operation, were very close to Alan. Wyatt was. Carvey was a good friend of Alan's. A lot of people who were very active in CDC were friends of his.

FRY: Do you mean that he would also come out for candidates when you had a candidate race?

GREENAWAY: He could well have, and I suspect that he would have endorsed Jerry Pacht in that race, but we don't know that.
I'll have to check, but he would be more apt to do it than some of the others would. Remember, he is to seek the CDC endorsement for the United States Senate in 1964, so it's not surprising that he would seek to help endorsed candidates.

FRY: Well, any candidate would need the CDC.

GREENAWAY: Any candidate would need the CDC until 1964, when Alan Cranston lost the primary with the CDC endorsement, and he was the first CDC-endorsed candidate to lose a state primary. But that jumps ahead, into the '64 election.

Anyhow, the Pacht-Wilson race was a bitter, bitter fight, which really tore the party apart, set lines that existed for years after then. I think it hurt Jesse when he eventually ran for governor.

The Unruh-CDC battle also tore the Young Democrats apart. I haven't mentioned them much, but although never being an officer in the Young Democrats, I had been active. For example, I think about 1961--maybe '60, but at any rate, somewhere along there--at the state convention in San Diego of the Young Democrats, [Phillip] Phil Isenberg, who is now an assemblyman from Sacramento, was elected state president of the Young Democrats. I nominated him for the presidency, and then two years later we elected an Unruh guy as the president of the Young Democrats, and it led to splitting the organization into two organizations.

It was a year before we put that all together, but that was the emergence of Henry Waxman and Howard Berman, because at the Young Democrats convention--I'll try to find
out the date, but it probably was around 1963; it was after the '62 elections—we had a convention at the Hacienda Motel in Fresno of the YDs. The president, who was a pro-Unruh guy, was named Barrien Moore, and he had a group of people who liked Jesse.

This had been a split that had occurred in the state organization for a long time. Moore had a group of people and they refused to seat the chairman of the Credentials Committee who was pro-CDC. They were claiming she hadn't filled out her YD membership card correctly and tried to throw her out. The Credentials Committee met for twenty-seven straight hours fighting about that, at the end of which a sort of fight broke out at which they were sort of like throwing chairs at each other.

FRY: Really?

GREENAWAY: Yes. I was there. The leaders of the Young Democrats, the good guys, the pro-CDC types, were Henry Waxman and Howard Berman. We all got up and marched downstairs; this was on the second floor of the Hacienda. There was a basement bar in the Hacienda Hotel which was called the Mermaid Room, because it was one of those things with an outdoor swimming pool and they have a girl in a swimsuit come down and swim in front of the window over the bar. It was the Mermaid Room.

Anyway. So this was like, oh, God, it must have been eight o'clock in the morning because we had been going, you know for. . . . We were starting about five o'clock the
previous day. But at any rate, we went downstairs and formed another California Federation of Young Democrats. We adopted something called "The Mermaid Manifesto," which was that we were not going to put up with Jesse Unruh and his people coming in and pushing us around and that kind of thing. For years afterward, Waxman and Berman had an annual dinner in Los Angeles, and this happened up clear through the eighties, where they gave what was called the Mermaid Award, which was to the Democratic politician who had been most heroic during the year in terms of fighting for good things.

It took about six months to a year to get the two factions reunited in a single organization. I was the head of the negotiating team to reunite the two federations. The people on the other side trusted me, the Barrien Moore group and so on, for reasons I don't totally understand because I was always anti-Unruh, but nevertheless I would be fair, so I was sort of the chief negotiator and arbitrator when the two sides came together. As I believe, this happened in 1963.

Anyhow, so that was part of all this factionalism that was tearing up the party.

FRY: One of Unruh's big, heavy moves at this time were these two bills in the legislature that would have eliminated CDC's power to make endorsements in the Democratic party's name, and what happened, and how did this happen? The senate killed one and Pat Brown vetoed the other. This was 1961.
GREENAWAY: Eventually he got that passed, Jesse did, but we had a... Well, that was aimed at preventing CDC from using the term "official" on its mailings, because it would say, "This is the official party endorsement" when we'd do a slate mailer out to voters. Jesse argued, probably rightly--I suspect in terms of quality government he was right in all of this--that this unofficial party organization had no right to use the term "official endorsement," but, you know, we nevertheless did.

Let me go through one more thing, and we'll do that.

FRY: All right.

GREENAWAY: We had a local race in 1962 which occupied a lot of my time, which was sort of a microcosm of this big fight that was occurring. We had had, for several years, an assemblyman in Fresno named Bert DeLotto. Bert had been a county supervisor--I first met him in 1952 when I first got active before I went into the army, when Carol and I came back to Fresno--a supervisor for a few years, and then he ran for assembly and was elected from the Thirty-second district, which was the city of Fresno.

Bert was Catholic, not particularly liberal. He was sort of a protegé of [Senate President pro tem] Hugh Burns but had been in the club movement and had support in the club movement, and he would be part of the faction on the other side in Fresno County like the Bernie Sisk people. DeLotto would be somebody who didn't like me, but he was closer to me than some of the others were. He had been a Young
GREENAWAY: Democrat and it wasn't all that bad. It became bad with him later. Eventually he opposed Alan Cranston in a United States Senate primary in 1974, and he announced the only reason that he was running against Alan was because I worked for him. So he eventually became very bitter about me, but, you know, it was something that took years to bring about.

But at any rate, Bert was a totally devoted Kennedy guy and he wanted to do something as part of this new administration. The Kennedy people didn't--I don't think--have a whole lot of use for him, but at any rate they finally offered him a job to have some role in the Peace Corps in Ethiopia. Bert had all along said, "I will do anything for Kennedy," so he finds out that the only thing they want him to do is to pack up and go to Ethiopia, which he did, and did not seek reelection in the assembly race in 1962.

This was an obvious time for me to run for the assembly. I thought about it and all of that, but again I had the problem, because I couldn't run if I was an inheritance tax appraiser. Again, it was probably not a good decision, but who knows; it happened a long time ago. But I didn't run. When I didn't.

Back up for half a minute. When Lionel Steinberg left Fresno and left as county committee chairman, he got in a young developer named Anthony Alamprese, who became the county committee chairman. Tony was a wheeler-dealer, land-developer, subdivider kind of person who had some
money to contribute to the party but who was certainly more of a moderate, and although a guy who was close to me, also a guy who was close to the other side in the factions in Fresno.

And there was a young attorney in Fresno whom I had known, named George Zenovich, who had been the student body president of Fresno State College at the same time when I was a student body president at Roosevelt High School back in 1947. George was about four years older than I, and I had known him since I was in high school because of this coincidence of the terms and so on. George was basically a kind of a laid-back, hippie type who played the bass in jazz bands, and that was the biggest thing he had done, other than being an attorney. Married to a Yugoslavian national named Kika, and they were a very popular couple, and she was a very attractive woman.

Anyway, so George Zenovich decides he's going to run for the assembly. Well, Zenovich was no liberal, in my book, so those of us who were active then--basically George Ballis, whom I mentioned earlier; and me; my friend Dick Guerin, who had been sort of my colleague in . . .

[End Tape 4, Side B]

[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

GREENAWAY: George Zenovich decided to run for the Thirty-second Assembly District, and that decision, George Ballis and I--not solely us, but I mean the so-called liberal group--recruited a
professor from Fresno State College named [Russell] Russ Leavenworth to run for the assembly, so we had the Leavenworth-Zenovich primary.

Leavenworth's a very nice guy. He lives in Indiana now; he's retired. But his wife, whose name is Ann Leavenworth, was very active. We had managed to elect her to the school board, the Fresno City Unified School District, and she later, I think during Jerry Brown's administration, was on the State Board of Education, but she was one of the really exceptional people who, I think if she had run, she might well have been able to beat Zenovich.

FRY: I was wondering how you asked her husband to run.
GREENAWAY: Well, she wanted him to run. It was that sort of thing. We would have been delighted to have her, but I think he wanted to run.

So we had a fight. We had a local preprimary endorsing convention. We had it in a little town outside of Fresno called Laton. The reason we went down there was because we knew that it was easier to get liberals to go to a convention thirty miles away from Fresno than it was to get conservatives, so it was easier for us to have the votes going out to this little town than it would be, you know. And of course, Laton was way out in the Thirty-third Assembly District, it wasn't in the Thirty-second, but only people who lived in the Thirty-second could vote in the preprimary endorsing convention. So it was all sorts of things like that were involved in this.
We naturally won. Leavenworth got the endorsement. It was probably a dumb thing for me to do politically. I talked to Lionel before we got Leavenworth in the race, and he told me, "You're not going to run. Support Zenovich." Lionel was down in Palm Springs when I talked to him, and he gave me good advice; I should have done that, but I didn't do it.

FRY: And avoid the . . .

GREENAWAY: Avoid the fight. A fight wouldn't have occurred. . . . If I had not been involved in this, it might not have happened. I mean, I made it happen, I made the Leavenworth candidacy.

FRY: And you made some enemies, I guess.

GREENAWAY: Yes. It tended to make the whole situation, the Unruh situation, worse, and although eventually it didn't terribly hurt me, it led to a lot of acrimony and fighting later on that shouldn't have happened.

At any rate, I think the thing was doomed ahead of time. George Zenovich was just personable and everyone knew him and liked him, and Russ Leavenworth was intellectual and dry and intelligent and a college professor, as opposed to a downtown lawyer. To no one's great surprise, the downtown lawyer won, Zenovich got elected, and I had been really a leader of the fight. And again, this was an Unruh thing. Unruh came in and endorsed Zenovich.

FRY: Oh, he did?

GREENAWAY: Oh, sure. But it wasn't something that Unruh had anything to do with putting together; Zenovich already was going to
run. But that was obvious, the kind of thing that was happening throughout California in these races, where you had an Unruh candidate against a CDC candidate. The Unruh candidate was much more apt to be like George Zenovich, and the CDC candidate was much more apt to be like Russ Leavenworth.

Zenovich and I became much better friends later on. Zeno served in the legislature for a number of years and then was appointed to the state appellate court, served there for a long period of time as a judge, and then resigned from that when he had enough time to retire, and is now a lobbyist in Sacramento. And he calls me. Every time there's a Croatian issue that comes before Congress—which happens, you know, the fight in Yugoslavia being an on-going one—George is Yugoslavian so he calls me and lobbies me on the factionalism in Yugoslavia now and so on. He was an even better friend of mine than Russ was. We run into them and I do see them.

Ann Leavenworth—Russ and Ann retired after he quit teaching and went to Santa Cruz, and she died in the eighties of pancreatic cancer.

FRY: And he's still in Santa Cruz?
GREENAWAY: No, he is living now in Indiana. He was at Amherst [College] for quite a while.
FRY: In these races, and take this race as an example, which candidate, do you think, had the most money to run on?
Zeno certainly did then. Money wasn't that big a thing in those races anyway. I mean, you had some television, but it was more personal campaigning, it was more your sidewalk activists, your people doing precinct work having some influence. But George had a good deal more money and George was a local guy. Russ was from back East someplace. He was one of the people that Earl Lyon--Dr. Lyon, whom I mentioned earlier--had brought in to work in the English department. Earl was head of the English department at that point, and he was like an outsider; he was a professor and so on. I don't think there's any professor who would have won that race, even with more money.

Was there a town and gown division in Fresno?
To some extent, yes.

Had Unruh started passing out his little parcels of campaign money from his organization?
Yes, there was some of that, but I mean, again, it wasn't . . .

It wasn't big funds like now.
No, it wasn't, and TV wasn't as important.

But you still needed money, didn't you, to print those brochures?
Oh, sure, you needed that, but you could do that kind of thing. I was to run for a junior college board. It was the only time I ever ran for public office, in 1963, and we had a fund raiser, and we had about $3,000 total.
Willie Brown came down—he was an assemblyman at that point—came down and spoke at my fund raiser in Fresno. It was unusual for a black politician to come into the Valley. Civil rights hadn’t advanced a whole lot. The little town that I mentioned that Charles Garrigus was from, Reedley, Reedley Junior College and so on, they simply had a policy that if a black was seen on the streets after seven o'clock at night, he would be arrested, because the police knew no blacks lived in Reedley, and therefore any black must be loitering. Willie later went out there for a fundraiser and we kept telling him, "You've got to get out of town before seven o'clock or you're going to wind up in jail."

FRY: It was that state loitering law that let them do that.
GREENAWAY: Yes. This in the Central Valley in the sixties.
FRY: Pre-'68 in the Central Valley.
GREENAWAY: Exactly. So it was really quite a time.

Anyway, so the bitterness of our loss there, combined with the bitterness in our losing the Charlie Wilson-Jerry Pacht and some other races around the state, really meant that once that election was over, the hostility between the Unruh people and the CDC was just absolutely overwhelming and was to influence a lot of what was going to happen in CDC.

FRY: Do you want to go on . . .
GREENAWAY: No, I think we ought to quit now.
FRY: OK.
GREENAWAY: All right.

[End Tape 5, Side A]
This is Roy Greenaway, the twentieth of December.

OK, we'll start out with the CDC convention in 1962. I can tell you a few things about it, all right?

It's interesting you said you didn't remember much, because in researching it, I thought--at least comparatively--it seemed to be all sweetness and light.

There were a few things that happened. One of the big problems that came out of the 1962 U.S. Senate race: the Kennedy administration wanted Richard Richards to challenge Tom Kuchel for the senate, but unlike 1956, Richards didn't have a free ride, so he had to give up his state senate seat in order to run for the United States Senate. He claimed, at the time and afterwards, that the Kennedy administration had promised him a job if he lost. He never got a job, although in fact he did lose.

