Oral History Interview

with

HERBERT M. BAUS

Political Consultant
1948-1982

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By Enid Hart Douglass
Claremont Graduate School
picked California. They brought me out here in 1923, and they lived for one year in the Boyle Heights district of Los Angeles. Then dad got a job in the Inglewood post office, and they moved to Inglewood and lived there for a decade or two.

DOUGLASS: Your mother was a housewife?

BAUS: My mother was a housewife.

DOUGLASS: You had a sister.

BAUS: She passed away last March. I went to Inglewood High, and then I went to UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles]. I was graduated from UCLA in '36 and spent a year as a PR [public relations] director of the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce and then five years as PR for the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce.

DOUGLASS: Let’s back up. At UCLA you were a political science major.

BAUS: That’s correct.

DOUGLASS: That was an early interest of yours?

BAUS: That’s correct.

DOUGLASS: Did you have any vision then of what you might do with that bachelor’s degree?

BAUS: I always wanted to do something to express myself, particularly in the written medium.
DOUGLASS: In conjunction with politics?

BAUS: Not necessarily. Not limited to politics. I would have been a newspaper reporter, but it happened that I veered into publicity pretty early on because I could make more money.

DOUGLASS: You liked to write.

BAUS: I did like to write and always have.

DOUGLASS: Did you have anybody at UCLA as a professor, or contacts there, who affected your decisions about what you were going to do?

BAUS: I had some professors who influenced me deeply but not really professionally. I particularly remember Dr. Paul Perigard, the French civilization professor who was a captain in the French Army in World I; Dr. Ivan Lobanov-Rostovsky, a veteran cavalry officer from the Tsar’s army who participated in the Battle of Tannenberg and in the White [Russian] versus Red [Russian] civil war of Russia; and Dr. Wilham Diamond from Germany, who was later killed by a speeding driver while crossing Wilshire Boulevard.

I always wanted to go East, and at the end of my sophomore year, Ernst Liebacher, a former president of the student body of Inglewood High,
had gone to Georgetown Foreign Service School in Washington, and we corresponded. In the summer of 1933, between my sophomore and junior years, he got me a job as a night clerk in a hotel in Washington. I dropped everything and went back.

DOUGLASS: Is that when you worked for the Washington Post?

BAUS: I worked for a year for the Washington Post.

DOUGLASS: I wondered when you worked that in. Were you doing general work at the Post?

BAUS: I was northern Virginia correspondent, based in Fredericksburg, Virginia. I was paid twenty-five cents an inch. I made more money than most of the full-time reporters.

DOUGLASS: Did you like doing that?

BAUS: I had a very marvelous educational year. I motivated Bart Sheridan, a college fraternity brother of mine, to come East after he graduated. Six months later he wanted to have some adventures before he settled down. He came out to see what I was doing in the East. I got him a job on the Washington Post as correspondent for Charlestown, West Virginia.

DOUGLASS: This was a summer job at the Washington Post?

BAUS: No. I took a year off from UCLA. At the end of the year, Bart had been able to get a job offer
for me as the UCLA correspondent for the old [Los Angeles] Herald-Express. I decided to come home and finish college.

[My decision was between staying in newspaper work or deferring a career for two more years to acquire a diploma. My thinking was a diploma was probably not really vital for a career, but I had met older men who always regretted they didn’t have one. I reasoned two more years would be a drop in the bucket of time, so why rush into the marketplace and maybe spend a lifetime of gnawing doubts that I should have finished university. Besides, I figured my work for the Herald-Express would be professional training at the same time, and it worked out that way.]*

DOUGLASS: What percentage of time were you working as you went to school?

BAUS: I spent at least half of my time working the last two years. I had three jobs, but the Herald-Examiner was the most important and most interesting one.

DOUGLASS: What were the other jobs?

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
BAUS: One of them was to deliver advertising copy and proofs from the UCLA Daily Bruin to its advertising clients. The other one was to run errands for the UCLA Publications Office and its manager, [ ] Joe Osherenko. Thus, on driving downtown for my Herald-Examiner work I was able to kill three birds with one stone on one thirty-mile round-trip downtown!

[The Herald job generated some fascinating experiences. One had political overtones in harmony with the century we live in. The provost of UCLA suspended five leaders of the student council, the student body’s legislature, for possible Communist involvement. I got wind of it and the Herald broke an eight-column banner headline on it. This spurred a big uproar on the campus and a mass meeting where student body president John Burnside denounced me by name for "selling the university for two bits an inch."]*

DOUGLASS: Did you live at home when you went to college?

BAUS: First two years only. I was on my own forever after my year in Virginia and the Lambda Chi

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
DOUGLASS: You also worked for the Los Angeles Times, didn’t you?

BAUS: Not for very long.

DOUGLASS: Was that an experience while you were in college?

BAUS: After my graduation in 1936, Bart Sheridan was manager of the Times news syndicate, and he hired me for special assignments and to take his place when he went on vacation.

DOUGLASS: Bart Sheridan was a close friend then.

BAUS: He has been for almost sixty years. He still is. He lives in Idylwild. We see each other constantly and talk on the phone twice a week.

DOUGLASS: What did he end up doing as a profession?

BAUS: He was an editor for Good Housekeeping, Life, McCall’s, Redbook, and several other national magazines, winding up with a decade as western editor for Medical Economics.

DOUGLASS: When you graduated from UCLA in 1936, it sounds like you had a job lined up pretty quickly.

BAUS: I didn’t find one right away because that was in the deep depression. You just couldn’t go out and get a job, presto. It isn’t like today
where they are waiting to recruit college seniors.

DOUGLASS: It was a tough time.

BAUS: It was very tough.

DOUGLASS: You went to the junior chamber. Was that your first job?

BAUS: No. My first job was to work for a publicity man named [Harry Hammond] Ham Beall. I worked for Ham six months, including a spell as a movie fan magazine staffer for Fawcett Publications. After that, I was suddenly offered three jobs at once. One was a special temporary project to publicize the world trade week for the [Los Angeles] Chamber of Commerce. One was a half-time job for the L.A. [Los Angeles] Junior Chamber [of Commerce] because at that time they only had enough money for a half-time [position]. And the other, managing editor [ ] Jack Campbell called me and invited me to come in on a one-week trial basis to be a reporter for the Herald-Express.

I rejected the chamber job because it was only temporary. I took the Herald job and worked on it for a week. Then the junior chamber called and offered me that job. I went
in to see my managing editor, the last of the old-time, fire-eating editors, and he offered me a full-time reportorial assignment. I said, "Unfortunately, you are offering me twenty-five dollars a week and the junior chamber is offering me fifty dollars a week. And I want to get married." He took the cigar stub out of his mouth, spit, hit the spittoon, and said, "Another goddam space killer!" [Laughter]

DOUGLASS: Was the junior chamber job only a half-time job?

BAUS: Yes. It was at first.

DOUGLASS: But for the same amount of money you would have gotten for a full-time job at the Herald-Express.

BAUS: More. Fifty dollars a week instead of twenty-five dollars a week.

DOUGLASS: So that wasn’t a hard decision for you to make?

BAUS: And the junior chamber upped it soon to full scale. While I was doing the junior chamber job, the next World Trade Week was offered to me on the side, and I took it. I did several other special things for the senior chamber. At the end of the year, they needed a full-time PR director, and I was given the job.
DOUGLASS: You were the publicity director for the junior chamber. That was your title?

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: It grew quickly into a full-time job.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Did you work with anybody particularly at the junior chamber who you can remember in terms of the leadership of the junior chamber of commerce?

BAUS: Clifford [L.] Rawson, who was manager of the junior chamber for many years, was manager then. I soon knew everybody on the board of directors. I can remember a few of the names. Presidents like [ ] Don Smith, [James] Jim Cairns, [James] Jim Pierce, Wilson Pierce, [ ] Don Petty, and others. None of them would be anything for the chronicle now. The big thing I did at the junior chamber was to use it as a springboard into the senior chamber. That is where we germinated the contacts that have endured.

DOUGLASS: Did you move to the senior chamber before the war?

BAUS: Yes. That was in '38.
DOUGLASS: Did you get to know some of the community leaders through your work in the chamber?

BAUS: Quite a few, including some key enduring connections. Most notably, Frank P. Doherty. James L. Beebe. James L. Beebe was "Mr. Politics" for the L.A. business establishment until he died in the late sixties.

DOUGLASS: What was his profession?

BAUS: He was a partner of O'Melveny and Myers, long a major Los Angeles law firm.

DOUGLASS: He was a lawyer. He lived in San Marino, I believe.

BAUS: At the time, yes.

DOUGLASS: I had not realized he had been that active. He was very well known then in Los Angeles?

BAUS: James L. Beebe, in the deep depression in '32, formed a committee when everybody, meaning property owners of business as well as individuals, was threatening to stage a tax revolt and refuse to pay their taxes. James L. Beebe stepped in and took the leadership to combat this. One reason he was so active was that he was a bond attorney. He made his living by evaluating the integrity of bond issues for the city, county, and various municipalities in
the state. That was his specialty for throughout his professional lifetime, and he was famous statewide for it. He was the one who showed the leadership and the guts to stop that tax revolt.

As a result, he became the state and local government chairman of the senior chamber. He occupied that post for more than thirty years in a volunteer capacity. No committee chairman before or since has approached that record for longevity. He was recognized everywhere as the Los Angeles business establishment’s political spokesman. I came along and became his field general in the field of political combat.

DOUGLASS: He probably saw the implications of such a revolt succeeding, in terms of the stability of the city. I am just thinking why he was so motivated.

BAUS: A tax revolt would have destroyed the bond business. It would have vitiated the credit of all the local governments. Thus Beebe’s leadership provided a major contribution to California local government fiscal integrity.

DOUGLASS: When did you first meet Mr. Beebe?
He was the president of the chamber of commerce in 1939, during my first full year as the publicity and PR director.

And you came in 1938 to the chamber.

I worked closely with all the presidents.

Was there any problem of your moving from the junior to the senior chamber in that they were taking the junior chamber's staff man? Was that transition a problem at all?

No. It wasn't. Actually, it was a blessing of sorts because the junior chamber, due to the depression, was short of money. Their conscience hurt them, you might say, to put me back on half time and they were in a position where they might have to do it.

So this was a good solution.

For everybody. Cliff Rawson was delighted and honored, you might say, to have the senior chamber recognize them in that way.

Who was the president of the chamber then?

The president of the chamber was [William] W. S. Rosecrans, a direct descendant of old Union General William Rosecrans in the Civil War.

Yes. I interviewed Mr. Rosecrans when he was alive.
BAUS: He was my first president.

DOUGLASS: Your title was publicity director of the chamber.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Did the chamber have an executive director?

BAUS: Yes. Leonard E. Read.

DOUGLASS: Did you report directly to him?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Was the nature of your duties similar to the work at the junior chamber?

BAUS: On a grander scale for a much bigger theater.

DOUGLASS: Did the L.A. chamber cover the county or was it the city of Los Angeles?

BAUS: It substantially covered the county. There were other local city chambers, but the L.A. organization did a lot of things for the whole county. They received several hundred thousand dollars of income from the county under contract to do specific assignments. That was in the specific field of promoting Los Angeles and southern California on a nationwide basis to increase our markets and our impacts. There were certain areas where they served all of the chambers.
Incidentally, Leonard E. Read happened to have a very close relationship with James L. Beebe, who was the second president while I was on the staff. A lady name Ruth Meilandt was for many years the staff head of the chamber's political arm. Beebe was the chairman, and she was the staff head, of the state and local government committee. That was a fountainhead of a lot of the political things that went on in the city and state.

DOUGLASS: Let me get this straight. Beebe was president of the whole chamber.

BAUS: For one year.

DOUGLASS: Then also served on the local state and government committee.

BAUS: He did that for thirty years.

DOUGLASS: Did Miss Meilandt work on the staff of that committee?

BAUS: She worked on it at first, then later managed it for years.

DOUGLASS: Where was the major percentage of your energies put at that time? What were you doing?

BAUS: I was getting the L.A. Chamber of Commerce and all of its activities, programs, special events, elections coverage in the daily newspapers and
radio stations. There were no TVs [television] at the time.

DOUGLASS: So you were a newspaper contact.

BAUS: That's right. The was the major medium.

DOUGLASS: Did you write most of that or did you have somebody to help?

BAUS: I wrote it all, with secretarial help of course.

DOUGLASS: You were busy.

BAUS: I had a lot of energy in those days.

DOUGLASS: Did you like doing that?

BAUS: I loved it.

DOUGLASS: Meanwhile, you are meeting more people. More businessmen. People active in the chamber. You named James Beebe. You named Mr. Read. Were there any other people in that period that were outstanding in your mind?

BAUS: Frank P. Doherty was another president.

DOUGLASS: Was he a lawyer?

BAUS: He was also a lawyer.

DOUGLASS: With one of the major law firms?

BAUS: He had his own one-man firm. He was a giant in the town. He had his son, Frank W. [Doherty], with him. He had another attorney son named James P. [Doherty], who he hoped would join his
firm. But James wanted to become a practicing city attorney.

DOUGLASS: He did become a city attorney?

BAUS: He did. He didn't ever become the top elected city attorney. He did become the top staff deputy city attorney, and a very close friend and ally of mine.

DOUGLASS: It sounds like you had a lot of lawyers involved with the chamber.

BAUS: A good share.

DOUGLASS: Would it be good now to talk about how they affected your life or does that come up as the story unfolds?

BAUS: Beebe was the closest to my life because he was the leader the business establishment looked to and city hall and county hall of administration looked to on matters of legislation and campaigns having to do with the city and county. Beebe was considered the spokesman of the business community by all and sundry. When I started my own business after the war, James L. Beebe soon became a father figure or big brother to me. And to him I became the engineer he looked to, to make it all happen.

DOUGLASS: He would turn to you as being the contact.
BAUS: That's right. I would be the one hired by the committee to put the thing together and make it happen.

DOUGLASS: That was a continuing relationship because you said he was on that committee for thirty years.

BAUS: That was a continuing relationship until he died in 1968. Ironically, that also was the year I retired!


BAUS: Bill Mullendore was one of the top wheels of the city's business establishment. He was the president, later chairman and CEO [chief executive officer] of the board of Southern Cal [California] Edison [Company]. We had a very close and friendly personal relationship. In the course of time, I did quite a few things for the Edison Company as a client.

DOUGLASS: So that was a continuing relationship. What about Doherty?

BAUS: Doherty was getting older and was not as active on a daily basis and with the civic machinery as Beebe. But he always looked to Baus and Ross [Company] and always recommended people to us, and we always worked with him. Anything he got involved in, he would come to us. We would
often get sage counsel from him. For example, on the county board of supervisors pay raise. He was very important to us. He was our father confessor, [William] Bill [B. Ross] and myself.

DOUGLASS: You had a lot of good people to turn to, it sounds like.

This takes us to wartime. When did you go into the service?

BAUS: For a period of eight months, Leonard E. Read had a very close, personal friend named [Raymond] Ray [W.] Smith, who became the manager of the Downtown Businessmen’s Association. He offered me quite a bit more money than the chamber. With Leonard’s blessing, I moved to the Downtown Businessmen’s Association. I was made their promotion director.

DOUGLASS: Was that around 1940?

BAUS: That was ‘42. In ‘43, I was drafted into the armed services.

DOUGLASS: You got married somewhere in here.

BAUS: I married my first wife, Ruth [Baus], in 1937.

DOUGLASS: You were drafted. How did you end up in the air force?

BAUS: I wanted to be in the air force. I was allowed a choice. At least, they asked me my choice,
and that's where they sent me. I was sent to the San Bernardino Air Service Command. This leads me, for background, to say that I taught PR at USC [University of Southern California] extension school for several years.

DOUGLASS: Starting about when was that?

BAUS: It started in '39 and lasted until I went to war. A man named [Kelita J.] Kelly Shugart was the PR director of the musicians' union. He became a devoted student and disciple of mine. He was attached to the air force band at San Bernardino Air Service Command. He managed to get me plucked up for my first assignment by that unit. I was on the PR staff of the air force. I was "limited service." I could not go overseas under any circumstances. My draft doctor said, "With your hearing, your eyesight, and, particularly, your trick back we are ready to give you a 4-F. But we will give you a choice." I said, "I want in." He said, "OK. You will be on a 4-F or limited service basis. That means you can never go overseas."

So I went up to the San Bernardino Air Service Command and applied for OCS, officer candidate school, Miami Beach. Made it six
months later and survived OCS. After OCS, I was briefly assigned to Wright Field and then to New York, which was really a dream assignment. I made all kinds of contacts there and enjoyed the rich exposure of New York.

DOUGLASS: When did you end up in New York? In '44?

BAUS: I was in New York in the spring of '44.

DOUGLASS: What were your duties in New York?

BAUS: I was on the PR staff of the Air Service Command with offices on Wall Street.

DOUGLASS: A nice location. [Laughter] Were you doing writing? What were you doing in that job?

BAUS: Primarily I was doing special events, especially organizing groups of writers to go and visit air force supplier plants.

DOUGLASS: I had you down as being stationed in [Washington] D.C. Were you also there or was this basically that assignment?

BAUS: This leads into that, as I shall relate. I soon ended up with a commanding officer named Richard T. Nimmons, who later became director of development and vice president of Pomona College. We have remained good friends since.

DOUGLASS: Yes. He was your commanding officer when you were on this duty?
BAUS: He was my commanding officer in New York. In the summer of '45, after the European war had ended, I came West for a vacation. And Dick said, "Get back here. Don't spend the whole time there. The European war may be over, but our duties are not over."

I came back West. A special command detail wanted to draft me for duty in connection with a classified project: campaigning to publicize the need for manpower to straighten out the railroad roadbeds so they could handle the anticipated heavy freight movement of men and materiel from Europe across the continental U.S. [United States] for the invasion of Japan.

DOUGLASS: Was this a special assignment?

BAUS: Yes. This was a project backed by the Pentagon. The war was over in Europe. Then in August of 1945, the big bomb hit with the one-two punch of Hiroshima-Nagasaki, and the war ended. I returned to New York. I met a colonel named Lloyd Mitchell whom I knew out here. The result was transfer into the Pentagon, where I spent my last days in uniform.

DOUGLASS: When you say you did special events in New York, what kind of an event would that be?
I would organize a big group of newspaper, magazine, and special publications writers to take a tour of the Glenn L. Martin Company or Grumman Aircraft [Engineering Corporation] or General Electric Company or a ball-bearing manufacturer.

Why would the air force be doing that?

These were suppliers of the air force. The resulting coverage stimulated employee and civilian morale.

You were trying to create some rapport with the people you were bringing in to visit?

That was part of it.

Who would the visitors be?

Mostly publications specialists—New York Times, various technical publications, etc.—who would look at the plant and go home and write about it.

These were your fellow journalists. Get the media interested in the businesses that were supplying the war effort. Is that the idea?

That's right.

So this threw you into a lot more contacts.

Yes. Quite a few. As a matter of fact, after the war I debated on whether to stay in New
York. I had several offers, including one to join the staff of George Gallup in the research field. I might have stayed in the East if it hadn't been that Ray W. Smith called me and wanted me to come back and run the Downtown Businessmen's Association.

DOUGLASS: You were tempted by all contacts you had in New York?

BAUS: All the contacts and several putative offers. Indeed, I was tempted. I liked New York. I liked the pace. I liked the scene. I liked everything about it. And by now I knew a fair number of key people.

DOUGLASS: He made you a good offer. Ray Smith.

BAUS: He made me a good offer, but the thing fell apart in several months.

DOUGLASS: When were you discharged from the army, Mr. Baus?

BAUS: I was discharged in December of '45.

DOUGLASS: Did you go directly to this job?

BAUS: I went directly to the job without a vacation interregnum between three years of wartime military service and a new civilian life. I shed my uniform, put on mufti, and went directly to the job.
DOUGLASS: You were returning to the job you had done before.

BAUS: No. Now I was the head man.

DOUGLASS: You had been a publicity man for them before.

BAUS: Yes. PR and publicity.

DOUGLASS: He was now asking you to come back as the top manager.

BAUS: That's right. Because he was leaving to take a job as manager of a planned, newly established branch of the women's apparel industry.

DOUGLASS: So Smith had been the director.

BAUS: Yes. I came back and did it, but in three months that new job of Ray Smith's fell apart.

DOUGLASS: Why was that?

BAUS: I was not party to the inside details, but I suspect Smith was trying to put something together and it didn't jell. But it did fall apart. So Ray Smith had by crafty prearrangement set the stage so he could come back and take his old job back. He offered me a job as his assistant manager. But I resigned forthwith. With little delay I decided now was the time bite the bullet and go into business for myself. I did it without the luxury of any advance planning. I just did it.
DOUGLASS: Forced. Spur-of-the-moment kind of thing. Did you give that business a name, initially?

BAUS: I think it was Herbert M. Baus & Associates or Herbert M. Baus & Company.

DOUGLASS: Did this consist of you and a secretary to begin with?

BAUS: Yes.

[Interruption]

DOUGLASS: Where you were located?

BAUS: At first out of my hat and out of my home. Then the 700 block of Venice Boulevard. The spot is now a pillar of the Harbor Freeway.

DOUGLASS: Did you hire someone else on board?

BAUS: I hired a secretary.

DOUGLASS: What were your first accounts?

BAUS: One of them was the chamber of commerce. One of them was a money-raising campaign in Bakersfield, California. It was a big success, too.

DOUGLASS: What was that?

BAUS: It was some kind of veterans' organization. We were raising money to build a veterans' facility in Bakersfield.

DOUGLASS: You had to travel up there?
Back and forth constantly. Meanwhile Frank P. Doherty hired me in the spring for the major ballot issue of the 1946 election: the FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Commission] campaign. And he also made me responsible for some county issues in the June primary.

What was the first job you did for the chamber? Before the Bakersfield job.

I was a general consultant to Harold [W.] Wright concerning every aspect of chamber operation. Harold Wright was now the general manager of the chamber.

Were you on a retainer?

I was on a retainer with a year’s contract. It was extended to me to give me a solid start.

So with these things you were able to generate enough income to get along?

That’s right. I generated more income every year than I left behind me at the Downtown Businessmen’s Association, my previous career high.

This was good news. Well, let’s talk about the FEPC campaign in 1946. Who approached you initially about that one?
BAUS: Frank Doherty. It was his baby. He approached me.

DOUGLASS: This was a ballot issue on the state ballot.

BAUS: Yes. Our mission was to defeat it.

DOUGLASS: Was the impetus for it centered in northern or southern California, or either?

BAUS: We concentrated our major activity at that time in southern California.

DOUGLASS: I understand that. Was southern California where this had been generated or was it a statewide movement?

BAUS: I think the sponsorship of it originated down here. This was the most important aspect of the campaign. Even then we outweighed northern California in population, finance, and other factors.

DOUGLASS: Even then.

BAUS: Not nearly as much as today, however. And northern California took several more decades to discover, or at least accept, that reality.

DOUGLASS: What were the groups who were sponsoring the legislation?

BAUS: Labor unions. Democratic party affiliates. The NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People]. The black community.
Minority groups. The liberal coalition. Against it were business-oriented organizations across-the-board. I was getting my start as the political campaign spokesman for the business community.

DOUGLASS: What was the chamber's official stand on this?

BAUS: Emphatically "no." Our effort was not financed the way, let alone the degree, campaigns are these days. There was not a terrific amount of money. But I was put in charge of the campaign against it, and we managed to beat it.

DOUGLASS: That ballot issue was actually a referendum vote. Were you doing certain specialized things in terms of that campaign? Were you doing media, like the newspapers?

BAUS: We didn't do a heavy program of advertising at all. We didn't have enough money. We got out some mailings. We generated a lot of publicity and releases to the press. It was not a full-fledged campaign in any sense, but I drew my first blood!

DOUGLASS: And you liked it?

BAUS: I loved it. I was hooked. A watershed experience was the acquaintance of Harold Feinstein, who owned the Aldine Printing
Company, which eventually was to become the biggest political printer in the world. And Baus and Ross were to become his biggest customers. I started working with him and learned a lot from him. He helped me put together the basic mailings and get the material out. We became fast personal friends.

DOUGLASS: The chamber paid you on a contract for that activity?

BAUS: No. The chamber didn't pay me for that. It never pays anybody to do political work. Frank P. Doherty raised a little money.

DOUGLASS: So it was an independent account. How tight was your schedule? Was this jammed in very late to put this together?

BAUS: I spent close to full time on this after I got into it until the election.

DOUGLASS: Was this six weeks?

BAUS: Approximately six to eight weeks

DOUGLASS: We should get on the record your first acquaintanceship and involvement with [Clement Sherman] Clem Whitaker, Sr. When did you first contact Clem Whitaker?

BAUS: I will put this in human terms. [William] Bill Sparling at that time was the L.A. manager of
the state chamber of commerce. I knew him from my chamber days and did a lot of work with him on this FEPC campaign. At some chamber social event, Bill Starling said to me, "You should meet Clem Whitaker, Sr. There is a lot of gold out there in political campaigns. He's got this political campaign thing developed on a big scale. He needs help down here." I took that seriously. I had never been loathe to cultivate leads that could expand my horizons.

So after the campaign was over, I got in touch with Clem Whitaker. We made a date. I remember going up on the night businessmen's train, the Lark, I went up to see him on August 11, 1947.

DOUGLASS: Well, that's pretty good. [Laughter]

BAUS: I went up specifically to see him. I walked into his office on a cold, foggy "summer" day in San Francisco. It had been hotter than the hinges in Los Angeles. I was pretty disgusted that they had the gas heat on in San Francisco in the middle of August! I visited with Clem and Leone [Baxter], who were partners of Whitaker and Baxter. [Clement Sherman] Clem [Whitaker], Jr. was a little younger than I. He
was very nice looking, but he seemed to me at the time quite a young fellow. A little younger than I but probably not that much so. After all, he too was a veteran of the Second World War. No specific deals were made at that time. Clem Sr. summarized, "We can use your services down there. We need some help down there. We don't have an office there." He did have an operative down south. An Irishman. Edward Clancy by name, I believe.

[Interruption]

DOUGLASS: You were giving impressions of Clem Whitaker, Jr. I would be interested in knowing what your first impression was of Clem Whitaker, Sr.

BAUS: He was a fascinating, aquiline-beaked, very distinguished-looking man. He was frail and fragile but wiry. Up to about six feet high and slender as a bamboo stalk. One of the most articulate men I've ever met and a fascinating man to talk to. What a salesman! Today he could sell German reunification to Margaret Thatcher!

DOUGLASS: So you clicked right away?

BAUS: We clicked right away.

DOUGLASS: Was Leone Baxter part of your meeting?
BAUS: She was in on everything. Clem never went into a meeting without her in all the years I knew them.

DOUGLASS: What were your impressions of her?

BAUS: She was a beautiful lady and one of the brainiest ladies who ever breathed. A perfect foil for Clem. We all three clicked right away.

DOUGLASS: Whitaker, in essence, said that you would become their southern California point person when they needed one?

BAUS: Yes. They indicated an intention to hire me for special projects and assignments, as they might come up. Whitaker felt one would come up, and it did.

DOUGLASS: This would be a contract, in other words. When he wanted you, he would contract with you to do a particular job?

BAUS: That is right.

DOUGLASS: So what came up?

BAUS: The first thing that came up was that [former Assemblyman Samuel W.] Sam Yorty was an attorney in Los Angeles. He brought a contract to Whitaker and Baxter to do certain promotions in connection with the oil industry. It had a technical name. There was a controversy at that
time about oil in ports. The port of Long Beach, specifically.

DOUGLASS: This didn't have to do with the tidelands?

BAUS: Yes. It was a tidelands oil matter. That is the word I was looking for.

DOUGLASS: There was a big fight about how the money was going to be apportioned. Where was Yorty coming from on that?

BAUS: Yorty was somehow involved as a legislator and brought the account to Whitaker and Baxter.

DOUGLASS: What were the issues that caused Yorty to do this?

[End Tape 1, Side A]
I don’t have a really clear memory of that. I have a much better memory for the concurrent public housing and featherbedding.

How long did you work on that tidelands matter? Clem brought me into that. He fed me more and more to do because he felt that I had proved myself on what I did for him on the tidelands project. And then, bang, the featherbedding campaign qualified for the 1948 ballot.

Now about what year are we talking about? The tidelands project was ’47 and early ’48. And featherbedding was on the ballot for November ’48.

That was a Whitaker contact? He was very close to the railroad industry and its Sacramento lobbyist, Walter [J.] Little.

This was a major statewide campaign. He asked you to manage southern California?

He asked me to manage southern California.

What was the essence of that issue, Mr. Baus? To reduce the number of brakemen required on a freight train. Labor made a major watershed fight of this. I put together a campaign to send mailings to various groups, organize
committees of businessmen and other supporters in the cities of southern California, obtain permission of community leaders to use their names, generate endorsements all over the landscape, motivate editorial support. Whitaker and Baxter commanded all the statewide advertising. Clem and Leone, when they hired me, said, "You come from that wild and wooly, radical, leftist, labor-ridden southern California. We don’t expect you to win the campaign down there, but we want you to keep the damage down to levels allowing us to win it up here." And in the end we established the victory margin down here while it lost in the north! [Laughter]

DOUGLASS: They must have been astonished.

BAUS: They were.

DOUGLASS: So you were covering everything south of the Tehachapis [Mountains].

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: How strenuous an effort was being made on the part of labor? And did they have some hired guns, so to speak? Were there particular people advising them?
BAUS: I was not conscious of their having hired guns outside of their professional leaders. I don't remember ever having the feeling that so-and-so was the campaign manager for labor. I just know that labor was on the other side and fighting us tooth and nail for every foot of ground.

DOUGLASS: That was the general election.

BAUS: That was the general November election wherein [President Harry S.] Truman defeated [Governor Thomas E.] Dewey to win reelection. Meanwhile, there was shaping up statewide the first of several major public housing campaigns that Baus and Ross were to manage over the years. This one was a measure that labor had put on the ballot. It provided a quarter-billion-dollar bond issue to build a huge public housing project in the Chavez Ravine. We took that on with Whitaker's consent because my new partner, Bill Ross, was available to head that one up.

DOUGLASS: Was this where you had the contact with Earl [S.] Anderson?

BAUS: Yes. Earl Anderson was the one who led the fight to get us, Baus and Ross, into it.

DOUGLASS: OK. We are in 1948. We need to go back and finish the story of you forming your firm but
let's finish this story. So it was Earl Anderson who got you involved.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: The building trades and business community opposed this?

BAUS: They were against the measure and financed our campaign.

DOUGLASS: Labor was for the measure.

BAUS: Labor and the liberal, Democratic-oriented apparatus. The same crowd that fought us on the railroad featherbedding battle. They wanted a "yes" vote. We had to get a "no" vote. We had to get a "yes" vote on the railroad measure.

DOUGLASS: That is part of the confusion about running ballot-proposition campaigns. To get that straightened out, what you are voting for.

BAUS: That's always the eye of the storm.

DOUGLASS: Are there any anecdotes you have about that struggle? And was it a long one?

BAUS: It was a violent one. We ran the full campaign.

DOUGLASS: All responsibilities?

BAUS: All responsibilities. Full advertising, full publication, full organization. All out to reach out and get endorsements and support for our side. Write and build the campaign
argument. Raise the money. Create and place the advertising.

DOUGLASS: This was to put the housing in Chavez Ravine, which is rather a key moment, when you figure what later happened to Chavez Ravine.

BAUS: We were involved with the whole development from the beginning to the settling in place of the [Los Angeles] Dodgers. Baus and Ross were the battling knights of Chavez Ravine.

DOUGLASS: We need to track that. What kind of a contractual arrangement would you make when you did something like that? Like the public housing issue. Did they give you a set amount of money?

BAUS: A citizens' committee was formed against the public housing package. We got one [John F.] Fred Dockweiler to be our chairman. He came from an old Democratic family, although he was what is called a conservative Democrat. We wanted a Democrat for political reasons. We fleshed out that committee with the names of leading citizens from every walk of life. We had a steering committee, and that comprised the businessmen who were interested in financing the fight. Our front line included the building
trades, the realty boards, the home builders, the savings and loans, the banks. Those were the major components. Fritz [B.] Burns was the chairman of the finance committee.

DOUGLASS: Plus I suppose there were unforeseen costs you might run up against, too?

BAUS: Always. So we would work very closely with the committee to raise the money throughout. We gave them a budget that said so much for staff, so much for campaign expenses, so much for mailings, so much for newspapers, so much for radio, so much for outdoor advertising, and, later on but not yet, so much for TV.

DOUGLASS: But in terms of hard cash, Mr. Baus, were you given some up-front money to get started?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: The expectancy would be that they would raise the budgeted amount to pay you?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: There is a certain amount of faith in there.

BAUS: There certainly is. What we had to remember is that the pros have to remember to never get ahead of the cash flow. We didn’t want to start financing the campaign. But due to a mistake made in good faith, we spent about $20,000
twice. They thought it was there and authorized it. We got a little ahead of ourselves. The result is that at the end of the campaign, we faced a campaign deficit. What was worse, at the penultimate moment on the Friday before the election, they wanted to buy an extended advertising schedule on radio, and they wanted Baus and Ross to finance it. We had a mailing that we thought was covered, financed and paid for. As I say, it was a double entry. We met with our committee and found this out.

Leaders of the committee said, "We will authorize you to go ahead with the whole program and spend the additional money on radio." We said, "Gentlemen, we cannot spend any more money. On the contrary, we have to be reimbursed today for what we've already spent on the mailing. We have to get the money today if we are to buy the desired new advertising. If we don't get it, we will cancel the newspaper advertising and other things to raise it. And that will effectively disembowel the campaign."

These businessmen faced the music and said, "We will sit here and raise the money today." They got on the phones and called up their
colleagues and subcontractors and those with whom they had leverage and said, "Your share is $2,500 or $5,000 or $10,000. No, you can't mail it Monday. We will send a messenger out for it right now. Have it ready when he gets there."
That is what we did and the finance committee did. We raised all the money, paid all the bills that day.

DOUGLASS: So you went ahead with the radio campaign.

BAUS: We went ahead with the radio, and we won the campaign by a very respectable margin.

DOUGLASS: When you said at that point that it was $25,000 in debt, was that going to be out of your pockets, if indeed they didn't raise more money?

BAUS: Yes. After the campaign is over, what leverage is there that we would have had on them? What leverage has any creditor ever had with a political campaign committee which vanishes with the closing of the polls on elections night?

DOUGLASS: I guess you learned quite a lesson from that.

BAUS: We never forgot it!

DOUGLASS: You never got yourself in that situation again?

BAUS: Never did. Others have, but we never did.
DOUGLASS: In that particular fight, what were the arguments that your side of the issue was putting forth?

BAUS: One of the best slogans we had for all our years in the business was "Don't pay somebody else's rent." That was a very effective slogan. It was a smasheroo on our billboards. The chief argument was that this would create a seedbed of a vast new slum in a few years. Public housing had a notorious record for doing just that in other instances, and to go into the virgin territory of Chavez Ravine and build this huge project of public housing would in every way create the seedbed of a vast slum. It would generate crime. Generate dependency. We opposed the principle of public housing. That was the main thrust of our whole campaign.

DOUGLASS: What was the other side projecting?

BAUS: Need. Need for more housing.

DOUGLASS: Just before the election, did you feel you were going to win?

BAUS: We, I think, did have a certain confidence. We were starting to use polls. The polls helped us define the most effective arguments and told us
that the wind was so blowing that we just might win it.

**DOUGLASS:** Did you administer the polls?

**BAUS:** We always called in Dorothy [D.] Corey. I don’t know how much you know about her.

**DOUGLASS:** I want to learn more about her. Had she been in the polling business before this time?

**BAUS:** Yes. She had.

**DOUGLASS:** Had you known her?

**BAUS:** Not too well. She was head of something called Facts Consolidated. She was prominent in the organized women’s advertising world, and I was active in the advertising club and on the board. I fervently believed in research and through the years always insisted on using Dorothy.

**DOUGLASS:** Was this the first time you used polling?

**BAUS:** Yes.

**DOUGLASS:** What caused you to make that decision?

**BAUS:** I pointed out to the committee that we are not taking the poll for vanity. We were not taking it to find out who is going to win and who is going to lose, or by how much. What we were really taking this for is to evaluate the arguments.
We used to construct the polls for all our campaigns by somewhat the same formula. We would state the proposition, and then we would say, "As this reads, based on what you know now, would you be for this or against it?" Then we would say, "Why?" Name the reasons why you are for it or against it. Name what you think are the strongest arguments for it or against it? We would word it that way. Then, first, before we intruded into their minds, we would say, "Here is public housing. It is going to provide a quarter of a million dollars in projects." At this point, we didn’t put any arguments up, either for it or against it. Dorothy would test the questionnaire rough draft with a focus group panel before we ran with it in the field.

DOUGLASS: Was this door-to-door polling?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: On a sampling basis?

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: She provided the expertise to do that.

BAUS: She did. She administered it, and she had the troops. All we worked with her on was the questionnaire. After we had found out in depth what the respondent thought on one side or the
other, why, then we would present: Here are our six arguments that they say are the main arguments for it, and here are six arguments that they say are the main arguments against it. How would you evaluate these arguments? What is the strongest, the second strongest on both sides?

DOUGLASS: Was this another poll?

BAUS: All our polls were built like this.

DOUGLASS: This was in the original poll.

BAUS: That's right. This is the way we structured a poll. Then it would say, "What endorsements are the most important? Newspapers, chamber of commerce, labor union, the Catholic Church or whatever." It would give an idea of whom they would listen to the most. We would tell them, frankly, for this argument are the labor unions, the NAACP, the Protestant ministers in the black community, and whatever. And against it are: We would list a few newspapers, chambers of commerce, trade associations, and others.

Then we would say, "Now that you have gone through all this material with us, how would you vote?" And that would tell us what the strongest arguments were and what the weakest
RESTRICTIONS ON THIS INTERVIEW

None

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PREFACE

On September 25, 1985, Governor George Deukmejian signed into law A.B. 2104 (Chapter 965 of the Statutes of 1985). This legislation established, under the administration of the California State Archives, a State Government Oral History Program "to provide through the use of oral history a continuing documentation of state policy development as reflected in California's legislative and executive history."

The following interview is one of a series of oral histories undertaken for inclusion in the state program. These interviews offer insights into the actual workings of both the legislative and executive processes and policy mechanisms. They also offer an increased understanding of the men and women who create legislation and implement state policy. Further, they provide an overview of issue development in California state government and of how both the legislative and executive branches of government deal with issues and problems facing the state.

Interviewees are chosen primarily on the basis of their contributions to and influence on the policy process of the state of California. They include members of the legislative and executive branches of the state government as well as legislative staff, advocates, members of the media, and other people who played significant roles in specific issue areas of major and continuing importance to California.

By authorizing the California State Archives to work cooperatively with oral history units at California colleges and universities to conduct interviews, this program is structured to take advantage of the resources and expertise in oral history available through California's several institutionally based programs.
Participating as cooperating institutions in the State Government Oral History Program are:

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History Department
California State University, Fullerton

Oral History Program
Center for California Studies
California State University, Sacramento

Oral History Program
Claremont Graduate School

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library
University of California, Berkeley

Oral History Program
University of California, Los Angeles

The establishment of the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program marks one of the most significant commitments made by any state toward the preservation and documentation of its governmental history. It supplements the often fragmentary historical written record by adding an organized primary source, enriching the historical information available on given topics and allowing for more thorough historical analysis. As such, the program, through the preservation and publication of interviews such as the one which follows, will be of lasting value to current and future generations of scholars, citizens, and leaders.

John F. Burns
State Archivist

July 27, 1988

This interview is printed on acid-free paper.
HERBERT M. BAUS
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SESSION 1, December 11, 1989

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Attends UCLA—Takes a year off from college and works for the Washington Post—Accepts a position with the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce as director of publicity--World War II service--Returns to civilian life and establishes an independent firm—Meets Whitaker and Baxter, a political consulting firm in San Francisco.

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Personal satisfaction in defeating the assessment on golf courses--Baus and Ross Campaigns defeat first reapportionment plan.

Extension of daylight saving time--Strategy on school bond campaigns--Proposition 15 in ’64 to permit cable TV--Early attempts to establish a state lottery--Decision to retire from Baus and Ross Campaigns--Writes a crossword puzzle dictionary--Accepts a part-time position with Braun Campaigns.
Works against the introduction of greyhound racing to California—Out-of-state work in Arizona—Helps realtors to defeat an attorney-sponsored initiative—Attempts to revoke the tax-exempt status of cooperatives—Earlier work for the Metropolitan Water District—Need for ethics in professional campaigning.

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Interviewer/Editor

Enid Hart Douglass
Director, Oral History Program and Lecturer in History
Claremont Graduate School
B.A., Pomona College [Government]
M.A., Claremont Graduate School [Government]

Interview Time and Place

December 11, 1989
Mr. Baus’ home, Palm Springs, California
Morning Session of 1 1/2 hours

January 18, 1990
Mr. Baus’ home, Palm Springs, California
Morning Session of 2 1/4 hours

February 1, 1990
Mr. Baus’ home, Palm Springs, California
Morning Session of 1 3/4 hours

February 28, 1990
Mr. Baus’ home, Palm Springs, California
Morning Session of 2 1/4 hours

Editing

The interviewer/editor checked the verbatim manuscript of the interviews against the original tape recordings and verified proper names. Insertions by the editor are bracketed.

On April 3, 1990, the edited transcript was forwarded to Herbert M. Baus, who made many emendations and added some additional information in writing. He returned the approved manuscript May 7, 1990.

The interviewer/editor prepared the introductory materials.
Tapes and Interview Records

The original tape recordings of the interview are in the Oral History Program Office, Claremont Graduate School, along with the records relating to the interview. Master tapes are deposited in the California State Archives.
Herbert M. Baus was born on March 29, 1914 in Indianapolis, Indiana. Mr. Baus' father was a postal employee and his mother was a housewife. Mrs. Baus' respiratory ailment prompted the family to move to southern California in 1923. Herbert Baus attended the local public schools and graduated from Inglewood High School in 1931. He enrolled at the University of California, Los Angeles and earned an A.B. in political science in 1936.

While attending UCLA, Mr. Baus went East for one year and worked for the Washington Post as a northern Virginia correspondent based in Fredericksburg, Virginia. When he returned to UCLA he worked part time for the Los Angeles Herald-Express and the Daily Bruin, the UCLA college newspaper. Mr. Baus continued to work for the Herald-Express after graduation but was offered a more lucrative job at the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce as publicity director. Through his work at the junior chamber he met the top business and political leaders in the city of Los Angeles and was eventually hired by the senior chamber. His journalism experience proved invaluable in promoting the chamber's activities, programs, elections, and special events in the daily newspapers and radio stations.

Mr. Baus was drafted into the army in 1943 but because of certain physical limitations was not allowed to go overseas. He was assigned to the public relations staff of the Air Service Command in New York City which disseminated information to the print media about the domestic war effort.

Mr. Baus was discharged from the army in 1945 and returned to Los Angeles to work for the Downtown Businessmen's Association as general manager. When his predecessor wanted his old job back, Mr. Baus, instead of accepting a demotion, decided to start his own public relations and political consulting business. Using the contacts he cultivated earlier while working for the chamber of commerce, he was put on retainer and directed the publicity programs on behalf of the L.A. Chamber of Commerce.

As he became more successful and his clientele grew, Mr. Baus formed a partnership with William B. Ross, with whom he established Baus and Ross Campaigns. Baus and Ross Campaigns, later to be known as Baus and Ross Company, was one of the first political consulting firms in California and pioneered the use of polling, direct-mailings, and
widespread media coverage in political campaigns. The firm worked on various local and state issues, including public housing, expansion of the Los Angeles International Airport, daylight savings. Baus and Ross also handled campaigns for elective offices such as the city council and mayor races in Los Angeles, statewide campaigns for attorney general, lieutenant governor and governor, and presidential primaries in California for Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater. Baus and Ross also directed the Nixon-Lodge general election campaign of 1960 in California.

The extremeness and stridency of the Goldwater campaign disillusioned Mr. Baus about the political process. Known as a staunch conservative Republican, he began to moderate his position and would eventually work for Edmund Brown G. Sr.'s gubernatorial campaign in 1966. He resigned from Baus and Ross Company and retired after the 1968 election.

Having always been fascinated with etymology, Mr. Baus set out to compile the definitive crossword puzzle dictionary in his retirement. He wrote the Experts' Crossword Puzzle Dictionary in 1973, which was later revised in 1981 and published as the Master Crossword Puzzle Dictionary, the most exhaustive ever compiled in the English language.

In 1975 Mr. Baus was asked to join Braun Campaigns, a subsidiary of Braun and Company, as a political consultant on special projects. He traveled around the state and met with newspaper editors and presented whatever issues Braun Campaigns were working on. Mr. Baus also began to write a twice-weekly column on restaurants for the Orange County Register, continuing that activity until his retirement in 1988. Braun and Company liquidated Braun Campaigns in 1982. Mr. Baus is retired and lives with his wife, Helene Walther Baus, in Palm Springs.
DOUGLASS: Mr. Baus, you were born in Indianapolis on March 29, 1914. Your father worked for the post office?

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Was his family from Indianapolis? Is that why you were living there?

BAUS: Everybody in my family, including first cousins and parents, was from Indianapolis. Today, I don't think there is a single one who lives in Indianapolis. My particular end of the family included my sister and myself. She came out here. We both went to Inglewood High [School].

DOUGLASS: How did you happen to get from Indianapolis to Inglewood?

BAUS: My mother had respiratory health problems, so they decided to come to either California or Florida for that reason. Thank goodness they
arguments were. That is where we zeroed in. I will tell you a story about that later, but it doesn’t affect this campaign.

DOUGLASS: Would you up front ask if they had already formed their opinion?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: This was your first statewide operation?

BAUS: Public housing was our first integrated total political campaign.

DOUGLASS: How did you manage to cover northern California in that situation? That was a new experience to have to cover the whole state.

BAUS: We didn’t yet have a northern California firm at this time.

DOUGLASS: So you tried to generate enough out of your office to do the state job.

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: That sounds like a major undertaking.

BAUS: It was.

DOUGLASS: And you succeeded.

BAUS: We succeeded.

DOUGLASS: Do you remember the percentage? How well did you succeed?

BAUS: I think we won it 2.3 million to one million, a spanking margin at the time. That was
Proposition 14. The featherbedding was

Proposition 3. We won 1,767,587 to 1,703,303.

That was close.

DOUGLASS: Continue with the Chavez Ravine story. You said you had involvement beyond the housing one.

BAUS: The next chapter was that the housing authority had built a pretty strong political machine. They were in league with then Mayor Fletcher Bowron. They had come back with pretty much the same proposition with new clothes and new arithmetic, but it was basically the same quarter-of-a-billion dollar bond issue for public housing in a package that was said to be a contract with the city of Los Angeles.

Suddenly, the same people that hired us for Proposition 14 came to us on this. They said, "We are going to get this matter on the ballot in the city of Los Angeles next June."

DOUGLASS: This became a city, not a state, issue?

BAUS: Yes. This was 1952. The industry group hired us, and we put together a campaign. We had a very bitter campaign.

DOUGLASS: Now who hired you?

BAUS: The same group.

DOUGLASS: The same participants.
This was a much more savage and bloody campaign than the one in '48 because it was local. Both sides all lived together in the same town.

A lot of face-to-face confrontations?

Half of the city council was on each side. It varied eight to seven, one way or another, on the city council. So we were doing things with the city council every day. The mayor was against us because he took a position, being a lawyer and a judge, that the city had no choice. It was contractually bound to do this, and that the election was meaningless in any event. We came back with outright fury in response to that, castigated him roundly and frequently.

Were you working with the minority group on the council who were opposed to doing this?

Yes.

Do you remember any of the key people in that?

Yes. John Holland. Harold [V.] Harby. I knew them all very well. [ ] Ed Davenport was against us. [Ernest E.] Ernie Debs was against us. George Cronk was our stalwart. He is still alive. Harold Henry was on our side. There was a veteran newsman named Carlton Williams, who was the city hall bureau manager of the [Los
L.A. Times. He was very strong and on our side emotionally and intellectually. Carlton and I practically lived together. We became the staunchest of friends and political allies out of this campaign.

DOUGLASS: So did the Times take a stand opposing this?

BAUS: They were firmly on our side. The campaign wound up to a climax. Fletcher Bowron called a hearing in the city hall to "bring out the facts" on this. We denounced that roundly because he controlled it. He pulled all the TV and radio in. He ran the show, and so we were at his mercy. So we called a hearing of our own. James L. Beebe was the chairman of it.

DOUGLASS: You got the media there.

BAUS: We got the media there.

DOUGLASS: By now we are getting a little bit of television.

BAUS: We are getting a little bit of television. This was probably the first time we got a good bit of television.

DOUGLASS: What was the format of that presentation? Beebe presided?

BAUS: Beebe would preside. He would call certain witnesses every day. I remember that Beebe and
his chamber aide, Ruth Meilandt, and my fiancee, Helene Walther, and myself met every night of our hearing—our hearing was the second hearing chronologically—at the new Cove Restaurant in the back of the Ambassador [Hotel] across from the Windsor [Restaurant]. We met there every night and had a couple of martinis and dinner and worked out our strategy for the next day. That became a favorite restaurant from that time on until it died.

DOUGLASS: This wasn’t on Wilshire [Boulevard]. You said it was in back of the Ambassador.

BAUS: It was Seventh Street and Berendo [Avenue] in the Chancellor Hotel. A block east of the Ambassador on Seventh. On the corner of Berendo.

DOUGLASS: That sounds like it was pretty bloody, if you have city councilmen against each other.

BAUS: Hammering at each other. I remember at our victory celebration, Fritz Burns was our strategy committee chairman and our finance chairman, and Councilman Harold Harby got up and said, "Mayor Bowron fiddles while Fritz burns." [Laughter]
DOUGLASS: [Laughter] Well, you won. How close was that vote?

BAUS: It was close. I think we won it convincingly, not by a huge margin, but convincingly.

DOUGLASS: Did you feel there was any turning point in that that won it for you?

BAUS: No. We were in a bitter, trench-flogging contest from beginning to end. It never relaxed in its tension and its fury. When it was over, Mayor Bowron, true to his promise, denounced our victory as being contractually inoperative. "The city has a contract. We are going ahead with it."

DOUGLASS: You mean they had a contract to go ahead with public housing in Chavez Ravine.

BAUS: So the mayor contended.

DOUGLASS: But they actually were about to do something?

BAUS: Yes. I don't know what, technically, kind of a legal instrument it was.

DOUGLASS: Whose decision was it to put it on the city ballot? Was it the council? There was a majority to put on the ballot?

BAUS: I think we had a lot of eight votes [for] on a lot of things and seven votes [against] on a lot of things.
DOUGLASS: So a majority of the council didn't agree with Bowron that they just could right ahead.

BAUS: That was before it became such a bloody battle.

DOUGLASS: They agreed that it should be a ballot measure.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: One thing I am definitely realizing is that you never had a lot of lead time into these campaigns.

BAUS: No.

DOUGLASS: Some of them you would have as little as two months.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Unless somebody contacted you early in the issue development stage . . .

BAUS: Which seldom happened.

DOUGLASS: . . . you were not forewarned. So this means being prepared to mobilize quickly.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: How did you live with that?

BAUS: As best we could. We learned to shoot from the hip.

DOUGLASS: Did you pull in special people for each of these? For the public housing one, did you pull in extra staff.

BAUS: Oh, yes.
DOUGLASS: Did you have a cadre of people you drew from?

BAUS: Yes. We developed and trained our people over the years.

DOUGLASS: And some of whom had an expertise to fit the situation.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Of course, later you had a lot. Did you have twenty people?

BAUS: At times we had up to fifty people or more.

DOUGLASS: With different strengths.

BAUS: Yes. If we needed someone to work in the black community, we would hire one or two writers. We would hire someone to work with labor. All kinds of special appointments.

DOUGLASS: There would be these fits and spurts because of election years. Off-election years were quieter?

BAUS: "Champagne one year and feathers the next," we would say. By and large so, but off-election years were city-election years. We were frequently busy with city elections in odd-number years and state elections on even-number years.

DOUGLASS: This is not an easy-going PR business at this point. This is stress at times.
Hypertension was a leading reason why I got out of it relatively early in life.

I would like to go into the Ross connection on tape.

I would like to say one more thing quickly to close this so we can go into detail. As a result of Bowron's intransigence—he was coming up for reelection in '53 and this was '52—we, that is, our committee, decided that we had to run our own man for mayor to unseat Bowron in order to capture our victory on that public housing measure.

You felt it would keep coming up?

Bowron just wouldn't honor it. There would be litigation and so forth, and he would go ahead with it if he could. So we found our man, [Congressman Norris] Norrie Poulson, and ran him and won. That also was a hell of a bitter campaign.

Now when you say, "you found your man," was your company involved in seeking out a candidate?

We had been working with the business establishment hand and glove.

How did you find Poulson?
BAUS: I think Asa Call is the one who found him. Anyway, we can go into that story later. The first thing Poulson did after he went in was to sack the Chavez Ravine project for all time.

DOUGLASS: That is the end of the Chavez Ravine story.

BAUS: No. It isn't. The Dodgers came in there. Since the city gave Chavez Ravine to the Dodgers, there was a bitter referendum to try to send them back to Brooklyn. But that is another story.

DOUGLASS: We have to get that one, too. We'll get the story of that mayoralty campaign.

BAUS: My blood is all over Chavez Ravine. [Laughter]

DOUGLASS: I knew there was a big fight. Was one of the mayor's early acts to sign the contract for the Dodgers to come?

BAUS: His first act was to do away with the public housing project. The Dodgers came in two years later, also during his first term.

DOUGLASS: Let's cover the manner in which your company was formed.

BAUS: Frank Doherty started pelting me, asking me to come over and see him. He would start in a very subtle way by saying that I ought to really have an advertising facility and maybe I ought to get
better acquainted with a young man named Bill Ross, who went to USC at the same time I went to UCLA.

I knew Bill. He called me or I called him. I forget which. We started having lunch together because he had an office on Washington Boulevard, the next traffic signal south from Venice Boulevard, where I had my office. It sort of evolved slowly. We talked about it. Then Bill said, "Maybe I could save you some rent money. I have a little more space than I need." I wasn't very happy with mine. So my operation moved into the Ross facility.

It wasn't too long before one thing or another was settled, and we formed an agreement. W. B. Ross and Associates would continue their own advertising contracts, and Herbert M. Baus & Company would continue its own PR projects. But everything political would be done by a new entity called Baus and Ross Campaigns, which would use the combined talents, assets, abilities of these two gentlemen and their operations to do everything political. From that time until 1955, all our political operations were Baus and Ross projects. And all
BAUS: Our commercial publicity and PR were with Baus. All commercial advertising and his PR was with Bill Ross.

DOUGLASS: That is, you kept your own businesses going as you had them before.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Then, in '55, you fused.

BAUS: Fused the whole thing.

DOUGLASS: Into Baus and Ross Company. You kept the same name.

BAUS: We called it Baus and Ross Campaigns at first. We changed it to Baus and Ross Company in '55 because some of our business then was not campaign business.

DOUGLASS: Was that in 1948 that you formed Baus and Ross Campaigns?

BAUS: I think that is fair to say that's when we had our baptism of fire.

DOUGLASS: You had mentioned to me that one of Doherty's sons was married to Bill Ross' wife's sister. That was part of the connection you made when Doherty put you two together.

BAUS: Barbara [Smith Doherty] and Virginia [Smith Ross] were sisters. They both raised eight or nine kids.
DOUGLASS: Was the reason for the delay an obvious
evolutionary one or was it because, in your
heart of hearts, that you thought you weren't
sure there was a full-time living to be made
doing the political work? And each one wanted
to keep your own businesses.

BAUS: I think it was a combination. Plus it was a
natural evolutionary thing. I guess it didn't
occur to us, even though we got a great start
with two big victories. Bill wasn't in on the
railroad deal. That was strictly mine.

DOUGLASS: He had not done as much political work.

BAUS: He had not done any.

DOUGLASS: So the public housing was the first one for him?

BAUS: That was our first joint effort.

DOUGLASS: His strength was advertising.

BAUS: Advertising and the bookkeeping. The numbers.
He was very good at that. Financial control.

DOUGLASS: Would you say on a political spectrum he was
more conservative than you? About the same?

BAUS: I think we both thought I was more conservative.

DOUGLASS: I assume you were a Republican.

BAUS: We were and are both Republicans.

DOUGLASS: Had you grown up in a Republican family?
No. I was a Democrat myself. I devoted the summer of 1932 to volunteer activity on behalf of [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] FDR. And promoted a building in Inglewood and organized an Inglewood headquarters for FDR.

[I did get a dose of politics in the raw during the summer following my freshman year. Franklin D. Roosevelt was nominated for president that year (1932); I supported him keenly and wanted to open a headquarters for him in Inglewood. Many storefronts were vacant that depression year and I picked the most exposed one in town for my headquarters. I had no budget, of course, but the name of Frank D. Parent was on the "For Lease" sign in the window. It seemed logical to me that Mr. Parent would be glad to "lend" me this space, since it happened that I had won his "Frank D. Parent Cup" for outstanding activity in my Inglewood High School senior year.

His response: "No way are you getting that building for FDR; I am a staunch Republican." I scratched my head and went down to see competing realtor [ ] Em Dawson. He was a Lions Club officer whom I knew as a honorary Lion for my
senior year. And so I knew he was a Democrat. Em Dawson got me that building for a Roosevelt-Garner headquarters, which I set up and ran as a volunteer until school started and somebody for the party took over.]*

DOUGLASS: So when did you change?

BAUS: In the chamber of commerce, Leonard Read was an archconservative, as well as my friend and a major influence on my life.

DOUGLASS: You respected him. He was your boss and you listened to his ideas?

BAUS: That's right. I agreed with him, more or less, and became as harsh an anti-Roosevelt enthusiast as you could find anywhere.

DOUGLASS: So you went to the other end of the spectrum.

BAUS: Indeed.

DOUGLASS: And never changed that viewpoint, I gather.

BAUS: I have a saying. If you in your youth, you are not a liberal, there is something wrong with your heart. But if in your old age you are not a conservative, there is something wrong with your head. [Laughter]

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
DOUGLASS: OK. I think I have tired you out enough and that is a good stopping point. If you think of anything later about the very beginnings of the company, that is of great interest.

[End Session 1]

[End Tape 1, Side B]
DOUGLASS: I think you had something you wanted to elucidate on from the prior interview.

BAUS: Yes, I did. Most of the amendments I penned in, but some of these are complicated and extensive enough to justify talking about them.

DOUGLASS: All right.

BAUS: Early in the first interview we were talking about some of my contacts in the chamber in the early days. I wanted to pick up and say that there were two very important staff connections who became close personal friends and developed into vital connections after I went out on my own. One was Earl S. Anderson, who came to the chamber after being the executive secretary of Republican Governor Frank C. Merriam, way back in the twenties. Earl held several jobs in the chamber, principally being in charge of the
convention department and being in charge of the building trades department.

DOUGLASS: Was he on the chamber staff when you joined it?

BAUS: Actually he was on the chamber staff before I joined it. He was a little older than I but not a great deal. We became fast personal friends. He was from USC, and I was from UCLA. We used to bet a small sum every year on the "biggest" football game and generate a lot of to-do over that. We just became great, great friends.

Later on, after I started Baus and Ross, Earl became a resolute champion of mine and paved the way for us to take over a number of major campaigns, including all the public housing campaigns which were so vital in our early years.

Earl left the chamber to become head of the Los Angeles Realty Board, always a major entity in the public housing campaigns. He occupied that position for many years. He also got me an assignment of publicizing the Home Show in Los Angeles. This was not political but, nevertheless, it shows how close we were.
DOUGLASS: In a business like yours, I suppose there is a lot of overlap between what is public relations work, marketing work, and political work?

BAUS: That's true. A great deal.

DOUGLASS: They interlock, I suppose, sometimes.

BAUS: Yes. For example, in 1949, when I took over the nonpolitical account as the public relations consultant for the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, that year the stock exchange became the major backer of something that was put on the ballot by the state legislature. A measure to make daylight saving [time] a permanent fixture of California life. Daylight saving had been defeated on the ballot five times before we got into it. The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange was the major protagonist of daylight saving time.

DOUGLASS: Because of the time difference with the East?

BAUS: Yes. The New York Stock Exchange opened at 7 A.M. PST [Pacific Standard Time] and the Pacific Stock Exchange and financial markets had to coincide. When daylight time prevailed on the East Coast but did not extend to California there was a four-hour spread. That meant Los Angeles and San Francisco markets ran on one cylinder from 6 A.M. to 10 A.M. during daylight
saving months. Naturally, they looked to me, since Baus and Ross had this political arm. We took it over and ran with it and passed it.

DOUGLASS: Do you remember the year of that proposition?

BAUS: It was 1949. It was a special election in 1949.

DOUGLASS: To get back to Mr. Anderson, he was a lifelong contact for you. Is that right?

BAUS: Lifelong. He even wound up, eventually, getting me into a campaign for the real estate industry in Arizona. Which was fascinating because it comprised a head-on collision between the lawyers and the realtors of Arizona. With no little delight, we won it for the realtors.

DOUGLASS: Was this a matter of who would handle real estate transactions? Was that what they were fighting over?

BAUS: The lawyers put a measure on the ballot requiring a lawyer to be involved in every real estate deal. The realtors took that on.

DOUGLASS: That is not a western syndrome. It is an eastern syndrome. I suppose there have been these fights. Has there been one in California?

BAUS: Not in my time.
DOUGLASS: How do you believe you managed to get over the daylight saving proposition after it suffered so many defeats?

BAUS: Frankly, there were two major strategic elements. One of them was that California had daylight saving during the war. It was imposed by Washington as part of the war effort. The people lived with it for several years during the war and found out they liked it. They also found out the canards that had always been raised against it, largely by farmers, simply were not true.

Number two, the theater industry had always resolutely opposed it with money and their entire propaganda apparatus for the entertainment industry. This time we managed to split the theaters in two. The main body of the theaters supported daylight saving because they figured it might exterminate outdoor theaters. Outdoor theaters could not show their product during the daylight.

DOUGLASS: Now, again, were the farmers in opposition to this?

BAUS: Always.
DOUGLASS: So you put together a coalition that won this time.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Anything else about Mr. Anderson or staff at the chamber?

BAUS: The other staff person on the chamber was Harold W. Wright, who was the head of the domestic trade department in the years I worked for the chamber. We became close friends and worked together on a number of things. Harold Wright was appointed to succeed Leonard Read as manager of the chamber during the war when Leonard went East to join the National Association of Manufacturers. Later he founded his own Freedom Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson, New York.

Harold became manager of the chamber. I came back from the war and had my blowup with the Downtown Businessmen's Association and started a business for myself. Harold Wright promptly engaged me as a consultant of the chamber. That was a keystone account in my early years. In that role, I met with him sometimes daily to discuss all kinds of chamber problems. I think that was very helpful to
Harold because I had been with the chamber and knew the people and the machinery. He was just getting started with his new job.

DOUGLASS: Were you on a retainer with the chamber?

BAUS: Yes. This led to all kinds of business and other collateral benefits. Harold and I remained close for the rest of his life, which extended for—I don’t remember exactly when he died—at least twenty years.

One other chamber leader was William C. Mullendore, who was president and CEO of California Edison and a very good friend.

DOUGLASS: You mentioned him in the first interview in passing.

BAUS: I deleted it in my editing. That is why I am reintroducing it now.

DOUGLASS: Let’s talk about your modus operandi for Baus and Ross.

BAUS: We, early in life, developed a modus operandi unique at the time. In the first place, internally, Bill and I worked out an effective division of labor. He was Mr. Inside and I was Mr. Outside. He would run the office and hire the people and run the bookkeeping and take care of the numbers. I have always been a word man
and not a numbers man. He was more of a numbers man. You need both in this business. We complemented each other. All the way from the fact that he was a converted Catholic because he married Virginia, a devoutly Catholic lady. Converts are the most ardent kind. I had been raised a Catholic and, so to speak, seceded from the church. [Laughter]

DOUGLASS: So you were different people.

BAUS: But we were very tolerant of each other. I understood Catholicism. He understood both sides of it, too.

DOUGLASS: When you say you were the outside man, explain exactly what that involved?

BAUS: That involves all kinds of contacts. I was the partner who was the member of the Jonathan Club and the ad [advertising] club and PRAA [Public Relations Association of America].

DOUGLASS: Is the ad club called an advertising agency club?