So you lost Richard Richards.

We lost Richard Richards as an elected official.

And an appointed official?
GREENAWAY: I don't know why the Kennedy administration didn't give him an appointment, but they didn't, and as I say, he always felt that he had been betrayed and lied to by the Kennedy administration because he didn't get the appointment.

One interesting thing that was happening at that point was that Tom Rees, who was a state legislator--no, he wasn't at the time, but he wanted to run for state senate. He wanted to run for Richard Richards' seat if Richards ran for the United States Senate. So what Rees did was announce that he was a candidate for the United States Senate while Richards was still making up his mind. But he had buttons printed which said, "Rees for Senate." He didn't say "state" or "U.S." so then when Richards indeed did announce that he was going to run for United States Senate, Rees promptly withdrew and ran for state senate, and then, of course, a few years later was elected to Congress and served back here for ten, fifteen years. He had a very distinguished career.

The other thing that was happening at that point is that we were about to reapportion the state senate, so that instead of being based upon counties, where L.A. County only had one state senator, it was one man, one vote, so they reapportioned the senate and did away with county representation, so that instead of being only just one state senator from Los Angeles they probably had, oh, I don't know, ten or twelve. That was in the works, but when Rees first ran, it was before the reapportionment of the state senate had occurred.
FRY: I was wondering what the CDC did about the reapportionment.

GREENAWAY: That was the whole fight with Unruh, in fighting for the reapportioned seats, because they were new seats, and that I did talk about last time.

FRY: And Bonelli's proposition--Proposition 23--to make reapportionment a little less drastic than the 1960 initiative?

GREENAWAY: I just am not into that issue.

FRY: OK.

GREENAWAY: Not very well. We were more concerned with when we got the races, who ran for what, than anything else.

So there was the Richards thing, and that was an issue at the convention, although Richards had no opposition, really, for the CDC endorsement, and as I said earlier, was always as much a hero to the CDC as any politician was. He was really tremendously respected and so on.

The other thing, in 1962 we still hadn't elected a secretary of state, so there was a contested primary for secretary of state at the CDC convention. There was an effort to get an Hispanic candidate, but another person out of the Ziffren Los Angeles group sought the endorsement, Don Rose, and he got it.

He had been chairman of the county committee. Many people thought he had a chance to win--we didn't win with him--but they felt that he did have a chance to win. His wife, whose name was Roma Rose, was extremely popular statewide in the Democratic party, and she was one of the
probably ten top women in Democratic politics in California at that point. So Don plus his wife were very popular. He got the endorsement and did run.

Anyway, the other thing about the '62 convention is we had 4,100 delegates accredited to the convention, which is the biggest CDC convention in history. The Fresno convention center at that point only could seat 3,500 delegates on the floor, so following the convention, I announced that we would never have another CDC convention in Fresno until they built a new convention center. It turned out that that threat on my part became correct, because the next one we had in Fresno was in 1967 in the new convention center they had built.

But aside from that, there wasn't a whole lot to that convention in terms of there being much controversy. You're right; with an incumbent governor, lieutenant governor, controller, attorney general, and treasurer, nobody wanted there to be any big fights happening at the convention, and there weren't, other than issues, and you always had issue fights at CDC conventions.

FRY: It looks like there weren't any inflammatory issues passed either.

GREENAWAY: It could be.

FRY: Why not?

GREENAWAY: Again, it was the year for reapportionment. You had, in June, all of the contested primaries where you had Unruh candidates running against CDC candidates, so the
convention didn't want to do anything to embarrass the CDC-endorsed candidates against the Unruh candidate, so it was really a convention where everybody was holding back.

And of course, at that point Unruh was threatening legislation to take away the CDC unofficial organization's ability to use the word "official" on their endorsements and so on. I mentioned to you the Democratic primary in Fresno where we had George Zenovich, an Unruh candidate, against Russ Leavenworth, the CDC-endorsed candidate, in '62, and in that election, on our local Democratic headquarters, we had used the word "official" in the sign that we had in front of the thing. The Unruh people were threatening to sue us because we used the word "official" there, although at that point it hadn't been outlawed yet.

FRY: I see.

GREENAWAY: And the fight was such also that Jesse at that point was threatening to put in legislation to abolish the inheritance tax appraiser system. See, that was to get at Alan Cranston, who, as I said, was—as much as any state-elected official—was considered to be the head of the anti-Unruh faction. So they were going to do that.

I had a situation. . . . I'm going to have to lapse into '64 now, because of the politics that were involved here. Let me go through that, and then . . .

FRY: That's fine, as long as you tell me when you're talking about '64 and when it's '62.
GREENAWAY: Following '62, for example, in 1963, we adopted the Fair Housing Bill, which was named after the black state assemblyman from Oakland named Byron . . .

FRY: . . . Rumford.

GREENAWAY: Rumford, OK. It was called the Rumford Act.¹ Then in the 1964 election was Proposition 14 to repeal the Fair Housing Act, which had been adopted earlier by the legislature, and Jesse Unruh had been negative about it. I'll give you an example of how bitter some of this was. He had said something like California wasn't ready yet for a Fair Housing Act. This was in 1963.

Then there was a widely publicized incident involving me. We had a meeting in the Fresno Democratic Association, which was our big CDC club in Fresno, and I stood up at that meeting and made some remarks critical--just as a member of the club--of Jesse Unruh for saying we weren't ready for fair housing legislation yet. Well, there was a reporter from the Fresno Bee there. He picked up my statement. The press wire picked that up, and it was a front-page story in the following day's Los Angeles Times. The way they ran the story was to say that my statement attacking Unruh was the opening salvo in Alan Cranston's campaign against Jesse Unruh going into 1964.

Jesse responded by threatening to move the bill to abolish the inheritance appraiser system. I was an

inheritance tax appraiser, as you know. The inheritance tax appraisers, many of them, immediately called Alan insisting that I be fired right away.

Alan did not fire me as an inheritance tax appraiser. He stood up to them, but he did want me to go down in Los Angeles and talk to the guy who was sort of the heavy who ran the inheritance tax appraiser system, Prentiss Moore.

Prentiss Moore had been given to Alan in 1958 as a fund raiser and to run Alan's campaign.

FRY: Pat Brown had given him?

GREENAWAY: Pat Brown had given Prentiss Moore to Alan. Prentiss became an inheritance tax appraiser himself, and Prentiss was the guy whose responsibility it was to shake down the inheritance tax appraisers for money for Alan's reelection campaign. For example, they came into Fresno County in 1962 and told us how much money we had to give to the campaign.

The later charges, which were to hurt Alan in 1966, of the inheritance tax appraiserships being sold for campaign contributions, was one of the things that may have led to his defeat in 1966, although it clearly wasn't the main thing. I've always felt it was simply Prentiss Moore's heavy-handedness with people.

I didn't go along with them then [1962]. For example, they wanted a contribution in cash from the inheritance tax appraisers, and I refused to do that. I gave them a check, but I would not give them cash. Apparently I was the only
one who wouldn't. So I was never popular with my fellow
inheritance tax appraisers at all, because of all of this. But
at any rate, that's a sample of how bitter the fight between
Cranston and Unruh was during the period between the '62
convention and the '64 convention.

FRY: What kind of a guy was Prentiss Moore? Was he an
idealistic liberal, or was he . . .

GREENAWAY: He was a machine. He was a bag man. He could have as
easily been working for Jesse Unruh as he was working for
Alan Cranston. I mean, he fit into the very heavy-handed
sort of machine politics which was the thing that the
Democrats in California were always struggling to get out of
as I started out in the very beginning, in 1949. Prentiss
Moore is a guy who could have worked very well with Boss
Malone in San Francisco, for example. I mean, he was that
kind of big-city, machine-type politician. Clearly, he never
liked me.

Particularly, none of them liked me because of my
getting Jesse even madder at them and wanting to abolish
the inheritance tax appraiser system. They would gladly
have sold CDC or anything else down the river to get rid of
anybody, so long as they could keep the inheritance tax
appraiser system.

FRY: And this was all in 1963?

GREENAWAY: This was all in 1963.

   Anyhow, so . . .

FRY: May I ask one other thing about the tax appraisers?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: In the federal government, a secretary on the cabinet usually expects his underlings to get out there and campaign for the boss--I mean the president, in other words. Did this happen with tax appraisers?
GREENAWAY: They weren't so much expected to campaign. They were expected to contribute.
FRY: But if they had speech-making abilities?
GREENAWAY: Oh, no.
FRY: And you had speech-making . . .
GREENAWAY: They didn't even think of that. If I helped Alan, it's because I liked Alan, but I never--it was not expected of inheritance tax appraisers that they do that. They were only considered sources of funds. Surrogate campaigning has never been a particularly big thing in California anyway, so no, that wasn't the case.

Anyway, so the '63 period was kind of wild. As we went into this. . . . The '63 convention, I should add, the CDC convention, was in Bakersfield. That was a convention at which we reelected officers of CDC. It was a campaign of mixed success for me. My candidate for vice president of CDC, the position that I had held before, was elected, but we lost the campaign for the guy who was to be the CDC director from Fresno. My candidate didn't win, and that was kind of a blow to me; I was unhappy with that. But the convention was sort of a pro forma.
GREENAWAY: At this point I want to get away from CDC, and then I want to come back and talk about it, but I want to go into the '64 convention, which was in Long Beach. This was the convention where Alan got the endorsement for United States Senate, in February of '64.

We had learned in January that Clair Engle had cancer, a brain tumor. Alan then announced that he was going to run for Clair Engle's [U.S. Senate] seat. Engle didn't pull out of the seat. He died in, oh, after the primary--was it June or July of 1964? His wife, Lou Engle, sort of ran his office and ran him à la Woodrow Wilson in his final days.

The campaigning got going for the senate seat. Somebody, and I don't know who it was--it could have been his own initiative--got Jimmy Roosevelt very interested in it--a very good congressman, a former candidate for governor and so on. Roosevelt announced that he was going to seek the CDC endorsement, so we had a battle basically in Long Beach between Cranston and Jimmy Roosevelt, and with Clair Engle seeking the endorsement, announcing he was going to try to run for reelection, although he clearly wasn't able to do that.

So going to Long Beach was a big organization of the people who were going to be working to get Alan Cranston the endorsement, and this included some of the people who had stood in his way in 1958, of getting the endorsement, as you remember. I told you that the party had sort of turned its back on Alan in '58 because they wanted Clair Engle to
be the nominee. In '64 there was kind of a reversal of that in many of the people who--like Paul Ziffren, who could as easily have supported Jimmy Roosevelt, who would have made a good senator, clearly--were for Alan. Alan had kind of the establishment support within CDC.

Anyway, those of us who worked the floor had, you know, it was the sort of state of the art, the first time we ever had walkie-talkies at a convention so we could communicate with each other on the floor. We had the votes, and we worked hard, and we got Alan the endorsement.

There was a really touching moment during the convention, and other people have described this. They hooked up an amplified telephone speaker and had Clair Engle from Washington speak to the convention.

Fry: From his hospital?
Greenaway: From his hospital bed or something like that. He could not talk. He would say a word and then wait thirty seconds before the next word came out, and it was just terrible because everybody knew Clair and liked him regardless of the contest. People were crying, and it was just awful. It was one of the worst things I've ever seen in politics, to have him try to do that and to fail so completely.

But anyway, after everybody got finished with feeling sorry for Clair Engle, Alan got the endorsement. The story was, following that, that when Pierre Salinger was talked
into running for the senate, which happened about a month after the CDC convention . . .

FRY: Who talked him into that?

GREENAWAY: That isn’t clear, but the idea has always been it was Jesse Unruh. Jesse had supported Roosevelt because he hated Cranston. But you see, at this point Jesse had lost his influence at the CDC convention because in ’62 he’d pulled his Democratic clubs out of CDC.

FRY: At what point did Unruh get control of Los Angeles County Central Committee? Was that before the ’62 election, or the ’64, or did it kind of happen all through that?

GREENAWAY: I didn’t think he did have control of the L.A. County Central Committee.

FRY: Maybe he didn’t.

GREENAWAY: I don’t think he did.

FRY: But his man won the chairmanship.

GREENAWAY: Who was that? I just don’t recall that, and the L.A. County committee was not a big thing in my life anyway.

FRY: Let me go on to the other question, too. Mosk wanted to run for the senate. He was also a candidate, and I guess a very viable one, but was he an Unruh man by this time?

GREENAWAY: He was kind of. . . . I don’t know whether he was ever really an Unruh man. He was obviously a Pat Brown man. See, at times Pat Brown was closer with Unruh than he was with the CDC. So Brown waffled on this.

FRY: I thought Brown had made Mosk pull out, is that right? Is that the way . . .
GREENAWAY: I guess it's '64 that Mosk... The story was that Mosk had to pull out because somebody had some incriminating photographs of him. That was the accusation made that Alan Cranston was the person who was going around showing these photographs. There was also an accusation that Pat Brown was showing those photographs of Mosk, and it was Mosk in a compromising situation with some woman in Mexico.

Stanley Mosk's wife--I believe her name was Edna--was an absolute tiger and the kind of person most people are just terrified of, so the idea of this probably had more impact because Stanley was supposedly more afraid of his wife than he was of the adverse publicity had these photographs been made public. So there was always a bit of discussion and argument about what they meant, but to this day Tom Braden, the columnist, claims that Alan Cranston showed him those photographs. Alan has always denied it, that he had anything to do with the photographs, and I have no way of knowing what is correct.

FRY: At any rate, that simplified the senate race temporarily.