BAUS: Not just "agency." Advertising directors of companies and executives of media also were members. I was the contact with the chamber of commerce and the various business associations that I knew well from earlier days. I would go
to all kinds of functions and affairs. Bill was raising nine children and was not as able or willing to go out at night as I was.

DOUGLASS: What about with the newspapers?

BAUS: We both had our contacts. I probably had more than he did. He was always on the advertising side. He would buy advertising time and/or space. I was always on the editorial side getting the newspapers interested in our causes. That became a key element, too.

DOUGLASS: So you maintained your contacts with the key people in the newspapers in hopes of getting editorial support?

BAUS: Exactly.

DOUGLASS: You probably developed materials like handouts. Was that something you developed or did he develop it?

BAUS: Whichever one of us assumed prime responsibility for the particular campaign. That gets to the next stage of our division of labor. I might add one more thing. So this really meant I was automatically more apt to generate new business than Bill was. That was fine. It worked very nicely. Per our division-of-labor pattern, every time we signed up for a campaign, we
assigned it to one of us. So Bill would be the campaign manager or I would be the campaign manager. It would always depend on various factors. It seldom created any trouble between us. We ran three campaigns for Norris Poulson. I managed the first and third, and he managed the second.

DOUGLASS: We will get to those shortly.

BAUS: So we both had a firm grasp of our campaign structure that we jointly created. We jointly developed and approached each project the same way. We would meet for lunch almost daily. I would say two-thirds of the time or more we would have lunch and use it for business. We talked all these things over. We would talk about a new campaign and what the major issues should be. How would we approach it.

DOUGLASS: Mr. Baus, say if you were assigned a campaign, Mr. Ross assisted, but you were clearly the person responsible and in charge. Would that be correct?

BAUS: That is correct.

DOUGLASS: In other words, you consulted with each other and worked together, but one person had the clear responsibility.
BAUS: Precisely. As far as the advertising part of any campaign, advertising is a big part of the campaign process. A huge part in some cases. Probably a bigger part today than it was then in terms of the enormous sums of money that are raised today as compared with then. Beyond certain fundamentals most of any campaign budget is spent on advertising. Bill came into our business as a successful advertising agency operator, whereas I had no previous advertising agency exposure. So the advertising end of it was pretty much Bill's domain. Everything from creating the ads to placement of the ads. But we worked together closely on all aspects.

Then when we got a campaign, it was assigned to one of us. That partner would run with it, but we would talk about it together. He would make many a contribution to mine, and I would to his in the way of ideas. I guess the main thing about it is it worked very amicably and quite profitably and very effectively on the scoreboard. That was the bottom line.

DOUGLASS: We discussed earlier that you pulled in particular people for a particular campaign. You must have had a kind of a pool you drew
from. Let's say he would be in charge of a campaign. But would you and he decide who the number two and number three people were who would be pulled in on that?

BAUS: Yes. Sometimes that would be a problem. Bill would be managing one campaign and I would be managing another. We had to decide who would have whom, and sometimes we would both wanted to recruit the same ones. But we worked it out.

DOUGLASS: How big a staff, Mr. Baus, would you have? That is, permanent staff.

BAUS: Permanent staff was as few as a half a dozen, which I called a cadre. It grew up to over a hundred in some of the campaigns.

DOUGLASS: It would expand and deflate according to the campaign.

BAUS: The other thing I wanted to say about our modus operandi is that we had a system for organizing a campaign. We would start off by organizing a steering committee. That would be business and professional and association and other leaders who had a keen, deep interest in the campaign issues at hand. Usually including a financial interest. We tried to keep that committee fairly small so it could move fast. It was
essentially the board of directors of the campaign. It would meet sometimes daily, usually weekly—in the early stages of the campaign, maybe every ten days or two weeks—and make decisions. We would come in with an agenda and go over all the points. The steering committee would adopt the budget and adopt this and that and our campaign plan and thrash it out.

We developed and maintained our own master list of community leaders. We would send a basic mailing to that list, outlining the approach to the campaign and asking them if they would allow the use of their name. From that, we always ended up with a campaign committee which gave substance, a recognizable substance. All these people became campaign leaders now, and we would present them as the campaign committee. That made it legitimate.

Then we would proceed to set up a budget and organize a finance committee, which sometimes, to some degree, duplicated the steering committee. A budget had to be a merger of hope and realism; hope being what we thought we ought to have, and realism being what we
BAUS: thought we could raise. The budget was always a "rubber budget." If we raised a lot more money than anticipated, we would step it up accordingly. If we raised a lot less, we would scale it down accordingly. We would frequently, at an early stage of the campaign, introduce polling to test public opinion and measure the issues. You will hear more about that when you talk to Dorothy Corey. I will get back to that in a minute.

Whichever partner was campaign manager would write up a precis, an overview of the campaign strategy and the major issues as we saw them and what we should do and how we should allocate our strengths and our resources. Bill and I worked together very closely on that. After we adopted it, we would revise as needed and use that as our guideline and the guideline of our steering committee. Then we would break out from there, and we would go after endorsements. That means we would seek the formal support of all kinds of organizations, all kinds of community groups, and newspapers and other media.
DOUGLASS: This would be institutional support. The other mailing you spoke of was to individuals, saying could we use your name?

BAUS: Exactly. Then the campaign would sort of break down to what kind of communication we would go into. We structured communication into publicity and advertising. A direct mailing would sort of fall on the side of advertising. Advertising meant projecting information via media space on time we paid for at prevailing rates. Publicity meant generating news that the papers would print because of its interest per se without charging us.

DOUGLASS: That is an art.

BAUS: No doubt about that. And combined with a certain measure of just plain luck.

DOUGLASS: You got to be pretty good at that?

BAUS: Well, that was my forte for many years.

DOUGLASS: This would be done by an event or development related to the campaign? Is that how you would try to get it in?

BAUS: All kinds of things. Planning special events. Having a candidate make a speech or make an appearance. Some of our major endorsements would constitute publicity. We went into all
kinds of things to do it. Both Bill and I were, if I may say so, rather adept at this. Maybe it was more my thing than his, just like advertising was more his thing than mine. As for the advertising part, of course, we would allocate as much money as we could to that and allocate it between the different media. Television started to flower in the early fifties and grew into a bigger and bigger part of campaigning; although lots of campaigns, we could not afford television at all. One can buy all kinds of radio exposure for what it costs to buy a couple of TV spots. If we had ample funds, we’d go for balanced TV and radio and newspaper. We always had a policy that there has got to be a basic newspaper budget because newspaper support was important. We could not expect it on many issues if we were not going to give the press quid pro quo advertising support. So that, in a quick stroke, was our modus operandi.

**DOUGLASS:** Someone stated— it might have been a comment from Mr. Whitaker—that to run a business like this, the owners, like you and Mr. Ross, ought to be able to do every task involved as well or
better than the underlings you expected to do it for you. Do you buy in on that?

BAUS: Absolutely. I think Clem Whitaker, Sr. exposed me to that viewpoint early in life, and I agreed with the thesis.

DOUGLASS: So between the two of you, you indeed had that.

BAUS: At least we thought we did. It was the old thing, leadership involves never asking your troops to do what you can't do better yourself. [Of course, the technological variety and intensity of the business has expanded to the degree that we might take another look today. Television and computer technologies are worlds in themselves as we got into the 21st century, and if I were in the business today I would recruit special talents in those fields. But that is another story.]*

For another fact, I didn't go into the nuts and bolts of polling. It can be done here or later.

DOUGLASS: Go ahead. This is as good a time as any.

BAUS: Our application of polling was this was not for vanity. We did not use polling just to see if

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding material during his review of the draft transcript.
we were ahead or behind. We were not just
taking to try to feel good. We were taking it
for two reasons. One of them was to measure our
progress. In other words, if we are fifteen
points behind today and we change to ten points
behind in a month, we are making progress. We
must be doing something right. And [the other]
use was to measure issues that will be effective
in the campaign. We have had experiences where
what we thought were the issues were not really
as effective as some we had not even thought of.
The polling brought this out. I will tell you
that story in detail when we get to the George
[H.] McLain measure, wherein we had a dramatic
little experience that changed the whole
campaign.

In our polling, we would create a basic
poll. We worked constantly down through all the
years of our business with Dorothy Corey of
Facts Consolidated, who eventually became an
extremely close personal friend of mine and a
good personal friend of Bill's.

DOUGLASS: How did you connect with her to begin with?

BAUS: She was prominent in the Los Angeles Advertising
Women’s Association, and I wanted a research
outfit. I just went to her, and we worked together most agreeably. We sort of developed some of the early concepts of the use of polling as a campaign tool. Roughly, our formula of constructing a poll in every campaign was an approach that would say, "Here is Proposition X. Would you vote for that or against it if you were voting today?" Then we would probe, "Why?" Then we would ask, "What do you think are the several strongest arguments on the 'Yes' side of this measure? What do you think are the several arguments on the 'No' side of this measure?"

Then we would start over again and say, "Here are six arguments in favor of Proposition X that are advanced in favor of it by the proponents. What do you think are the relative merits of these arguments? The second best?" And so forth. Frequently, we would probe deeply. "Why do you like this? Why don't you like it?" Then we would say, "Here are the six best arguments that the opponents propound." We would go into depth of what they thought of these arguments. Then after that, we would say, "Now that you have gone through this subject matter with regard to Proposition X, how would
BAUS: you vote today?" That was sometimes quite revealing. And then we would say, "What would influence you the most on this argument? Things that you would get through the mail? The organizations you belonged to? Like a chamber of commerce? Labor union? Church? Newspaper endorsements? Radio endorsements?" Those elements would we try to evaluate in every poll.

DOUGLASS: That sounds like a challenge to pull the material together. The results. For instance, would you try to pull together the reasons they expounded for something or would you jump just to what you had laid out and what they said were the best arguments?

BAUS: When we would present half a dozen arguments for it and a half a dozen against it, this would be a combination of our thinking and the thinking of the existing entities on the subject. For example, in public housing. The industry opposed it because it was socialistic in effect. It invariably created slums. It invariably ran down neighborhoods. We would limit it to these arguments and then see what the public would come up with. Maybe they would come up with something clear out of left field that nobody
had previously thought of. Not often, but sometimes. Then we would take the results of our poll and our own thinking to help us hammer out the approach we wanted to make.

**DOUGLASS:** Would these be an example of an initial poll?

**BAUS:** Yes. Lots of times in those days we didn't have all that much money. Maybe there was not going to be enough money for another poll.

**DOUGLASS:** You started out doing city issues when you first used Dorothy Corey?

**BAUS:** No.

**DOUGLASS:** Oh, that was the state proposition for public housing.

**BAUS:** The first one was state.

**DOUGLASS:** What I am trying to get an idea about is how large a sample you might be talking about. Would she, for instance, do polling for you statewide?

**BAUS:** She operated on a remarkably small sample, but one she considered quite adequate and accurate. Usually a sample of several thousand would suffice for the entire state. We kind of left it up to her.
DOUGLASS: So that is something I should ask her. Did you find that doing this was beneficial in conducting your business?

BAUS: We considered it a must. We almost always found a way to get it into our budget.

DOUGLASS: I noted that you, in your book, hammer very hard about the importance of research. I gather that is something you feel strongly about.

BAUS: Very strongly.

DOUGLASS: Research. What would it encompass beyond polling?

BAUS: Digging into the history of the issue and all the facts of the issue. Reaching any authorities or people who were acquainted with the issue. Seeking out all the related legislation. Exhaustively probing to determine media attitudes. Actually, we tried to find everything we could find on the issue.

DOUGLASS: It is like historical research.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Would you have somebody on your staff who would be particularly good at that or would you assign to different people according to the issue?

BAUS: In the early days, we did it ourselves. I figured, and Bill figured, "I want to know more
about this than anybody in the state. So I am going to dig into this myself." Later on, as we got busier and so forth, on some situations, we might assign it to somebody on the staff.

DOUGLASS: All right. Let's move on to another item.

BAUS: You had asked how we covered northern California in the first campaign. I wanted to say we developed various ways of covering northern California and also covering San Diego County, which was a big factor. Sometimes there was a northern California committee and a southern California committee. Frequently, the northern California committee would go with Whitaker and Baxter and the southern one would go with us. We worked with them on a lot of those situations in later years. If we had the responsibility for the entire state, which also happened frequently, we would hire another agency or encourage the northern California group to hire it. We preferred to hire the agency ourselves so we would have some control over it.

There were several agencies we would use in northern California. Most of the time we used a man named [Frederick] Fred Whitney in San Diego down through the years. He later became a
DOUGLASS: Did he have his own consulting business in those days?

BAUS: Yes, for many years he did.

DOUGLASS: Are we talking forties? Fifties?

BAUS: And sixties. There were other people we employed for one reason or another in San Diego. Maybe he could not do it. Maybe some potent committee member down there insisted on it. Usually, we would pick him.

DOUGLASS: Did you ever have your own office in northern California?

BAUS: Mostly, no. But we had one in Fresno a few years.

DOUGLASS: But you had a contact you would use particularly, say, in San Francisco. I gather you did quite a few things in tandem with Whitaker and Baxter.

BAUS: Quite a few. There were other agencies we worked with at times.

DOUGLASS: One question I want to ask was, say, in that '46 referendum campaign on FEPC, Fair Employment
Practices Commission, how did you coordinate your work with Whitaker and Baxter?

BAUS: Whitaker and Baxter were not into the FEPC. We had no other agency in that one.

DOUGLASS: There was one they asked you to handle.

BAUS: They hired me. That was the railroad featherbedding. Whitaker and Baxter were the statewide primary agency. They were in command of it. They hired me to oversee the operation down here.

DOUGLASS: I see. You were specifically hired by them to do it. It wasn't like two agencies coordinating something.

BAUS: Exactly.

DOUGLASS: Anything else you want to pick up?

BAUS: No. I am ready to go.

DOUGLASS: I would like to move to your first candidate's campaign and that would have been for Sam Yorty when he ran for congress. My first question is did that contact come out of your tidelands oil campaign that you handled?

BAUS: Yes, it did.

DOUGLASS: In other words, did he himself approach you?

BAUS: Yes.
DOUGLASS: Did he pick up the phone and call you personally?

BAUS: He either called me or called Bill. I don't remember which. But he did.

DOUGLASS: Yorty had served in the assembly earlier. He was also a practicing lawyer in Los Angeles.

BAUS: I might say with regard to Yorty, it is remarkable how often a political leader has a devoted henchman concentrating on his career almost like St. Peter was devoted to the career of Christ. Yorty had one named Eleanor Chambers. She came into my life in 1948 when I was doing the featherbedding. Clem Whitaker asked me if I could find a place for her in the campaign as a favor to Sam Yorty because she was so close to him. She focused on his career for years as his major aide and backer.

DOUGLASS: Would you go so far to say she was almost an alter ego?

BAUS: Yes. I would. Not a romantic thing in any way, however. [Peter J.] Pete Pitchess had another example in [James F.] Jimmy Downey, his undersheriff for years. When [Robert C.] Bob Kirkwood's political star was rising, A. Ruric Todd was his devoted deputy.
DOUGLASS: That is not too uncommon?

BAUS: No. It isn't.

DOUGLASS: Let's talk about that for a second. Does that pose problems for a person like you trying to handle campaigns? This could either be a help or hindrance, I would think.

BAUS: I managed to make it a help most of the time. I think it depends on your attitude and on their attitude. It is best to work at it and make it a help because it is there, and you have to live with it anyway. So Sam wanted to find a job for Eleanor between innings for him. Clem asked me if I could do it, and I did. I put together a tight little staff. Eleanor became a fixture on the staff. In the process she became a very close friend of mine. I valued her very highly. She was extremely able and skilled and had an astonishing array of contacts. She was indirectly responsible for my meeting Helene [Baus], who has been my wife for forty years.

DOUGLASS: How was that?

BAUS: Eleanor had a friend named Leona Wilson, who was a professor at USC. Leona Wilson came to her and said, "Could you help a friend of mine from Washington, D.C. get a job? Maybe with Baus and
Ross?" Leona Wilson knew about us. Eleanor said, "I will certainly ask." And she did. I called Helene Walther in for an interview. One thing led to another. Now we have been married for almost forty years.

DOUGLASS: What did she do at first at the agency?

BAUS: We never did hire her.

DOUGLASS: You didn’t hire her. You met her, though.

BAUS: What happened was that Bill Ross had a running account with the American Red Cross to raise funds for them every year. The campaign usually came at a time when I wasn’t all that busy. For several years, he would hire me to do certain things in connection with the Red Cross. It turned out that Helene had served with the Red Cross three years in Europe during and after World War II, all the way from England to France and Germany. So I offered her a position in this situation, but it was a temporary job. She said that she didn’t want a temporary job. So we never did hire her.

DOUGLASS: I see. But you met her. That was the beginning of something. [Laughter]

BAUS: It was a wonderful thing for both of our lives.
DOUGLASS: You were working with Eleanor Chambers in this campaign for congress in 1950.

BAUS: Eleanor worked with me throughout the featherbedding, faithfully and loyally.

DOUGLASS: What kind of work did she do?

BAUS: What I call organization work. Finding more and more emphasis on the Democratic and liberal side. I had the emphasis on the Republican and conservative side. Getting the message out to these people. Generating direct mailings. Motivating them to endorse our side of the issue. And being my general organization assistant. She was a very able lady.

DOUGLASS: In what capacity did she work with you on the congressional campaign for Yorty?

BAUS: In the congressional campaign, what they really wanted from us was advertising more than anything else in that particular campaign.

DOUGLASS: I guess we should point out that Yorty had been elected to the assembly in a special election in April of 1949 because of the death of Assemblyman John [C.] Lyons. Yorty ran for congress in the Fourteenth Congressional District the next year.
BAUS: That's right. The election was in the first Tuesday in June. I don’t remember too much about this. It was primarily Bill’s connection, for the reason that it was primarily an advertising rather than a general, all-around campaign.

DOUGLASS: Baus and Ross were the advertising end of it.

BAUS: We were the advertising end of it, and Bill was the one who handled it.

DOUGLASS: It was interesting because Yorty had to become first of twelve in the primary. Of course, there was cross-filing then. There were people from both parties filing. Jack [W.] Hardy was elected as the Republican candidate.

[End Tape 2, Side A]
[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

DOUGLASS: Do you remember that as being an exciting experience because you had never been involved in a candidate campaign?

BAUS: That was Bill's baby. I had little to with it. After the 1948 election Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter were hired by the American Medical Association to run a national campaign against socialized medicine. They asked me to go to Chicago with them and be their assistant manager of that campaign for a very handsome fee. And I went. Bill and I had not congealed our operation yet but we maintained our relationship intact just the same. I did go back. So I was in Chicago for the first four months of that year. That is why I didn't have any connection with the Yorty thing. Bill was here, and I was there. They came to Bill because he was my partner.

DOUGLASS: Did they use your company in any of the future campaigns that Yorty had while he served in the Congress? Were you involved beyond that initial campaign?

BAUS: With Yorty?
DOUGLASS: Yes. I didn’t find any record of that, but I am not sure.

BAUS: If so, I didn’t handle it. I don’t have a clear memory on it either.

DOUGLASS: I want to wind up Chavez Ravine affairs. We took the story up to the point where you got Poulson elected mayor--I would like to talk a little about that when we cover the Poulson campaigns--but there was, and you referred to it in the first interview, a 1958 referendum to send the Dodgers back to Brooklyn.

BAUS: Yes. The campaign to uphold the [Los Angeles] City-Dodger contract.

DOUGLASS: We have gone through the fact that there was a fight over putting public housing in the Chavez Ravine and the fact that you got Poulson elected, and he abolished that notion for good. Two years later, the Dodgers came, which would be about ’55. Something still must have been boiling about this. What caused this issue to emerge as a referendum? What was the discontent about it that caused this to be a referendum issue?

BAUS: In the first place, Chavez Ravine was earmarked by the public housing forces, including the
L.A. public housing authority, which was a potent factor in L.A. city government for many years. Barbara Rosine and--I forget his name now--it might be Howard Rosenthal or something like that. He was the head of it. She was high up in the management. The two of them were in it. It was a pretty proficient political machine. The 1948 statewide fight was over a program scripted for Chavez Ravine.

DOUGLASS: We covered this. The Dodgers had already come. I would like to pick up at that point and find out why there was a '58 referendum to send them back.

BAUS: When Poulson brought the Dodgers here, it was somewhat controversial in some ways. The most controversial part of it was that the city offered the Dodgers the Chavez Ravine site in exchange for being given Wrigley Field, where the old [Los Angeles] Angels played. Somehow or other, the Dodgers held title to that, although it had once been a Chicago Cub property. I don't remember just how this dovetailed.

DOUGLASS: You mean by that time the Dodgers had the title on Wrigley Field.
BAUS: That's right. So the Dodgers ended up trading Wrigley Field for the city's Chavez Ravine. There were a lot of surviving political scars and still-throbbing wounds over that fight. There were certain elements of dissent in the city that always seemed to throb, certainly in our city and in many I am sure. The dissenters never did swallow this Chavez Ravine matter gracefully. So the Dodgers moved in, but they had not developed the stadium yet. The dissident groups were strong enough to qualify a referendum. If the referendum was lost, the Dodgers would lose the Chavez Ravine property. Many thought that this would send them fluttering back to Brooklyn. In those days, there were other more progressive forces very anxious to keep the Dodgers, which is easily understood today.

DOUGLASS: Were some of the people who were discontented environmentally oriented people who thought that the ravine should not be developed at all?

BAUS: I am sure that was part of it.

DOUGLASS: Plus the scars from the public housing fight. That kind of thing?
BAUS: Heavily. But I think the main thing was that they thought the city had been taken in. They thought the city had given this slicker from Brooklyn too good a deal.

DOUGLASS: Well, we are hearing similar things today about the Los Angeles Raiders. [Laughter] The story doesn’t change.

BAUS: Yes. Of course, [Allen] Al Davis and Walter O’Malley offered very different makeups.

DOUGLASS: But it is an issue about how much a city should do. You were hired to handle that campaign? To defeat the referendum?

BAUS: Actually, we were very close to Mayor Poulson. Every major campaign of any nature that occurred during the eight years of his two terms befell to us. This included city bond issues of all sorts: police, harbor, the global airport, and many more.

DOUGLASS: As I understand it, this was the first one in which a telethon was used. How did you happen to do that?

BAUS: Yes. We managed it, but that was Bill’s campaign. If you are going to talk to him, that is a question to save for him because you will get a lot more detail.
DOUGLASS: You were sort of an outside man. You might have been involved in something like a telethon.

BAUS: Not too much. I had some pretty exacting things to do myself for the firm.

DOUGLASS: So this referendum fight was really his. Do you recall how large the victory was on that? That is, you defeated the referendum.

BAUS: I generally recall it was decisive, but not a landslide by any means.

DOUGLASS: That means there was quite a dialogue going on in the community.

BAUS: It was a bitter fight. I remember telling Walter O'Malley, "Your biggest contribution to this fight would be to establish a winning record and get into the World Series." And that year, the Dodgers floundered all over the place. They didn't cooperate on that front. They waited until next year to win the National League pennant and defeat the Chicago White Sox in the World Series.

DOUGLASS: Let's finish out Norris Poulson's campaigns and then pick up the LAX [Los Angeles Airport] bond issue. The first Poulson mayoral campaign, you talked some about. You were pulled in. It was a striking victory. I think you said in the
primary Poulson had gotten a vote greater than the incumbent who had been in office for fifteen years. That is the '53 primary. Then you got him elected in a hot final campaign.

**BAUS:** City elections, the primary was the first Tuesday in April. And the final was the last Tuesday in May. All the city elections were that way.

**DOUGLASS:** All right. We are talking about another schedule with city elections. You handled them both and you personally were in charge of that.

**BAUS:** I was.

**DOUGLASS:** Beyond that which I have laid out, do you have any other particular comments about the campaign because we only referred to it in the context of the whole Chavez Ravine problem?

**BAUS:** Well, it was a bloody and bitter campaign. Recriminations flew thick and fast. We attacked Bowron bitterly. All the newspapers supported us, but they carried a lot of stuff for the incumbent mayor, too.

**DOUGLASS:** This the primary fight now.

**BAUS:** Both.

**DOUGLASS:** Didn't Poulson defeat Bowron in the primary? Of course, it was a nonpartisan [election].
BAUS: In a city election, if you take 50 percent plus one of the vote, you win. That's it. It's all over.

DOUGLASS: But he didn't. I follow you.

BAUS: He got more votes than Bowron, but he didn't get 50 percent. So the two had to run it off.

DOUGLASS: Which becomes hot and heavy because you have driven off the others who were in the primary.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Was this the status-quo-versus-the-challenger kind of scenario?

BAUS: Yes. I would say so. And we fought the public housing thing all over again. It was a major issue, if not the major issue. We couldn't accuse Bowron of corruption. He was a guy who originally ran as the champion of civic rectitude against corruption. He had an incorruptible administration. His major vulnerability was that he refused to obey the will of the people in regard to the public housing fight.

DOUGLASS: That is what you attacked him on?

BAUS: So we battered very heavily on that. And being mayor too long. We needed new blood.
DOUGLASS: What were the chief institutional allies you lined up on Poulson's side in the first time Poulson ran and was elected?

BAUS: The business community and the establishment. The Republicans. Poulson was a Republican congressman. The other side had the Democratic establishment, the labor unions, and the minorities. We stirred up a lot of dissent against Bowron out in the San Fernando Valley.

DOUGLASS: Because they were basically more conservative?

BAUS: They were more rebels, too.

DOUGLASS: Nonconforming?

BAUS: That's right. They were notorious mavericks. We got some potent valley political figures and allied ourselves with them or hired them, or both.

DOUGLASS: Would these be business people and farmers because there was still agriculture in the valley then?

BAUS: Agriculture was not a factor. It was business people, community groups, political leaders. Republicans were strong out there. Blue-collar workers were also.
DOUGLASS: Do you remember any particular individual names that were of great use in that campaign, in general?

BAUS: Spencer Van Dyke was a longtime political activist whom we affiliated with our campaign. We had a guy named [David] Dave Fautz who worked with us. He was a Democratic activist who had worked with us on the featherbedding. We had him working with us on the liberal Democratic side of the campaign.

DOUGLASS: I suppose Poulson already had, from his congressional races, a covey of people who would step forward. So those would have been used?

BAUS: He did. He had his own clique. We had pretty much, by that time, a pretty good little band of allies who went with us in most campaigns. They would step in.

DOUGLASS: A dependable group?

BAUS: That's right? The business groups that were strongly against public housing were very strong in this campaign. I remember an interesting anecdote from that campaign. It stands out very clearly.

At the end of the long and bitter fight, not too long before the final election at the
end of May, Norman Chandler, who was then the publisher of the Times, called me and asked me if I could meet in his office with him and [Kenneth] Ken Norris. Ken Norris was the finance chairman. So I went down to meet them. Norman acted as the spokesman. He did almost all the talking. He said, "We have done everything we can do to raise money for this campaign. As a matter of fact, as publisher of the Times, I very seldom get involved in such things but I did this time. The well is dry. We have raised all the money we can raise. I am desperately trying to get some more money for last-minute advertising, per your request. I am going to do an unorthodox thing. I am going to ask you if you would forego part of the Baus and Ross fee as your contribution to the cause."

I said, "Well, Norman, I can. I don't have any realistic hope or expectation of ever becoming as rich as you are. I don't have the family tradition and background. But I am trying to do the best I can. I am sure as hell not going to get there by chopping my fee. The answer is 'no.' The fee has to be intact." But
BAUS: he respected and accepted that, and we wound up on a high note.

DOUGLASS: You gave a hard answer.

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: That’s a good one. That was a major victory. Did Poulson clearly beat Bowron or was it close?

BAUS: It was very close in the final, a margin of 35,000 votes. The final was closer than the primary. In the final campaign, Bowron’s strategy was to concentrate his fire on the L.A. Times, which was very much front and center for Poulson throughout the campaign.

DOUGLASS: Why was the Times for Poulson?

BAUS: There were a lot of reasons. The Times was a different newspaper in those days. It was still the conservative, hard-line, right-wing paper that had been under Harry Chandler, not reflecting the liberal, almost left-wing, image it has developed today. That came later and had not yet arrived. The Times had several political principalities. They had a national political editor, Kyle Palmer, who presided over it for years. Kyle was one of the leading spokesmen for the Republican party. It had a
much less pronounced one in [Chester B.] Chick Hansen doing the same thing for the state.

Over at city hall, Carlton Williams was their political honcho. The Times pretty much went along with what Carl recommended for some years. Carl got so powerful that he probably was one of the most decisive forces of any kind in city hall. He would recommend something or demand something and get it, frequently. Carl emerged very early, being a staunch conservative Republican, as a leader in the public housing campaign of 1952.

I promptly developed a liaison and was very close for the rest of Carl’s political life, for the rest of his Times career, which was, in a sense, shattered by a combination of circumstances when Poulson lost to Yorty in ’61. But that is a later story. As a result, Carl and I became very close person friends. We would have dinner at each other’s house almost every Sunday. Talk strategy and all these things. We conferred daily or many times daily. Our campaign figured heavily in the Williams coverage. Some people would call it propaganda.
BAUS: Carl would often call up and ask for something, and I would provide it.

DOUGLASS: So you had a great pipeline.

BAUS: That's right. We became close allies and worked together very closely on this. This is a liaison that lasted throughout the Poulson years, but it was forged in blood and steel in the campaigns of '52 on public housing and '53 on the mayor. That was an integral part of the story.

DOUGLASS: You managed the whole '53 campaign, but was it the '57 one that Mr. Ross managed?

BAUS: Yes. He managed the '57.

DOUGLASS: I note that Poulson was reelected in the primary. That must have not been too tough a campaign.

BAUS: I got the two bloody ones. The honeymoon was still on in '57.

DOUGLASS: Why don't we go back to the airport bonds. I think that is important. You thought that was in '56. Is it in your list? I think your list doesn't cover much before 1960.

BAUS: It doesn't cover much before 1950.

DOUGLASS: Then it must be there. Do you see the airport bonds there?
BAUS: Yes. It is '56.
DOUGLASS: This was something Poulson put forth?
BAUS: Poulson promoted it. It was his baby.
DOUGLASS: At that point, there was an airport there.
BAUS: Los Angeles had an airport for many years. There were three airport bond issues before ours, and they all failed. It was getting to be a desperate situation because the jet age was dawning. Something had to be done to LAX to make it a modern airport that could physically handle jet aircraft. So they hired us. I remember the preceding bond campaign employed the inane slogan: "For better transportation, vote 'Yes.'" We came out with "For a global airport that can handle the jet age. Vote 'Yes.'" It had a lot more romance and machismo to it.

DOUGLASS: Who was opposing that bond issue? What groups would be opposing it?
BAUS: I don't believe any groups particularly opposed it, except the ordinary dissidents. But it was always tough to put over a bond issue like that. You have to have a two-thirds vote. Bill handled that issue, chiefly because Mayor Poulson became indignant with me for a couple of
years. I am not sure I ever will know why. But not indignant enough to try to impair the long-range relationship with Baus and Ross.

To keep peace in the family we just let Bill handle it. I think some of the abrasions Poulson and I went through together in '53 led to tensions. So Bill took over and did a masterful job of it. His main thing was to start off with a bang: Global airport. Make L.A. a global airport.

DOUGLASS: Of course, it is very difficult to get a two-thirds majority. He obviously got that.

BAUS: We got eight-to-one.

DOUGLASS: That's very good. So that was his project pretty much.

BAUS: Primarily.

DOUGLASS: Let's jump to the '61 Poulson campaign.

BAUS: Do you want to do it that way?

DOUGLASS: I wanted to finish Poulson unless you have more to say on the airport.

BAUS: No more on the airport.

DOUGLASS: Let's finish Poulson because that wraps up that business because we started it with the Chavez Ravine.
BAUS: OK. In '57 Poulson won in the primary with no further ado. As '61 approached, the business establishment was unable to position a candidate. Poulson didn't want to run. I have a dictum basic to all candidate situations. The first thing a successful candidate has to do is want to run and want to win. Without his personal confidence in winning and determination to win, forget it. He is going to be beat. Which is probably the bottom line of the Barry [M.] Goldwater saga. He really didn't want to run.

Poulson was through. He had had it. He was tired. His health was not good. He just did not want to run. But he had been a damned good mayor. The city had gotten along very well. It had made a lot of progress, made some signal advances. The airport being one, the Dodgers being another, and there were others. So the mayoral assignment for Baus and Ross befell me. And Poulson was a hard man to live with and a hard man to get along with.

DOUGLASS: Did he have a testy personality?
BAUS: He was the original cantankerous curmudgeon and played that role to the hilt. He was short-fused and a very easily upset prima donna.

DOUGLASS: Was he an intelligent man?

BAUS: Extremely intelligent. Bill had just agreed that I went through the bloodshed of '53, and it was his turn in '57. It turned out that was the easy one, whereas I ended up with the bloodbaths of '53 and '61. Now it was my turn.

DOUGLASS: Poulson was willing to accept you?

BAUS: Yes. With the years Poulson warmed up to me. And given my closeness to Williams that was a big help. Carl Williams was very close to Poulson and had a great influence over him. Our first hurdle was to prevail on Poulson to run. So we arranged a draft-Poulson dinner. We programmed it at the University Club because it was felt that the California Club was too lofty, too aristocratic, and too fussy. And politically definitely not the place to do something like this. So we scheduled Poulson's own University Club. It was a testimonial. It was left up to Carl Williams to deliver Poulson. We didn't want to tell him what was going on.
I put that lunch together. It was the most complete array of Los Angeles establishment brass that I have ever seen before or since in one room at one time with one purpose. It included all the top figures in the downtown Los Angeles business establishment. All of them. You name it. The president of Richfield Oil, [Charles S.] Charlie Jones. Asa Call. Lynn Beebe. Frank P. Doherty. The newspaper publishers. You name them, they were all there. So at the right moment, Carl Williams delivered the mayor. There was the top brass of this town, all in this room. They rose to their feet and toasted him. Made speech after speech about how great a mayor he had been and how the city needed him. They practically bulldozed the guy into running, notwithstanding that he really didn't want to deep in his heart of hearts.

DOUGLASS: So in other words this really put the pressure on him to get him to run.

BAUS: One reason he didn't want to was there were some phalanxes of dissidents that were pretty powerful and he knew it. In two eventful terms he had picked up the usual "political barnacles." And a big field of opponents formed
against him, led by ex-Congressman Sam Yorty and city councilman [Patrick D.] Pat McGee. Poulson had a very keen political nose. He knew it was going to be very tough. That January, Poulson caught a cold, and he contracted laryngitis. The man would not stop speaking and talking on the phone. Finally, we virtually kidnapped him and sent him down here to Palm Springs. But we couldn’t keep him off the phone, although his doctor and we told him he had to stay off of it. Poulson lost his voice and when he lost it, he never regained it until the day he died. He completely lost his voice.

DOUGLASS: Really? Was this partly psychological, do you think?

BAUS: Indeed, I think it was partly psychosomatic. So we had a candidate that we couldn’t expose. We couldn’t produce him at a press conference. We could not produce him at a TV show. We could not produce him at a meeting, except to introduce him and have him bow. He couldn’t talk. So I had the Hobson’s choice. We’ve got a candidate that in an appearance would parody death warmed over and make a mess of things because he can’t utter anything. Or we had to
keep him under cover, which will make him into the phantom candidate. What are we going to do? That was the major part of what beat us.

DOUGLASS: What did you do? Some of each?

BAUS: We generally hid him.

DOUGLASS: Did you consider someone who could have been his spokesperson, who could have made the appearances and statements for him or was that too much evidence of his vulnerability?

BAUS: We used a surrogate mayor at times which only intensified our dilemma. We tried to brazen it through. Perhaps that was the ideal thing to do, but that was our considered judgment at the time.

DOUGLASS: The only other choice would have been to withdraw?

BAUS: It was pretty late in the game for that. We had never done such a thing in our careers. I don't think any of our forces really wanted to do that. Poulson might have accepted it. But we had a field of guys running against him. Councilman Patrick McGee was a prominent city hall figure. And Sam Yorty, our old friend and client.
DOUGLASS: Did Yorty jump in because he smelled an opportunity?

BAUS: No doubt. And then he smelled blood.

DOUGLASS: He was out of congress by then, I believe. He was practicing law.

BAUS: Oh, long out. Yorty had emerged from time to time to run for various things, including previous tries for mayor. "What makes Sammy run?" applies to him like a glove. Eleanor Chambers was right with him.

DOUGLASS: Again. Here you are on the other side of a Yorty campaign.

BAUS: On the other side of a bitter campaign with all the ups and downs for the command of a major city.

DOUGLASS: Did they run a pretty sharp campaign?

BAUS: They ran a pretty sharp campaign. There was a potent San Fernando valley leader, C. F. Flanegan, who not only was a good friend of mine but married to the first cousin of Howard McCollum, one of my best friends since 1931. Flanegan had been a staunch political ally of mine and Poulson's during all the Poulson years. Got mad at Norrie Poulson and led the charge in the Valley against him. Every time we would get
out a mailing, he would counter it with a contradictory mailing. He fought us tooth and nail. Revolts like this, led by disgruntled former Poulsonites, broke out all over town.

**DOUGLASS:** What happened to the funding? Did it begin to dry up as this problem emerged with Poulson?

**BAUS:** There wasn’t particularly a problem with money. We had all we needed.

**DOUGLASS:** Did he have a war chest?

**BAUS:** He had the money. It was a problem of voice. If we put the candidate on TV, he does the cause more harm than good. It was a bitter, bitter situation.

**DOUGLASS:** Did Yorty defeat him by a high number of votes?

**BAUS:** By a rapier’s edge. The closest in years.

**DOUGLASS:** It must have been depressing for you.

**BAUS:** It was shattering. [Joseph] Joe Quinn was one of Yorty’s chief lieutenants, and after Yorty was elected, became deputy mayor for many years. Joe owned the City News Service. I knew him well him over a long period of time. Dorothy Corey took a poll at the latter part of the campaign that showed us winning it by a narrow margin. Joe and I got into a talk, and we ended up making a $1,600 bet on the outcome of the
[election]. I still think that Dorothy’s poll was accurate at the time it was taken, but this was so close.

A bunch of motorcyclists, mostly blacks, staged a riot at Griffith Park over the Decoration Day weekend. That swept in waves through the colored in other communities, and I think turned the tide to provide Sam his very thin majority. It was very close, but we still lost it. C'est la guerre. I sent my messenger with $1,600 to Joe Quinn.

DOUGLASS: That sounds like quite an experience.

BAUS: Yes. It was. I will summarize. Our last campaign for Poulson came as close to an ideal, perfect campaign as any we can remember. We did everything. We got all kinds of groups endorsing. We got out dozens of mailings. We had enough money. We had everything except our candidate’s voice.

DOUGLASS: You felt all the parts were there and came together.

BAUS: I think a lot of people actually thought we were running a dead man. But he was so ghastly to produce that we didn’t dare bring him out.
DOUGLASS: How old a man would have Poulson been at that point? He had been around a while. He had been in congress. Maybe just had had it?

BAUS: I'd say he was in his late sixties.

DOUGLASS: What did he do after that?

BAUS: He retired. I saw him several years over the next ten years, the rest of his life. He never did regain his voice.

DOUGLASS: A strange story.

My plan had been to run through local candidates that you ran and then go to the propositions, figuring it would be easier to divide it up that way. I have a list of the candidates. You can just say out front whether you had a lot to do with it or not. In '53, your company worked for a board of education slate in L.A. which won at the primary. It was [Edith H.] Stafford, [Hugh C.] Willett, and [Ruth] Cole. Do you remember that at all?

BAUS: Bill handled almost all of our board of education campaigns.

DOUGLASS: So over the years your company did do board of education. Then in '54, Sheriff [Eugene] Biscailuz ran.
BAUS: That was mine.

DOUGLASS: Why don't you talk about that since he was such a well-known figure for years. Apparently, he won at the primary.

BAUS: He did. The business community knew that Biscailuz was conducting his last campaign.

DOUGLASS: Didn't he win?

BAUS: Handsomely. Going into the campaign, Biscailuz was an old man. Biscailuz had been sheriff for years unnumbered.

DOUGLASS: You stepped in late in his career.

BAUS: The business community felt it was important to shore him up because he was so old and infirm. They hired Baus and Ross to make sure he won and won well and that something terrible didn't happen.

I worked very closely with his undersheriff, one Peter J. Pitchess. And Peter's right-hand man, James F. Downey. We developed a careful campaign that was more or less a testimonial to a revered figure.

DOUGLASS: Was there a major contender?

BAUS: No. There was a nonfactor contender. I don't even remember his name.
DOUGLASS: So you were there mainly to shore up the situation.

BAUS: That's right. For insurance purposes and to lay the foundation for Pete Pitchess to take over four years later.

DOUGLASS: Let's jump to that one. That was in '58.

BAUS: That was the first Pitchess campaign.

DOUGLASS: Was that when Biscailuz actually went out of office?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Were you involved in that because of this earlier campaign.

BAUS: Yes. It was essentially part of the same package. The business community went to Peter Pitchess in the early fifties, before '54, and talked him into giving up a solid position with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and coming with the sheriff's department with the guarantee that the business community would support him for sheriff.

DOUGLASS: Biscailuz was willing to do this? To bring him in.

BAUS: It wasn't so much his doing as it was something they prevailed on him to do. I think, originally, they had hoped to do this in '54.
DOUGLASS: The business community was very active in this whole business of having a sheriff?

BAUS: They wanted to guarantee the community an impeccable law-enforcement structure. They prevailed on Pitchess to forego his FBI career and position as a possible successor to J. Edgar Hoover and to throw his lot with the sheriff's department. Biscailuz would not withdraw. He insisted on running. On a long-range basis, we were brought in there to effectuate a general buildup for Pitchess.

DOUGLASS: Was Biscailuz aware of that?

BAUS: Biscailuz was pretty senile at the time. Maybe he was, and maybe he wasn't.

DOUGLASS: In essence, that '54-58 period, was Pitchess pretty much running the place?

BAUS: Yes. He was the undersheriff. The undersheriff in that kind of a situation is like the CEO with the old man being the chairman of the board. He didn't want to work hard. In fact, he was incapable of it. He just loved to ride around in limousines and ride on horses in parades.

DOUGLASS: Was there any particular difficulty with the Pitchess campaign in '58?

BAUS: No. We won it handily.
DOUGLASS: I have it was a majority of more than a million [votes].

BAUS: Pitchess is a good friend of mine, but he is a very sensitive guy and can be terribly temperamental under a stress factor such as a political campaign and become a little hard to get along with. That was the toughest facet of the operation. We became good friends. We were together in Russia a couple of years ago on tour with UCLA and UCI [University of California, Irvine].

DOUGLASS: Then you must have done his campaign again in '62.

BAUS: I did.

DOUGLASS: You managed that?

BAUS: Yes, '66, too.

DOUGLASS: As I recall, those were not terribly difficult campaigns, were they?

BAUS: None of them were all that difficult. No significant opposition materialized. In fact, in 1962 no opposition whatsoever materialized in that nobody even filed against him.

[End Tape 2, Side B]
[Begin Tape 3, Side A]

DOUGLASS: You were saying that Pitchess wanted to see his picture on the billboards.

BAUS: Every candidate always did and always will. He got so he loved to see his picture on the billboards and loved the feeling of campaigning. When nobody ran against him, he did something unprecedented. He returned the money to the campaign contributors. Perhaps an unprecedented act ever done before or since.

DOUGLASS: He didn't keep it in his war chest?

BAUS: No. He returned it. I advised him to do it. He became a sort of Sir Galahad in the political pantheon.

DOUGLASS: I will back up just a minute and you can respond. Were you involved in Ernest Debs' race for supervisor in 1958.

BAUS: That was my baby.

DOUGLASS: That ought to be quite interesting. How did you happen to do that campaign?

BAUS: Even though Ernie, as a city councilman, was on the other side of our public housing campaigns, we developed a respect for each other and a certain affection. He knew he had a bitter fight coming up for supervisor.
DOUGLASS: Who was he running against?

BAUS: Edward [R.] Roybal, who later became a congressman for many years and long was the only Latino to hold major elective office in the Los Angeles area.

DOUGLASS: Was Debs a pretty good candidate to work with?

BAUS: Yes. Actually one of the best in my career. He was a sage political animal. Quick to do the things he should do. Quick to respond to what you asked him to do. One of the very best, really.

DOUGLASS: How long had he been in office in 1958?

BAUS: How long had he been in the city council?

DOUGLASS: Was this his first supervisorial campaign?

BAUS: First one.

DOUGLASS: So this was his move from council to supervisor. So that is always a major leap, to go onto the board of supervisors. Did you use any particular strategies for the campaign?

BAUS: Actually, he and his wife, Lorene [Debs], had their plans pretty well worked out. She is now divorced from him, and they both live on the desert. She is married to a retired minister, a nice guy. Lorene and Ernie had their own campaign apparatus, and both were what I'd call
street-smart political animals. What they really wanted me to do was publicity, advertising, and mechanics. The organization part of it, they preferred to do themselves, and that was fine with me.

DOUGLASS: It worked.
BAUS: Debs won!
DOUGLASS: Do you recall whether a seat was open or was he running against an incumbent?
BAUS: Longtime veteran John Anson Ford was retiring.
DOUGLASS: Debs was leading a field of four.
BAUS: Ford was not running but was supporting Roybal.
DOUGLASS: An open seat. Another campaign was [Harold] Henry for L.A. city council. Did you do that one?
BAUS: Yes. There, again, those district candidate campaigns, when we did them, we chiefly did the advertising and the publicity. The organization end of it, a local campaign like that, candidates would do.
DOUGLASS: So the candidates had their own organization?
BAUS: That’s right.
DOUGLASS: I did note that he won the primary with the greatest vote in history for city council. He must have done extraordinarily well.
BAUS: He was a very popular city councilman. He was one of the ringleaders on our side in the long, bitter public housing fight.

DOUGLASS: Then [Arthur H.] Cox for mayor of Pomona. I am just asking out of local interest? Were you involved in that one?

BAUS: Bill must have been. I don't remember that very clearly. Seems that was one printer and GOP-activist Roy O. Day got us into.

DOUGLASS: To stick with local races. One of the really interesting ones was the Philip Watson campaign for county assessor, in 1962.

BAUS: That is probably the most hair-raising of the local ones. Actually, it was not local but countywide. Watson, like Debs, was running for an open seat in a situation where the retired incumbent--in this case John [R.] Quinn--was just retiring because of mandatory retirement age and was backing someone other than our man. It was the most controversial.

DOUGLASS: How did your firm happen to do that one?

BAUS: Phil was a young man who wanted to run for office. He came to us. Bill took it on because I was involved with two Republican statewide
primary campaigns. Both of us had some misgivings.

DOUGLASS: Watson simply was a tax specialist. He had had no public office experience at that time.

BAUS: Watson had been on the staff of the assessor's office.

DOUGLASS: John Quinn was the incumbent.

BAUS: Indeed, but John Quinn was retiring. He opposed Watson, which was a bitter matter.

DOUGLASS: John Gibson, Jr., the city councilman, was the one Quinn supported.

BAUS: Gibson was a friend of ours, too. He was much better known than Watson, who had never previously stood for political office. And John Quinn supported him. Bill Ross really dug into this thing and raised some money, and fought it through. That was a very good victory for Baus and Ross.

DOUGLASS: I have a note here that part of the problem might have been that Gibson simply didn't have what you described as the passion to win that Watson may have had.

BAUS: I agree. Watson was a young man with passion and hunger for the office. I never saw anybody whose tongue hung out for an office more.
[Gibson was popular and respected. But he wasn’t well known beyond his Fifteenth Los Angeles city councilmanic district. He was rather isolated in the L.A. harbor area and had been a little old and tired at this stage of his career.]* That office, that is the one he wanted. The upshot was a good upset victory. It was a great feather in our crown. I take my hat off for Bill Ross and his splendid job on that.

DOUGLASS: The thing that Watson hammered at was personal property assessment as being an invasion of privacy, the way it was being done.

BAUS: Actually, Phil Watson always wanted to play the Howard Jarvis role. He had his own original versions of Proposition 13 for some years. Some of them we talked him out of as being premature to put on the ballot. Some of them got on the ballot, and we even fought against him on one of them. Then, in 1972, after I retired—Bill didn’t retire for a year or two more—Watson got one [Proposition 14] on the ballot. Bill was involved with him in this one. They fought a

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
good fight and raised a lot of money, but they lost it.

DOUGLASS: Let's see what you recall of this. I heard a story that Watson, when it came right up to Prop. 13, prematurely released the effects it would have on specific properties. I remember that vividly. And that hit the papers. What the reassessment costs were going to be on sample pieces of property. That might have had quite a bit to do with helping Prop. 13 pass. The story I heard was that he was a little panicked about what was going to be upcoming. Have you ever heard anything to that effect? This would be '78, of course.

BAUS: No. I was long gone from the political arena and into restaurant writing in Orange County by this time.

DOUGLASS: I didn't know he had this long-standing interest.

BAUS: Oh, Watson had a passion for bringing down the real estate tax and bringing it under control. He had some theories on it that were controversial. We were very much interested in it, too. It just happened that Jarvis carried the ball at the right time so that could not be
stopped, but Watson really paved the way for it, pioneered.

DOUGLASS: What elements were there in Jarvis that Watson would not have had, or vice versa? Where would they have disagreed?

BAUS: [The property tax was becoming a runaway monster by '78, threatening to devour many homeowners. So they erupted in a bloodless revolution. If Watson had been up to bat in 1978, he and we would have cleared the bases with that home run. The establishment always opposed this kind of legislation because it threatened to cut down so heavily on local government revenue and services. But in 1978 local taxes had accelerated to a point of unacceptable voracity and the jig was up.]*

DOUGLASS: OK. Anything more about Watson as a candidate?

BAUS: If we ever had a candidate as hungry for an office he was running for as Watson, I can’t remember it. He did everything he could and did much of it right.

DOUGLASS: This whole question of dealing with candidates is an interesting one because personalities

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.*
enter into it so much. Did you come to the point where you liked doing propositions better than candidates?

BAUS: Early in professional life. I have an anecdote to recite. I used this many times in making speeches: "I would much rather have a nice, clean proposition than a candidate anytime. Number one, no proposition ever has had a wife who raised hell by day and by night because her husband's billboard photo didn’t do him justice. Number two, no proposition ever woke me up at one o'clock in the morning with stupid questions. Number three, no proposition ever made an ass of itself on national television."

[Laughter]

DOUGLASS: Was there any difference in the income that was brought in? Over the long haul, would you say the business did better off of running propositions?

BAUS: Yes. In our case it definitely did. We both preferred propositions. I think we often thought maybe we ought to eliminate candidates from our agenda and go all out for propositions. But we never reached that dire point.
DOUGLASS: Right now, let's discuss the [Richard M.] Nixon presidential primary which you people handled. Was that both of you?

BAUS: It was Baus and Ross. Bill was the account executive. We handled not only the primary but also the general November campaign against [U.S. Senator] John [F.] Kennedy for all the marbles. Kennedy won nationally, but we won in California. I did another fascinating campaign while he did the Nixon one. I wanted him to, and he wanted to. Because I had another one I wanted to do.

DOUGLASS: Why don't we discuss both issues. You did the other one at the same time?

BAUS: I did the other one. That is probably too long a story for today.

DOUGLASS: All right. Let's make a note of it, though. Was it a candidate?

BAUS: The other was the famous "Keep California Green," saving the golf courses from extinction by taxation. It was a matter that the legislature put on the ballot.

DOUGLASS: OK. Tell what you do know about the Nixon presidential primary.
BAUS: We were hired to do it down here, and Whitaker and Baxter was hired to do it up north. Incidentally, we are pole vaulting past a couple I want to speak about. Kirkwood in '58.

DOUGLASS: I have done it by local races. And then we'll cover statewide offices. But since Nixon comes along in here, I thought we might do that one.

BAUS: Our area of responsibility in the Nixon campaign concentrated on local special events, candidate appearances, and statewide publicity and advertising. Nixon was running to capture the votes of the state of California in the primary. We just did everything by the book, and we won it. Nixon lost in the November presidential campaign.

DOUGLASS: You won the primary, according to what I have here, with the highest vote on either ticket, in California. Then you worked on the Nixon-[Henry Cabot] Lodge campaign for California electors.

BAUS: That's right. We won both of them.

DOUGLASS: Ross ran that primary campaign?

BAUS: He did. I don't remember too many details of that. We just did it.

DOUGLASS: You mentioned Kirkwood. I have a list of statewide offices below the governorship. The
'54 Kirkwood controller campaign, did you manage that one?

BAUS: No. That was Bill’s. Mine was Kirkwood’s ’58 reelection campaign.

DOUGLASS: That one you lost.

BAUS: Yes. I have some comments to make about that. In 1952, we had a Catholic tax proposition on the ballot, providing tax exemption for private schools. When the state legislature passed the exemption, it was forced onto the ballot by a referendum. It had been an issue for years. We were hired to do the public campaign. Bill was very active in the Catholic Church and a leader of the Catholic Press Conference.

DOUGLASS: This vote was for exemption of nonprofit school property. And you won that by an 188,000 Los Angeles county margin sufficient to overcome defeat in the rest of the state.

BAUS: Then they came back in ’58. The other side came back in ’58 with an initiative to try to take it away. So we had another campaign. In ’58, the late George Shellenberger, head of Merchants and Manufacturers [Association], approached me and wanted Baus and Ross to take a campaign for
right-to-work legislation in California, to break the union shop.

I said, "George, I always wanted to do that campaign, but I can't get into it this year. We have a contract with the Catholic Church and others to do the private school tax campaign. There is no way I can offend organized labor, one of the staunchest political allies of the Catholic Church, this year by doing the right-to-work campaign. I will go further and give you some unsolicited advice. There is a very strong liaison between the Catholics and labor which covers not only the tax matter but other matters. It will certainly cover right-to-work. You will run into a furious, organized, motivated army against right-to-work in the Catholic Church, many of whom might support right-to-work some other year. And the tax issue will bring out the Catholic vote like never before.

"Furthermore, this time would run the risk of bringing the Republican party down in flames. You have a situation where the Democrats are running for governor a challenger named [Attorney General Edmund G.] Pat Brown [Sr.],
BAUS: who is Catholic. Republicans are running a retiring senator named [U.S. Senator William F.] Bill Knowland, who is ardently Protestant and identified as staunchly against the tax exemption. Already, Pat Brown has the big advantage to be on the ballot this year with this Catholic issue. Right-to-work in '58 would just hand the election to him. This timing could upset the whole God-damned apple cart. And the Republicans across-the-board are apt to end many years of sway in Sacramento if you put that right-to-work on this year's ballot. That would force Bill Knowland to support right-to-work, and it would give Pat Brown the potent issue to run with. I urge you to put this one off until a more propitious year."

Well, they bulldozed ahead with it anyway. They put it on the ballot. History will tell you that not only did Pat Brown sweep but [Governor Goodwin J.] Goodie Knight was defeated for U.S. senator and every other statewide position except secretary of state, which matters least of all, went to the Democratic side. For years unnumbered most of the statewide posts had been owned by the
Republicans. And now, in 1990, most of them have remained Democratic fiefdoms since that 1958 bloodbath.

We had the Kirkwood for controller campaign. We came very close to beating [Alan D.] Cranston, notwithstanding all this. We lost by 20,000 votes while other Republicans running for statewide offices went down by over one million votes. We had a brilliant campaign, if I say so myself. We constructed a unique campaign on the hard rock of "Dear friend" postcards. Kirkwood was the incumbent controller and had appointed a corps of appraisers. The appraiser's job was to appraise an estate of a deceased person for a fee. There was nothing to it. It was practically a matter of coming in and applying a mathematical formula and issuing it getting a percentage of the total tax as a standard fee. Appraiser was a sinecure job and was ridiculously easy to do. So these appointments were in very high demand.

We mobilized these political appointees and beneficiaries of the system and said, "If Kirkwood is defeated, you are going to be replaced. He is apt to be defeated, the way
BAUS: things are going, where the wind is blowing. We want you to take these cards." We printed hundreds of thousands of "Dear friend" cards with the message why Kirkwood was a great controller and should be reelected. "All you have to do is take these cards and personally address each one to your friends, your connections, and your suppliers and say, 'Dear Joe,' in your handwriting. Use the first name and sign it clearly so that they know it is coming from you. We don't want you to send these cards to strangers. Send them to people whom you send Christmas cards to. Friends, family, customers, clients, people beholden to you. People who owe you something. Send them out in mass force." That was the main hammerthrust of our campaign. These personal cards.

DOUGLASS: Kirkwood did the best of anybody on the Republican ticket.

BAUS: By far and away.

DOUGLASS: What kind of a campaign was Cranston conducting? Were they using the media more? Would you say there was a difference in the approaches?
BAUS: As I remember, he was riding the coattails of Pat Brown, who was riding the coattails of the combination of Catholic-labor campaigns on the ballot. The Democrats had it made. The election was handed to them on a platter by Republicans and business leaders. And by the fact that Bill Knowland came in and shoved around California's governor, Goodie Knight, humiliated him before the world, generating serious resentment on the part of many voters in both parties. You may not remember that.

DOUGLASS: I do. It was the switching that went on. There has always been the thought that if Knight had stayed in place, he might have won the governorship. If Knowland had stayed, everybody might have been all right.

BAUS: Right on both counts. Both Knight and Knowland were popular as incumbents.

DOUGLASS: It is a strange story. You must have been frustrated because you predicted what was going to happen.

BAUS: I was frustrated because so many of my own people refused to read the political tea leaves. The only advantage is Baus and Ross were paid a very handsome recompense for the Catholic
campaign. We won that. That was the major beneficiary of all this perfidy. Perfidy isn’t the word. Stupidity is the word.

DOUGLASS: Anything more about Kirkwood?

BAUS: Kirkwood was one of the world’s nicest people. He was a very good guy. I think he died prematurely. There is little doubt he could have gone on to be governor if he had won this.

DOUGLASS: Was he a good candidate to work with?

BAUS: One of the best of my career. Very nice. He had a deputy named Rick Todd, who I liked. Rick was as fussy as an old maid and an unrelenting perfectionist. He could be difficult. I think I loosened up our troops at one point by saying a little two-liner and announcing it at one of our meetings.

How odd of Todd
To think he’s God

DOUGLASS: [Laughter] We will do the propositions later. I just want to do a couple of more things on statewide candidates. Your company worked on the nomination of Thomas Coakley as Republican candidate for attorney general in ’62. Did you work with Whitaker and Baxter?

BAUS: Yes.
DOUGLASS: He won the nomination, so you were successful. Did you work on that or did Mr. Ross?

BAUS: I did.

DOUGLASS: Anything particular about that one?

BAUS: That was extremely difficult. I remember Tom Coakley had a cantankerous personality. He was the curmudgeon rampant. He did not program very well. He was almost the opposite of the perfect candidate that Kirkwood had been.

DOUGLASS: What was Coakley's position at the time he ran? Was he an elected official?

BAUS: I believe he was a deputy state attorney general.

DOUGLASS: I think you are right. I think he was in the attorney general's office. There is a case of winning the nomination but not winning the office.

Another case that same year was the [Mayor] George Christopher campaign for lieutenant governor. Christopher lost to [Lieutenant Governor] Glenn [M.] Anderson. Did you both work on that? Which of you worked on that?

BAUS: I did.

DOUGLASS: Any comments about that campaign?
BAUS: We had a terrible time about money with both Coakley and Christopher. We had a horrible time raising it.

DOUGLASS: These were still lean years for Republicans?

BAUS: The fallout from the disaster of 1958 was still felt with unmitigated force. It still lingers on in the nineties. The Republicans used to own the legislature before 1958, too, but no more. Perhaps never more?

DOUGLASS: You think it is still partly a result of that musical chairs that went on?

BAUS: That started the landslide, and the Democrats have never since relaxed their grip on the legislature. Republicans have snipped off a statewide office once in a while.

DOUGLASS: What kind of a person was Christopher to work with?

BAUS: He was another prima donna and flew off the handle easily. He had a clique of mostly Greek and ethnic friends in San Francisco that he listened to more than he did anyone else.

DOUGLASS: That was his base, wasn’t it?

BAUS: Yes. He had been mayor of San Francisco.

DOUGLASS: You handled that statewide, your firm?
BAUS: No. Whitaker and Baxter and we worked together on both Coakley and Christopher. They in northern California and we in the south.

DOUGLASS: I think we can stop unless you have anything more to comment about Christopher or this period of '58 to '62.

BAUS: We had a rough, rough time with money. Republicans had a rough time all over. It was a mean year. It was the first general election following the '58 disaster.

DOUGLASS: The well dried up a little bit. In general, it sounds to me, particularly in terms of propositions, you were pretty well working on things you personally believed in.

BAUS: That is what we tried to do and wanted to do and ideally preferred to do. Even now, I sometimes wonder. Bill seemed sometimes more willing to go into things for the profit of it. I tended to take a keen, obsessive interest in things that, for one reason or another, I was swept up by and emotionally and intellectually involved in. There were some things I just didn’t want to do. By and large, Bill and I came down to the bottom line in pretty good agreement.
DOUGLASS: Would this have been true of candidates, also? The question of what candidates you might work for? Or did you pretty well take it if a good candidate opportunity came along?

BAUS: We took some candidates with minimal enthusiasm. A firm has obligations and payrolls to meet. The Goldwater story was something else. We plunged into that one enthusiastically and ended up with a taste of mud and tobacco in our mouths. In this business you don’t always know what you are getting into.

We both much preferred to do issues. However, I didn’t care much for one of the last issues in our career. The pay-TV issue.

DOUGLASS: Cable television?

BAUS: Bill was pretty eager to do that. So he took it and ran with it.

DOUGLASS: Did it work out naturally in a lot of ways that he could take something that you weren’t too enthusiastic about?

BAUS: Yes. Or vice versa. Over the years it shook down pretty well.

[End Session 2]

[End Tape 3, Side A]
DOUGLASS: I want to start off today by asking you to talk about the Goldwater primary campaign which your company handled. We would be talking about June of 1964. First of all, how were you approached about doing this campaign in California?

BAUS: I was approached by Peter Pitchess, who had been our client for years on several local campaigns for sheriff. Pete was on the national committee of the Goldwater campaign, one of the delegates to the national convention of '64. That is how we got the appointment.

DOUGLASS: Do you remember when you got started?

BAUS: We got started in January. Right after the first of the year.

DOUGLASS: How did you coordinate with the national scene? Of course, there were many other primaries that were going to occur before California's.
BAUS: There was a California committee, and the California committee hired Baus and Ross. We felt we needed to do this. In the first place, our previous presidential campaign had been my partner's, for Dick Nixon in 1960. In the second place, as I once told you, I was deemed the more ardent conservative of our partnership, although we were both conservative Republicans. So it was just a natural for me to take it. We structured the campaign with a local committee.

DOUGLASS: What do you mean by "local committee?"

BAUS: State of California.

DOUGLASS: A state committee. This would be a California committee to elect Goldwater?

BAUS: Yes. The whole state operation was based in Los Angeles. I was the campaign manager.

DOUGLASS: Do remember who was chairman of that committee, Mr. Baus?

BAUS: Senator William F. Knowland. He was a remarkable gentleman. I formed quite an attachment and a great admiration for him. His was a very powerful personality.

DOUGLASS: How did you get this plan off the floor?

BAUS: We had a group down here. A lawyer named Bernard Brennan who had gotten involved in a lot
of Republican campaigns, and his assistant, Dudley Thompson, who was a hired gun, and Henry Salvatori, who was one of the national committee and was the finance chairman, were sort of the day-to-day steering committee that made all the local decisions.

Then, in March, we started to get involved with the national operation. A small group of us went to Washington, spent several days meeting with Goldwater himself and the leaders of his campaign. Dean Burch, who later became well known as a prominent figure in several capacities in the Nixon and [President Ronald] Reagan administrations. Richard [G.] Kleindienst, who later became the attorney general for Mr. Nixon. After that we coordinated pretty closely with the national group.

Then late in the campaign, things got hotter and hotter and heavier and heavier. When most of the rest of the primaries in the country had been settled, a bunch of these national leaders, national hired people, of the Goldwater campaign moved out here in force. It wasn't
BAUS: always a happy rapprochement, but it was inevitable and happened anyway.

DOUGLASS: Are these the same people or are you talking about some other people?

BAUS: No. Kleindeinst and Burch. And a guy named Lee Atwater, who is not the same as today’s [President George H.] Bush’s man, Lee Atwater. A guy named Carl Hess, who was a speechwriter. And more than a dozen others.