GREENAWAY: There was a huge fight between Roosevelt and Cranston. Jimmy Roosevelt was very charismatic and a very good speaker, and Alan simply never has been that, so it was very tough to try to beat him. But then, a month later... 

FRY: Alan won by a big margin, if you're talking about the CDC nomination.
GREENAWAY: That's right. But I say it was a tough fight because there were a lot of people there who could have gone for Roosevelt. See, you had almost to be anti-Cranston to vote for Roosevelt at the convention, because there was just so much laid on the line. This is CDC, this is the whole party and everything, and Alan was the founding father, and you almost couldn't vote on the merits of who was the better candidate. That's sort of the way it was laid out, and that's what happened. People were being loyal by sticking with Alan; everybody felt he'd gotten a raw deal in 1958.

After the convention, a month after, Pierre Salinger announced that he was interested in running, and of course, Salinger had the problem that he was not registered to vote in California. He was registered to vote in Virginia because he'd been Kennedy's press secretary. So they had the court case, and the courts ruled that although Salinger could not vote for himself—he couldn't vote in the California primary because he wasn't registered—he could run, and that established new law on that particular issue. Alan has since told me that the day he saw the newspaper which announced that Salinger had won this fight in court, he knew he was in deep trouble and was going to have great difficulty winning.

The story was that Unruh met with Roosevelt and tried to pressure Roosevelt to endorse Salinger. Roosevelt refused to do that and campaigned very hard for Alan Cranston in the primary. As a matter of fact, I got to know Jimmy Roosevelt quite well because of the fact that he was working
for Cranston, and I was running into them in the course of the campaign. We've been good friends to this day.

At any rate, it was again a really bitter primary. All of the Unruh people were lined up for Pierre Salinger. I'd known Salinger for years before, and I never took him particularly seriously. I'd known him pretty well, actually, during the fifties. George Zenovich, who was the Unruh assemblyman who was elected over my guy in '62, was the head of Salinger's campaign in Fresno County. It was the Unruh fight all over again, except this time for a senate race. Salinger eventually won. It's interesting; Cranston won northern California, and Salinger won because he won southern California.

FRY: Was this a pretty good picture of the locations of Unruh's power?

GREENAWAY: I don't think it was a question so much of Unruh's power. I don't think Unruh helped Salinger all that well. It's curious because in retrospect you wouldn't think so, but Alan was the more liberal candidate in the race. In southern California Salinger was more conservative than northern California, so it made sense that Cranston carried the north, and Salinger... The southern California Democratic votes were more conservative than the northern.

Salinger, I think, won as much as anything because he was... Well, his identification with Kennedy obviously helped, particularly with the Hispanic vote, which is big in southern California and in '64 was not big in northern
California at all. It helped with that, and then I think he appealed as a more conservative candidate than Alan.

FRY:

In 1962, when Nixon ran for governor, one of his big issues was that the radical left of the CDC was getting control of the Democratic party and so forth.

GREENAWAY:

Yes, he put out a hit piece, or it was put out by some right-wing groups, which attacked Cranston, Brown, and Mosk. The right wing has always had a brochure, a pamphlet attacking Cranston, that was incorporated into this pamphlet that was put out, and that's the one that had the cropped photo of Pat Brown allegedly bowing to Mao Tse-tung.

FRY:

Yes. It was called the Little Red Book or something like that.

GREENAWAY:

Well, Cranston was "The Shadow" because The Shadow on radio was Lamont Cranston, and so they played on the name and that he was really a Communist in government. We still see those around. We still get copies of that kind of attack on Alan Cranston.

One of the things, for example, they allege, was that during World War II Alan was part of the Office of War Information. There was a thing that has always riled up the right wing called Katien Forest Massacre, and that was a slaughter of Polish Jews that occurred which could have been prevented by the Soviet Army, but the Nazis killed these people and the Soviet armies sat by and watched them do it and didn't do anything about it. Roosevelt apparently didn't want to publicize this because we were allies with the Soviet
Union in World War II. This was something that happened at the beginning of the war, in 1940. And Cranston somehow or another because he worked for the OWI, they claimed Cranston ordered the censorship of the news that the Soviets were really responsible for the Katien Forest Massacre. That was to be one of the things that you would find in those books that were being distributed.

So there's no question that during the forties there were a lot of far left wingers in government, there were Communists in government, and Alan knew some of them. That's quite true, I'm sure.

FRY: We know that. After all the furor dies down, we can kind of see that.

GREENAWAY: But Alan was. . . . It was funny because I don't think any of us who were working for Alan thought he was any more liberal than Pierre Salinger, but that happened. And then, of course, you know the history of the whole thing. Pierre lost the general, and he lost it perhaps because of the Proposition 14 fight, the anti-civil rights repeal of fair housing, which did pass. Pierre had had to take a position on it opposing the repeal. It was felt that that hurt him. Civil rights still, in '64, was a pretty dicey issue. I mean, we still had people in CDC in '64 who were opposed to fair housing and opposed to civil rights and so on, who certainly wouldn't have any blacks in their Democratic clubs. That still was the situation then. Anyhow.
FRY: In the 1962 CDC convention, you felt perhaps that they didn't pass any fiery resolutions, but the 1964 convention did have a lot of CDC resolutions, such as recognizing Red China, a lot that would be considered more or less . . .

GREENAWAY: We didn't have any crucial statewide races at that point. We had Lyndon Johnson as the president. It was just assumed that he would be renominated at the Philadelphia convention. We had no particular part in that. There was the senate race but CDC didn't care that much.

But again, and I want to try to keep this in some sort of sequence, I want to mention one minor little thing involving me, and then I want to go into what happened in CDC during the period '63-64 and then '65, OK?

FRY: Good. That's what I want.

GREENAWAY: The only time I ever ran for office I ran in 1963, and it was when they were reorganizing the junior colleges in California, and everybody had to be in a junior college district. They hadn't had that before, but they passed a state law.

FRY: Each one would have its own district board.

GREENAWAY: Yes, so there's a district board, and I ran for the state senate junior college district board in Fresno County. The election was December 3, 1963. One day I was in the studio cutting the TV commercials, we were standing around, and somebody walked in and said President Kennedy had been assassinated.
That blew it. It was two weeks before the election, and just the shock of the whole thing, nobody was going to go out and do precinct work for a junior college board in that period. I came in third. The top two were elected. I did get the *Bee* endorsement—the McClatchy newspaper's endorsement—which I was pleased about. But that was the only time I ever ran for public office. I don't know whether I could have won if Kennedy hadn't been assassinated, but I've always felt that any chance I might have had was ended by the Kennedy tragedy. We really never did precinct work. We never did any of the campaigning.

FRY: Yes, that election is a blank in my mind, too.

How did it affect you, kind of in the long range? His assassination, I mean.

GREENAWAY: Well, it got Pierre Salinger into the senate race, and that meant Alan Cranston didn't go to the senate. I think Cranston could have won the general, would have defeated [actor George] Murphy. Salinger's high point was winning that primary, but he was considered sort of flaky and kind of a swinger and not a serious candidate. So I think Alan could have beaten Murphy.

FRY: He was an incumbent at that point. I mean Salinger was, because he'd already been appointed to the senate.

GREENAWAY: Yes. In any event, that was resented, and the resentment directed toward Pat Brown, you see, who appointed him the summer of '64. Once Pat Brown won his second election in '62 and beat Nixon, he went downhill. His defeat in '66 was
predictable, it seems to me, no matter who ran against him, because the whole population seemed to turn against Pat Brown. So Pierre was hurt because Pat Brown appointed him, because it was an interim appointment. He would have been better off if he hadn't been an incumbent. So he was an incumbent for six months and then was never seen in politics again.

FRY: Was this climate of fear of the left wing one of the big factors, do you think?

GREENAWAY: I don't know that it hurt Pierre. It was more his support for fair housing which I think hurt him. I think that was more the issue, as we got into that.

Let me back up and talk a little bit about what happened to CDC during that period. It had become apparent to me, and this is part in answer to your question about '64 and the resolutions, something became apparent to me which I have since to this day believed is a law in politics, and that is that no party organization can ever remain static. If it's on the Republican side, it has to go to the right, and if it's on the Democratic side, it has to go to the left.

The reason is because the activists at the extreme simply believe more strongly what they believe than the people in the middle, so that if you give them some time, the activists will pull the organization over to them. You've seen that happen nationally, I think, in the Democratic party. Our
candidates for president today have to move to the left in order to win the primary, to win the presidential nomination. I think it is happening right now [1991] in the Republican party. The Republican party is getting pulled to the extent that Bush isn't in sync with the mainstream of the Republican party because the guy who's in sync is [Senator] Newt Gingrich in the Republican party, so that when they get into power particularly, and just in the normal existence of things, the extremes dominate and pull the people that way. That was certainly apparent in the Republican party in California because the California Republican Assembly started out as a very middle-of-the-road moderate organization way to the right to the extent that today it's just a bunch of loonies.

FRY: And [Republican U.S. Senator] Bill Knowland, who started it, was himself moderate at first.

GREENAWAY: Sure. This was obviously happening to CDC because I saw the state leadership of the organization dominated in part by people like me. I mean, I was on the left here, you have to understand, but we were winning. I became sort of a moderate figure in CDC by 1964 because the left got further into it, which I was a part of, so I had been on the left extreme in '58 and '60 of CDC. By the time 1964 came along I was a moderate.

The thing that bothered me about that wasn't that I didn't have the power in CDC, because I certainly did, but that I felt that CDC statewide was growing out of sync with
the individual and local Democratic clubs. So I wrote a paper in 1963 in which I proposed, because I saw this happening, that we simply abolish the [state] council and let the clubs alone for two or three years, and then let the clubs form a new state organization. I felt that if you did away with the superstructure that sort of overlaid CDC and got back to the clubs, that the clubs would reassert themselves and we would start to stop this drift to the left, which I saw happening. I circulated this paper to CDC statewide.

FRY: Do you have a copy of it?
GREENAWAY: I might be able to find it. I'll look.¹
FRY: It's very interesting, because at this time Edmond Constantini was writing from his perch at the University of California at Davis.² He had noted, in a statistical analysis, that the lower one's status was in the Democratic hierarchy, the more radical they became. And the lower the level of leaders, the farther to the left they were.

GREENAWAY: What do you mean by lower levels?
FRY: The local leaders, in other words.
GREENAWAY: I don't think that was true at all.
FRY: You don't think that was true at CDC?
GREENAWAY: No, and I don't think Ed Constantini ever understood CDC.

---

¹ The paper search produced nothing.

FRY: This was based on a list of national issues that divided the radicals from the moderates.

GREENAWAY: Yes, I think that's screwy. I'm not saying that the officers and directors of CDC were on the far left either. What I'm saying is there was a gradual motion to the left that was occurring. Whereas I would lose battles in '58 or '60, I'd win them in '64.

FRY: What issues were there that distinguished you . . .

GREENAWAY: Water was one.

FRY: . . . and made you . . .

GREENAWAY: Then the whole foreign policy stuff, the Red China kind of thing was an issue, and a loyalty oath. There wasn't a whole lot of discussion of issues. Civil rights was a big, big issue. We were picketing Woolworth's and things like that in Fresno.

FRY: What side were you on, on those issues?

GREENAWAY: I was on the left.

FRY: You were on the left side, still, in '62, '63, and '64?

GREENAWAY: Sure. I didn't change at all.

FRY: So you didn't change.

GREENAWAY: I didn't change in the least. It was just the party. That will become that much more apparent when you get past '65, so let me just give you the pieces and tell you what the political consequences of my paper was, OK.

The political consequence of it was that Tom Carvey, who was president of CDC, decided we ought to do something to try to revitalize it. There was a feeling in CDC
following this and in part following the '64 defeat of Alan Cranston that you have to remember was the first time a statewide-endorsed candidate ever lost. The first loss was Alan Cranston in '64. He lost the primary. There was a feeling that we were going downhill. The clubs were losing their effectiveness; we weren't growing. I had the feeling that the state was out of sync with the local clubs, all that.

So it was formed statewide what was called the Program Planning Committee. This was a committee whose responsibility it was to go around throughout the state to hold hearings, sort of like a congressional hearing where club members would come and talk about what changes need to be made, what was wrong with the organization, and so on. I was the co-chairman with a guy from Los Angeles named Howard Green, who was an old-timer. The committee was called the Green-Greenaway Committee. We held these hearings all over California and then made a report. They would not go along with abolishing the state board of directors, so I didn't win that, but we did make some changes in it which were to have an impact and so on.

But that was one of the most interesting periods for me in CDC because I was really the dominant force in this, sort of analyzing what was going wrong and what was happening with the organization.

FRY: Did you make any reports on that ground that would be available today?
GREENAWAY: Oh, yes, we made a report. Sure. Yes. I don't know where that would be, again . . .

FRY: What a picture of California's . . .

GREENAWAY: Yes, it was a report of the Program Planning Committee, yes. I remember these hearings . . .

[End Tape 6, Side A]

[Begin Tape 6, Side B]

GREENAWAY: In 1963, CDC elected a black woman as the corresponding secretary. Her name was Joan Finney Bran. She was from San Francisco. So an effort had been made as early as '63 to do something about this problem, but it was the period '63 through '65 that the Program Planning Committee was at work and that I was sort of taking the lead in these hearings. I was still in my thirties at that point but I had about fifteen years in politics behind me then, so I was probably sort of an old-timer at that point.

   Anyhow, so that was kind of a fascinating era for me, and I will see if I can find some stuff that would be sort of helpful to the . . .

FRY: We can put it in with your interview.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: Roy, I still don't think it's clear in this interview what was the. . . . What did the people who were involved in the drift to the left believe that you as a more moderate didn't believe? What led them all left, if that's what you're saying? Do I have it right?
GREENAWAY: Why don't you let me get to 1965, all right?
FRY: OK.
GREENAWAY: And I'll talk about [Simon] Si Cassady, because I think that epitomized it. It wasn't so much. . . . Well, I think when I explain why I opposed Cassady and why we threw him out, I think that may make you understand what the conflict was, because it wasn't a conflict or an issue. It was a conflict on the role issues played in terms of the volunteer club movement.

What I believed in more than anything else was voluntarism in politics, the sort of grass roots empowerment kind of thing. That was what was important about CDC to me. I didn't care what we did on the issues, even though I believed in them, but I didn't think that was the function of CDC.

So we go into the 1965 convention, which was in Sacramento. Tom Carvey was not running for reelection. One of the things that we did as a consequence of the Program Planning Committee was to create two new vice presidencies in CDC: a northern California and a southern California vice president. That was one of the things that the Program Planning Committee had recommended. What we had always had was a president and then five regional vice presidents. We kept the regional vice presidents, but to get some north-south cohesiveness we recommended creating these new positions.
GREENAWAY: Pat Brown was worried about 1966, and there was a candidate for president at CDC named Jerry Hill--Gerald N. Hill, who is an attorney somewhere in the Bay Area now. He had been in the Young Democrats. I first met Jerry Hill at the 1956 convention when Jerry was a schoolteacher in Madera. He later went to law school. He was part of the San Francisco Young Democrats, had come out of there, but he was not a person who was at all part of the--to the left. Even though he was a Young Democrat, he'd be more a conservative Young Democrat, but nevertheless, he was considered to be part of the irresponsible left in CDC, and Pat Brown didn't want him to become the president of CDC.

Pat Brown and his people found Si Cassady. Si was a newspaper publisher from El Cajon in San Diego County. He was in his late sixties. He was a very charismatic, white-haired guy who could sail around the world in a yacht and flew his own airplane and did things like that, and had a family of four kids--Mark Cassady is one of them--who were all interested and active in politics. He was kind of a latecomer into politics.

Pat Brown decided that it would be much better to have this guy than Jerry Hill as president of CDC, so Pat and his people got it, put it together. Alan Cranston went along with it and supported Cassady, and he was sort of the establishment candidate. It was just Pat Brown coming in and taking over the convention in Sacramento and electing Si
FRY: Cassady. I opposed Cassady. I nominated Jerry Hill, as a
matter of fact, at the convention.

GREENAWAY: So that named you, too, as a radical . . .

FRY: So I went to Alan and I said, "Look, if you're going to get
active in CDC and you're going to endorse a candidate for
president, don't tell me I can't run for something." He said,
"OK," so I ran for northern vice president of CDC at that
convention and was elected. As a matter of fact, Willie
Brown nominated me. The Willie connection still went back
. . .

GREENAWAY: You said he'd made a speech for you when you . . .

FRY: He came down and did a fund raiser for me when I ran for
the junior college board.

GREENAWAY: Anyhow, so I ran and I was elected the northern
California vice president, and a guy named [Charles] Chuck
Gant was elected southern California vice president. Gant
was a CDCer who'd been a director, and he was part of the
CDC establishment that resented Cassady as I did. He wasn't
for Jerry Hill, particularly. He was more conservative than I,
but none of us liked the idea that Pat Brown was going to
come in and name the president of CDC.

FRY: How did Pat manage to do that in CDC? Was he looked
upon as sort of a fatherly . . .

GREENAWAY: No, it was a very heavy move. There were a lot of people,
the legislators came in and the assemblymen and the state
senators, and they can influence club people in terms of how
they voted. Alan Cranston was supporting Cassady and he
GREENAWAY: was the father of CDC. He was the guy who a year before had been the CDC candidate for United States Senate. All of the Cranston people except me went for Cassady because of Alan.

Anyway, so I was the number two person in CDC at that point, because I was the senior of the two. Cassady was from southern California, and the southern California vice president, obviously, was from southern California. I was the only one. . . . So I was the top person in northern California and was first in line of succession to the CDC presidency.

So I started to work with Cassady in this new administration of CDC. I remember he flew into Fresno, landed his plane, picked up Carol and me--my wife and myself--and flew us to Santa Monica Airport and landed there. We had a meeting.

It turned out it was the single biggest mistake Pat Brown could conceivably have made from the point of view of trying to establish some stability in the party, because Si Cassady was way to the left and nobody knew it. He was moreover a violent anti-Vietnam War person in 1965, when Pat Brown was still supporting, when Alan Cranston was still supporting, the Vietnam War. Cassady was the head of the movement, if anybody could be called that in California, to get us out of Vietnam.

Cassady furthermore picked out some of the. . . . It turned out he was supported by his friends, who included
GREENAWAY: some very old-time, Jewish left-wingers. There was a guy up in San Diego named Harvey Fergatch who was rich, and they all supported... I mean Fergatch particularly supported Cassady in what they were doing.

Well, within six months Si was going around making speeches to Democratic clubs saying, "We've got to get out of Vietnam." But the thing that bothered us and the thing that bothered me was he was saying, "Unless you support..." We had passed a resolution in the '65 convention opposing the war in Vietnam. So Cassady's position with the clubs was, "If you don't support CDC's position on Vietnam, you should get out of CDC." So he made support of a specific position on an issue the litmus test for whether people should be in the organization or not be in the organization.

Immediately, that ran totally counter to everything I believed in, because to me the purpose of CDC was volunteerism, and volunteerism had to be diverse. It was a big tent. There were lots of different views in that tent, and you can't throw somebody out of that tent because they don't agree with the prevailing view on a specific issue. So I saw Cassady as simply destroying everything that CDC stood for, this in spite of the fact that I 100 percent agreed with him on Vietnam, long before Alan Cranston did.

Cassady had just gotten stronger and stronger, president of the CDC and all of that, so in May or June of 1965 Pat Brown called. He had met with Lyndon Johnson, and Lyndon Johnson said, "Anybody you want to have
b briefed on Vietnam, just send him back here and we'll give him briefings and we'll make him understand what we're trying to do there." So Pat Brown called Si Cassady and said, "Do you want to go back and be briefed?" Cassady said, "Sure."

So through a complicated kind of situation, I also went with him. Part of the reason for that was just to make sure that Cassady didn't come back and lie about what he had been told or what happened on the trip, because nobody at this point in the leadership of CDC particularly trusted him.

Yes, so Cassady and Harvey Fergatch and my wife and I flew back to Washington in, as I say, I think it was in May or June of 1965. We went to the Pentagon and we went to the State Department and we got briefed, and it was all just absolute nonsense. I mean, there was nothing that was new in it and it was just totally a waste of time. It served in my case to make me even more strongly against the war than I was.

And a funny thing about all this was that their view was in terms of what was going to happen. Oh, it was the domino theory. If you let the Communists win here, then Thailand, and so on. It was based upon a monolithic view of Communism that I hadn't believed in for years, and it was just nonsense.

FRY: Was that the White Paper?
GREENAWAY: Yes, it was that.
FRY: So it worked the other way for you.
GREENAWAY: It worked the other way for me. It just made Cassady even madder, so he came back and proceeded up and down the state to attack Johnson and Pat Brown for setting this up and so on.

So we held a meeting of the old-time CDCers who were all pretty liberal. Tom Carvey was part of it, Joyce Fadem, Barbara Double, Sharon Lee, Chuck Gant, most of the board. But see, those people had been involved with CDC at that point probably for, most of them, for six or seven years and weren't total newcomers to it like Cassady was.

We decided that Cassady was going to destroy CDC, and we were going to get him out. He had been elected for a two-year term so we filed the papers, whatever we had to do to impeach him, had the vote to remove him at the next convention. The next convention was in probably January or February of 1966, and it was in Bakersfield. So we announced that we were going to try to remove him.

Everybody said, "You're removing him because he's opposed to the war in Vietnam." Of course, while some of the people in CDC supported the war, many of us didn't, and that had nothing to do in my book with why we were removing him. I was removing him because I wanted to save volunteerism in politics. But you see, that's why I was having trouble to articulate earlier what the difference was between me and the people who were further on the left. It wasn't that I didn't agree with them. It's that I didn't think
that issues. . . . I didn't think that CDC should be an issues-based organization. I thought its function was to be a vehicle to try to empower grass roots in politics, to give them a voice, whatever they wanted to say, whether I agreed with them or not.

FRY: Its main function was to represent what most of the members believed, and to be a voice of that?

GREENAWAY: But to try to influence the selection of candidates, to get good people to run, to keep the other forces that were influential in politics--money, business interests, and so on--from dominating; to have a counterbalance. The dynamics of politics, I thought, was better served with volunteers having a voice.

So that's what the issue was for me, but we never convinced the press of it. It was an interesting time for me because I probably got more, really, of a press bloodbath during that period than any other that I was in, because they wouldn't buy the reason that we were doing what we were doing and so on.

Then, at the same time, Pat Brown and Alan Cranston, who had put Cassady in in the first place, turned against him totally, and they were supportive of our efforts to get rid of him. We said to them, "Go away. You did enough trouble getting Cassady in in the first place. We don't want you to even get into this." So we kept them very quiet, fortunately, and the fight to remove Cassady was really carried on by people like me, the old-timers in CDC who just didn't want
GREENAWAY: to see it become the kind of organization that he saw it becoming.

Now, in retrospect, it was inevitable, because again, as it was pulled further to the left—because it was being pulled to the left—it became an issues-dominated organization instead of being the kind of grass-roots organization that I wanted to see. But at this point, at least, we figured we'd try to get rid of Cassady. Obviously, most of the people who were strongly opposed to the war were for Cassady because they didn't care that much about volunteer grass-roots organizations and so on the way some of us did.

It was a particularly awkward situation for me because I was still an inheritance tax appraiser and Alan was opposed to Cassady, so people might say, "You're doing it only because you're an inheritance tax appraiser," which is even further removed from reality because I had opposed Alan in the first place on that.

So at any rate, so we go to the convention in Bakersfield. By that point I was an expert on conventions. We all knew Cassady could win. We thought we could beat him, we thought we could pull it out, but we did a lot of things. I'll tell you just one minor little trick because I think it ought to be part of the history.

The Bakersfield auditorium, which was a new auditorium, had a huge stage. It probably stretched back fifty feet from the front of the stage to the back of the stage, a big concrete slab they had there, and then the audience
was out there. We knew Cassady was pretty charismatic and pretty moving and all that, so we put the podium at the back of the stage so there was about a fifty-foot space between where the podium was and the first person sitting in the audience. And then we got all the shrubs that we could find in Bakersfield, and had all these shrubs on the stage, so that when you saw Cassady, it looked like you were looking through a path in the forest, and down at the end of it was this guy making this speech. Of course, it was in Bakersfield, which was part of my region anyway, and the person who managed the convention was pretty much one of the allies for all this, the vice president of CDC. His name was Horace Massey, and he was from Bakersfield, and he was the convention manager.

So we did all this. This was not simply my idea; this was kind of a mutual idea of all of us. At the very end, oh, I would say maybe five minutes before Cassady spoke, his son realized what we had "did", and they were out there trying to tear up the wiring so that they could move the podium up to the front of the stage, which they did not succeed in doing.

At any rate, Cassady spoke for half an hour at the convention, defending himself and so on. Then I spoke for half an hour, why he should be removed, and then the convention debated for an hour, and then they voted. We beat Cassady. The vote was something like 850 for him and 1,000 against him, so we did win.
GREENAWAY: To this day, I'll run into people who will not understand why I did what I did, but as I say, I made perfectly clear that it had nothing to do with Vietnam. In the speech I started out by saying, "I'm just as opposed to the war. I think we ought to get out, and Cassady's been right on Vietnam. That's not why we're doing this." Of course, he had said the reason was the Vietnam War in his speech. I know that the movie star Robert Culp was one of the people in the audience, and he came up afterwards and said, "Gee, I was really surprised to hear what you said about Vietnam." Anyway, it was really quite a moment.

One interesting consequence of all of that was that when Cassady was removed, I became acting president of CDC, and given my role, I didn't really want to do that, I didn't think. So I stood up and said that, before the convention, and suggested Tom Carvey, the previous president, but the Cassady supporters booed that down. So instead, I named Tom Bradley to be the acting president of CDC, and he agreed to do it. This was before he was mayor of Los Angeles. He agreed to do it and came out, and he chaired CDC until we elected a new president. The new president we elected was Jerry Hill, the same one Cassady had defeated one year before.

So at that point I was still the northern vice president. Gant had quit, and we had a new southern vice president, Carl D'Agostino, who is with Berman-D'Agostino, the PR firm in Los Angeles. "B.A.D. politics," you know; Michael Berman
is Howard Berman's brother. They're the so-called Berman-Waxman machine's political arm who run campaigns. It's called B.A.D.--Berman and D'Agostino. Carl D'Agostino at that point lived in Orange County, and that sort of got him started.

So we had a convention, as I said, and came out of the convention in '66. It was totally apparent to me that Jerry Hill, I thought, was a weak president in that he couldn't stand up for the sort of revitalization that I hoped we would try to do when we got Cassady out of there. And in fact the organization continued to move to the left, despite all.

So in 1967, which was the final CDC convention I ever attended, which was in Fresno again, I was not the manager of the convention, but I quit CDC because I just simply felt it was becoming so much of an issues organization that it was no longer a viable way for the grass roots to try to be seeking power, not in politics. It simply was losing its ability to dominate politics the way it had during '58, '59, '60, that whole period.