DOUGLASS: Was this April or May that they came?

BAUS: The election was the first Tuesday in June.

DOUGLASS: So when did they come out?

BAUS: They came out en bloc from the middle of May on, taking over a small hotel near the Ambassador [Hotel].

DOUGLASS: So they were omnipresent?

BAUS: That is what it seemed. [Laughter] The Goldwater operation was the bloodiest one I was ever in. It was bloodier in getting along with my own people than it was competing with [Governor Nelson A.] Rockefeller. It was a disillusionment to me because I turned from an ardent doctrinaire conservative to a fiscally-conservative Republican with definite middle-of-the-road tendencies in many respects.
I didn't like a lot of the things I saw, such phenomena as the John Birchers and Young Republicans rampant. It really reminded me a great deal of the [Adolph] Hitler regime, which I lived through, not as a German or European but as an American who watched it while it was happening, who participated in the war. Some of that type of jackboot mentality I saw in some of Goldwater's national leaders and in quite a few of the local volunteers and "Young Goldwater" extremists we had to contend with in here. We had a lot of neo-Nazi mentality types.

DOUGLASS: I take it that the connotation of this is no arguments, no questions, just do-as-I-say kind of an approach.

BAUS: Yes. And a degree of hyper-enthusiasm that seemed to blind and run away with these people. I have never encountered anything like it, before or since.

DOUGLASS: Did you have a plan, Mr. Baus, for how to approach this in place that they looked at? How did it work?

BAUS: We developed a series of special events to bring the candidate into this area. He came in several times. By this area, I mean the state
of California. We showcased him in places like the San Fernando Valley and Long Beach, Pasadena, San Diego, and northern California cities. It was a fiercely fought campaign. History shows that in the final analysis we won it by less than 2 percent, or some 50,000 votes. That is pretty close in the state of California. Rockefeller fought ferociously down to the wire.

DOUGLASS: What firm was he using?

BAUS: He was using [Stuart] Spencer and [Bill] Roberts.

DOUGLASS: How did the showcasing events go? Did you feel good about them when Goldwater came in?

BAUS: By and large, pretty good because Goldwater usually made a pretty good impression on his own troops, his own people, when he made speeches or made public appearances. But he could be a very disagreeable candidate to live with. A lot of candidates are like this. This is one reason I don't like candidates as well as I do propositions. Propositions never talk back. Candidates never shut up.

DOUGLASS: I suppose there is always something to be unhappy about. If you have that kind of
personality, you could be unhappy all the time. Is that one of the problems with candidates?

BAUS: That certainly is.

DOUGLASS: I am interested in how you, personally, responded to Goldwater? Could you distinguish your feeling toward him in dealing with him in person, as contrasted to these other people who were running his national campaign?

BAUS: We also had some problems with our local people. Bernie Brennan and Dudley Thompson maintained airtight financial control over the campaign. I mean accounting for every paper clip. Just for one example. I tried to develop a television campaign. I thought that TV would be terribly important in this campaign. I couldn't get any budget at all to do advance planning for TV.

I finally had to give up, and we had to rely on the national staff for television. This came close to putting us in a disastrous situation. We were not allowed any budget at all to create anything. It ended up our agency did all the time buying and, if I say so, did a good job of time buying. But where the final creation was a combination of what the national had to offer, which in our opinion was
inadequate and largely off target for the California market and what was created in the last minute by a sort of a jerry-built, slam-bang thing tacked together. It was mostly volunteers from ad agencies, like Neil Reagan, the older brother of Ronald Reagan, who was on one of our state committees.

[Another example of picayunish budgeting and financial control. This was a national event of the first magnitude but Brennan, Thompson et al would allow not a farthing for handling the substantial national press corps that it attracted. I had no money for needed extra personnel and the day was only saved because my dear friend [Charles] Charlie Horn, retired Hearst and L.A. Examiner veteran, as a favor to me stepped in as a volunteer. Our tightfisted Uriah Heeps would not even allow expenses and to reimburse Horn for travel and entertainment costs I had to cover up with Baus and Ross money. Meanwhile, Spencer-Roberts [and Associates, Inc.], operating with the sophisticated and lavishly endowed Rockefeller apparatus, ran rings around us on this front, laughing all the way. This was just another
example of how the Goldwater saga turned to sawdust in my mouth.]*

I believe that I probably got out of the political campaign business a decade or two or at least several years before I otherwise would have from the disillusionment and my total reaction to the terrible pressures of the Goldwater campaign. There was nothing remotely like it in my experience, before or since.

DOUGLASS: Again, I was interested in your reaction to Goldwater. You had some face-to-face meetings with him, did you not?

BAUS: Yes. Quite a few.

DOUGLASS: How did you react to him, if that reaction is different from how you reacted to the local or national people working for him?

BAUS: I thought he was mentally undisciplined and uncontrollable, often downright petulant, and acted like a spoiled brat. Above all, I came to the conclusion, and still feel, that he did not want to be president of the United States. I have always had a firm theory that if somebody runs for an office, willing to drive for it

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.*
desperately, that it is the most important thing in the world to him, he becomes almost unbeatable. However, if somebody runs for office against his will or doesn't really want it, there is no way he is going to win, no matter what.

DOUGLASS: What made you feel that Goldwater had these reservations? That is what you are saying.

BAUS: Yes. A good example of that one was Norrie Poulson, who wanted it in his first two terms. Then in the last term he didn't want it. The city's power structure sort of pressured him into it. We bulldozed him. "We" being the establishment of the city of Los Angeles. The reaction was that he lost his voice and things fell apart.

DOUGLASS: You also used Watson running for assessor as the example of someone who wanted it so badly. He won against all odds.

BAUS: A very good example. Getting back to your question, Goldwater drove me to this conclusion because as we went more deeply into the campaign, he became more and more detached from reality. There were just some things he wouldn't do that we thought, that we knew, he
ought to do. A very good example is that we scheduled him to appear on a television program on the next-to-last Sunday of the campaign, just ten days ahead of the election. It was a very key time. We knew he would be in town and would have no other campaign assignment. We had committed him for this, but he positively refused to do it. The reason he gave for this recalcitrance was that he was tired from the campaign and "wanted to spend the day with his grandchildren."

So Bill Knowland stepped in and did it, made the appearance for him, and did it passing well. But Bill Knowland wasn’t running for president of the United States, Barry Goldwater was. Just like a few years before we couldn’t produce Norrie Poulson on television, we couldn’t produce Goldwater for this appearance. And that was why. Only I knew the real reason and, of course, I could tell no man.

DOUGLASS: Had you, in your mind, projected that it would be a pretty clear-cut win for him or did you think it was going to be tough in any case to beat out Rockefeller?
BAUS: I always thought we could beat Rockefeller. And I thought we could win the campaign in the early part of it. Toward the end of the primary, I never lost my conviction that we could beat Rockefeller, although as the screws tightened, it increasingly became touch and go. However, I felt absolutely certain he would never beat [President] Lyndon [B.] Johnson. That is because LBJ wanted the job, and Barry Goldwater didn’t, more than anything else.

DOUGLASS: I wanted to ask you about Senator Knowland. What kind of an active role did he take in this? For instance, would you feel you could speak to him of your concern about the way things were being handled?

BAUS: Yes. I could and did. But he didn’t take any role in the actual mechanics of the campaign. He wouldn’t get into the tinderbox of the engine and supervise throwing coal so the engine could gather up steam. He was sympathetic, but we needed action not condolences. Bill Knowland would not put his hands onto the nuts and bolts.

DOUGLASS: He was out of the everyday running of it and really didn’t want to get involved.
BAUS: But he did make key appearances when we asked him to and did a very good job of that. He was a splendid spokesman, a very potent spokesman. There were times that I reflected, "Too bad Bill Knowland isn’t the candidate."

DOUGLASS: Things obviously were becoming pretty bad. I wondered what kind of efforts you made to rectify that or was it an almost hopeless situation, in your view?

BAUS: It was hopeless. I had some very good friends including several key employees who worked for me on the campaign who urged me to resign and get out. I wouldn’t do it. I had too much of my blood and guts invested. I wanted to finish and do this primary campaign.

DOUGLASS: To see the primary through?

BAUS: See the primary through. Right after the primary was over, I wrote a letter to Senator Knowland as chairman which, in effect, said that, basically, Baus and Ross wished to be withdrawn from any consideration of further involvement in the Goldwater presidential drive. I wanted to go on record promptly so they could make their plans without worrying about that.
DOUGLASS: Did Knowland ever get back to you as to why? Or did anybody pursue that?

BAUS: No. Not really. They accepted that.

DOUGLASS: In that group you had to deal with, there were one or two key Arizonans who were close to Goldwater?

BAUS: Yes. Dean Burch and Richard Kleindeinst, who were sort of the ringleaders of the Goldwater national staff, were both Arizona natives.

DOUGLASS: I think you referred to the "Arizona mafia."

BAUS: They were two prominent members of it. Mr. Kleindeinst was a Phoenix lawyer. He was a very hard-driving, good-looking, kinetic individual.

[Sealed material]
DOUGLASS: It sounds like it was a pretty bitter experience for you.

BAUS: It was. It was the hemlock of my political career.

DOUGLASS: I guess the next major campaign you did for a candidate, and maybe the last, was the one the firm did for Edmund G. Brown, Sr. against Ronald Reagan in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign. I am fascinated to know how you happened to be, for the first time, working for a Democrat.

BAUS: It essentially was indeed one of the first times, if not the only time. In the first place, I always have admired Pat Brown, as many of his friends affectionately call him to this day. Even though we were on opposite sides of the political fence over the years, when he would see me, he'd often say that he was so sorry that I was a Republican, he would love to have me on a campaign with him.

DOUGLASS: So you had seen him around.

BAUS: We knew each other. He had several people on his staff that were close to me, especially Roy
[J.] Ringer, who still lives in Malibu and who worked for Baus and Ross in the fifties on several campaigns. I have had a way of making enduring attachments out of the people who work for me. Several became lifelong friends. Roy was one of them. He became a fixture of the Pat Brown staff in the very beginning of 1958, when Brown was first elected. And through the years Roy and I never lost touch with each other.

I was against Reagan from the start, in the primary of 1966. We handled George Christopher for governor against Reagan in that primary. Brown actually did several things to help Reagan to defeat Christopher, from the unphilanthropic reason that he thought Christopher would be harder for him to beat in the final. He thought that Reagan would be easier for him.

I was against Reagan for two major reasons. One of them was a hangover from Goldwater. I was so disillusioned with the right-wing crowd that I didn’t think we needed such a group to sit in the catbird seat in Sacramento. And the other one was that I did not then, never did and still don’t, think that Reagan had the statesmanship and executive scope it took, or
BAUS: takes, to hold a job like governor of California, let alone president of the United States.

After we lost the gubernatorial primary and Reagan became the nominee, Bill and I talked about it, and we decided that I would talk to Roy Ringer. The upshot of it was that I told Roy if they wanted to get us involved in the campaign, we would consider doing so. We were invited to get into it, and we did.

DOUGLASS: So you were in for the general election.

BAUS: That was the general election.

DOUGLASS: You came on board during the summer?

BAUS: That’s right. Pretty close after the June primary.

DOUGLASS: And Reagan was using Spencer-Roberts.

BAUS: Reagan was using Spencer-Roberts.

DOUGLASS: Talk about that campaign. Who did you work with, principally, on that in terms of representatives of Brown?

BAUS: Brown set up a triumvirate in charge of his campaign that included Hale Champion, who was his financial chief executive in Sacramento, and his political man Don Bradley, who was a well-known Democratic campaign manager in the state,
and Roy Ringer, who was the governor's PR and media man. They wanted Baus and Ross to organize and put together a Republicans-for-Brown movement in California.

I think we all misjudged the degree and intensity of support that Reagan had. I will admit, quite frankly, that I didn't think the middle-of-the-road Republicans and the liberal Republicans—whatever you want to call them—would close ranks with very much enthusiasm behind Reagan for a job like governor of California. But they did close ranks and backed him. It had been a long and hungry time since a Republican had been governor. Plus the fact that Pat Brown had been in there eight years after defeating two GOP heavyweights, Bill Knowland in 1958 and Richard Nixon in 1962. Very often after someone has been in high political office that long, they become like a ship. They pick up barnacles that slow them up and drag them down. Lots of times, after two terms, a chief executive of a city or a state or a nation will make so many enemies and upset so many people by some of his policies that it will drag him down if he tries for a third term.
DOUGLASS: Too much baggage?

BAUS: Too much baggage or too many barnacles. Well, Brown had done a lot of controversial things. The [Caryl] Chessman case was a very notable one and an extremely negative one. He really did an outstanding job, in my opinion, in his two terms of office of building up the University of California and the state highway system and building the state water system. An outstanding job of solidifying the state’s infrastructure. But a governor has to step on a lot of toes and say no to a lot of powerful people. That can add up to a massive liability.

DOUGLASS: Do you think any one of those was critical? For instance, was the death penalty a kind of a mortal wound?

BAUS: I think it was. Look at public opinion on that subject today. As a matter of fact, I have to confess that I was absolutely furious with Brown for a long time, myself, on that issue and specifically for his Chessman absolution. It didn’t make any real difference because I wasn’t involved in the first reelection campaign against Pat Brown in 1962. I advised Dick Nixon
not to run. I don’t think he has ever forgiven me for that.

DOUGLASS: Did Nixon ask you?

BAUS: We were discussing it. I made it clear that in my opinion he should not run and could not win. He had been our client in 1960, and so I forthrightly expressed my opinion that it was very ill-advised for him, after having run for the president of the United States and came closer than any loser in history to making it, to step down in rank and run for governor of California.

DOUGLASS: How did he respond to that?

BAUS: He thanked me for my expression. But that was not what he wanted to hear. He ran anyway.

DOUGLASS: How was Brown to work with as a candidate?

BAUS: Most agreeable. I never had any trouble with him. I don’t know whether one of the triumvirate that I mentioned might give you more detail and a different opinion.

DOUGLASS: I am interested in your perspective because we talked about Goldwater and how campaign candidates can be pains.

BAUS: You have to remember that our position with the two was different. In the Goldwater campaign, I
was right under the gun. I was under fire. I was the campaign manager. I had to bear the brunt of everything. Every time our side got strafed, I got strafed. In the Pat Brown operation, they kept Baus and Ross, as far as they could, away from the Democratic side. I know they felt we were pretty controversial at that time.

DOUGLASS: It was a more distant relationship to the candidate.

BAUS: To the whole campaign. We just had our salient, which was the Republicans-for-Brown. We did a good job on that, but we were unable to build it up to become the decisive factor that we expected to be possible when we went in.

DOUGLASS: You were given the manifesto to work on the Republicans, those who might be willing to support Pat Brown, statewide?

BAUS: Statewide.

DOUGLASS: How did you go about that?

BAUS: We did it with a series of mailings, personal approaches, negotiations, and other overtures. We just kept inviting Republicans (and getting others to do the same) that we felt might be interested to join us.
DOUGLASS: Were you surprised at the election returns?

BAUS: For the first time in my career I was overseas on election night, I was in South America at the time of the election returns, for the reason that the [United States] State Department wanted to me to organize a public relations symposium in Lima for the industrial, political, and agricultural leaders of Peru. I wanted to do that, but it had to be done at such a time that I had to get away from California before the election to accept the assignment.

So I talked to my partner, and we agreed that we didn’t both have to be here in this kind of an operation. The main thrust of our responsibilities and duties were already discharged. So the Baus family got away two weeks before the election. We had polls and other reasons for being cautiously optimistic. I just could never believe an untried man like Ronald Reagan, who had never run for or had occupied any office ever before or had any occasion to practice a display of executive grasp, would step right up and win the backing of the people of California for its highest office. But he did.
Reagan was technically a dream candidate, as we all know. In many ways. He is a great communicator. He is a splendid communicator. He is irresistible on television to many people. His suits seem all made of teflon. He was always unruffled. He programs. He is a good actor. He follows the script. I don't think Ronald Reagan was really ever president of the United States. I think he was always an actor who was playing the role of president of the United States. Maybe even an Oscar-winning performance.

He did things in Sacramento that I disapproved of strongly. The main one was the time he held an election on a tax initiative of his own sponsoring. He caused a special election to be held as a showcase, really, to position himself as a candidate later on for president of the United States.

DOUGLASS: A statewide special election?

BAUS: Yes. It was in 1972. It was some sort of a forerunner . . .

DOUGLASS: Was it Prop. 1?

BAUS: It was called Prop. 1.
DOUGLASS: That was his original tax restriction move that failed.

BAUS: That was a preliminary of Jarvis. That was Reagan's baby. He put it on the ballot, he led it, and he campaigned for it. Clem Whitaker was involved against that, I think, but we were not. (I had already retired.)

DOUGLASS: Yes. That, in a sense, set the stage for his platform and created an audience.

BAUS: Yes. It cost the state of California a lot of money to have that special election just as a convenience and showcase for Ronald Reagan.

DOUGLASS: And it lost. This was the precursor to the tax limitation measures.

BAUS: I don't know whether you remember, but it was strictly Ronald Reagan's baby.

DOUGLASS: Yes. There is an economist at Claremont McKenna College, [William] Craig Stubblebine, and some think-tank type people who were called in by the Reagan administration. I had forgotten it was a special election.

BAUS: That was after my retirement. I would loved to have campaigned against that one.
DOUGLASS: How did the Republican people feel about you after you had worked on the Brown campaign? Did that affect the business?

BAUS: It didn’t keep us from being a strong firm in business, but it did upset a lot of people. I am sure that we had some friends who probably never completely forgave us for that.

DOUGLASS: Do you think it meant Republican candidates would not be as apt to ask your firm to do their work?

BAUS: For a while. But it might have been forgotten with time.

DOUGLASS: Was it about this time that you really decided that you were through with candidates? Had there been some time in the history of the firm, while you were a full operating partner, that you and Mr. Ross had made a decision that you would pretty well go to issues and stay away from candidates?

BAUS: We always preferred issues.

DOUGLASS: This was the last major candidate campaign?

BAUS: Yes. In the first place, there is no question about it, the Republican leadership included a lot of elements who were unhappy with us for doing this. There is no question about that.
Plus the fact that Reagan was, among other things ipso facto as a fait accompli, the head of the Republican party of the state. The governor is always the head of his party in the state. It was not going to please the governor to see us show up in a campaign for a Republican candidate.

For local campaigns there wasn't anything to keep us from getting into it. We did get into a campaign for Sam Yorty. In 1969, we campaigned for Sam Yorty for mayor. We did some local things. But, don't forget, all local things in California are nonpartisan. I know we didn't get into any other major Republican situations.

DOUGLASS: You were sort of on the blacklist from his viewpoint.

BAUS: There is no question about it.

DOUGLASS: Did you ever directly deal with Ronald Reagan?

BAUS: No. Except in only a mild way. He was on the statewide delegation of the Goldwater campaign. I met him there, but I would not say that I worked with him or got to know him very well.

DOUGLASS: He gained a name as a money raiser in the Goldwater campaign.
BAUS: He did but never as much of a fund raiser to alleviate the national deficit. At the convention, after we were out of it, he made that famous speech. That was really the springboard that first projected him into the political spotlight.

DOUGLASS: Before we leave the candidate topic, I wanted to ask you your view of the role of absentee ballots. That is right up front and center right now. We just had another special election in California for the assembly in which the absentee ballots seemed to make a difference. I wondered how you view that. They have been used in various ways for years. Something seems to be changing out there. What is that going to do to candidates?

BAUS: I think absentee ballots are a very potent weapon in certain candidate situations. Not propositions, but certain candidate situations. An effective organization to generate absentee ballots can make the difference. I think the Republicans started that. We used absentee ballots heavily in the Kirkwood campaign, where we made a much more potent showing than any other Republican statewide candidate.
DOUGLASS: Was your theory at that time to use it to get people, to make sure that they voted. Get them committed early. This is early on. Why did you do that?

BAUS: There are a certain number of people who, despite their best intentions to vote, have to go out of town for some reason and don’t get around to voting on election day. When you process their absentee ballot, you’ve got their vote nailed down. It is in the bank. In a close election, that can be a decisive factor.

DOUGLASS: So you figured that this was one way to get some of those Republican votes in the bank.

BAUS: Exactly.

DOUGLASS: Things seem to be changing to the degree that it would almost appear that in any candidate’s election one has to use this strategy.

BAUS: It has reached the point where both sides recognize its value and feel that they do have to use it. The side that doesn’t use it risks losing a close one by default.

DOUGLASS: This is going to do interesting things to the registrar of voters, the counting of ballots, and the handling of election day, with this higher percentage of people voting absentee.
BAUS: Well, nobody knows what that vote is ahead of time.

DOUGLASS: I know. But it obviously is going to have some effect on on-site voting.

BAUS: I suppose so.

DOUGLASS: I suppose you could argue that it just means more people are participating. The people who would come to the polls will come to the polls.

BAUS: Plus the fact that you sharpen up your campaign skills and campaign arguments and your campaign organization, by the act of getting these votes and bringing them in and putting them in the bank.

DOUGLASS: Do you think last-minute charges and literature that is sent out warrant feeling that absentee ballots are insurance against that kind of fire?

BAUS: I don't think I would regard that as a major issue, but it is certainly a possibility that someday something could happen. I don't think the last-minute charges are very often decisive. I think people discount them. They expect it.

DOUGLASS: People have learned to be skeptical of that tactic?

BAUS: I think so. It often backfires. So I don't think, in that respect, that it is a major
thing. It is the campaign discipline of getting the votes. You work like hell on election day to make sure the voters go to the polls. You send cars out for them and call them. If you get the vote in ahead of time and you have a bunch of them there, you've got them.

DOUGLASS: It is going to change how time is spent, isn't it?

BAUS: That's right.

[End Tape 3, Side B]
DOUGLASS: Unless you have something more you would like to say about the general question of candidates I would like to move on to the major ballot propositions you handled over the years? First of all, I would like to ask you up front: What is the challenge of trying to explain to the public what a yes vote or a no vote means? The follow-up question is: Is it harder to win a no vote or a yes vote?

BAUS: We always thought it was harder to win a yes vote. In order to win a no vote, all you have to do is confuse the public. In order to win a yes vote, you have to enlighten the public, and that is always much harder to do, human nature being what it is.

DOUGLASS: A lot of red-flag waving and danger signs can help you get a no vote?

BAUS: Sure, buzz words. We used to say "throw ink into the air and you get a no vote." You upset a voter and confuse him and you got yourself a no vote, especially in certain issues that are highly complex. The insurance mess in the last election was a pretty good illustration of that.
DOUGLASS: This business of having several propositions on the same subject and the gamesmanship that goes on. The one that gets the highest vote is the one which becomes the law. Certainly, there is some strategy in putting something on that is lesser or different than the other. How much does that sort of thing go on, to your knowledge?

BAUS: It didn’t go on too much in my day of activity, although we did encounter it. It also reached a crescendo with this insurance thing.

DOUGLASS: So many alternatives.

BAUS: That’s right. In the end, the insurance thing was a fiasco. Almost everybody was as confused as hell about almost everything on the insurance periphery. There were five propositions and precious little enlightenment.

DOUGLASS: Would that be a classic case which the initiative fails, in that perhaps the legislature is passing the buck?

BAUS: The initiative system can almost break down by abuse in that regard. I was just disgusted with the insurance babel. I voted against all of them. I didn’t think any of them were worth voting for. I wasn’t sure what any of them
really meant. I doubt very much that most of the people in the state, including some of them close to the campaign knew, either.

DOUGLASS: It got terribly complicated. I will move on to some specific ones. Was the first issue campaign for you, in '46, Proposition 11, the Fair Employment Practices Act?

BAUS: That was the first one.

DOUGLASS: Do you have any more comments that experience?

BAUS: You have to remember that was my first one.

DOUGLASS: As I recall, you got the contract through Doherty?

BAUS: Mr. Frank P. Doherty was a prominent lawyer in the state, who had been president of the L.A. Chamber of Commerce in 1943 when I was a PR director of the chamber. Doherty and I became very good friends. I became an admirer of him for his wisdom, sagacity, and wit. He admired me as a young whippersnapper with promise. I caught his eye as a potential partner of Bill Ross, who was married to the sister of Frank W. Doherty's wife. Bill and I and those who knew him best referred to him affectionately as "OMD," Old Man Doherty.
Frank Doherty had a lot to do with [Governor] Hiram [W.] Johnson and actually getting the initiative process underway. So a certain number of political projects and issues came Doherty's way. He just sort of took the FEPC thing and ran with it. He invited me to manage the campaign for him.

DOUGLASS: Did he take it statewide, Mr. Baus?

BAUS: To my best knowledge. This was not a full-fledged campaign. In the first place, we didn't have that much money and no prospect of raising it. In the second place, in all honesty, I really didn't know yet what I was doing.

DOUGLASS: Feeling your way?

BAUS: I was feeling my way. I was just thrown into the political waters with nobody, including myself, knowing if I could swim. I fell in love with the challenge of politics. This is what made me get into it. With what money we had we did a little newspaper advertising. We did quite a bit of mailing and quite a bit of literature distribution.

DOUGLASS: What was your pitch? Do you recall?

BAUS: That the FEPC issue would upset labor relations in the state of California and upset the economy
of the state. Above all, under the aegis of better race relations it would intensify racial barriers. It was bad law. It would divide the races rather than bring them closer together. That was the main thrust of our argument. It was a matter of doing the best we could to get the word out to chambers of commerce and trade associations and business groups and conservative leaders.

The other side was for yes and we were for no. The yes side had minority groups, labor unions, and Democratic-associated and liberal organizations. Like an octopus, we threw as much ink as we could into the water. One thing or another, we won it. I don't remember the vote. I think we won it by a pretty good margin.

**DOUGLASS:** I know that you had a very high percentage of no vote in L.A. County. I don't think I got the actual count on that.

**BAUS:** That was the major thrust of our effort.

**DOUGLASS:** L.A. County.

**BAUS:** Yes.

**DOUGLASS:** So you liked doing that?
BAUS: Frankly, I loved it. [It has one rewarding practical advantage over other specialties of PR. In most PR there is no scoreboard to prove how well you are doing. In politics there is a "D Day." Decision Day. It is coming, and coming inexorably. You win or you lose.]*

DOUGLASS: In the November election of '50, you had two items on the ballot. One we covered. Proposition 10, the statewide public housing projects. The other was another Proposition 1, which was an initiative constitutional amendment prohibiting the state or any of its political subdivisions from imposing personal property taxes.

BAUS: For some reason, I don't remember too much about that one. It doesn't stand out as a mountain on our career landscape.

DOUGLASS: That was, of course, just personal property.

BAUS: That was one of those things that we sometimes did on a very low-budget basis. We did it because our friends in the business world wanted [us] to.

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
DOUGLASS: So this is still early on. Let’s go to ’52, the November election. You had four state ballot issues you were handling on the state general election ballot. Prop. 3, taxation welfare exemption of nonprofit school property, which we began to talk about once way back. Prop. 7, which was elections, that is, ballot designation of party. This is a case where it is an alternative to cross-filing. And Prop. 13, which would have prohibited cross-filing. And Prop. 11, which was the McLain pension plan. I would like to ask you how you handled four at once. Isn’t that quite a drain on a company?

BAUS: Indeed, it can be. But in the political campaign business you take them on when they happen, and we had a bunch of them simultaneously several times. We called our business "chicken one year and feathers the next." We took our chickens when we could catch them.

Nineteen fifty-two was a very interesting year. In the first place, that same Proposition 3, which was for religious schools, was a very big campaign. The next two were both on cross-filing. There was very little money raised on
them, but we were getting active in the Republican party and sort of inherited that issue.

DOUGLASS: On the cross-filing? Really?

BAUS: Yes. That was more or less a Republican issue. I believe those two were packaged. We did what we could with a very low budget to win those and came out OK.

The other one [Proposition 11] was McLain. That was another major campaign. I will discuss that one first.

DOUGLASS: For the record, we ought to say that it is the payment of pensions to aged persons.

BAUS: That is the one Dorothy [Corey] was talking about. We didn’t have enough money on that one. So we couldn’t do what we usually try to do very early in the campaign. That is, to make some polls to help define how we were going to structure and aim the campaign. I told you some things about that, and Dorothy probably underscored some of the things about it. How we structured these campaigns. Dorothy and I worked this out together in those early years.

But late in the campaign we raised a little extra money, and we decided to hire Dorothy’s
firm to do a poll. As I say, we didn't believe in vanity polls. We didn't have in mind to predict who was going to win or anything like that. We wanted to find out if we were using the right arguments. Since we didn't have enough money to make the study early in the campaign, we still thought it was worthwhile to see if we were on the right track.

Our poll surprised us. It showed George McLain winning. It showed that we were focusing on the wrong argument. We were using economic arguments. "This would devastate the economy of California and seriously deplete the financial strength of the state of California. It would maybe get out of hand and raise taxes." The polls showed that people didn't care all that much about the taxes or what it did to the economy of California. They wanted old people to be taken care of and felt that should be done. But it showed something that was almost eerie in its psychological significance. There was a fear on the part of the people, especially the older ones who would benefit from this, that by generating so much bounty for the old folks it would attract a tidal wave of oldsters from
other states. That this, in turn, would vitiate the state; this would raise so much hell with the economy of the state that it would destroy the goose that laid the golden egg. That came through loud and clear.

In her poll.

So Bill and I restructured the whole campaign. We rewrote our response. We redesigned and redid the billboards, and changed our newspaper ads and radio spots and everything else at a fairly late stage of the campaign. Instead of saying that it would wreck the economy of California and raise taxes, we found a way to get a message across in a few words that it would undermine the California old-age pension largesse by attracting too many people from elsewhere. Which was our response to the message the survey registered.

I believe she said that one of the things that was discovered in that survey was that, in fact, the younger people weren't against it. They felt it was all right to take care of the older generation. That was not a viable way to attack. Maybe you figured you would get their
votes, but that wasn't the case. It was more this indirect effect.

BAUS: This was very potent, and it came across loud and clear. This was one that we hadn't anticipated at all. We tested it, but we didn't think it would be all that potent. But it sure was.

DOUGLASS: You won. It was an incredible vote. Twenty million to two and a half million. Of course, similar things have been tried with ham and eggs. This was McLain's first?

BAUS: This was the first of two. We handled no against both.

DOUGLASS: So that was a big success story. Have you very often changed your tactics in the middle of the road like that?

BAUS: No. The reason was in this one, we didn't get the money to do our poll until real late. Usually, we had the money up front and did the poll early. We would make such discoveries early enough to go from the first into our campaign literature, planning, strategy structure, and so forth.

DOUGLASS: How did you happen to get that account?
There again, James L. Beebe was the principal figure. James L. Beebe occupied a very unique role in the Los Angeles establishment. He was the political elder statesman of the Los Angeles business community. He was accepted by everybody. Lawyers, business executives, trade associations. He was the political oracle. I went to him for political counsel. What should we do? He was like a father or an older brother to me. We admired each other and became very close friends. He turned our way every time a campaign came along.

You wanted to take these in a certain order. Do you want to take the nonprofit school property next? Or do you want to do the ballot cross-filing issue?

I don't have much to say about the cross-filing issue. Our budget was so small. We just put together a little campaign and got a campaign committee. We did some basic advertising. I don't think there is a big story there.

Prop. 7 was put on as an alternative, obviously, to the abolishing of cross-filing, which Prop. 13 proposed.
I think that was an early use of the strategy you mentioned, where if one of them passed by a greater margin, it would supersede and knock the other one out.

It intrigued me. For the Democrats, this was a very heavy-duty cause to abolish cross-filing. For the Republicans, it was a case of liking the status quo. I was a little surprised that the Republicans were not putting more money or effort into it, but it sounds as though they weren't.

They weren't.

Prop. 3 then is the one you want to talk about.

Bill Ross was raised a Protestant, and when he married Virginia, he converted to the Catholic faith. He became one of the most ardent Catholics I ever met in my life. Truly devout. He painstakingly followed the precepts of the church. I was raised a Catholic and an altar boy. I converted to agnosticism at an early age. I was personally, and intellectually, not anti-Catholic at all. But I was an agnostic. So I left the church, and Bill joined it. That was one of the many instances where we had profound differences. That probably made it a
better partnership. I never discussed religion or argued with Bill. Neither did he.

He became an ardent Catholic, and one of the things he joined was the Catholic Press Council. He became sort of a PR adviser to the cardinal and the Catholic hierarchy. This measure to retain the tax exemption voted by the state legislature was, in the main, sponsored by the Catholic Church. It was a natural for Bill, with nine children in parochial schools. He was invited, through that connection, the Catholic Press Council and his relationship with the Catholic hierarchy, to manage this campaign. He did it. He did the whole thing. So if you are going to get the story from him, you will get a lot more detail and better recollection and all the rest of it.

DOUGLASS: Was it through him that you got this as a contract to work on?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: And he ran that.

BAUS: That was his baby.

DOUGLASS: The issue was the exemption from taxation of nonprofit school property, but wasn’t it a
certain kind of school property? Did it include the site itself.

BAUS: Yes. Everything to do with the real estate tax.

DOUGLASS: Oh, yes. It was anything below collegiate level. Your firm chalked that up as a win.

BAUS: Oh, yes. It was a well-financed campaign. The main thrust of his strategy was to keep this from being seen as a Catholic issue. So he made it strictly a private school issue. He positioned Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Protestants, and Jewish people, and others out in front of the campaign. I think the Catholics contributed 90 percent of the money.

DOUGLASS: Was the Catholic Church most actively involved because they had more schools affected?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: There are a lot of other private schools but not a lot of them.

BAUS: They were brought into the picture, but the Catholic school system was at the heart of the campaign. I think they had more money. At least, they put more money in.

DOUGLASS: Let me go back to how you managed these four issues. The two on cross-filing didn’t take a major effort and you sort of packaged that
effort. Mr. Ross apparently did most of the work on Prop 3.

**BAUS:** He did.

**DOUGLASS:** Did you both work against McLain’s Prop. 11?

**BAUS:** Yes. But it was my primary responsibility.

**DOUGLASS:** So you divided responsibilities?

**BAUS:** We traditionally did it that way. We would get into a campaign. We had our own division of labor. Overall, Bill was the man on money and watched the numbers and covered the mechanics of advertising because he came up the advertising agency route. I was the man on press contacts, publicity, and the front man. Really, "Mr. Outside" and the chief cultivator and seeker of new business, although he frequently was the "finder," as he was for this one.

**DOUGLASS:** You were more apt to be out in front. The contact.

**BAUS:** Whoever brought it in, we’d both get into the act. We would meet for lunch two or three or more times a week or whenever we could and discuss the strategy in all the campaigns. He would tell me what he was doing, and I would tell him what I was doing. We would bat it around. I would critique his, and he would
critique mine. So we both got into it in that respect. As far as the firing line, the field operations, the Catholic one was his baby and Prop. 11 was my baby. That was the way it was throughout our career together. Input from each of us was always valuable in any case.

DOUGLASS: So were you able to avoid the possibility of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing?

BAUS: We never had any problem with it.

DOUGLASS: It sounds like you had that worked out. The next major campaign you had—and I am doing statewide campaigns—was in November of '54 was another McLain measure, which was Prop. 4, initiative constitutional amendment. Did you handle that?

BAUS: Yes. I handled that.

DOUGLASS: It was a little different proposition, but the same idea. Did you use the same approach? It is interesting when you are fighting an issue again.

BAUS: My chief memory of the '54 one is that I campaigned against George McLain as a "pension racketeer," and that was a mistake, although I think he was exactly that. Nobody had much
question. Which meant that this was not something McLain had his heart and soul in. He was just using the pretext of aged welfare as a pious pretext to make money for McLain. Nevertheless, we campaigned against him on this "racketeer" issue. He sued us. He sued me and sued the committee and everybody on the committee individually for libel. And he scared the bejesus out of a lot of good citizens, because the world is full of people who (for good reason) want no part of being party to a lawsuit. So we had a little legal problem there, but we worked it out. That was my first experience of being hit with a "political lawsuit."

DOUGLASS: That was in the first campaign or the '54 campaign that that happened?

BAUS: I am pretty sure it was the '54.

DOUGLASS: So you just went after him.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Did you settle that out of court? What happened?

BAUS: It was still pending when the election was over. I just said to all our people that this was what you call a political suit. He was doing it to
scare people out of attacking and hopefully to impede fund raising. Our attorneys wanted me to take that language out, and I did take it out. I took it out of everything. Not long after the election, the suit was dropped. Which is almost always what happens in political suits.

DOUGLASS: That was a bit of a scare for Mr. Everyman citizen involved in the campaign.

BAUS: If anybody is named in a suit, it upsets them a little bit and makes them unhappy.

DOUGLASS: Moving now to November of '58, it reminds me that I added a little of this proposition in with the other nonprofit school property one. In '58, there was Proposition 16, which dealt with the taxation of school property of religious and other nonprofit organizations.

BAUS: That proposition in '58 was essentially an encore of the '52 measure.

DOUGLASS: Because it is less than collegiate level. It is another go at it.

BAUS: The other side had certain elements of the arch-Protestant persuasion, simply revived the whole thing.

DOUGLASS: The 1958 one was an initiative constitutional amendment. The Prop. 3, the earlier one, was a
referendum. It was a referendum of the legislature. The one in '58 was an initiative constitutional amendment. That would seem as though it was a way of circumventing anybody by getting it into the constitution.

BAUS: It was designed to expunge that tax exemption from state law and make it legally impossible for the state legislature to establish another one. It was really a rerun of the earlier campaign.

DOUGLASS: Did Mr. Ross handle that, too?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Also on that ballot was a Proposition 17 for state sales use and income tax rates. It was an initiative. The idea you pitched in your campaign was that if the sales tax went down, then the income tax would go up.

BAUS: Yes. That one was not well financed and not a very heavy campaign. But we did do it.

DOUGLASS: Did you handle that?

BAUS: I did.

DOUGLASS: It was clearly overwhelmingly defeated. You won. It wasn’t a big turnout on that issue.

BAUS: That was in '58. My major campaign that year was Kirkwood for controller. I did tell you the
story of my interview with George Shellenberger, who wanted us to do right-to-work, and my prediction that if they put right-to-work on the ballot, it would stagger the Republican hierarchy. Which it did because it would result in an alliance of the Democratic side with the Catholic candidate for governor. The Catholic Church and the labor unions would all get in bed together. And it just raised hell. That was almost as big a factor as was the fact that Bill Knowland in an act of pure arrogance knocked Goodie Knight out of his job. If Goodie had stood up to Bill Knowland, history might have been different.

DOUGLASS: Knowland was so associated with the right-to-work issue. BAUS: He was associated with the right-to-work. He was considered anti-Catholic. He was strongly against the Catholics on this issue. DOUGLASS: This raises an interesting question. How much interconnection do you think there is, in your experience, between a statewide candidate, particularly gubernatorial, being strongly impacted by the ballot propositions that are on
that particular November election? Can this be a real negative? Or can it help a candidate?

BAUS: It can be a factor that is helpful or harmful.

Now, in 1990, we have [Attorney General John] Van De Kamp playing with some issues. And so is [U.S. Senator Pete] Wilson. It can be, but lots of times it isn't. It just depends. That year, '58, it did.

DOUGLASS: The right-to-work.

BAUS: It had almost universal Republican backing, and it had almost universal Democratic opposition. The Democrats had a Catholic candidate. The Republicans had a strong Protestant candidate. And it all got mixed up.

DOUGLASS: I suppose that some of this is happenstance and some of it is planned, whether a ballot issue happens to connect.

BAUS: Sometimes it is planned. This time it wasn't planned, but it was forced on them by events. If they had used their heads--I gave them advice--history might have been different.

DOUGLASS: Gun control in the first [Governor George C.] Deukmejian election might be another example of the coming together of various factors.
All right. I think we are now down to one of your favorite ones, the assessment of golf courses. This is November of '60. You spoke of this earlier, and I wanted to be sure to cover it with you.

BAUS: If there was a single campaign that was my favorite and my masterpiece, it was this one. It was like a game of chess.

[Interruption]

In the first place, in many, many of our campaigns, we were the champions of the business establishment against other factors and fought to gain a victory for what the business establishment wanted. That was fine with us. We believed in it. In this one, there was no ideological significance whatsoever, except for the fact that James L. Beebe was against me on this one. [Laughter] James L. Beebe and Ruth Meilandt, who was his aide for so many years, both thought this was technically unsound and bad legislation. I didn’t really feel that way. They didn’t like to see me take it in the first place, although there were plenty of business leaders on my side of the issue. They were against it. They did the best they could to
trip me. Without any malice on any side, this made it more interesting.

DOUGLASS: What was the proposition?
BAUS: I believe it was something that the state legislature passed.

DOUGLASS: It was an assembly constitutional amendment.
BAUS: It had to be voted on by the public for it to become a constitutional amendment. It provided that all real estate had to be taxed to its highest and best use. That meant if you had a golf course, like Los Angeles Country Club or Hillcrest Country Club which are in very rich areas, instead of being taxed as a golf course, which involves almost no tax at all—a privilege that golf courses had for many years—it would have to be taxed as if it was a commercially developed high rise, if the club was in a location where that was its highest and best use in its technical sense.

This would have the effect if it passed of knocking a lot of country club and golf courses out of existence because the tax would go up so high—to the highest and best use in the modern conditions of California—that they couldn't afford to keep it greensward. Golf clubs would
have just become macadamized and paved over and made expansions of the city. So there was an environmental aspect to this. It was a preservation, green-belt thing. I think that is what a lot of people saw as the major issue.

I was brought into this because certain leading businessmen wanted to win this because the very being of their golf clubs was at stake. Or at least they wanted to keep it from resulting in such a landslide defeat that assessors everywhere would take it as a mandate to tax such establishments out of business.

So I accepted the appointment. I gave the group a budget. I said, "This is a very unique strategic situation. I am going to fight it on the basis that very few ballot propositions have ever been fought on. We are going to fight it on a man-to-man, zone defense. For example, the best way to win the establishment vote and the vote of business people and the vote of conservatives is to get the L.A. Chamber of Commerce on our side. If the L.A. Chamber of Commerce makes a decision in a matter like this, it will be a bellwether and chambers of commerce all over the state are apt to fall in line. The
BAUS: state chamber and big trade associations will follow. Many newspapers will follow.

"You don't have any fundamental political, ideological issue here. There is no open sesame for conservatives or liberals to rally around or against it. You might have a certain tendency by liberal elements to say, 'I can't afford to go out and get a position on the tee. I can't afford to belong to the L.A. Country Club. Let's tax these rich guys out of their toys.' You are going to have that tendency. There is no reason for newspapers to take a position on this one way or another. There is no reason for labor unions to do it. We are going to have to create our own reasons. What we are working with here is a group of country clubs." That is what my committee consisted of, the leaders of country clubs. Oakmont in Glendale, L.A., Hillcrest, and Riviera on the west side.

DOUGLASS: You were handling this statewide.

BAUS: I was handling it statewide, but the heavy concentration of country clubs clustered in southern California. I told the client, "These are the people who are going to put up the money. There is no other place to get the
money. This time you have to put up the money. You can’t just write a check. In addition, you are each going to have to do a job to start with. I want you to give me a list of the boards of directors of all the country clubs. I will come back and give you your assignments."

We had certain key leaders of the chamber of commerce. Norman Chandler belonged to a country club in San Marino. Most country clubs have a local publisher. You have to reach him as a member of yours and educate him, so he will get his newspaper to go along with us on this matter. You have to motivate your members individually to activate their spheres of influence.

DOUGLASS: You needed a yes vote. This was to give them a break on assessment. So you were trying to get a yes vote.

BAUS: So we had our work cut out for us. "Yes, keep taxes down for these rich guys" was the package we had to sell. And giving the privileged a break on assessment wasn’t about to sell very well with a lot of people. The majority of people in California don’t join country clubs and can’t afford to.
We started with this premise. I opened fire on the L.A. Chamber of Commerce. It has various committees. They pass on issues and send their recommendations to the board of directors, which usually adopts the committee report, but not always. They have a state and local government committee chairman, James L. Beebe. That group has a subcommittee that studies this sort of thing. And they had a subcommittee in charge of this. The subcommittee, I looked into. We were licked before we got started. They had already recommended a no vote on this thing.

DOUGLASS: So you are now dealing with Mr. Beebe.

BAUS: The next step was that the package was scheduled from the subcommittee to the big committee, and that was James L. Beebe. And then it would go from the big committee to the chamber's board. And, usually, not always, if the subcommittee goes a certain way, it's on the rails to go all the way. I said, "It is close to midnight." I had been a faithful member of this committee, very close to Beebe. One of their prime rules was: Don't lobby your own committee. You must not lobby this committee. You must do this on
an intellectual basis. So I had to violate that. But I didn’t lose their friendship.

Anyway, I made a little study. The Security First National Bank, now the Security Pacific Bank, had six employees serving on the Beebe committee. That was more than any other company had. So I went to bank executive vice president Chester Rood. He was on the executive committee in my campaign. He was ardently for this measure. He was a heavyweight member and officer of the L.A. Country Club. I sat down and said, "Chet, we are in trouble. Here is the subcommittee report. The subcommittee of the chamber has already voted against it. James L. Beebe, you are not going to reach. You will not be able to influence him. He will be against it. And if the chamber goes against this, we are in deep, deep dooodoo." Chet reached for the phone. "I’m going to call Harold Wright (the chamber’s general manager)."

[End Tape 4, Side A]
"Hold on," I said. "The way the chamber functions there will not be a thing Harold could do about it, however sympathetic he may be. I will tell what I would like to ask you to do."

I got out my committee list. "Take a look at this." I had these six Security First National employees checked off in red. "I will bet you know all of these men." He said, "I certainly do." I said, "To start with, [ ] Ed Haskins here is chairman of the offending subcommittee. You have never talked to him about this measure, have you?" "No. It never occurred to me."

"Without delay you should talk to Haskins about this and convince him of the desirability of his committee reexamining this measure." I coached him very carefully. I said, "Reach all six of these Security First National Bank [people] and, without delay, educate them on the merits of this issue and the importance of voting yes for it when it comes before the big committee." He said, "I will take care of that."

I did the same thing across-the-board. I found somebody in Richfield Oil [Co.] to talk to [Rodney W.] Rod Rood. He was a very good friend
of mine but in addition I wanted somebody he would listen to, even more carefully than me. So I went to Charlie Jones, president of Richfield. I went about it that way. A bread-and-butter approach, if you will.

In short order, a miracle happened. This was one of the very few times a subcommittee votes unanimously to pass something and then reverses itself changes their vote. But that is what we achieved.

**DOUGLISS:** Is Mr. Beebe, by this time, figuring out what you are about? [Laughter]

**BAUS:** I think so.

**DOUGLISS:** Incidentally, what was their reason for turning it down the first time?

**BAUS:** Because it was considered to be, technically, bad tax legislation. That was the purist argument. Probably eliminating such favored tax treatment would be sounder tax legislation, if you want to be purist. Although I would hate to lose the Wilshire Country Club and all those other mid-metropolis green belts. I really would. This was in 1960, before the environmentalist movement hit its stride. So it
was sort of a forerunner of environmentalist muscle in politics.

DOUGLASS: That was the reason why they were turning it down.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: That must have happened very rapidly. Was that within a couple of days that you got that turned around?

BAUS: We got it turned around very swiftly. Time was of the essence. And I had to have the L.A. chamber as bellwether for so many others to follow, as in the past.

DOUGLASS: Then the chamber board accepted the recommendation?

BAUS: The subcommittee changed its vote by a four-to-three margin. We had four. It went for approval of the big committee. We won that by a considerably better than a 50 percent margin.

DOUGLASS: They didn't raise much reservations about the split vote on the subcommittee? In other words, that didn't trigger a bigger debate.

BAUS: We were now getting so we now have the votes. I talked to very few of these guys myself. I knew them all well, or most of them. I talked to their bosses. I found out who was big in the
country club that had an employee who was on this committee. I did it personally that way. Very carefully, man by man.

So we won the keystone upon which I was building the support of the business community and the trade associations and most of the newspapers. In this kind of an issue they will pay primary attention to what the chamber of commerce recommends. They have been accustomed to that pattern for years unnumbered. It was a battle to carry the big board, but we managed that too with the same man-to-man approach.

Now we turn our attention to labor unions. Nobody thought we could win the labor unions. Union members would tend to say "thumbs down" on country clubs. For why would working stiffs want to take it easy on the rich country club set? However, this was not a "gut issue" and we had a chance. Everybody knows where labor is going to go on right-to-work and on some of the issues that are gunpoint issues to them. I said, "On an issue like this, if one or two locals, or one or two of your components in the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations], take a position,
BAUS: usually the rest of them go along with it." I had good friends in labor and I talked to them, but they said, "There is no way you could get labor to go along with you on this thing."

Well, I saw possibilities in two unions. First, the musicians' union, with many of whose members I had served with during the war for a while, as the corporal PR director for the San Bernardino Air Service Command post band. Kelita "Kelly" Shugart, PR chief for the musicians' union, was my friend there. This was a very peculiar labor union. These guys make a lot of money playing all their instruments into the night, and quite a few of them love to spend a lot of their days on the golf course. Quite a few of them were members of country clubs. So I went to Kelly Shugart. I said, "Kelly, I need your help on this." We aroused the musicians that this was a threat to their golf courses. This is one element within the labor unions which belonged to country clubs.

The other concerned group was the culinary workers' union. Every country club has a lot of culinary workers, and most of them were unionized. They present dinners and lunches and
so forth. So I went to the culinary workers' union. We came into the state AFL-CIO convention that summer with the backing of these two unions, urging that our measure be backed. We carried the statewide labor unions.

DOUGLASS: That's amazing. Were they AFL-CIO?

BAUS: Yes. Central labor council. So we got the labor unions. This is the way I fought the whole campaign. Man-to-man.

    Then I thought, "What are we going to do for our public propaganda?" The month of October came. In 1960, as usual, it was hot and dry. The Santa Ana winds were prevailing. People were worried about forest fires. Pretty soon billboards showed up all over the state, "Keep California Green." Everybody thought this was an emotional drive against forest fires, and everybody in California was against forest fires.

    [By the way, we deliberately avoided the big 24-sheet billboards to avoid the impression of a big money campaign. We concentrated on the little quarter sheets, the [George] Kennedy Outdoor Advertising A boards. Thus, we
concentrated on a "poor man's advertising campaign." [*]

We justified it on the basis it would save these green-belt country clubs from being turned into high-rise business districts. Beebe was beside himself. [Laughter] "Keep California Green."

**DOUGLASS:** Somewhere along here did an organized opposition rise?

**BAUS:** No. No organized opposition ever arose. We did our best to avoid it. And who was going to organize it? One little additional story to show you how I fought this campaign. Our committee assessed every country club. Most of them put up their money. That gave us a pretty respectable budget to fight a campaign like this. But the San Diego Country Club refused to go along. They said, "You can't win it. There is no way you can win this thing. We are just not going to invest the money in it."

So I went to [ ] Ed Zuckerman, the golf clubs' appointed chairman of the campaign and

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.*
prominent in one of the country clubs. I said, "Ed, can you take me into the San Diego Country Club's board of directors for dinner and let me make a speech to them?" He said, "Hell, yes." So I made a speech to them. I pitched for their contribution.

I first told them why I thought we could win. We had some polls that looked good, given a certain treatment. We had impressive endorsements from chambers of commerce and labor unions. I said, "Not every issue has both the chambers of commerce and labor unions behind it." I said, "Here is our billboard art. We have done this and we've done that. We have a good chance to win this. I am going to lay the cards on the table, gentleman. If you don't make your contribution, we will have to concentrate all our money where the contributions were made." I said, "Even if it does get defeated, and if it is defeated a lot worse in San Diego than it is anywhere else, your assessor is going to say, 'Boy, I have to face the electorate. They want me to tax country clubs.' If we win it elsewhere and you lose it, you still might lose impact with your
BAUS: assessor. He can still choose to tax country clubs."

DOUGLASS: Yes. It is a county-by-county decision. So it was an enabling legislation?

BAUS: That’s right. So I said, "You have a big stake in this thing. It would be penny-wise and pound-foolish not to go along with this." They said, "Well, would you and Mr. Zuckerman sit down in the bar and let us talk about it."

Pretty soon they came out with the check representing their assessment in full. So we won this thing. You can see why this campaign was my ultimate private delight in terms of personal satisfaction.

DOUGLASS: Mr. Beebe, did he ever recover from this?

BAUS: I went to the Orient with Helene when this was over. We went to Japan and Hong Kong. In an art store in Kyoto, Japan, I found a beautiful, silk-embroidered picture of a green forest burning down. It was done by needlework on a silk base. I sent it to Lynn Beebe and Ruth Meilandt for Christmas. To Beebe and Ruth, on my accompanying Christmas card I marked, "Keep California Green!" They took it in good spirits. I think they admired the artistry.
They got big laughs out of this. But I didn’t get a damned bit of help from them, I assure you.

DOUGLASS: This was a real challenge.

BAUS: If I had taken them on on a really serious ideological issue, it might have been unforgivable. But this wasn’t that kind. This was an intellectual game. I just loved this one.

DOUGLASS: I can tell. It is like doing crossword puzzles or playing chess.

BAUS: This was often cited as almost a watershed case for how to win a campaign.

DOUGLASS: How to form networks and get the thing together, too.

BAUS: I remember I got into a conversation with someone. We were talking about the campaign they wanted us to bid for. They said, "This takes the same kind of masterful treatment that was in that one of several years back of ‘Keep California Green.’ I remember that one. You ought to study this one." I said, "That was my baby. I did it." We got that campaign, too.
DOUGLASS: You became known. This became a known fact that something had been turned around that looked so difficult?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: That same November, your firm handled a campaign to defeat a senate reapportionment plan, which was Proposition 15. Did you run that campaign?

BAUS: Bill did.

DOUGLASS: What comments might you have on it, though? This was reapportionment time. Your firm defeated the proposition.

BAUS: This was one of a number of things that we did for the Republican party for very little money. There is no big story to it.

DOUGLASS: Were there particular people in the legislature you had contact with?

BAUS: We were never a lobbying firm. I knew some people in the legislature. I knew [Assemblyman] Laughlin E. Waters. He is a United States judge now. I knew quite a few of the other legislators, especially on the Republican side. I knew [Assemblyman] Jesse [M.] Unruh, the famous Democratic speaker. I knew [Assemblyman Caspar] Cap [W.] Weinberger when he was in the state legislature.
DOUGLASS: Did you ever have any dealings with Unruh at all in terms of consulting?

BAUS: No. We were good friends and had a mutual admiration.

DOUGLASS: Had you just met him in the course of the L.A. region group that seemed to interconnect?

BAUS: We were pros, and effective pros admire each other. I could admire a good pro who was on the other side, which Jesse always was in those days. He did, too. Pat Brown admired Baus and Ross vocally. A professional politician is like a pro in anything else. You can fight somebody tooth and nail, but you can still respect and value them for their technique and their professional aplomb and sit around the table in civilized fashion.

[End Session 3]
[End Tape 4, Side B]
[Session 4, February 28, 1990]
[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

DOUGLASS: I would like to finish up a few ballot propositions we haven't covered. I think, starting in 1962, there was a June ballot issue on public housing for the aged and physically handicapped which you worked to oppose. I know you were involved in a number of public housing issues. I don't believe we have talked about this one. Do you remember anything different about this? It did include the physically disabled.

BAUS: In '62?

DOUGLASS: In June of '62. It was Prop. 4 on the ballot.

BAUS: That wasn't a very big thing with us. I hardly remember it. We managed major anti-public housing drives in '48 and '52, but I can't recall one in '62.
DOUGLASS: You apparently were successful in opposing it. It failed by a million votes. I suppose that would be along the same lines as the other public housing issues.

BAUS: I think the public housing thing had lost its steam, its vitality, its tremendous political punch by then. When we fought it in the late forties and early fifties on several occasions, there were very lively and also dynamic and major campaigns. This one, even though it is ten years closer to us in time, I hardly remember it. It means that it wasn’t that big a factor.

DOUGLASS: All right. Also, there was the issue of the extension of daylight savings later into the fall. Do you remember anything about that? I know you worked on daylight saving in the beginning.

BAUS: We were always champions of daylight saving. When the extension came up, it was natural to call us in to do what we could for it. It was no longer a hot issue. There was no longer any serious opposition to it. And by this time daylight saving was so popular and well-accepted that any extension of it was easy to sell.
DOUGLASS: What had happened was a realization that if it was good to go through September, this was to extend it another month? To the way we have it now.

BAUS: That’s right. There was really no serious opposition to it.

DOUGLASS: Another item that your firm handled in ’62 was the Los Angeles school bonds. This one I noted because you lost it. I believe you told me that you worked on a number of school bond issues. It would be interesting to discuss the handling of a big city school district’s bonding challenges.

BAUS: We handled quite a number of those and most of them were successful. All but one passed, I believe. Are you going to interview my former partner Bill Ross?

DOUGLASS: I believe I am.

BAUS: He was the one who usually handled our school bond issues. He can give you a great deal more input in that area than I could. I really shouldn’t try to get too deeply into it.

DOUGLASS: Give me an overview that you have.

BAUS: What we would do would be to go in and form a citizens’ committee in favor of it. We would
raise money from school suppliers and contractors and others who had a financial stake in the success of such things. We worked closely with and mobilized the PTA [Parent-Teacher’s Association] and the other school-support and public-support groups. Plus mobilizing community groups and organized labor. And doing the best we could to motivate business, also.

DOUGLASS: Since you faced the question of a two-thirds majority on a bond issue, I would think up front you would be pinpointing who the opposition was. Do you remember this one particularly because you lost it, as to who was the opposition? Or is there a pretty general cast of characters you are usually dealing with on that?

BAUS: This one does not stand out in my memory, to be quite honest with you. The main reason Bill Ross handled school bonds and I didn’t was very direct and logical. The Bauses unfortunately didn’t have any progeny and the Rosses had nine children.

DOUGLASS: But weren’t his children going to parochial schools?
They were going to parochial schools to be sure, but, nevertheless, Bill was more attuned to education, the needs for education, and naturally more sensitive and sympathetic to the issue than I was.

I did note that there were five major bond issues on that ballot, which I imagine makes it tough.

If you want to know why it lost, that has to be a major reason. A ballot saturation with bond issues. [I can tell you that I believe this was the only school bond issue we ever lost. In fact, Baus and Ross waged more than 100 campaigns and batted over .900. (Thomas C.) Tom Lasorda would call that an acceptable win-loss ratio in any league.]*

Perhaps a local issue could get less attention if there are some important state bond issues, and people just begin to get negative about it.

That's true. There were currents. There were times that were better and times that were worse for bond issues because of personalities and

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
other factors. Some of which began to recede in point of time. I find as I look back on all the things we did, some of them stand out much more vividly in my memory than others.

DOUGLASS: Sure. That is natural. I will try to cover it with Mr. Ross if I interview him.

Let's go on to '64. You had mentioned this in passing before. This was Proposition 15, which is called "free TV." You were successful in this, but I am not quite sure what the issue was. Was it cable?

BAUS: Yes. There was a group that wanted pay TV. You meant pay?

DOUGLASS: I had "free" written down. I pulled it off your list. The issue may have been free TV.

BAUS: I think we called it "pay TV" at the time. We probably called it "free TV" for euphemistic campaign reasons. There was a movement in that time to create a pay TV network. It required some legislative OKs.

There was a group headed by Walter O'Malley and his Dodger baseball club and several other sports groups that were in favor of arranging that pay TV could be developed and sold to the public as an additional medium. They negotiated
with us, that being Baus and Ross, over a period of time to get in and run a campaign for them. A guy named [Sylvester] Pat Weaver was a big New York advertising man. He was hired by that coalition to put a pay TV network together. He wanted to run the political campaign himself.

Walter O’Malley led a group that wanted us to run it. We had a number of meetings. Nothing ever happened. They just couldn’t get it off the ground to get it to the point of coming to an agreement to hire a firm and let us do this for them instead of having them run it themselves.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the battlefield stood the theaters, the organized theaters. We had a relationship with them because we had done several things for them. They wanted us to oppose this. So we really opposed it in the name of free TV. I remember now how that developed.

DOUGLASS: So you were working for the theaters?

BAUS: We were working for the theaters on other things. When they came to us on this, we were very close to them. We were getting to the point where you sometimes get to in this
business where there were reasons why you might go with either side. This was not what anybody called an ideological issue or battle of principle, which so many of our issues were, meaning business versus anti-growth and so forth. So we were free, as far as ideology was concerned, to go on either side.

We just went to Walter and said, "Look, we have been talking to you and we have been quite willing to make an agreement with you and start a program. But here come the theaters, and they are urging us to start one for them. The time is coming when we have to make a decision. We want to get into this thing one way or the other. It is going to be a big issue."

And Walter said, "You have done your best, and you have been very patient. I have done my best. We have not been able to get our group to move on this thing. You guys are in business. I certainly would not be offended if you became disgusted with the procrastination that we have evinced against my will. So please consider yourself free to make a deal in that direction. If that is the way the ball bounces, that is the
BAUS: way the ball bounces." So that is the way the ball bounced.

DOUGLASS: So you went with the theaters.

BAUS: We went with the theaters and organized a statewide campaign and won the campaign. Unfortunately, or fortunately as the case may be, our effort was deemed by some as a matter of stifling new business enterprise and a threat to the freedom of speech. So the state supreme court denied us our victory after the campaign was over. But we still won it on the battlefield. Bill Ross operated that campaign because it was getting started in full bore while the Goldwater campaign was on. I was totally absorbed in the Goldwater campaign.

DOUGLASS: That sounds like the first ballot issue on pay TV.

BAUS: It was. Bill did a very ingenious thing of organizing a special committee in every community in the state. He will tell you about it. It was a very good professional piece of work, and it was very effective.

DOUGLASS: You did make the comment that you weren’t terribly happy about the company’s participation in this. Was this because you were kind of
ambivalent about which side you personally might have supported?

BAUS: We both would have rather been on the side we talked to over a period of months.

DOUGLASS: On the pay TV [side]. This would be paying for the broadcast of special sports events.

BAUS: It has now developed. It is all over the place. You see evidence of it every day on your own set.

DOUGLASS: At that time, would it just have been the Dodgers? Would it just have been baseball?

BAUS: The Dodgers were our friends for many years. They were our client. That was part of it. We felt ideologically it would have been a little more comfortable on that side of it. We really felt in our hearts that this was a legitimate new form of free enterprise.

DOUGLASS: What I was getting out was the issue just in general of being able to have pay for special events, beyond having just your free television. That was the issue. It wasn’t specifically doing baseball?

BAUS: No. Not at all. Because he was a businessman with vision, Walter O’Malley was interested in it.
This was a broad question.

We didn't like the idea of a piece of legislation or the government stepping in and saying to free enterprise, "You cannot develop this." The theaters, most of them, simply wanted to stifle this thing so that this viable alternative of going out to the theater would not develop and flourish.

Do you remember generally what kind of arguments you used? You must have been persuasive.

You can get this from Bill. Or I can dig it up for you later.

Let's go on to one that really intrigued me. Proposition 16, which was the first attempt, I believe, in California to establish a state lottery. You were on the "no" side of that.

Your firm. That must have been quite an interesting experience. Was Mr. Ross the key man on that or did you handle that?

I don't think as matters developed, a very substantial budget was generated on that one. The state lottery comes under the aegis of that old saying that nothing is as powerful in politics as an idea whose time has come. It came later, but it had not come yet. So this
was simply voted down. It looked like a big issue at the time, but it wasn't, in terms of anybody putting up very much money on it.

DOUGLASS: Was there a particular outfit that wanted to run the lottery that pushed the issue?

BAUS: Yes. That is usually the case. That was the case here.

DOUGLASS: Since you won clearly--over two-to-one--its time had not come.

BAUS: That's exactly right.¹

DOUGLASS: Why don't we move to the point at which you decided that you wanted to retire from the business. What made you conclude that finally?

BAUS: In the fall of 1968 Helene and I engaged an apartment in Honolulu for a month. The month of November, right after the election. We went over there, and it was the first of several occasions when we did go over there and spend a considerable length of time. We just talked it over. My doctors were pressing me on the problem of high blood pressure and on the related question of general health and overweight.

¹For additional material about other local campaigns please see appendix.
We weighed the factor that the political campaign business is a meat grinder, a man killer. If you really go into it, it just tears you apart.