FRY: Had the Vietnam War continued to be a divisive issue?
GREENAWAY: It was less divisive because fewer people who supported the president [of the U.S.] would have anything to do with CDC. Membership dropped off dramatically; it simply went downhill. And of course, by the time we were--a few years later in CDC it was down to very few Democratic clubs and it sort of, kind of revived every once in a while. It still exists. It still has a president and so on, but it's the far left
wing of the Democratic party in California and it is totally an
issues organization. It is no longer a major force in the
California Democratic party.

It's funny because there was no way a person could
"join" CDC. You could become a member of a Democratic
club that was affiliated with CDC, but by the mid-seventies
they had a class of memberships so you could simply be a
member of CDC without being a member of a Democratic
club.

What we tried to do, then, in 1967, was to form new
regional councils, those of us who had left CDC. So we had
a central California, there was a southern California and
northern California, and they were the same clubs that had
been in CDC from the areas, but those of us who didn't like
the direction the whole thing was going in, we put together
a new regional council, and it sputtered around for a while
and finally died out.

Fry: These regional councils took the place of . . .

Greenaway: . . . the state councils. And they were composed of clubs
that were not at all happy with the left-wing domination that
had occurred with the state board, and the club didn't
particularly want to affiliate with the CDC. You get a few
left-wingers who would like to do that and so on, but in the
Valley, which was what I was focused on at that point, we
didn't. As I say, they didn't last too long. They sort of died
out. A lot of the clubs collapsed.
I would suspect today that clubs have constituted about 10 percent of what they were in the days of the big CDC. If we have fifty clubs, I would be surprised, in California. It ended. It ended predictably. If Cassady hadn't ever happened, it still would have ended. It wouldn't have been quite as dramatic, I don't think, but I think I would have gotten out in 1967, even if there had been no Si Cassady.

FRY: Because it cancelled the volunteers' initiative?

GREENAWAY: Yes, exactly. It just wasn't serving that purpose anymore. And see, that had sort of been on my mind back in 1964, when I proposed that we abolish the state organization and let the clubs continue, so it wasn't a new idea.

FRY: At that time [1965], the polls showed that there was just a minuscule number of people who were against the war, so it really was a very minority issue. It would have been an organization that probably would be behind the war, among other things.

GREENAWAY: Yes. Well, I think a lot of the. . . . At that convention, I mean, I think that a lot of the votes against Cassady were people who did support that war in 1966. Cranston didn't really come out against the war until 1968. So by '68 it was popular to be against the war, but at that point it certainly wasn't.

Meanwhile, my life had sort of changed because in 1966 we lost the whole state, including Alan Cranston.

FRY: Do you want to go into Cranston's campaign for reelection?
GRENAWAY: The '66 campaign? I was not terribly active in the campaign, but he should have won [against Houston I. Flournoy], and he probably would have if he hadn't agreed to be the sort of good guy for Pat Brown.

Pat Brown wanted somebody to do a white paper attacking Ronald Reagan, to try to link him with the far right wing and so on, and they needed to take the most popular Democrat running, because Pat was in real trouble with Reagan. So Alan Cranston agreed to publish, to put out this white paper attacking Ronald Reagan. It was probably in, gee, August, September. I wasn't part of it. I was never part of Alan's state operation in that sense until his campaign for the senate in 1968.

But in '66 he and his advisors agreed to do this and then Pat went downhill and downhill more and more, and Reagan knew he was elected governor, so Reagan spent the last two weeks of the campaign attacking Alan Cranston. Alan, who was ahead in the polls, ten days before the election he was probably 20 percent ahead of Houston Flournoy. He lost.

As a matter of fact, he was going to be the only one who won. He was ahead in the polls the day after the election, on Wednesday, and he got in a plane in Los Angeles after having issued a victory statement and flew to San Francisco, and during the hour that he was in the air the late vote from Orange County came in, and when he got off the plane he had lost. The staff people who came out to
meet him, they were crying and so on, and yet when he had taken off, he was ahead by 50,000 votes. So it was just an enormous sort of blow for him.

FRY: At that point, was CDC unable to help him very much?
GREENAWAY: CDC didn't mean anything. No. It had shrunk. We had just come through the Cassady fight in '66.

But I think it was in no small part Pat Brown's campaign's fault. I was sitting at a Pat Brown fund-raising event in Fresno, I think it was at the Eagle's Club, which is across the street from the Fresno Bee on Van Ness. We were in a bar and it was a fund-raising event of some sort. Jack Palance, the movie actor, was there. He had come in to campaign for Pat Brown. There was a TV set over the bar and they showed the spot that Pat did, which was an actor shot Lincoln.

FRY: Oh, that famous spot where Pat says, "Don't vote for Ronald Reagan" or something like "You know it was an actor who shot Lincoln."

GREENAWAY: Palance, an actor, is sitting there and sees the thing. He got up and walked out, flew to Los Angeles, and quit campaigning. It was just as dumb as could be. It was that kind of thing that Pat's people did. They attacked the former mayor of San Francisco, George Christopher, in the primary because they thought Ronald Reagan would be easier to beat.

FRY: Did you have anything to do with that decision?
FRY: At this time, as I understand it, the Democratic party at 212 Sutter was also in on making decisions like that, and so I wondered what the CDC's relation to . . .

GREENAWAY: It was out of it.

FRY: It was totally out of it by that time, right?

GREENAWAY: Yes. It wasn't meaningful.

FRY: Why did you refuse?

GREENAWAY: I wrote back a letter to him and I said, "Look, you said that you were going to take politics out of this." I said, "I'm a very good appraiser. I know how to do this. I do it myself, unlike many of these people. If you give an examination, I will pass it. Your only reason for firing me is political. If you said you were going to take politics out of this, you can't fire me."

So he fired me anyway, but I stayed in for another month as an inheritance tax appraiser because of that. It's one of those jobs that sort of dies out, whereas a year later I was still doing appraisals and being paid for it and all of that.

FRY: But as a private citizen?

GREENAWAY: No, no. Still things I was assigned. In other words, when a probate is filed, the judge at that point appoints the
inheritance tax appraiser. You may not get the inventory of the estate for a year. Anyway, so then in . . .

Fry: But Roy, you weren't being paid?

Greenaway: Oh, sure, I was paid.

Fry: You were being paid. OK.

Greenaway: I'd gotten fees for the appraisals and everything else. I even brought some stuff back here to Washington when I came back. I was still signing papers occasionally, in 1969.

But at any rate, on July 7 of 1967, I had been out as an inheritance tax appraiser for about four or five months. I was out appraising, and I was in that second high-speed, head-on collision in my life, which I told you about, and was in the hospital for a month and was walking on crutches and then a cane and so on for a long time after that. So that was the second wreck. The first one was in 1956, the second one in 1967.

Fry: Which one altered your life the more?

Greenaway: I don't know whether either of them altered my life. One of them broke my left side, the first one, and the other was an almost identical injury, but the right side. Broke my hip and broke all the ribs, suffered numerous cuts. It was funny because when they took me in the emergency room in the second one and X-rayed me, they found out all the injuries from the first wreck and didn't believe it.

Fry: They said, "Now you're going to be symmetrical."

Greenaway: Actually, it's true. The first wreck shortened my left leg, and the second wreck made them even again.
FRY: Oh, for heaven's sake. So that's why you look so normal today after going through all of this.

GREENAWAY: I had forty-five stitches in my face in the second wreck.

FRY: You did?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: Roy, I read that when people go through something like this and they have to stay in the hospital a long time, they frequently make changes in their lives because they lie there and think about their life a lot. Did it cause any changes in your life?

GREENAWAY: No. In the first wreck, I was very close to death. I think it was a miracle that I was pulled out of the car and survived in the first wreck. I think that coming close to dying does influence you. I'm not sure I can tell you how, because it doesn't necessarily make you a fatalist but. . . . I don't know. I think that probably the first wreck had an awful lot more impact on me.

In the second wreck, the car that hit me, the woman who was not driving, but her husband was driving, her husband was a lawyer from Illinois. It was a woman, her husband, and about a four-year-old kid, and they were driving a Pontiac station wagon pulling a house trailer and coming downhill, and I was going uphill. The guy just simply swerved across and hit me head-on. I've always thought that he was trying to commit suicide. Both wrecks, incidentally, were 100 percent the other person's fault.
So then they packed me off. In a wreck you keep passing out and waking up, and passing out and waking up. They put me in an ambulance and took me to a little hospital in a town called Reedley. I got into Reedley and I knew I didn't want to go there. It turned out they only had two beds so I talked the ambulance driver into not checking me into that hospital but to take me back to Fresno, which was thirty miles away, and he did.

FRY: And then you passed out again?

GREENAWAY: I passed out again. You do that, but I knew what I was doing, because I knew I was going to be in the hospital for a while, and I didn't want to be in the hospital in Reedley, which would mean Carol would have to commute thirty miles each way to come and see me. I don't think the doctors were very good down there, particularly since one doctor looked at me and told me that I had ruptured my liver and was going to die. But I didn't believe that. What had happened was I had simply broken the sternum in the ribs here, but somehow or another he decided my liver had been destroyed, and there was never any indication that that was correct.

FRY: You didn't feel like that was true at the time?

GREENAWAY: I didn't believe it. But the impact was so great. I was wearing a chest seat belt. The seat belt snapped. It broke. It was really something.

FRY: That was quite an impact.
GREENAWAY: I had the steering wheel in my hand and it shattered. I was driving a Volvo. Anyway, I was holding the steering wheel and the steering wheel literally shattered in my hands and cut my hands, so I could see the bone right there from where the steering wheel had gone through. So it was really kind of crazy.

Anyhow. Well, that was in the midst of... As a matter of fact, the same weekend we were having a meeting in Fresno of the Central Valley Regional Council that we had set up. So I missed it.

Anyhow, so I also was removed as an inheritance tax appraiser. And then, to take the personal thing up to where I come back here, there’s just a slight bit more that needs to be said. I mentioned a number of times Joyce Fadem as being very close to me and a person who was... She was the secretary of CDC from '63 until '67 when we both resigned. We both left CDC at that point.

Her husband was one of the best condemnation attorneys in Los Angeles. Since I spent eight years as an appraiser, I began to take cases as a condemnation appraiser working for Jerry. That’s an appraiser for defense. In other words, the property owners come in because the new highway plan wants to take part of their land away; they hire an appraiser. The appraiser has to go into court and testify.

The whole thing about that job is not necessarily that you be the world’s greatest appraiser, but that you be able to
GREENAWAY: stand up to cross-examination on the witness stand. Since you're testifying as an expert witness and since an appraisal is a matter of opinion, the only thing that a cross-examining attorney can do to attack your appraisal is to destroy your credibility. So you sit up there and they go through a very complicated sort of dance which is supposed to convince the jury that you don't have any credibility as a person. So it's the sort of forensic or the rhetorical ability of the appraiser that's much more important than the appraisal itself for the purposes of winning cases like this.

I at one point was on the witness stand for eight hours a day for five days straight being cross-examined in the effort to weaken my credibility as a person. It's just incredible. It's the hardest job in the world. I always felt once I got through that I could do absolutely anything, because that was so difficult. People who did it, particularly civil service appraisers who were testifying for the plaintiff, for the state, were just terrified of doing that. I found out in the course of this that it really frightened the other appraisers.

So anyway, I qualified as an expert in Los Angeles and in Solano County superior courts and testified in a few trials and was on the way to making a profession out of that when Alan asked me to come back here at the end of 1968, after the election when he became a senator. I had been involved in his campaign.

We're at about four-twenty now. How much more do you have on this, do you know, or does it matter?
FRY: On this we're just about out, but I have another tape.
GREENAWAY: Well, I'd rather do another one if you can.
FRY: Sure.
GREENAWAY: So let's try to... The office is going to be closed next week, so I would just as soon not try to do something next week, if that's OK with you.
FRY: All right. Well, this is fine with me to just go on right now.
GREENAWAY: Now, I've got a thing coming up at five o'clock that I've got to prepare for, so I think it would be better to finish. I think about one more session should take care of it.
FRY: I believe so. Are you saying you want to stop right now?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: Oh, OK.

[End Tape 6, Side B]
This is January 4, 1991 with Amelia Fry, Roy Greenaway. Now, just to pick up on the former session.

Yes. You indicated that we missed recording something on the tape when it was turned last time.

When the tape was turned and you were about to tell some anecdote there, I think.

This was the state--the CDC Program Planning Committee.

Yes, and you were going all over California.

Basically, I think what we found out, and this was in the process of more than one year, and many areas. . . . First of all, I had sort of concluded that the state organization--that is to say, the state council, the board of directors, and the state program--had sort of gotten out of touch with the individual clubs. I had proposed, and as a matter of fact, I specifically proposed in the 1967 convention before I left, that we abolish the state council, and that was defeated overwhelmingly. We mentioned that, but it was this whole concept of being out of touch.
GREENAWAY: The second area that the Program Planning Committee plus various of us within the CDC felt was that we weren't following up on issue positions that we took. In other words, here you have an organization of probably 50,000 people—at that point it had diminished somewhat in size. With all these clubs, we would adopt a resolution calling for federal reclamation law reform or calling for various civil rights type of activities, calling for actions involving the war on poverty, and all of that, and yet there was no following up of that with a program aimed specifically at the local clubs.

One of the proposals which we considered and which there was an attempt made to implement was made by Rudy Nothenberg, who at that point was chairman of one of the other state committees of CDC. It was that we have, in effect, action committees on the specific areas which we covered in the issues conferences. The issues conferences would consider, say, three or four broad areas like housing and so on, then we put together a specific statewide committee to carry out—to try to implement politically what we had decided was a good idea in the resolutions we adopted on housing and so on.

So it was that kind of thing, to try to make it more effective, to try to make it more real for the local clubs and to bring it all together. I think if I were to summarize what the Program Planning Committee findings were and proposals
that we were making coming out of that, that would be the area that we were talking about.

FRY: You picked these up from the hearings that you held . . .

GREENAWAY: Those were the conclusions that we drew from the hearings, that's right. In other words, the hearings were basically things where local club people would come in and talk about what they wanted CDC to do, how they were happy or unhappy with the organization. You got a feeling that the club people felt that the orientation of the organization was too much on who won the debates at the state conventions, who was able to pass a certain resolution? That isn't why somebody joined the Anaheim Democratic Club, for the purposes of doing that. It was a time, I think, when there was a sense of empowerment.

Let me digress a minute in something else which I need to cover. Although it doesn't relate to CDC, it does relate to my own activities. Lyndon Johnson, after becoming president, announced a War on Poverty, and one of the consequences of that was community action agencies formed in various communities throughout the country, and those agencies had to be in existence to get War on Poverty funds and to fund programs in local communities.

There was an organization in Fresno called the Fresno Community Council, which was an organization which included representatives of most of the sort of do-good organizations in the community--the Red Cross and all of the other sort of social welfare-related agencies. They had this
GREENAWAY: organization whose job was basically to coordinate. Well, when the War on Poverty funds came down through whatever route, to the county or the city, and I don't recall which, the powers-that-be decided that the community council in Fresno would be the group to set up the--I think they call them cap agencies--the community agency which would pass on the War on Poverty funds to the various organizations and so on.

For reasons that I'm not totally aware of, I was asked to be a member of this group. This was in roughly 1965 and I spent a good deal of time on this in Fresno County. We got into it, and it seemed to me from the very beginning that this sort of upper middle class, almost all-white organization which had been put together by these agencies in Fresno were hardly reflective of the poor people who were supposed to be running the War on Poverty. So we managed to stage what was in effect a revolt on this board which I had been appointed to, and said that we thought that the board, which was supposedly the cap agency, should in fact contain representatives elected by poor people, by the various groups in the community.

So I went around. It was interesting because it was sort of a parallel to what I was doing in the Program Planning Committee in CDC. I went around and I got appointed chairman of the by-laws committee of this. So I announced we were going to write new by-laws.
So I went to all of the poverty areas in Fresno County and held hearings to have people come in and tell us what they thought they wanted in this. We went out to places like East Mendota, which was one of the worst agricultural slums in the Central Valley, and we held a hearing, and 150 people showed up, most of whom didn't speak English; they were mostly Hispanic. Talking about this, we were trying to explain that we wanted to have a board that was in fact elected by community people in places like East Mendota and so on and that would give representation on the board to the poverty communities. That would be the board to decide how to fund the War on Poverty project so the poor people themselves would be on the board and were going to have a voice instead of having on the board people like me who were appointed for political purposes for whatever reason but was very, very far from living in poverty.

So we did this, we adopted new by-laws, and they actually elected a board which represented poor people. So far as I know, this was the first time that this happened in the United States, in the War on Poverty. It later was required, but we did it voluntarily in Fresno County. We went through that whole process in 1965. And then when it was all finished, the board that I was on was abolished because it was replaced by a board of poor people who were the ones who were running the thing anyway.

FRY: And you lost your position too?
GREENAWAY: That's right. Exactly.
FRY: At this time, I think that was the typical—or correct me if I'm wrong—a typical situation, how the War on Poverty funds tended to be dispersed; I remember many criticisms about lack of control by the people affected by poverty.

GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: When you said "we," that was not a little CDC group, or was it?

GREENAWAY: No, I was not working with a whole lot of CDC people. Actually, I think it was organized labor in Fresno County that got me into—talked the community council into appointing me to the board. Some of the allies in that battle were liberals from organized labor.

Of course, [United Farm Workers Union leader Cesar] Chavez's group was also involved in pushing for this. I don't think the Farm Workers had formed as a union, but Cesar's organization prior to the United Farm Workers was called the CSO, the Community Service Organization, which was a statewide organization headquartered in San Jose with Cesar as the head of it. The purpose was to try to empower poor people, poor Hispanics, and so on, and particularly farm workers. He moved from that into forming the union, but that was sort of the basis of it, and I think in '65 CSO was still in existence. I think he started the union about two years later. I think the union really started around '67, '68.

FRY: But it would have been the same group of people locally that you knew?
GREENAWAY: Yes. And I was close to them. Part of it was George Ballis. He was still editor of the Valley Labor Citizen at that point. He had a lot of influence with labor, and of course, he and I went into the whole farm labor thing because of the water issue, because of the 160-acre limitation issue that we had been working on for, at that point, probably seven years.

FRY: This is a naughty question, but it just struck me: how did the farm workers, who were migratory, feel about having small family farms? Because wouldn't they wipe out the migratory work?

GREENAWAY: As a matter of fact, the very interesting thing about the farm workers on small family farms now. . . . We're talking about in the Central Valley?

FRY: Yes.

GREENAWAY: You need a huge influx of workers at harvest time. Say, take grapes. When you harvest grapes, you've got to have a team of people come in and they work for two weeks and there may be twenty people, and then they're gone from that grower and he doesn't have anybody.

Probably a guy farming forty acres could do everything himself except harvest. In other words, he could do all the pruning, which was done in January where you have to go through the grapevines and you cut all the vines off except three, and then you have to tie them to wires. It's pruning, trimming, and tying, but he might do that all himself for eighty acres. But when it came time that he would have to harvest, then he'd have to have a lot of people.
GREENAWAY: But that's not the point I want to make. So there was always a demand for farm workers on the family farm, but it was basically a harvest job, and that's why they would follow the harvest. The same thing was true, though, out on the factory farms, in the huge farms. They'd need a lot of people coming in, temporary migrant workers, to come in only during harvest time, although they might have, like, for example, if you have cotton and there was more cotton being grown out there, they would have farm workers come in and chop cotton, which was basically weeding cotton, so there would be maybe more work. It's also true that if you had a forty-acre family farm that had forty acres of cotton, they have to have farm workers come in and chop cotton. You'd have a hoe, and it's a terrible--really a terrible job. It's a difficult job.

But the point was that the family farm paid about twice as much for farm workers as the factories in the fields. In other words, you would, at that period, you might, out on the west side, get like fifty cents an hour, whereas around Sanger or Reedley a farmer gets about a dollar and a quarter an hour. The farm workers were very supportive of the idea of family farms. They had a better deal working there. The family farms were more apt, as a matter of fact, to handle families of farm workers, whereas the huge farms, they would have dormitories, have men only, and the families wouldn't be there.
See, they used to have a lot of farm labor housing on the farms, but then when you got housing codes and standards being adopted by counties and so on, the farmers all just simply tore the shacks down for farm workers and refused to provide them with housing.

**FRY:** Family farms, or the big ones?

**GREENAWAY:** No, no, I'm talking about the big ones. Family farms never could afford to have that. They would never have. . . . They would never provide housing. It was the big west-side farms that had the row housing. They simply got them off their farms because they didn't want to be responsible for meeting housing standards if you were providing houses to somebody.

Anyhow, [in the War on Poverty] sure, there was sympathy. That wasn't their major fight, and of course Cesar's orientation always in any of this was the Farm Workers [Union] had to be focused on the major fight, and the major fight was wages. Nothing else could interfere with that. Chavez, of course, had to fight not only the farmers but also most of the Hispanic leadership, political leadership, which was always off doing something else.

Organizations like MAPA—the Mexican-American Political Association—for example. I remember probably around '64-'63 maybe--MAPA had a state convention at the Hacienda Motel in Fresno, and they were at that point negotiating with Pat Brown about what they were going to do, and they were talking about Farm Workers and all this. Chavez with his organization and his people put a picket line
GREENAWAY: around the Hacienda Motel protesting the Mexican-American political associations trying to cut deals with Pat Brown, saying that the only goal for Farm Workers is to improve the quality of their wages, nothing else, and they marched around the whole motel. I was there.

And then Cesar sent in Dolores Huerta, who was his number two. She went in, and they had the entire political leadership of the Hispanic community in California sitting up at the head table. Dolores came in. They had invited Cesar and he refused to come, but he sent Dolores in and Dolores walked up to the podium and went right down the line one after the other, telling them how no good they were, how they had betrayed the people they were proposing to represent and so on, and she just took them one after the other. I never saw a performance like that in my life.

So it was really a tremendous period. I had always. . . . You know, I got to know Cesar and have had close ties with him, as has Alan. When Cesar first started the CSO in about 1962--it could have been even earlier than that--but Alan gave him all the furniture for his first headquarters back when Alan was controller. They've always been very close, and close personally. When Alan's mother died I remember Cesar calling him and commiserating with him and so on, sympathizing.

Anyhow, I digress. This was a big issue the whole time. As I told you, the Young Democrats had gotten into the farm labor issue and the 160-acre limitation issue. We
had a statewide conference in Fresno dealing with the problems of the 160-acre limitation, but the title of that conference was farm labor.

FRY: Somewhere I picked up this information that the CDC gave thousands of dollars to Chavez's Farm Workers.

GREENAWAY: I don't know that. It could be, but CDC never had any money to contribute to anybody, so I would be surprised if that was the case.

FRY: That's why I was surprised. But I wonder how CDC as a whole felt about Chavez.

GREENAWAY: CDC as a whole was very sympathetic about Chavez, about the Farm Workers and so on.

FRY: As opposed to the MAPA?

GREENAWAY: No, no, those people would also be part of CDC.

FRY: OK.

GREENAWAY: They were sufficiently chastised by Dolores and by Cesar doing what he did. They very much cooperated in the future with Cesar when Cesar had battles. But there's always been some friction between Cesar, who was really fundamentally not interested in politics or making political deals on behalf of the Hispanic community, and the political types who were providing leadership and who were very active in CDC, who did want to make deals with the community. There was always friction there. That exists even to this day.

But at that point, of course, Cesar--the Farm Workers--were in the process of being formed and the people who were to have a good deal of influence in the formation,
people like Marshall Ganz and Jerry Cohen—there still were a whole group of Anglos with Cesar when the union was formed, when the first strikes in Delano occurred.

Later they were run out of the Farm Workers, in the seventies, because the feeling was Hispanics should be the only people in the leadership positions in the Farm Workers, and they wanted the Anglos out. They got them out, and with that, threw an awful lot of the liberals and left-wingers out of the organization, but that gets way up into the seventies by the time that that happens.

FRY: Did you pick up, in this period, now, from your kind of unique position of having gone all over California and going to these meetings and everything else, did you pick up any signs of real underlying changes? Did you have any surprises?

GREENAWAY: Do you mean political?

FRY: Yes. In the whole political scene, Roy. In the more general scene, did you get surprises, in other words?

GREENAWAY: 'Sixty-two was the year that you saw the real emergence of the right wing. The John Birch Society was suddenly made public; it had been sort of secret. The Liberty bookstores were around. There was a beginning of a right-wing movement that started in '62, and I think that right-wing movement has captured a good deal of the Republican party today. But I mean, that's when it started. Before then, it wasn't. In those days you heard Republican people like county committee chairmen and so on worrying about the
impact that these right-wing groups were going to have on the Republican party.

It's a far cry from where they are today, where, I mean, you know, guys like [U.S. Senator] Jesse Helms and [U.S. Senator] Phil Gramm and so on who typified this kind of attitude are very much in control of the Republican party. That was one of the things that happened in '62, that process. But I don't know that I saw a whole lot of surprising changes.

FRY: In '62 there was the Francis Amendment, and I wanted to ask you about that. It came out on the ballot.

GREENAWAY: I did some checking to see if I could find anything in my own records or notes about it, but I cannot. I remember it, but I don't remember anything about it.

FRY: Oh, OK. But it was a kind of a reflection of what you were talking about. In other words, it was to prevent subversive activity. You couldn't carry any documents that might be subversive, and so on.

Also in '62, while we're on that, I had a question to ask you about Bruce [V.] Reagan. What kind of a candidate was he when he ran against Cranston for controller?

GREENAWAY: He didn't do much in the way of campaigning. I mean, he went around and made speeches, and he. . . . See, once Alan took over the inheritance tax appraising and he had a Democrat appointing the inheritance tax appraisers, then the Republicans who had been appointing inheritance tax appraisers from 1912 to 1968, they appointed all of them.
There was never a Democratic controller during that whole fifty-six year period, and when suddenly Cranston starts appointing them, people start attacking the system. So one of the things Bruce Reagan did was to attack Cranston's inheritance tax appraisers.

They would always single me out and attack me because I was so political. Of all the inheritance tax appraisers, I probably was the one who was most active in Democratic party politics. So Reagan attacked me, Pierre Salinger attacked me by name when he ran against Alan in the primary of '64. Fluornoy attacked me.

**FRY:** On what grounds did they attack you?
**GREENAWAY:** That I was political and not qualified to be an inheritance tax appraiser.

**FRY:** Not in your political views, especially, but just the fact . . .
**GREENAWAY:** Just that I was a political person who was appointed to this. They argued that I wasn't qualified. I probably was one of the ten best qualified inheritance tax appraisers in California because I did all the work. I didn't hire help. I learned how to be an appraiser and so on. When Fluornoy finally gave his test, I got one of the highest scores in the state.