[We had a saying that after an incumbent mayor, governor, or president (executive official; this is not necessarily true of legislators) has served for a while—usually after two four-year terms—he begins to accumulate barnacles that pull him down. He says "no" to people, he steps on toes, he offends and is not forgiven. We have all seen this happen many times. There are exceptions but not many. Like FDR and his four terms. Or Mayor [Thomas] Bradley and his four terms, although the barnacles are slowing him down increasingly of late.

Well, a political campaigner can set up these barnacles. Some very good friends and staunch political allies were offended by some of our attachments like the pay TV issue, which messed up some investment dreams; like the Pat Brown-versus-Reagan campaign; like the restricted housing campaign of 1964, which we
refused to get into, to the dismay of some of our real estate profession friends]*

Also, the factor that I was fairly well along on a major project called the Crossword Puzzle Dictionary, which intrigued me vastly. I had a contract. That is, I did, personally. Not Bill. Bill Ross was not involved in that. With Doubleday [Doubleday & Co., Inc.] to produce the biggest crossword puzzle dictionary ever created.

So it was a combination of those things. My general health. And the fact that I came to the conclusion I really had enough of this. Some of the pristine pleasure and joy and joie de vivre, you might say, that I had from political campaign work earlier had been blunted by some of the things that happened. And the existence of that dictionary project.

There was one other factor, too, that weighed pretty big in my mind. And that was, the business was reaching a point where the government was getting increasingly intrusive.

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
Both the state and local government were beginning to create various no-nos, restrictions, and limitations. The IRS [Internal Revenue Service] was getting tougher and tougher about its financial reporting requirements. So it was becoming a legal nightmare to run this business with the IRS and certain reform movements and so on yapping at our heels like jackals. It dimmed the luster and joy and freedom of the business. I added all those up, and I just decided to hang up my battle dress.

DOUGLASS: How was it that you happened to get involved in the crossword puzzle dictionary?

BAUS: I always have loved words. I used to, as a kid, memorize a new word a day. For years I did crossword puzzles all the time as a hobby. I noticed that the state of the crossword-puzzle-dictionary art was very primitive. So I thought doing something about that would be: (A), very useful on the market, and, (B), a lot of fun.

I took it up with Clyde Vandeberg, who had been an old friend of mine for many years and who had hired me in the thirties to handle the Los Angeles end of the opening of the San
Francisco Golden Gate and Bay Bridges, and who in the sixties had become a literary agent in Los Angeles. And he liked the idea. So I made the contract with him. He queried many publishers and we decided on Doubleday. So I made a contract with Doubleday.

DOUGLASS: Over what period of time were you expected to produce this dictionary, which sounds like a monumental project?

BAUS: Nobody had any idea of the parameters. That is to say, the Doubleday people didn't know. I didn't know. I didn't know of anybody who knew. I thought it would take some years to do, and it was just a matter of what leeway they would give me in a contract to do it. If I remember right, they gave me five years with an option to renew.

DOUGLASS: They gave you an advance probably.

BAUS: They had given me an advance. I was hoping to produce the volume "as quickly as possible," but I ended up producing it in about fifteen years.

DOUGLASS: What kind of support did you have for this? Did you have a couple of people working for you doing research? How did you approach it?

BAUS: At first, I did it absolutely by myself. I had a big home up on the top of Micheltorena Street
in the Silver Lake Hills. One of the former owners of that home had created a huge playroom down at one end of the house. It had a view of much of the city of Los Angeles and environs. A playroom with a giant wet bar and a lot of wall space. That room must have had a thousand square feet in it. I sort of laid that room out. I put up some shelves in the room and designed things for the use of half a million three-by-five cards.

DOUGLASS: Yes. There were no computers then to do this.

BAUS: That's right. I looked into that later, but they weren't ready yet. That would have been very helpful in their present state of development. I laid out a program of what I wanted to do, which was to go laboriously through the Webster's Unabridged [Dictionary], the Random House Unabridged [Dictionary], the complete volumes of [William] Shakespeare, Roget's Thesaurus, several dictionaries of American slang, German, French, and Spanish dictionaries, and a number of other sources, and just plow into this thing on a laborious basis.

I sort of refined the process myself on how to do this. And after laboring on this for
about five years, my eye doctor said, "Look, what the hell are you doing? Your eyes are going downhill fast." I told him. He said, "If you want to be able to read your dictionary, if it ever gets printed, you had better get some help on this."

So I went to Richard Nimmons, who I believe is known to you, who was then the vice president for development at Pomona College and who had been my superior officer for a good part of World War II, at which time we became fast friends. He was a very good PR man in his own right. He worked for Ivy Lee and T. J. Ross in New York and for the Hawaiian Islands Travel and Visitors Council for a number of years before he finally decided to rejoin the academic world and go back to his alma mater and take this development job.

I told Nimmons about the project, showed him what I was doing. Took him and showed him everything in the house and suggested that maybe we could work out something that would benefit a lot of people and good causes and at the same time it was a worthy intellectual undertaking. If Pomona would provide me with the manpower to
BAUS: do the research and finish that so I would not overburden my eyes any longer, with my constant involvement in a supervising and consulting capacity . . .

[Interrupted]

DOUGLASS: You made a deal with Pomona about the income from the dictionary.

BAUS: On the income split which we worked out was that I would divide the royalties fifty-fifty between Pomona and the Baus family for as long as both of us should live. And that upon the death of the second of us to go, all of the royalties would be directed to Pomona College.

DOUGLASS: What was the form of the help that the college provided to you? Did they provide you with research help?

BAUS: One other thing. I further guaranteed them $50,000 from my estate. So that covered their basic outlay.

What we worked out after we started doing it was that the college put together a team under the guidance of one Margaret Mulhauser, who was the wife of Dr. Frederick Mulhauser, a professor of English literature at Pomona College. She would head up the team and work
with me. That was done. In not too long a time it really ended up that she was just working with me mostly herself.

DOUGLASS: You were using her eyes.

BAUS: I was using her eyes. We got along very well. She was a whizbang of a researcher. Very effective, very good, very conscientious. Before we got too deeply into the project, she became a widow. This dictionary was a godsend to her on several grounds. It gave her something to steep herself into. It was very good therapy for her. It provided a financial backup for her at a time she could use it. It was certainly a godsend for me.

DOUGLASS: You, in essence, taught her what you had been doing. She just carried it out for you.

BAUS: That's right. I brought the whole thing out to her home in Claremont and laid it out and visited her once or twice a week, or as often as necessary, to check on everything and to make decisions on vital things. So I was really involved deeply all the way to the finish, but my eyes weren't.

DOUGLASS: A very wise move. How has that dictionary done, Mr. Baus? It seems to me that it is a standard
work for people who are really serious about crossword puzzles.

BAUS: It is a standard work. It keeps selling hundreds of copies a year. It never realized my hopes of becoming anything like a best-seller or even a major or an exciting financial success. I always felt, and so did my agent and so did Nimmons, that Doubleday dropped the ball on the thing. It should have moved in thousands or more a year, not hundreds. I think it could have been a much more smashing success with any kind of backup.

It seems that Doubleday is one of the biggest publishers, and the big publishers have an attitude about reference works—and this is a reference work—that you don’t promote. You just publish them. They stand out there, and they will sell a certain number per year for an indefinite number of years. Doubleday seemed to be content to let it go at that. So we had experiences where they didn’t even have the book on the shelves of certain stores, not even some of their own Doubleday stores. They didn’t do anything to push it. They didn’t advertise; they didn’t promote it.
DOUGLASS: That is one of the pitfalls of writing something and having it published. A lot depends on how the publisher handles it.

BAUS: I know a lot more about these things now than I once did.

DOUGLASS: To get back to the main thrust of our interviewing here, would you say for five years this was the focus of your work?

BAUS: The project was more than fifteen years in the works from its inception to publication.

DOUGLASS: Did you do any political consulting until you hooked up with Braun and Company officially in '75?

BAUS: Yes. I did. In 1970, which was the year after my retirement. I retired during 1969. I had a very bad medical experience in '69 which confirmed the wisdom of getting out of the business. One night walking my poodle, Diesel, I blacked out on the side of the street.

DOUGLASS: Was this after you decided to get out, Mr. Baus?

BAUS: Just after.

DOUGLASS: It confirmed your decision. So you found you had better take care of yourself.

BAUS: I got the message. In 1970, I did get back in to help a firm. My agent, Vandeberg, got me a
connection with a young lawyer named [Michael] Mike Parker, who was involved with a bond issue for the University of California. As I remember it, we did a pretty thorough job on that, but it didn’t fly.

DOUGLASS: This was University of California bonds for buildings?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Statewide bonding.

BAUS: Yes. I enjoyed the work very much. The result of it was that [through] Mike Parker, who was also involved with the first of a number of statewide campaigns to legalize opening up the interest rate limitation in the state of California, I was engaged to run a statewide campaign for that.

DOUGLASS: For limiting interest rates?

BAUS: No. For delimiting them. Opening them up.

DOUGLASS: For removing the lid?

BAUS: That’s right. At that time, no bank or savings and loan or other agency in the business of lending money could, by state constitutional limitations, lend at any more than 10 percent interest. Meanwhile, all over the nation and
the world, the interest markets were going up and up.

DOUGLASS: That's right. This was 1970.

BAUS: This was '70. I did this in the campaign that fall.

DOUGLASS: Did you campaign to remove the cap entirely or to raise it to a certain percentage?

BAUS: Remove it entirely.

DOUGLASS: That would have been known as deregulation then?

BAUS: That's right. We lost that campaign by a close margin. A very few years later when I was with Braun the same issue came along again and that was one of the campaigns I worked on for Braun. We won it that year.

The compelling reason why it won the second time and not the first time was that there is nothing as powerful as an idea whose time has come. The interest rates were going through the roof in the middle seventies. Everybody could see that there wasn't going to be money for mortgages for homes. That it was going to break down all kinds of things. It would simply let outside sources come in and lend money while California institutions sat on the sidelines.
So it passed relatively easily almost a decade later.

DOUGLASS: Again, was that just removing the cap entirely? No set cap.

BAUS: That's right. Fear of insufficient capital to get things done replaced fear of usury in the public psyche.

DOUGLASS: That was the campaign that Braun and Company handled. Was that 1975.

BAUS: No. I think it was '78.

DOUGLASS: Let me get this clearly. Who hired you? Mike Parker hired you to work on the '70 campaign?

BAUS: Mike Parker recommended me to the California Mortgage Bankers Association.

DOUGLASS: So that was who was handling that campaign?

BAUS: They were. They were backing that campaign. They were the people who hired me. By the late seventies a consortium of interests across-the-board hired Braun.

DOUGLASS: Like any ballot issue campaign, there is a closed period there when you have to do it. So it is an intensive period of work, and then it is over.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Was that about it?
BAUS: That was my political swan song.

DOUGLASS: What was the background of your decision to be on retainer to Braun and Company?

BAUS: For years I had known [Theodore W.] Ted Braun, and over a shorter term knew [Clifford] Cliff Miller and [Lawrence] Larry Fisher. Cliff was then the president and Larry was the executive vice president. Ted Braun was the chairman of the board of Braun and Company.

DOUGLASS: You probably had known Ted Braun over the years.

BAUS: I had know Ted Braun for decades. We were very good friends. Cliff Miller asked me to dinner one night and wanted me to affiliate with the firm and help him out on some things they were doing, and I agreed. It was a good relationship that lasted about seven years.

DOUGLASS: Would you be on call? What was the kind of arrangement in terms of time commitment?

BAUS: It was pretty much on a project basis. I decided to do it for several reasons. Number one, I didn't want to start my own business again.

DOUGLASS: You didn't want to form a corporation again?

BAUS: I didn’t want to worry about the increasing government regulation, the rules, the
interference of the state legislature, and all those technical things. I didn’t want to fool with that. I didn’t want to organize and carry a big staff of people. But I did want to get into action again, and I wanted to supplement my income. I wanted to build up my social security entitlement, which this did, to the top figure.

DOUGLASS: Were you kind of missing the action a little bit?

BAUS: To some degree.

DOUGLASS: I would think it would get in your blood.

[Laughter]

BAUS: You mean blood pressure? This way I just got to do some of the things I like to do best instead of hiring others to do things. One of the things I did for Braun all this time was to constantly travel around the state of California and talk to editors and brief them on the causes that interested us. And try to persuade them to back us editorially. I loved that.

DOUGLASS: Here you are being Mr. Outside, which is what you had done for your firm.

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: As I understand it, this is what they really wanted you for. This continuing kind of contact
that you were able to keep. Of course, you must have known an incredible number of people.

BAUS: And that editorial thing, I had never had time to do.

DOUGLASS: Would you go in with an idea for an editorial, Mr. Baus? How would you do that? Wasn't the idea to stimulate them to run editorials?

BAUS: Much more than that. I would start by assembling a kit. The kit would have an exhaustive investigation of the issue, all the facts pro and con. Copies of editorials that papers around the state (or other states, where applicable) had done on the subject, if any, before on a related subject. I would make up this kit. Then I would stay in touch with the editors as new developments occurred, especially in the editorials. I would send material out to them in waves. Very effective work.

DOUGLASS: They eventually would probably respond and write something?

BAUS: Usually.

DOUGLASS: You would hope that you would be persuasive in terms of the side of the issue Braun and Company was [on].

BAUS: That was the idea. It worked pretty well.
DOUGLASS: Did you ever find, Mr. Baus, going into those situations that some past campaign you had worked on worked to your disadvantage with people? Did you ever have that happen?

BAUS: No. I never did. My past didn’t haunt me.

DOUGLASS: As I have talked to you, I get the impression that possibly one of the reasons you were very successful as Mr. Outside was that you managed to conduct your business in such a way that you didn’t make enemies, no matter which side of an issue your company was fighting.

BAUS: I think that’s largely true.

DOUGLASS: Is that part of your personality or did you really purposely conduct your business that way?

BAUS: Maybe it was a combination of the two. My wife likes to say that I am just a likable gentleman, anyway.

DOUGLASS: [Laughter] Maybe your wife is right.

BAUS: I have been called at times a lovable old curmudgeon. But I also was very careful about how I conducted myself.

DOUGLASS: It seems to me that it is an inherent problem in the kind of business you are in. If you are fighting for one side of an issue or one candidate, there is always the potential that
you could be viewed as the enemy by someone who
felt strongly on the other side.

**BAUS:** That's true. And sometimes that did happen
earlier in the career. With time I learned to
handle it in such a way that we kept the doors,
the avenues, and the feelings pretty well open.

**DOUGLASS:** Of course, there would be the up side of people
who agreed with you who might be more than
delighted to talk to you. That is the other
side of it, too.

**BAUS:** The icing on the cake.

**DOUGLASS:** You must have really enjoyed that. That sounds
like it is right up your alley.

**BAUS:** I thoroughly enjoyed that.

**DOUGLASS:** That meant traveling quite a bit?

**BAUS:** It always meant a lot of traveling. I made
regular tours around the state constantly.

**DOUGLASS:** When you talk about a fact sheet, Mr. Baus, you
must have a notion in your mind that a fact
sheet has got to be not too long but thorough.
Would a two-page fact sheet be your idea of a
fact sheet?

**BAUS:** Always a one- or two-page fact sheet.
Preferably one page.

**DOUGLASS:** A chronology of the problem?
BAUS: Exactly. Sometimes on some of the more complex issues possibly a longer document in addition. Even if I had what I call a "campaign bible" of any length, there was always a brief fact sheet.

DOUGLASS: What percentage of Braun and Company’s business was involved with political campaigns?

BAUS: Braun created a new entity called Braun Campaigns.

DOUGLASS: And that was what you were working for?

BAUS: That is what I was working for.

DOUGLASS: Was that Larry Fisher? Who was handling that part of Braun’s operation?

BAUS: Larry Fisher and [Douglas] Doug Jeffe were handling that part.

DOUGLASS: At that time?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: So you worked with them.

BAUS: That is really what I got in for. I bought stock in it.

DOUGLASS: This was a subsidiary of Braun and Company?

BAUS: This was a subsidiary of Braun and Company. I didn’t get involved at all in the other things that they did on the financial front.

DOUGLASS: So you were working for Braun Campaigns.
I worked until 1982 and stopped at that time, partially because Braun Campaigns, and with it the Braun involvement on the political front, was liquidated. They made the resolution to get out of the political campaign business for various reasons, including legal and tax reasons. And including the fact that it was interfering a little too much with some of their major thing, which was corporate activities.

Corporate relations, public relations.

That's right. Corporate and financial relations.

Are they completely out of that now?

They are out of it. They haven't been back into it since I left them.

One initiative I know that you were involved in was a greyhound racing initiative. I guess it was '75.

Seventy-six.

It was an initiative to introduce the racing of greyhound dogs into California.

That's right. And we opposed it. Our chief clients were... Braun, for years and years,
had a close relationship with Santa Anita Racetrack.

[End Tape 5, Side A]
Braun and Company had had a close relationship with Santa Anita Racetrack?
For many years. Santa Anita brought them into the thing to put together a campaign to defeat greyhound racing.
Besides the horseracing industry there must have been a coalition of other people who were opposing this.
Yes. I think most of the money came from that source, but some came from the theaters and general entertainment business.
Someone mentioned that the environmentalists even got into this and the people who were interested in the treatment of animals.
We stirred up as much as we could on other fronts, too.
So it was the horseracing industry that asked Braun Campaigns to work on this?
That's right.
And you were pulled in as a consultant to assist.
That's right.
What was the psychology or strategy of the campaign?
BAUS: One factor we ran into very heavily was—and we did get the SPCA [Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals] and the environmentalists involved in this too—dog racing was a very cruel sport. Animals were treated abusively and insensitively. As part of the process we publicized that and distributed material on this. We stirred up as much religious support as we could for the idea we didn’t need any further extension of gambling activities. Even though no stress was applied to the fact that our basic client was in just exactly that business. But we fought the greyhound group as one that would contribute disrepute to the very subject of gambling.

DOUGLASS: Was there a question here about the kind of people in the country who were doing greyhound racing?

BAUS: That’s right. We dug up and disseminated some information of some pretty bad elements that were behind it.

DOUGLASS: Incidentally, was gambling part of what you used to defeat the lottery in that first campaign?

BAUS: Of course.

DOUGLASS: So you were still working on that strategy?
BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Was there a lot of money poured in on the other side of this? Were they trying to break California?

BAUS: I think the other side made a pretty great effort because they thought if they could sell this in California, it would be a lot easier to sell it in other states too. But it did not develop into a runaway money campaign like the insurance issue generated in 1988, or like the tobacco industry always generates for any effort to limit smoking.

DOUGLASS: Now Doug Jeffe was specifically handling this item?

BAUS: Actually, the structure in Braun, Larry Fisher at that time was executive vice president of Braun and Company. In that capacity he oversaw the operation of Braun Campaigns and I think carried the title of chairman of that. Doug Jeffe was the president and CEO of the Braun Campaigns operation. Both Larry and Doug came to Braun out of the Orange County Democratic central committee, which they had professionally served in managerial capacities before. So they had political and Sacramento experience. Doug
Jeffe was the principal actor of the political arm.

DOUGLASS: You won that by 75 percent.

BAUS: Yes. It was a big win.

DOUGLASS: That is something whose time didn't come and may never come, do you think? Greyhound racing?

BAUS: I don't think it will. I don't think so.

DOUGLASS: Again, were you going around talking to editors? Did they use you for that specific issue?

BAUS: I did. I did that for every issue that Braun had during the seven years I worked with them.

DOUGLASS: So on any particular ballot proposition or issue you were brought in on that's what you did. But you did some of that contacting sort of in general, didn't you? If you went up north or you went to San Francisco or you went to Stockton, would you do a circuit where there wasn't an issue on the table?

BAUS: Yes. I would talk to chambers to commerce and friends of mine in various trade associations. I spent a great deal of time in Sacramento dealing with the press there, associations, legislators, and government agencies. We often staged press conferences there.
DOUGLASS: So were you on the knife-and-fork circuit a bit in terms of luncheon speaking? Or was this person-to-person talk?

BAUS: One-on-one [contact].

DOUGLASS: Have you ever done much luncheon speaking? Dinner speaking?

BAUS: I was pretty good at it. Over the years I did bit of it. Yes.

DOUGLASS: Anything particularly that you remember out of the Braun experience? This must have been kind of interesting. It is a huge company, but with this subsidiary you were in that small environment again. Was it more like Baus and Ross?

BAUS: In a way, yes.

DOUGLASS: Except it was part of a bigger organization.

BAUS: [Braun & Company was a big operation in corporate and financial terms. Braun Campaigns, the subsidiary, was small compared with Baus and Ross. But the two Braun operations lived under the same roof and had the same company infrastructure, bookkeeping, payroll, etc.]*

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
We had a big success getting legislation passed to try to bring trial lawyer abuse medical malpractice litigation under control. That was our first project in 1975.

DOUGLASS: Was that an initiative, Mr. Baus?

BAUS: No. It was taking something through the legislature to curb the activities of the trial lawyers. Our clients in that matter included several associations of doctors.

DOUGLASS: I take it this was a result of the malpractice situation in which doctors were very concerned about being vulnerable. Being sued.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Was this an attempt to pass legislation that would protect the doctors?

BAUS: Yes. I don’t remember the exact detail of the legislation now, but it was hard fought and we got it through.

DOUGLASS: So, in other words, it was the trial lawyers on one side and you on the other. You helped mold that legislation through the legislature and it did get passed.

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: That's '75. Anything else out of that period?
BAUS: They also had a proposition one year on interest rate limitation.

DOUGLASS: Which you mentioned earlier.

BAUS: Yes. And we had a statewide campaign on that. That was a rerun of the one I had in 1970. But, as I say, the time had come.

DOUGLASS: You were saying that, also, over the years, you had worked with law enforcement agencies. And with Braun and Company, you did work on a L.A. city police bond issue.

BAUS: One of my last major projects at Baus and Ross was an L.A. city bond issue. It was very successful. I had a lot of the same contacts still fresh when I worked with Braun.

DOUGLASS: Were these bonds for facilities for the police department? I am trying to think what a police department would need bonds for.


DOUGLASS: So it was for buildings.

BAUS: Building at the police academy. I think we did at least two campaigns for the P.D. [police department] when I was with Braun.

DOUGLASS: What kinds of things had you done with Baus and Ross for law enforcement? Same sort of thing?
BAUS: Same sort of thing. A major bond issue in '68. I managed all the campaigns for Pete Pitchess every four years starting in '54.

DOUGLASS: If that pretty well completes your recollections of anything significant out of that Braun and Company experience, we can go on to something you mentioned. You said you did some work in Arizona in 1962, when you were still Baus and Ross. What was that?

BAUS: That was very fascinating. I will make a note of something else that I want to tell you about later.

DOUGLASS: OK. One thing leads to another. First of all, let me ask, did you do much out-of-state work?

BAUS: In terms of our total spectrum, it was small.

DOUGLASS: How did you happen to be working in Arizona?

BAUS: I had a visit in the early sixties from a guy named Vaughn Pierce, who was the director of PR for the Salt River Project [SRP], which furnished water and power for the city of Phoenix and the surrounding metropolitan area. The Salt River Project was a major force in Arizona politics.

They had a healthy and horrendous rivalry with the Arizona Public Service Company, which
is the Southern California Edison of Arizona, a big investor-owned electrical utility. The Salt River Project was a co-op. As such they had certain tax advantages over any competition. And the big competition between the Salt River Project and APS, Arizona Public Service, was not over water. It was over the electric power. The Salt River Project was able to operate with certain income tax exemptions that all co-ops everywhere enjoy.

Actually, Bill Ross and I for many years, starting in 1957, had been involved with the California cotton industry in an effort to put together a nationwide campaign to limit the tax advantage of co-ops. That is a pretty big story in its own, too, that we might touch on later. So we did get involved in something national there.

Anyway, Vaughn Pierce wanted to engage us, Baus and Ross, to come over to Arizona and take a look at this thing and tell them whether they should plan to resist the effort that they saw certainly coming from Arizona Public Service to diminish their tax advantage.
BAUS: I went over and we looked into the thing. I laid out a program to them of doing some research through Dorothy Corey to see what public opinion would be, and analyzing how they would structure a campaign, what the effects would be, and what their chances of winning would be, and costs and so forth. Then if it was decided to have such a campaign, to run that, but that was down the road.

So we signed a contract, and I went over there several times. I took Dorothy Corey over, and we structured a poll. I put together a report, which included the poll on the whole thing. It was a very careful report on where we could expect opposition, where we could expect support. We were researched in depth.

And I came to the conclusion and reported it to the board of directors that they could win a showdown fight, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory not worth the cost and ill will. That it would be extremely bloody and costly. That it would make a number of enemies that would haunt them down through the years. And that it was questionable public relations for them to do this. That the cost to them, not only in money
but in goodwill, would be so great that in the bare bones essence there was a question whether they should do it. Even if they won the first round, eventually they must expect to lose.

I pointed out to the board that if they did do it, it would be a rich campaign for Baus and Ross, to be sure. But I was never going to recommend that they get into a campaign where, even if they won the actual showdown, it would be a Pyrrhic victory.

**DOUGLASS:** Did they agree with your conclusions then?

**BAUS:** They not only agreed with me, but they promptly sponsored the tax on themselves through the state legislature and submitted it and worked with Arizona Public Service to get it through. In my original report I encouraged that. I said, "Someday a tax is inevitable, even if you win this fight. You are not going to kill it. They will be back and back and back."

Maybe this is one of those times when if you figure out something that will appease the enemy and make them happy, but that you can live with, that this may be much better than the alternative of something they would seek to impose on you and could actually succeed. I
suggested their situation was one where by sponsoring a tax upon themselves they could live with they might well appease the opposition to the point of motivating them to settle the issue short of imposing—or trying to impose—a draconian tax.

DOUGLASS: Did you work with them on that strategy? Or did they do that themselves?

BAUS: They did that themselves by going to the legislature. They didn’t need Baus and Ross for that move. There was no problem. They said, "Here, tax us." They wooed all the people that wanted to tax them onto their side, so it was unanimous.

DOUGLASS: Do you think it really proved out that they were benefitted by going that route?

BAUS: They were very happy. That’s what counts.

DOUGLASS: That’s fascinating.

BAUS: I did have one other campaign.

DOUGLASS: In Arizona?

BAUS: In Arizona. Which is partially a result of this and partially from my long-established contacts from the California real estate industry. A measure came to Arizona for the state ballot which would require that anybody completing a
real estate transaction would have to involve a lawyer for services that realtors perform as a matter of course. In other words, before you could sell a piece of property you had to hire a lawyer to get in on the act. It was strictly a make-work proviso.

This upset the real estate industry so much that they wanted to make a national issue of it, if necessary. The California Real Estate Association head was [Jackson] Jack Pontius, who later headed NAREB, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, and the L.A. Realty Board [head] was Earl Anderson, and they jointly came to me and asked if I would get involved in this thing to help the Arizona realtors beat this. I had my own opinion about lawyers. So it was a chance to get revenge and make a legitimate profit on it. That was good news for Baus and Ross. So I went over and helped them structure a campaign.

DOUGLASS: In Arizona.

BAUS: In Arizona. We won it handily.

DOUGLASS: Was this a matter of a piece of legislation or something that went on a ballot?
BAUS: It was an initiative sponsored by the Arizona bar association.

DOUGLASS: So you had to defeat the proposition. And you won, I assume.

BAUS: Won it two- or three-to-one.

DOUGLASS: The involvement of lawyers in real estate transactions seems to be an eastern phenomenon and, to my knowledge, has never taken hold in the West.

BAUS: Exactly.

DOUGLASS: You said, over the years, you had been involved in the problem of tax advantages for co-ops. I would like to pursue that a little bit with you. When did you first get interested in that question, Mr. Baus, or drawn into it?

BAUS: In 1957, we were approached by [J. E.] Jack O’Neill, who was a close friend of Bill Ross because they worked together on the two major statewide campaigns involving taxation of private schools. They wanted us to look into the subject of co-ops and their tax advantage and what might be done about it. So a contract was executed, and we went to work.

DOUGLASS: What was Jack O’Neill’s position?
BAUS: He was a major stockholder in the hierarchy of Producers Cottonseed Oil Corporation, the biggest cotton processor in California.

DOUGLASS: So he was looking at agricultural products as a nonco-op producer.

BAUS: Yes. An investor-owned operation. Included in this consortium were the Boswell Corporation, which was very big in the cotton business.

DOUGLASS: That is a big agribusiness up in the [San Joaquin] valley. Boswell.

BAUS: One of the biggest. Bigger than ever now. Also the California Cottonseed Oil Company, of which [William B.] Bill Coberly [Jr.] was president, and the [James] Camp interests in Bakersfield. Those were the four majors. I don’t know whether Dorothy Corey touched on this or not. She got involved in this act, too.

DOUGLASS: I don’t believe she got into this one.

BAUS: We wanted to start out by testing the air to see what the grower and public opinion might be in the agricultural regions themselves on this subject. Privately owned companies had never gotten anywhere down through the years in congress. The co-ops seemed to have a stranglehold.
DOUGLASS: Could you explain the tax advantage that they held?

BAUS: Yes. A cooperative does not have to pay an income tax on a profit generated by its operation. I am trying to remember how this works. Various growers or members of the co-op and the profits that are generated by a co-op which serves them is not considered a profit as such because technically it is passed on to them in the form of lower costs.

DOUGLASS: Lower costs and shares. So there is no actual money exchanged?

BAUS: Yes. So they can compete with private companies like our clients to advantage because our clients do have to pay an income tax on their operation before any of these benefits go back to the stockholders, the customers, and the suppliers.

DOUGLASS: So you were fighting to set up a system whereby whatever would be comparable to profit would be taxed?

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Nothing had worked in congress up to this point.

BAUS: That's right. The privately owned companies just didn't get anywhere with it at all.
DOUGLASS: How would you explain it, Mr. Baus, that it didn’t get anywhere?

BAUS: It always baffled me. I think the co-ops were almost sacred icons and considered untouchables.

DOUGLASS: Would there be a lot of pressure on senators and congressmen from these farm areas to not do this?

BAUS: Yes. I have never understood the power of agricultural interests in Washington. In the latter days I still don’t understand it because as time passes and development intensifies agriculture becomes a relatively less important factor in the total political spectrum. But they have never lost their power. They still get those huge agricultural subsidies plus all kinds of perks and legislative favors.

DOUGLASS: Do you think that has something to do with seniority and the incumbency factor?

BAUS: It’s possible, but there is a lot more to it.

DOUGLASS: At any rate, you were hired to do this in California, is that right?

BAUS: We were hired to just look at this and see what we could recommend. See if we could figure out something they could do.
DOUGLASS: You were to study the issue and to come up with a plan?

BAUS: What we came up with was a proposal that a national study be made to really get to the bottom of this thing and find out some of the answers to all the questions that occur to you and that occur to me on why this existed and whether it should exist. What the alternatives to it were.

We talked to Arthur Little & Company and other big research enterprises and had a number of a meetings where we brought together companies from other industries all over the country, like Cargill [Co.], the big grain people in Minneapolis. Ralston Purina [Co.] in St. Louis. Monsanto [Corp.], the chemical titan, and various other companies which were processors of agricultural products. We staged a number of meetings with these people all over the country.

DOUGLASS: You were trying to get ideas from them about what strategies to use?

BAUS: Yes. Trying to get them together on a program so that they would actually involve a research company and put together enough money to come up
with a program for action in Washington. We had a number of meetings over a period of ten years, but we never could get a focus of activity on this thing. There were too many disparate, widespread different groups. We just never could marshal a consortium that would agree on all these things. One of our major hurdles was the apprehension that any group activity on this might be vulnerable to attack. Also Baus and Ross represented one industry only. All the others were in no way beholden to us. So they tended to think, "Who are these guys and why do we need them?" A good question, except no one else was ready to step in and take over. But, I think we came pretty close. As far as I know, we came as close as anybody or any group ever did to putting something together on this.

DOUGLASS: Had there been any successes on this in states as far as state taxing?

BAUS: Not that we ever knew of.

DOUGLASS: Were you ever asked to work on that in California? In other words, did you ever come up with a strategy to put that on the table?

BAUS: This is a national problem rather than a state problem.
DOUGLASS: I guess it wouldn’t work. You would have to have the national precedent, wouldn’t you? You could not do it state by state.

BAUS: I don’t think that would work.

DOUGLASS: That was the end of that story. Nothing has ever happened, right?

BAUS: Nothing has ever happened, at least that I know of. But I enjoyed the effort very much. [Arthur] Art Kemp worked with me on that.