**FRY:** It didn't do you much good, did it?
**GREENAWAY:** No.

**FRY:** There was another little thing left hanging in my mind about the Max Rafferty period. Did the CDC do anything about the vacancy that Larry Simpson left when he suddenly resigned in May from state superintendent of public instruction?
GREENAWAY: See, that was nonpartisan.
FRY: And it was nonpartisan.
GREENAWAY: See, CDC would never endorse a nonpartisan. There was no primary. They couldn't make a preprimary endorsement.
FRY: Yes. And they wouldn't come out on it even as an issue on education or anything?
GREENAWAY: We certainly. . . . A lot of CDC helped, Ralph Richardson, but no, there were no official actions.
FRY: Cecil Hardesty and Wallace Hall were the others, besides Max Rafferty.
GREENAWAY: Richardson was the guy who was really very much of a hero, too. See, Richardson had been the head of the State Board of Education, I guess, appointed by Pat Brown, so he was sort of a leading liberal in the education field at that point, so a lot of the "top people" embraced him. They probably put him on the slates and all that, but there was no endorsement because we weren't empowered to make endorsements for that sort of a race.
FRY: But he would have been the CDC man, informally?
GREENAWAY: Yes.
FRY: OK, what else do we need to cover?
GREENAWAY: You can almost answer that.
GREENAWAY: I want to talk about the '68 campaign, because that's the . . .
FRY: Why don't we do that.
GREENAWAY: You asked one other question. You said what was my specific title in Cranston's senate campaign in '64.
FRY: Yes, did you do anything?
GREENAWAY: The way it worked was... And I did some checking myself just to see what the newspapers were saying about me. This morning I read some clips from '64 newspapers about the campaign, and I was just identified as a Cranston supporter. What I think happened was that CDC was doing all the work for his campaign, and I was an officer in CDC. I was the chairman of the Political Action Committee of CDC at that point, so I would go to campaign meetings and I would talk to some of the people who were on the payroll of the campaign and that kind of thing, but I mean, it was always in my capacity in CDC. I never had a specific position in this campaign in '64.

FRY: OK, but did you function that way?

GREENAWAY: Yes. In other words, we did... If anybody was going to run this campaign in the Valley, I would run it. We'd always had some names and titles. There would be the chairman in the Valley, the Fresno County chairman and so on, but in effect, in any of these Cranston campaigns, I did them in my area and then was involved in the statewide campaign. To the extent that there was any sort of organized statewide campaign, I was involved in that, just on a sort of ad hoc basis rather than with any particular title. There was never any reason to give me a title.

The '68 campaign was really interesting, the senate campaign, because I had been of course close to Alan and I had been involved when he made his decision to run, very enthused about it.
FRY: How did that happen?

GREENAWAY: I remember we were in a hotel in Los Angeles. I was with him at the point at which he met with Jesse Unruh. Jesse toyed with running for the senate, but of course everybody pulled out because they felt Kuchel wasn't beatable. Cranston was the only one who had enough of a sense about the strength of the right wing--this is six years after its first emergence--the strength of the right wing and that [Max] Rafferty had a chance of beating Kuchel in the primary. See, no other Democrat thought they could handle Kuchel, so no other heavyweight candidate got into the senate race in 1968 other than Cranston. Although Unruh toyed with it, he didn't.

Anyway, I was active and involved and met with the people in northern California and southern California who were involved in his campaign. He had a not-well-organized campaign; in the primary it wasn't particularly well organized. After the primary, he brought into the campaign a guy much like Prentiss Moore had come into the '58 campaign because Pat Brown put him in. This was an attorney from Los Angeles named Allyn Kreps.

Kreps had been the son of the dean of the business school at Stanford and had grown up. Alan had known him when he was a teenager and had lost touch with him. Kreps had gone through becoming a lawyer and was a top-flight litigator and a very, very tough guy. So he took over the campaign in southern California, the statewide campaign in
southern California, in probably June or July of 1968. He basically was sort of a manager. There were people raising money, there were people involved with message issues and doing other things like that. Kreps was sort of a field general involved in the campaign.

I was chairman of the campaign, in effect, in the San Joaquin Valley. The guy who ran the campaign in northern California, who was a Stanford law professor, a professor of constitutional law named [Robert] Bob Gerard, who was an old friend and an old friend of Alan's and a guy who I knew pretty well, anyway, he ran the northern California campaign. They didn't know what they were doing, particularly, so . . .

FRY: Was he an attorney too?
GREENAWAY: He was just a law professor.

So Kreps decides in July that the inheritance tax appraiser system was a liability for Alan. As I mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for that was that Alan was being criticized. He was criticized during the '66 campaign for selling appraiserships, selling the position to people who'd make a $5,000 contribution and so on, and that issue reared its head again in 1968, even though Alan had been defeated and hadn't been the state controller for two years.

So Kreps decides that nobody who has been an inheritance tax appraiser can have a role in Alan's campaign for the senate. So he writes me a letter telling me I can no longer have a role in Alan's senate campaign. I ignored that
and sent it to Alan, because something like two days after I had the letter I was invited to go down to a statewide meeting on "message," which they just didn't tell Kreps anything about; Alan had put it together at the home of his fund raiser, whose name was Mimi Harris, in Los Angeles. We talked about what the thrust of the campaign would be and all that. It was really the big message campaign planning session. This was two days after Kreps had fired me from being in the campaign.

I went back up to Fresno, and Gerard wasn't too well organized either, I think; he was harassed with fund raising and he wasn't really doing much else, and they had no sort of field campaign going on, so Gerard sends a young man down who's on the payroll, in effect assigns him to me. So I have a paid assistant in this campaign that I had been thrown out of, to work the San Joaquin Valley. So I just took off on my own, and I printed our own literature specifically for the Valley, for Alan Cranston's senate campaign.

FRY: You wrote it?
GREENAWAY: I wrote it, had it printed. I never told the campaign about it. Then we distributed the letter throughout the Valley using this paid guy that Gerard had sent down to work the Valley. So I just really ran his campaign in the Valley without having any real credentials to do it at all. But incidentally, during this time I was still sort of recovering from my second wreck and I was finishing up cases from
being an inheritance tax appraiser and doing the condemnation appraising, so I was traveling around quite a bit during the period of the '68 campaign.

So the election occurred then finally, and Alan won. I think everybody was sort of surprised, although Rafferty was in many respects a terrible candidate, but he had really right-wing enthusiastic support that way. Alan had organized during the '68 campaign Republicans for Cranston, and these were basically Kuchel supporters who were the more moderate Republicans and just couldn't stand Rafferty and were furious with the whole thing.

Kuchel helped Cranston during that campaign. He did it privately, but I remember, for example, after the primary sometime in September, I went up to Sacramento to Kuchel's office in the Capitol and met with his top staff guy there to talk about ways in which Kuchel could help with the Cranston campaign. As I say, although Kuchel never did that publicly because that would have hurt him, a lot of people who had been very active and very strongly for Kuchel formed what were called the GOPocrats. That was GOPocrats for Cranston. They helped him win, and he established a sort of a kind of campaigning that he has always followed since, and that is a real appeal to Republican voters.

FRY: The moderate . . .

GREENAWAY: Moderate. But even—but I mean, Alan's always fund raising among Republicans. I remember during the '74 campaign,
for example—this skips ahead a little, and I'll come right back to where I want to be—but during the '74 campaign, for example, Nixon had a group called the Blair House Group, which were a group of about thirty Republicans who were his top advisers and supporters in California, who were really the Nixon team in terms of making contributions and everything else. Of those thirty, over half of them supported Cranston in his campaign for the reelection. That's an awful lot of Republican support, including some conservative Republicans, too. It's one of the things that is even today sort of hurting the Keating [Savings and Loan hearings] situation, but it was always typical for Alan to go to conservatives and raise contributions and so on. People look at it and say today, "Well, why would a guy like that contribute?" Why would these guys who felt that Richard Nixon was the greatest thing that ever happened contribute to Alan and support Alan?—but they did.

FRY: Why? I'll ask that too.

GREENAWAY: All right. The L.A. Times did a story on that in '74 as to why that was happening, and they took these people who contributed to Alan and went around and asked them. The answer was pretty consistent from them. That is, they felt that Alan would listen. They felt that they made a case and could convince him, that he was not ideologically programmatic about things, that he was very pragmatic and that he could be persuaded that there was merit to their case, and if they could do that, they would have his support.
FRY: They didn’t care what party.

GREENAWAY: They didn’t care what party. They just wanted somebody who would listen. That’s all they’d ask from their own party, really, if they’re businessmen and want something, was somebody to listen to them and make an objective judgment and so on. That’s one of the things that led me, during all of Alan’s senate years, to believe that his great strength was not his speaking, but his listening.

When we, for example, in 1985-86 had to come back from the harm that his running for president and failing so terribly had developed, and how to get him back so he could win in ’86, we developed a program called Community Forums. The whole idea of the way we set them up and everything else was for Alan to go out and listen. So listening has been the real key in my own mind about how to get Alan elected and what his strength is when you go into things like that.

So that all came out of this question, why Republicans would be willing to support Alan, which really started in the ’68 campaign. Obviously, if he was going to campaign to get Republican votes in ’68 to pick up the disaffected Kuchel supporters and so on, he had to present himself in such a way that he wasn’t simply out there as the press saw him, as a very liberal guy out giving speeches about why Red China ought to be in the United Nations and things like that, but rather had to show that he was willing, again, to listen.
I think it was the fact that he had the Kuchel-Rafferty primary as the backdrop for his running that shaped him that way. In other words, I'm not sure that if Alan had been elected to the senate in '64, if he'd beaten Salinger and so on, that he would have ever been able to be elected for four terms, because he would have come in on a very different basis, and I don't think it would have fit in. I don't think it would have fit his strengths and so on.

FRY: That's an interesting "what if" to speculate on.

On the Republicans who were contributing to him, just to put this in perspective for future historians of political science, how many of those do you think were contributing to him just to hedge their bets, who were also contributing to the other side?

GREENAWAY: They may have, and that was typical, that you'd get Democrats who would do that too. Businesses normally give to both sides. Take a big company in Washington like General Electric, for example. They have their Democratic lobbyists and their Republican lobbyists. The Democratic lobbyists for G.E. get PAC money for the Democrats, and the Republican lobbyists for G.E. get PAC money from G.E.'s PAC for Republicans, and they always go to the fund raisers and so on. That's just the way politics work, and it worked then. But these guys legitimately liked Alan. I know Leonard Firestone, who was Firestone Tires, a very wealthy guy whom Nixon had appointed ambassador to Belgium or one of those countries, always was a Cranston supporter . . .
GREENAWAY: Firestone supported Cranston as late as the '86 campaign, but I mean, we always had these people. I know in the 1980 campaign, when the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed Cranston, the current president of the California State Chamber of Commerce was chairman of Cranston's business committee. So he had always done this and always gotten that sort of Republican support. But at any rate . . .

FRY: I just have one other question here. Did you find, when you were helping with all of this that these people were interested in issues that they felt that Cranston supported anyway, such as foreign policy and things like this, or were they mainly interested in getting his support for their own needs?

GREENAWAY: I would say the latter. Occasionally you'd run into the former, but that would be infrequent. I suppose as businessmen they felt they had to divorce their personal lives and their personal beliefs from what was to their advantage or to their profit as businessmen, so that's what they were focusing on.

That isn't necessarily as narrow as it sounds, though. It can involve things like infrastructure improvements, building, opening ports, getting more money for highways, getting money for mass transit, getting money for rail transit, airports, and things like that. It is pretty broad.
The California Business Round Table in recent years, for example, has made education its number one issue. It feels that it can't find workers well enough educated to man its plants, and has said, "If we don't get that resource we can't do anything else; we can't be productive." So they have put more effort in education than any other issue.

FRY: Were any of these hearings a two-way proposition—in other words, in which Cranston actually educated some of them, do you think, or was it mainly his trying to find the common ground so that they could support his campaign?

GREENAWAY: I think he.... I don't think during the campaign there was much of this going on. In '68 the motive for the Republicans to support Cranston was that they didn't like Max Rafferty. I think a lot of them supported Cranston with the idea that they would defeat him in '74. What happened is, having made the contacts with them, he kept those contacts up. He impressed them during that six-year period with his ability to listen.

Anyway, so we're back to the election. He does win. I expressed an interest in coming back to Washington primarily because Joe Wyatt, who was the second president of CDC—he's an attorney in Los Angeles and he was the president who succeeded Cranston, a guy I had known for a long time and, I mentioned earlier, one of the people who came out of the Young Democrats in the early fifties—he showed up one November evening in 1968 in Fresno and came out to the house and said, "If you want to go back to
Washington with Alan, now's the time to hit him, call him," and so on. I never, to this day, know quite why Joe made that visit or called me, because Joe was never that close to Alan.

But I did, and I called Alan. I said I wanted to come, and he said he'd let me know. On Christmas Eve, 1968, in the afternoon he called and offered me a job to come back as a legislative assistant working in domestic policy. This was on December 24 and he wanted me in Washington on January 5. So we moved to Washington, and that's how I came there. Anyway, that, in a sense, is the end of the story of my California political career.

FRY: And that will have to be the chronological break-off until we can take off again when we have our other series.

But I want to go back and ask you, on this campaign, to tell us more about how you dealt with the right-wing accusations and so forth in that campaign, because at least locally there seemed to be a very vigorous set of organizations of right wingers that would also attack schools and things like that.

GREENAWAY: The first time it appeared was in 1962. That's when their book was out and so on. They had also distributed in most campaigns this whole right-wing litany on Cranston's life called "The Shadow in the Senate," based upon the fact that the Shadow of the radio program was Lamont Cranston. This argued that simply Alan was a Communist in disguise and went back and talked about all sorts of contacts that he
had had. I mentioned quite a bit of this earlier. He responded, but I don't think any of that ever particularly worked. You know, I mean, it wasn't effective.

FRY: How did you look upon things like forcing your opponent to separate himself from the John Birch Society publicly, or to make a decision about that. I know that was talked about in the Nixon-Pat Brown campaign, and I thought maybe it was in this one, too.

GREENAWAY: It may have been. Again, I was not usually, in Alan's campaign for controller, involved with the press people or with the people who were dealing with issues. The one exception to that was the '68 campaign when I went down and met with the group which was planning a broad sort of outline of what the message would be.

FRY: That was kind of what I was thinking about, in the context of that.

GREENAWAY: I was never particularly involved in that. The idea, too, I think, of message and that kind of strategy, the way it's talked about now, is a more recent development, but basically it would be Alan's press people. Alan always would have some full-time reporters on his staff. He himself having been a journalist, he always used journalists in a lot of this. They would sit down daily and bang out the release. If they could figure out some way to attack somebody, they'd do it. I don't think there was a big planning program that was involved in this. It was more a question, really, of a press
hit for the day. So if somebody figured, "Oh, that's a sharp thing to do," that's kind of how it happened.

Alan may have seen it and he may not have seen it. As a candidate, of course, he didn't have the time to approve an awful lot of the press stuff that his press people were putting out.

FRY: It's always a question, how much of this does reflect what the candidate is doing and thinking.

GREENAWAY: Sure.

FRY: I wondered if in the San Joaquin Valley you had . . .

GREENAWAY: The San Joaquin Valley at that point was not particularly a bastion of conservatism, I think in no small part because of the McClatchy newspapers—the Fresno, Modesto, and Sacramento 

Bees—which were relatively liberal Democratic newspapers and kind of set the tone in the Valley. For example, in the '56 election the only part of California that Adlai Stevenson carried against Dwight Eisenhower was the Central Valley—Fresno and so on.

FRY: Those were strong newspapers, too, in their staffing and everything else.

GREENAWAY: Exactly. But the tradition has always been that southern California was conservative and northern California was more liberal, and that the Valley was as liberal as the Bay Area. Now, that did change because it was never really true when you got into some issues. In Bakersfield, Kern County became much more conservative, probably the most conservative Democratic county in California. It may not
even be Democratic now, but it traditionally had been. But it wasn't. . . . When you thought of the John Birch Society, you did not think of the Central Valley; you thought of Orange County, parts of Los Angeles, parts of San Diego, more than you did the Central Valley.

FRY: The context of all this is that at this time the newspapers resist beginning to change from being--all of the major ones--being Republican newspapers in the state except the Bee. Well, maybe the Bee was Republican, but it was Earl Warren.

GREENAWAY: The Bee was Democratic.

FRY: Was it? OK. But they were very much for Earl Warren.

GREENAWAY: They were for Earl Warren. They were for Kuchel. Any of these sort of Republicans in the Earl Warren bipartisan era. But you see, they were for Pat Brown for the same reason. Pat Brown was in the Earl Warren position of being bipartisan. And again, see, so was Alan, although the press thought of him as being very liberal. But in fact Alan was part of this bipartisan tradition which Kuchel and Warren were in, as opposed, for example, to Knowland, who was never from that tradition.

FRY: In the San Joaquin Valley, did you have anything like when Nixon ran and he had the Committee for the Preservation of Democrats in California, when the minority party--which was Republicans--were trying to get more conservative Democrats in theirs? But they didn't do it like Alan Cranston did to get Republicans on his side. Nixon wasn't quite as
straightforward as that. So did you have anything like that, any local incidents like that, to worry about?

GREENAWAY: No. They didn’t have much influence in the local community. They didn’t have. It wasn’t right wing. There were a lot of conservative Republicans, but it wasn’t right wing. At that time, all of the congressmen from the Valley were Democrats. Harlan Hagen, Bernie Sisk, John McFall, John Moss.

FRY: In that campaign of 1968 with Alan Cranston, what would you say was the most important or the most exciting issue or event?

GREENAWAY: I think that Rafferty lost. I think Alan. . . . People felt Rafferty was a. . . . I think he was defeated because he was a right-winger. He did things; like in the campaign, for example, they found out that during World War II, that Rafferty had claimed he had some sort of physical disability and he walked with a cane during World War II, and as soon as the armistice was declared and the war ended, he threw the cane away. Cranston used this as a symbol with his campaign, the canes. They were in his lapels and so on to tell the story. It was that kind of thing that defeated Rafferty.

As is often the case in California, the statewide election there is often decided because somebody decides that they don’t—because the people decide they don’t like somebody. They don’t like the incumbent, and because they don’t like the incumbent, they vote the other person in. I think that
was clearly the case when [Senator] John Tunney lost. Nobody was voting for [Sam] Hayakawa; they were voting against John Tunney because they didn’t like him. That’s typical.

FRY: The only other really important thing that I have to throw in here is to go back to 1963-64. I have a few questions about Jesse Unruh that I’m a little puzzled about, because in the 1962 period--'62-63--he did things like he kept the legislature locked up for two days and two nights or something, a long time, wouldn’t let them out of the capitol until they passed his legislation. And then [ ] Farrell came out with a book that was a "revelation", I’ll say, rather than an exposé, of the way Unruh was functioning to get control of campaign funds. He called it Money, Power, and Politics. And yet in retrospect, this looks like it really didn't affect Unruh much. Is that right, and if so, why not? It looks like it would have dented his progress.

GREENAWAY: He was an incredible power, but the history of the speakers of the assembly in California is that the very powerful ones get away with very heavy-handed tactics. Jesse, when he tried to get out of it and run for governor, didn’t make it.

We despised--"We", the CDCers and that part of the Democratic party--just despised Jesse. We thought he was as bad as could be. It was what we were against in politics. I don’t think Jesse was as bad as we thought he was, but that was the attitude at the time. Ideologically he was, for example, I think a Kennedy type. I think he was an
enormous admirer of Jack Kennedy, and I think he could live in the world of issues the way Kennedy could.

A really bad guy like Hugh Burns, who was the state senator and president [pro tem] and from Fresno and a good friend of mine, incidentally--I've known him for years and years and years--he was really bad news, much worse than Jesse, and yet he didn't have anything like the sort of publicity that Jesse had and wasn't viewed that way.

FRY: But wasn't Hugh Burns, was he the UnAmerican Committee chairman?

GREENAWAY: Yes. At one point, yes.

FRY: I mean the California one.

GREENAWAY: Yes.

Burns had started out as a sort of liberal in 1936. He was Franklin Roosevelt's chairman in Fresno County, for example, but then moved way to the right.

FRY: Do you want to go into the fight of Warshaw versus Yorty in 1966? This was on the Democratic party level. It was an Unruh move, and at the same time, Si Cassady and the others were trying to form what they called "The New Party."

GREENAWAY: That would be after Cassady got thrown out as president of CDC.

FRY: Right. After he was thrown out.

GREENAWAY: I didn't pay much attention to any of that.

FRY: Were all these people kind of on the same side, originally?

GREENAWAY: Cassady was way on the left.

FRY: Cassady and Carmen Warshaw?
GREENAWAY: No, no. Carmen was always a conservative. One of the big fights—I think it was in '62 at the state convention—was when Charlie Warren, who was an assemblyman and CDC-type candidate, ran for Democratic State Central Committee chairman against Carmen Warshaw. We were all out there for Charlie, and Carmen had the support of moderates and conservatives. A lot of the Pat Brown people were for her. It was extremely close.

Carmen lost by like one and two-thirds votes out of 2,000 cast. Cranston was at that point still one of the best vote counters in predictions. Warren's campaign put him up in a room at the Senator Hotel and simply fed information to him. He did the vote count and counted it accurately, down to the fraction of a vote, so we knew we were going to win and we knew it was extremely tight.

Carmen was furious when she lost that. Alan had had his campaign headquarters for reelection as controller in the Subway Terminal Building in Los Angeles, which Carmen owned. The following morning Carmen simply padlocked the doors on his campaign, never let Alan in. He never got any of his files or anything out, and suddenly he didn't have a state campaign headquarters because she threw him out of the thing.

But Carmen was sometimes for Jesse. She didn't like the left. I always got along very well with Carmen; she

1. This was 1966, as Greenaway corrects below.
liked me, but she didn't really like the left. She's a very brilliant and very outspoken woman. [Arthur] Art Hoppe, who wrote a column in the San Francisco Chronicle, labeled her at various times "The Dragon Lady," for example, so she showed up at one state convention, I think it was '64, in a rickshaw being pulled by a Chinese coolie, and came in as The Dragon Lady. He also called her "The Wicked Witch of the South" in one of the columns.

But she was a force, and as I say, while I was on the left and part of a group that was very opposed to her, I've always personally gotten along very well with Carmen and saw her as recently as . . . . The last time was in 1982 at the midterm convention in Philadelphia, and we had a great time then. Of course, her daughter, Hope Warshaw, worked for Alan's '84 presidential campaign.

FRY: According to my notes, in 1966 Alan Cranston led the effort in Democratic State Central Committee meetings to defeat Warshaw for state chair.

GREENAWAY: That was the Charlie Warren thing in '66.

FRY: It was '66 instead of '62. OK.

GREENAWAY: But the rest of the story is absolutely right.

I had first met Carmen in 1955 in Lionel Steinberg's living room in Fresno as part of the CDC convention. I think I mentioned that when we were talking about that part of it.

FRY: Are you glad that you had all of this training before you came to Washington?

GREENAWAY: I don't know whether it was . . .
FRY: ... relevant?

GREENAWAY: No, it was not. ... I don't think it is too relevant. Some of the things that I learned, dealing with CDC, have been extremely helpful to me here. For example, I am very good in unstructured situations. You have to do that to deal with volunteers because you can't hire them, you can't fire them, and you can't make them do things. You have to persuade them to do things. You have really to be very good at dealing in unstructured situations.

Alan is very much like that also. He's good, and kind of insists on having fairly unstructured situations, and since I'm good at that, why, we work together. I think that's because we both came out of the club movement. A lot of people can't do that. A lot of people need structure. For example, in this office I've never allowed an organizational chart to be drawn, and I change things all the time.

FRY: You mean you don't have a hierarchy?

GREENAWAY: I move everything around. When we have somebody who quits, the first thing I do is figure, is there some way I can reorganize the job and do it differently rather than hiring another person to do the same thing? So I don't think that there's anything absolute or universal about what's the best way to do things, what's the best way to organize things, so I always operate under the theory that what's right now will be wrong in six months and was wrong six months ago, and that you have to change things and do that. And that's something that I learned coming out of the club movement.
It certainly affects the way I run this office and organize the staff.

That's about the only thing out of that period that helped me. I think my college education did much more to prepare me. In other words, the sort of training as a generalist that I received had more to do with preparing me for what I had done on the senate staff than any other experience that I have had.

I suppose the other thing is that after you've been at it for a while, you learn that winning fights isn't the way to succeed in politics. As in debate, you don't win a debate by doing the better job of overcoming the other guy's arguments. You win a debate by impressing the audience with whatever you do, and that may mean not necessarily beating down the other guy's argument.

Fry: Just going ahead with your own?

Greenaway: Yes. It may mean. . . . I think you have to. . . . Aristotle discussed this at some length. I think that you win by convincing people that you're right. You do that not necessarily by winning the argument but by impressing them with your reasoning and by any one of a number of tactics. Sometimes you can win a debate by conceding. I think that being active in politics helped teach me that.

Fry: Do you want to check over these things quickly [on our outline]?

Greenaway: Yes, let's see what's here.

Fry: See if you have one last addition here before we close off.
GREENAWAY: [Looks through papers] I didn't get involved at all in the '64 Atlantic City Democratic convention.

FRY: Oh, OK.

GREENAWAY: I didn't try to go. We were supportive of the Mississippi Freedom Delegation, but...

FRY: "We" being CDC?

GREENAWAY: CDC types, yes. Joyce Faden went, for example. I didn't go to the '64 convention, and then Alan, as part of his campaign strategy in 1968 running for the senate, chose not to go to the '68 convention in Chicago.

FRY: Why?

GREENAWAY: Because they knew the demonstrations were going to occur, they knew that, you know, the antiwar activists and so on, so it wouldn't do him any good to be on the inside. He was an opponent of the war at that point. In many respects, one of the smartest things he did was stay away from that convention, because it was just disastrous, [the riots] you know, the convention.

So I didn't go to a national convention until the '72 convention in Miami. I was never on a delegation other than '56 and '60, and I never was in a position to try to be on a delegation once I was back here with Cranston, because although I've always been registered to vote in California, I've never been there so that I could be more active, but I did go to the '72 convention, to the '76 convention in New York, and to the '84 convention in San Francisco.
FRY: This business of holding hearings, has that little technique continued?

GREENAWAY: Not really. I mean, we do it with Alan. I think the idea of the Community Forums, which I thought up in January of 1985 as a sort of major tool in Alan's reelection campaign, kind of came out of my feeling about the futility of speeches as a way to accomplish a whole lot of other things, to learn things, to give people a sense of involvement.

FRY: And you scheduled him up and down the state with these?

GREENAWAY: Yes.

FRY: Roy, thank you.

GREENAWAY: OK. Well . . .

FRY: If you have nothing else that you can think of to add. . . . I've gone through my list.

GREENAWAY: I would think going up to the '68 campaign, that's pretty much it. I think if . . .

FRY: We can always add when we get started again, then, on the Cranston project.

GREENAWAY: All right. What is the status of that?

[End Tape 7, Side B]