DOUGLASS: Right. Arthur Kemp at Claremont McKenna College. At the [Claremont] Graduate School, too, I think.

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: Did you work with anybody else at the Claremont Colleges?

BAUS: No.

[Interruption]

DOUGLASS: You were saying that you would like to discuss the 1956 Metropolitan Water District [MWD] bonds. What was the issue?

BAUS: The Metropolitan Water District had a PR director named [Donald] Don Kinsey, who was a genuine old curmudgeon and a delightful fellow when you got under his armor. He approached me about Easter weekend of 1956, and he said that
suddenly Governor Goodie Knight had signed a bond issue—not giving them very much time—for a quarter of a billion [$256 million] to complete the Colorado River project. And would I put a campaign together for them even though the June '56 primary was coming up in only two months? They were pretty worried about having such short notice.

I said, "Yes. Baus and Ross can do that." He said, "Have a little plan for me, and we will have a meeting. And a budget." I came together with them with a blueprint including a budget covering what I thought they should do and how to do it in two months time. The precis detailed the different things that we were to produce with a proposed budget. Kinsey bought it hook, line and sinker. He said, "I don’t know how the hell you can do all this in so little time, but let’s start." He thought our fee was a little high, and he chopped some out of the fee. The rest of the budget he accepted intact.

So they authorized us to go ahead with it. I got busy. It was sort of a model campaign in respect to financing because in those days MWD
BAUS: did what their lawyers might not let them do today. They financed it. So we didn’t have to worry about raising the money. I personally produced the copy for all of these documents. A fact sheet, a folder, a political pamphlet, outdoor advertising poster copy and art, letters to the editor. Everything we wanted to send out. One after another. I put all this together over one weekend. He had given me the requested information and material to work with. In a week’s time, we were in print with proofs of all of these things. And we were in business with plans to see every editor in the MWD area, to explain to them why we needed this. To win support for it throughout the five-county district, we would take it before the L.A. Chamber [of Commerce] and other groups.

DOUGLASS: This was a state water bond issue, of which MWD would get some?

BAUS: It was not a state issue. It was an issue on the state election primary, but it was to be voted on only in the counties served by MWD. Which is really essentially most of the southern part of the state.
DOUGLASS: It was regional and would go on the ballots in the appropriate counties. So this is an example of having to put something together very quickly?

BAUS: In ten days time Don was so happy with all this that he said, "I am going to increase the budget substantially so we can produce these things and get them out in heavy enough volume to saturate the market." It included billboards, quarter cards. The one-fourth size of small billboards, the A-boards that Kennedy used to put out. [Baus and Ross had a special working relationship with George Kennedy whereby he'd give us first call on A-boards, which were available in supply almost short of demand. We preferred to use these 6-sheets (one-fourth the size of 24-sheet billboards), for bond issues. They got the message over a forcefully as the billboards without the impression of a lavish outlay of money.]* It included radio spots. TV was not very big yet. We didn't go into TV. It included a heavy schedule of newspaper ads. Kinsey said, "I cut your fee. I am now

*Herbert M. Baus added the preceding bracketed material during his review of the draft transcript.
restoring it to the full amount that you asked for. Without your asking me to do it I am just going to do that right now."

DOUGLASS: A happy client.

BAUS: A very happy client. Well, we got all of these things produced. We got everything done. We put on the campaign, and we won the thing thirteen-to-one, which may be a margin not exceeded by a bond issue before or since. So that was a model campaign in the sense of how much you can do and how fast you can do it, if you have the money you need from the outset.

DOUGLASS: You hadn't worked on water bonds before, had you? This was a new experience?

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: That was one of your big glowing early successes.

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: But enough money to do it right.

BAUS: Enough money to do it right, on the line from the outset, and for sure.

DOUGLASS: Is that a constant frustration, Mr. Baus, in terms of campaign funding? You think you have the right plan and you know you could do it, but you are constantly fighting the lack of funds.
BAUS: Lack of funds, uncertainty of funds, and early uncertainty of when funds would be available. It was especially true in those early days in the business. Today, it seems to me that some of these campaigns have an unhealthy surplus of too much money. They seem to trigger them into doing silly things to get "all that" money spent.

DOUGLASS: [Laughter] That's an interesting point. All right. Let's talk about the profession a little bit. You have been around since the beginning, or virtually almost the beginning, particularly in our part of the world. The West. How do you feel about the question of professional standards for political consultants?

BAUS: I think it is a fine thing for them to have professional standards. How are you going to enforce them? In other words, you have professional standards for lawyers and doctors, and they are enforced by a licensing apparatus based upon four years of special advanced education plus review boards and a whole structure of the professional establishment. Are you speaking of trying to organize this profession that much?
DOUGLASS: Yes. I am going to ask the question: Should there be some form of registration for political consulting firms?

BAUS: That's been debated. It would be terribly hard to define and enforce. Campaigning is a unique kind of a profession. I don't know whether it would work. Whether as a practical matter it is doable. To define specific standards and enforce the standards. Political campaigning is more of an art than a science. Medicine is more of a science, and the law to some degree is, too, I think.

Political campaign managers. Where do they come from? They don't come from any particular background. They don't come from having degrees in college. They don't come from being English professors or lawyers or chemists, although a surprising number of lawyers get into political campaigns and have from the start. It just takes a certain type of animal that takes to this arena. To a large degree, it is applied common sense and strategy. However, the whole matter is getting more and more to be a subject that is looked at by congress and state legislatures.
There was a proposal in 1985 that [Senator Alfred E.] Alquist carried and supported by the FPPC [Fair Political Practices Commission] chairman, a man named Dan [L.] Stanford, to establish the licensing and regulation of paid political consultants. One of the things it would have required would be the financial disclosure requirement that is now imposed on government officials. In other words, where is the money coming from that supports the campaign, I suppose is the point of that. And that failed. What do you think of something like that? Do you think that is too radical to try to do?

I think full financial disclosure is a healthy thing. I would like to see it. I would buy that and that would definitely include, in detail, who put up the money.

The disclosure part?

Sure. When a campaign is put together, it should be made a matter of public record. Who is putting up the money and how much.

You would feel you could conduct your business on that basis?
BAUS: I think so. Actually, as far as the profession itself is concerned there is now a national society of political campaign consultants.

DOUGLASS: The American Association of Political Consultants. They do have a code of ethics.

BAUS: That is what it is. That came after my time.

DOUGLASS: You didn’t have a network?

BAUS: It wasn’t a matter of we wouldn’t join it. It wasn’t there. I don’t know who is and who is not members. I don’t know what the code of ethics provides.

DOUGLASS: I have an excerpt from their code of ethics. Here it is: "To appeal to the good and commendable ideals of the American voters and not to indulge in irrational appeals"--then there is a little break in there--"and not to disseminate false or misleading information intentionally and not to indulge in any activity which corrupts or degrades the practice of political campaigning."

BAUS: That’s pretty general. As the lawyers would say, it lacks depth.

DOUGLASS: Right. As you say, how do you cite somebody for failure to do that and enforce it?
BAUS: You should read the articles by Robert Caro in the *New Yorker* since October about political campaign activities of and on the behalf of Lyndon Johnson.

DOUGLASS: I will make a point. In the last few issues?

BAUS: The first one started in October. Usually, the *New Yorker* runs them in consecutive issues. They ran one in October and said, "A series of articles on this will appear from time to time." The first one was in October and after two or three weeks another one ran. Then all of a sudden in January or February they ran four consecutively. Now I understand it has come out in book form.

[End Tape 5, Side B]
DOUGLASS: The sense of what we are talking about may come down to your perception of the state of affairs of the business of political consulting in today's world. In fact, what would be of interest would be talking about this early period of the forties and fifties when you started out, as compared to the time you opted out of the business as a major actor, and today. You obviously must have thought about this. Do you see more problems than were there when you started? Are there more outstanding bad players? Let's put it that way.

BAUS: I see lots of money on some campaigns, so large that I could only use the adjective obscene to describe it. I think this is unhealthy, even pathological. I think a lot of this money is spent foolishly. Some of it is spent unconscionably. I don't like the dissemination of filth. And I don't mean pornography. I mean lies. I mean character assassination.

This ran riot in the insurance wars on the ballot of the last election year, which was 1988, in California. I think something like $13 million or more was spent on those things. And
they were so bad I couldn't vote for any of them in good conscience. They were very confusing. I think it ended that everybody was confused, including the guys that wrote the checks for all that money. It was utterly ridiculous and stupid. I used to think and to say that I will always make a choice on the ballot. Even if all options are bad, there must be one that is the best available, and I will vote that way. But those insurance things were all so muddy I couldn't tell, and didn't know who could tell, which was the better or worse choice. So I voted no across-the-board.

And what was accomplished? Total bewilderment and bafflement of the public. That is about the only thing I could see that was accomplished. But I don't know how you can control that, by legislation or by licensing.

**DOUGLASS:** Perhaps we are getting into this other problem that a complex problem like that should be solved in the legislature rather than come to the point where it is solved at the ballot box.

**BAUS:** True. But, alas, the legislature (state and federal alike) seems increasingly incapable of making decisions even though that is their sole
raison d'etre. And there is no doubt that an unhealthy amount of money is spent on political campaigning.

DOUGLASS: So somehow controlling the finance side is key to improving the situation?

BAUS: Yes. Although I don't have any specific panaceas to throw into the pot at this point. I do know that at some time Bill and I have said, "We were born twenty years too soon."

DOUGLASS: You mean you would have liked to have been in the action now?

BAUS: We would have liked to have been exposed to this kind of money. This kind of money was unheard of for political campaigns in our time. Unheard of and inconceiveable. We did have a couple of million-dollar campaigns. But they were just a little over a paltry million dollars, even if we did think them pretty big at the time.

DOUGLASS: Is the change that in today's world it is accepted wisdom that you must get a political consultant to help you, which wasn't accepted wisdom when you started out?

BAUS: We were looking today at the Times at how in the town of Mission Viejo they put a recall campaign up to try to knock a city councilman out of
office. The Mission Viejo Company was interested in this. That company put up several hundred thousand dollars for miniscule Mission Viejo.

DOUGLASS: I think almost $500,000.

BAUS: Almost half a million dollars. There is 76,000 population in Mission Viejo. This made the public so mad that apparently they arose in wrath and voted for this guy instead of to depose him as the sponsors recommended.

DOUGLASS: They voted in reaction to the money being spent.

BAUS: I read the first story on this before the election, and I thought, "If I lived in Mission Viejo, I would vote against this just because of all that money." And that is just what the voters did.

DOUGLASS: That is a case in which the city would need to pass an ordinance saying there is a limit, a cap, on what you can spend on a campaign. That is something one would not have anticipated necessarily.

BAUS: No. But it is a good illustration of the unhealthy sums of money. But limiting the amount by law is a difficult thing to do.
DOUGLASS: Why is so much money being allocated in this kind of thing? Are the stakes so great and the capability of winning such that the people are going to do it?

BAUS: There is a school of thought that the biggest budget wins. But it often works out the other way. The oil unitization law of 1956, even under the euphemistic banner "conservation," crashed down. The insurance campaigns were all smeared. Merely spending too much can backfire.

There is another factor. We have had inflation. Our currency has been debased by a succession of horrible deficits. Who knows to what degree that explains how this thing has gotten madly beyond control.

DOUGLASS: Beyond the amount of money that is spent. Why don't we talk about the ethics of what is done in campaigns. I know there are more players in the game, but, let's say, in the sixties when political consultants established a beachhead, do you think there are more problems in terms of ethics today than there were then? Or do you think, all things being equal, it is not that much different?
The cast was 100 percent human then, and it's 100 percent human now. I don't like to present a parade of pomposity. But the hell and brimstone fury of political attack has reached an intensity we never experienced. The negative vote seems to have taken the upper hand. Bill and I tried to maintain our own standards. We believed that the truth properly presented would prevail in most cases.

There must have been some things going on in those days that upset you.

Yes. There were, but nothing like what I see today.

Is it partly scale? Is it partly this money that makes it possible to do those things on a bigger basis? Or is this accepted practice?

In 1956, we had an oil conservation amendment measure on the state ballot. Proposition 4. The major oil companies got together and hired Whitaker and Baxter. They raised and spent between $5 and $6 million. At that time that was the most extreme parade of financial flamboyance that we saw in our career. Whitaker and Baxter senior made enough money to retire on out of that campaign and did retire on it. They
spent the money, which was the most unheard of sum at the time, and for many years after remained unsurpassed. And they lost the campaign.

DOUGLASS: They did. How amazing.

BAUS: We wanted in the worst way to get on the other side of that campaign because we thought we could beat them. There were some people who had different ideas. Some of the leaders of the campaign against that conservation measure wanted us, but some didn’t. The ones who didn’t prevailed. We didn’t approve of the way their eventual campaign was run. It was the one that showed sharks swallowing small fish and so forth. Anyway, notwithstanding such poppycock, they did beat it. They beat it handily. That was an example of a very stupid piece of legislation that was so bad that it fell on its own weight. I don’t think there was any way to save that campaign.

DOUGLASS: You said this was in the fifties?

BAUS: Nineteen fifty-six.

DOUGLASS: It was on the ballot?

BAUS: It was on the ballot. An oil conservation measure. But it was so complicated and so
unwieldy in its provisions that it almost defeated itself. "The confused voter always votes no," we always said, and he did with a vengeance on this one.

**DOUGLASS:** But you said Whitaker and Baxter were hired to work for that measure.

**BAUS:** That's right. They were hired to work for it. They spent the money. Clem Whitaker Sr. and Leone Baxter, his wife, made enough money out of it to retire. The firm was carried on by Clem Jr.

**DOUGLASS:** Who were the backers?

**BAUS:** The independent oil people were against it. For it, were Standard Oil Co., as the leader, Mobil Oil Co., Shell [Oil Co.], Texaco [Oil Co.], Richfield. Those are the ones who were for it. Union Oil Co. was on the other side. Union was the only major on the no side. Union was on the other side with a lot of independent oil producers.

**DOUGLASS:** This had to do with the concept of units and how you pulled the oil out of the fields. It was complicated.

**BAUS:** It was.
DOUGLASS: So the independents felt they were being taken advantage of. All right. I do recall that. And it was complicated, as I understand it.

BAUS: The independents put up over a million dollars. And they beat it. That was an illustration of several of these things. You had a bad piece of legislation. You had an almost obscenely excessive amount of money. You had utter confusion on the part of everybody, including many of the spokesmen of the sponsoring companies. And you had failure. That was a sort of a prelude to the type of thing that we saw in the insurance campaign and several others that went on the ballot of late years.

DOUGLASS: It is a mentality that we will just go over the cliffs anyway and spend any amount of money without thinking about realities?

BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: Incidentally, did you ever work on the wording of ballot propositions? Would you people help, in some situations, write the wording or were you always called in after that was in place?

BAUS: I think there were a couple where we did. You would think that consultants would be called in at that initial stage more often. I know of one
instance. Our old mentor, Frank Doherty, was extremely clever. For years and years they had tried to get a raise for the county board of supervisors. And the board of supervisors made $9,600 a year it seemed like forever. Every time they went out and asked the public for a raise, they were defeated, defeated, defeated.

So Frank Doherty came into the picture—and I was associated with him at the time—with a new measure to get them a pay raise. The wording of the measure was not that they should have a pay raise to $12,000 a year or anything like that. This time the measure was worded: "The salary of a member of the board of supervisors shall not exceed that of a superior court judge." I think a superior court judge then got about $13,000 or something like that. It passed. After years of being defeated, with this beguiling use of the English language, it passed.

DOUGLASS: That is precisely what the L.A. city council is tinkering with now. To link their salary to superior court judges. That is exactly what they are arguing for right now. I guess the difference is now that everybody knows. It is
so public what that amount is. Maybe that is the way they will word it on the city ballot.

BAUS: Anyway, that made the board of supervisors happy at last. That is an example of how.

DOUGLASS: To put the case?

BAUS: That's right. Doherty was not a professional consultant per se, but he was a very shrewd political advisor.

DOUGLASS: He came after failure, failure, failure. So then they got smart.

BAUS: Frank Doherty was a craft, canny, old curmudgeon.

DOUGLASS: It doesn't sound like you have ever been in on a proposition from its birth in the sense that you were pulled in and it evolved. Practically, you were always called in when the issue was set?

BAUS: In the main, that's true.

DOUGLASS: How about in terms of candidates? I know you didn't do as many candidates. But were you ever called in at the point at which a candidate is being selected?

BAUS: I guess the closest answer to that--and I don't know whether this is a fair answer--came in 1961 as to whether Poulson should have a third term.
DOUGLASS: You put on that dinner. You were part of the pressure to get him to run.

Let me go back again to get your final word about the state of political consulting. Do you think there are some things that could be done to improve the situation? You certainly have mentioned financial disclosure as being something you could go along with. Do you think there are any other things that could be done? Would you go so far as to limit campaign spending?

BAUS: I don't think it would work, although it is an attractive thing to say, "Yes. I would." I don't know how you would effectively set the limits as a practical matter.

DOUGLASS: Nationally, we have tried to limit candidates' campaigns. But this question of ballot issues has not been treated. It is a challenging one, isn't it? How do you approach that problem? The very one you are saying is almost obscene, the amount of money being spent.

BAUS: I think that if you are going to consider legislation, one of the things you have to consider is whether it is enforceable. I don't know how, as a practical matter, you could
enforce any limitation on campaign spending. For example, if you have a measure on the ballot of the state of California and you have a limitation on spending of, let's say, $2 million for one issue, presumably that means that if there were a statewide campaign that the sponsoring group would have a legal limit of $2 million that it could spend. What is to prevent the development of a campaign in San Diego that would spend a million dollars of its own? And the development of a campaign in San Francisco to spend another million. One in the city of Los Angeles that will spend three million. And one in San Bernardino. One in Pasadena.

DOUGLASS: So you can only hold accountable the statewide effort. So if it is organized in regions, you can't control it?

BAUS: That's right. What is to stop people from organizing two or three statewide efforts? And the first amendment comes into play here. Multiple campaigns have been done in some cases for other reasons.

DOUGLASS: There is always the strategy available, which is used anyway, and that is you put another measure on the ballot that is a lesser evil than the one
you are fighting. You can have more measures. A lot of different things could happen to make the waters murkier?

BAUS: That is what happened in the insurance deal. They put one in right after another. They tried to straighten out something that is not capable of being straightened out. And many factions of the multi-faceted insurance industry got into the act.

DOUGLASS: A lot of money, as you say. One could only wish that that money would go towards solving the problem.

BAUS: I don’t see as a practical matter how in the world a financial maximum could possibly work.

DOUGLASS: What about the technological changes in the business? It is fascinating. I was talking with Dorothy Corey about starting out with the IBM [International Business Machines] punch cards and where they have gone now. In the period in which you were really active, let’s take to 1969, were there some technological things available to you in that period that made a drastic change in how you could conduct business?
I think the use of computers and direct mailing was in its infancy then. But I think it was getting under way. It has become a very big thing.

You were just getting into that world when you left. That was just beginning.

That's right. The use of television in political campaigning also existed, but it has really ballooned and been refined a lot since then. I am sure there are refinements of the use of computers. The more you can personalize a campaign the more effective it is. Even today, I don't know how effective it is to send too much of that computerized direct mail. I get a piece of mail, "Dear Mr. Baus," and "Mr. Baus" appears throughout it so that it is almost offensive. It is so artificial. You know what I mean?

I know what you mean. You know that it has been fed into the system, and it is churning this out to everybody.

But I do think that a more suave and subtle application of the computer art is possible. So certain information will reach me, and it won't be addressed to "Dear Mr. Baus," but it will be
concentrated on subjects that are of interest to me because the computer has accurately classified me.

DOUGLASS: You can be targeted.

BAUS: So I can be targeted. And if I don’t know if I am being targeted, it might be effective.

DOUGLASS: Now what about on the cost side? I get the impression that mailing, the cost of using the post office, has become quite a problem in terms of what it costs you to put a piece of literature in your hands. Do you think that has changed?

BAUS: Not at all. Postage is the major cost factor. Postage goes up all the time.

DOUGLASS: As to the percentage it takes of your effort to send out printed material in the mail, do you think that’s proportionately higher?

BAUS: No question about it.

DOUGLASS: So the basic costs in conducting campaigns have gone up overall probably, just because, I suppose, people try to do more. In other words, if you can potentially target all these people, you can play around with all these various things, this can be immensely expensive.
BAUS: It is immensely expensive. To get back to that Lyndon Johnson series in the *New Yorker*, this goes into detail about how much money he spent. The biggest sum of money ever spent in a senate race in the state of Texas. And how it was spent and how it was applied to the dissemination of deliberate lies and misrepresentations and how effective this was.

DOUGLASS: What about timing, Mr. Baus? We are right now discussing maybe moving a presidential, and possibly state, primary in California to March. What about timing? What do you think that would do? If it were moved, do you think that the state primary ought to stay with the presidential or should be separated out? Have you thought about it at all?

BAUS: How did you word your question?

DOUGLASS: My question is this: The timing and linkage of national elections and state elections and then the amount of time that elapses between holding those primaries and the November election. Now they are discussing the possibility of moving up the presidential primary to March. As a subset of that, some are arguing that you should keep the state primaries with that. Others are
arguing, "No, just have the presidential primary and hold the state primary in June or September."

BAUS: In other words, you would vote for the presidential candidates in March and have another election in June for state offices and state offices.

DOUGLASS: You could. Or you could keep them together. I was just wondering if, in your mind, it would be disastrous to hold the state primary in March with the presidential.

BAUS: I have always thought the best solution would be to have a single national primary day for the presidency. Whenever it is. If it is in March, you pick an (evening) hour, whatever it may be, maybe ten o'clock in New York. Then it would make it seven o'clock here. You would close polls at the same time so it would be impossible for the California polls to be open after they closed on the East Coast. Now they get all the news of what is going on back there and people on the West Coast feel, "Why the hell should I vote?" So if you have one uniform primary, that would solve the problem.

DOUGLASS: For the national.
BAUS: That's right.

DOUGLASS: That's an interesting answer. Now let's talk about state politics. Do you have a feeling about how much time should elapse between a primary and a general election? Thinking of candidates. You worked with candidates. Do you think from June to November is too long? Do you think from March to November would be just ridiculous?

BAUS: I think March is too early. There is an awful long time between March and November, and after the holidays it doesn't allow much time to crank up for March. I don't see how you can get the campaign going until after New Year's. People are tied up with the holidays and the football and all the rest of it.

DOUGLASS: It is interesting that Governor Deukmejian has tossed out the thought of holding the state primary in September.

BAUS: I think that is too close.

DOUGLASS: Of course, woven into this discussion is the whole question of reapportionment, which will be coming up. Which is another complicating factor because there is the fear on the part of the Republican party that reapportionment will not
be in place by early in 1992. So people would be running in their old districts. This is further complicating this discussion. That is why I was intrigued with the whole business of timing.

BAUS: I think if we had a national primary, then we would have to address the issue that you brought up: Shall a national primary be limited to the presidential?

DOUGLASS: Do you see an upside or a downside on that in terms of turnout? For an interest in the state primary.

BAUS: If you had a presidential primary on a different day than the state primary, it would hurt the turnout on the state primary. No question about it. I think I would be for having the primary on the same day.

DOUGLASS: Have you ever been frustrated about the time period between the primary and the general elections. Our standard modus operandi in California is June to November. Was that always a comfortable time frame for you to work on campaigns?

BAUS: I thought it was fairly good. I think the primary day should be sometime after March and
certainly before September. Even May might be better.

**DOUGLASS:** Do you have any feelings, in general, about collapsing the amount of time that leads up to an election campaign. I think the most obvious example is the presidential one. But we could take it to the state level and talk about the gubernatorial one. The standard criticism that it is too long. It drags out. It becomes counterproductive after a while. Do you have any feelings about that? The length of time that one is involved in candidacy.

**BAUS:** It would be healthy to compress the time. Maybe that would help reduce the obscene amounts of money.

**DOUGLASS:** Yes. You can only do so much in so much time. Then it is more of a challenge as to how clever you are in doing that, I suppose.

**BAUS:** If you have a Labor Day primary and the election on its present first Tuesday in November--the first Tuesday in September would be right after Labor Day--and some way of starting the campaigning right after the Fourth of July so that the first half of the even-number years would be spared. I think there is too much
overexposure and it does wear people out. It vitiates the quality of campaigning. It stimulates the expenditure of excess sums of money. There might be a lot of virtue to that compression.

DOUGLASS: It is interesting to toy around with those ideas. I am doubly intrigued by your insights because you have been in the trenches, so to speak, working these things, and have some idea of the kind of crisis management you have to go into. So often, it seems to me, that you have had to go into a campaign that is suddenly there and you have to develop a fairly complicated [strategy].

BAUS: Well, that MWD bond issue was a good example.

DOUGLASS: Yes. On the other hand, maybe that is not all bad. It is a test of the talents of people. If everybody had to do that on an equal basis, maybe it would be healthy. In other words, if everybody had only a fairly short period to get their act together.

BAUS: That might clean up the stage a little bit.

DOUGLASS: I think we can wind down here. If you have any overall observations, I would very much like to
get them now. Is there something that I have failed to ask you?

BAUS: I think you are a splendid interviewer. I can't think of anything you have overlooked. I will admit that I have been so preoccupied with being the nursemaid and the assistant doctor that I have not had time to think about much else too seriously. One publication down here wants me to do a writing job that I am interested in doing. I said, "When we get her [Mrs. Baus] all well, I will come down to talk to you."

DOUGLASS: Which reminds me, that is one thing I really didn't wind up. You did engage in another activity after you did the political consulting with Braun. When was it you started to write for the Orange County Register?

BAUS: Dorothy Corey, who did most of my research down through the years, was the marketing consultant for the Orange County Register for twenty or more years and a close personal friend, as well. Dorothy, Helene, and I shared in a lot of "shagging" restaurants, which is my term for trying out different restaurants and new restaurants. Among other things Dorothy recommended to the Register for a long period of
time was that they should have an independent restaurant critic. They finally said, "OK. We’ll go. Now you help us find one."

So she came to me and said, "I have got something that is made to order for you. You love to eat, you love to go to restaurants, and you love to write. Here is a newspaper, a big one, that is looking for a critic. Why don’t you do this?" I said, "I am interested." So I went down to see [James] Jim Dean, the editor, on a day in 1977. We talked about it. We made certain agreements on the perimeters. He said, "Write half a dozen columns and see what happens." And I did that. And I never stopped until 1988, when I retired.

**DOUGLASS:** How many restaurants a week would you visit doing that?

**BAUS:** I wrote about two [columns] a week for years for the Register. I visited a lot more restaurants than that at times.

**DOUGLASS:** When you went into a restaurant, you were anonymous?

**BAUS:** That’s right. That overlapped with my experience with Braun for several years. So I was doing Braun things as well the Register
until 1982, in the middle of which Braun
Campaigns was liquidated. I was ready to
concentrate full time on the Register. It was
about that time they came along, maybe it was
earlier than that, that the paper wanted two a
week. It was getting to be a little much.

DOUGLASS: That meant you had to eat out quite a few times.

BAUS: That’s right. I had a lot of other things with
that. For a while we got out an annual dining
edition. I got out a book about every three
years on the best restaurants in Orange County.

DOUGLASS: As I recall, you mentioned that you covered the
whole spectrum. You went to the inexpensive as
well the expensive. The holes-in-the-wall kinds
of places.

BAUS: That’s right. I went to holes-in-the-wall. No
fast food [restaurants]. Nothing like that.
Any serious restaurant. You know, a hole-in-
the-wall can be a very determined restaurant.

DOUGLASS: Yes. That is an interesting facet of your
multi-faceted career. I want to thank you very
much.

BAUS: I will say one more thing. I have often thought
that it would be a good idea that the state
chamber of commerce, or some other agency that
is interested in being a watchdog of politics in California for the conservative business establishment, might very profitably hire somebody like me, or Bill and me together, to be their campaign consultant on a basis of not being active, not running the campaign, not getting into the daily thing, not writing the material. But sitting like you sit on a board of directors and having the problems come up and getting our input on what arguments should be used? Is this a good plan of campaign or would you suggest this modification? Is Jack and Jones a good firm to hire or not?

DOUGLASS: You would be neutral. And I gather you are saying that this might help the standards?

BAUS: I think it would. I would be terribly interested in it. I would like to do it. For example, they have a campaign that almost came along this year on the subject of the split-roll property tax. The split-roll tax would mean that they would soak business double what they would charge a private homeowner.

DOUGLASS: Yes. This is the fallout from the [Howard] Jarvis [tax rollback].
BAUS: Yes. The state chamber, according to the Wall Street Journal, was gearing up for a mighty effort to defeat this. I am sure it would have generated several million dollars compared perhaps to several hundred thousand in my day. I was thinking I have a lot of ideas on some things that could be done to defeat this thing. They might also avoid some very foolish and counterproductive or unproductive mistakes by getting an old warhorse to sit in there . . .

DOUGLASS: Who doesn't have an axe to grind.

BAUS: That’s right.

DOUGLASS: Do you think the chamber would go for something like that? Kirk West is head of the state chamber. Isn’t Ray Remy head of the L.A. chamber?

BAUS: Yes.

DOUGLASS: Who is a CMC [Claremont McKenna College] graduate. It would be interesting to see if they would buy in.

BAUS: In our day, we used to represent those interests. That is where our hearts lay. I was a chamber-of-commerce man before I got into campaigns at all. If it was presented to them they might be interested.
DOUGLASS: There are some informal ways like that to get at the business of ethics and standards also. As well as more effective campaigns.

BAUS: If an outfit like the state chamber wanted to consider doing something like that, they could certainly, I believe, profit from the input of an old veteran. I just feel that maybe with all the experience we’ve had, and we still have pretty good brainpower, we comprise a resource that might make a contribution, to call on us in such a capacity. They would be under no obligation to follow our advice. But they would have the benefit of it to weigh it.

DOUGLASS: Maybe you ought to pursue that.

BAUS: I really would like to. I could have dinner sometime very quietly with Kirk West, I would be quite interested in it.

[End Session 4]

[End Tape 6, Side A]
APPENDIX

Local Issue Campaigns

Addendum Written by Herbert M. Baus

Occasionally we did [get involved in local campaigns outside of the city of Los Angeles], although the activities we have been describing didn’t often leave much time for that. But we had interesting local campaigns in such places as Pasadena, South Pasadena, West Covina, Hanford, Ventura, Santa Paula, Bishop, and others. In most of these situations our client was a corporate entity seeking favorable outcome for an election, zoning appeal, or other contest.

A favorite case study played out in Orange County in 1965. [Charlie S.] Charlie Thomas, the president of the Irvine Company, the giant Orange County landholder, called me down to see if we could put the kibosh on plans made public by the MWD to locate a saltwater desalinization plant in one of four offshore areas, including just off Corona del Mar. Our mission would be to scuttle at least that location for such a plant.

I had known Charlie Thomas for years when he was president of Foreman & Clark [Inc.], a men’s clothiers, and a key Republican fund raiser. He served as Eisenhower’s Secretary of the Navy from 1952 until 1960 and was made CEO of the Irvine Company when he came home.
This issue was not subject to an election or any local authorities. The decision rested with the MWD board of directors. To gain our objective we had to motivate that body to formally abort the desalinization project or at least the Orange County coast participation in it. We blueprinted a campaign to fire up the Orange County population and establishment. And we planned at the appropriate time to take dead aim at the MWD bond issue scheduled for public vote the following year (1966).

We set up a headquarters in Costa Mesa and staffed it in Costa Mesa and proceeded to operate under the imprimatur of Citizens to Preserve the Orange County Coast. We fleshed out our committee letterhead through phone calls and mailings. A Corona del Mar home owner named Hans Lorenz was our chairman. The Irvine Company guaranteed our budget but we set up contributions from local homeowner associations and small businesses for our financial front. The Irvine Company was nowhere in sight. We animated homeowner groups, mobilized city councils, aroused bodies from the board of supervisors to local chambers of commerce and publicized the high costs and health perils of desalinization. Newspapers editorialized. And we began to fire warning shots across the bow of the MWD bond issue.

In a few weeks we had worked our way out of a job. The MWD made a public commitment to abort the Corona del Mar
offshore installation and little about desalinization has been heard since.

Campaigns thrive on controversy and starve on harmony. Too much flak on desalinization would fallout on MWD and hardly conduce to a successful bond issue. Successful bond issues thrive on serenity.
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