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State Government Oral History Program

Oral History Interview

with

**Kenneth L. Maddy**

California State Assembly Member 1971-1978
California State Senator 1979-1998

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Volume 2

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[Session 6, October 8, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Senator, I want to go back to the Governor's race. Of course, we haven't talked nearly enough about that. And one of the things that I found in your files -- and I'd like you to look at it and comment on it for me -- is a schedule. It looks like it comes from beginning in January of '78, and it's a schedule of events. I'm sure this is not a complete one at this point and it gets more crowded as time goes on. Here's, for example, over in Marysville a United Way dinner, a tour of the produce market. Then the next day you're at the Board of Realtors. In San Diego it looks like Coronado Women's Republican Club. And Irvine at a meeting, which is, of course, not far away.

How did all of these get organized? Who put these kinds of meetings together?

MADDY: These were basically part of the campaign structure this time in 1978. Of course, with Sal and Doug, and the staff they had working, you're inundated. I mean, two ways to go: One, you're inundated with requests to speak at every rotary club and every other function anyone needs a speaker. That's part of the function of, I guess, a person who is in charge of speaking.

SENEY: A speaking committee.

MADDY: Right. And then the other is obviously the strategy as to how you're going to lay out a format and try to run a campaign. And we knew we had to run a grassroots campaign.

Evelle Younger was sitting with 95 percent name ID and wasn't leaving his home. Ed Davis had his big name ID in L.A. I was a total unknown. And so the key we had to do was try to influence every county, and we set up a campaign chairman, if you will, and tried to get somebody mostly beginning with the ag background and the truckers and some of our natural allies and move forward and have people who then in each county would say, and there was an organization behind it, "Tell us who is the most important people I should see." If I wanted to go up to Marysville, how could I make the day at Marysville, leaving Sacramento, a worthwhile day so that I just don't drive up and drive back and then go back someplace else? You know, it's all the typical scheduling that must go forward.

It just fills. And my job, in one of the places where you'd get Russo laughing again, would be to sit down and try to -- let him tell you what it was like when I picked up one of these things and how I would just rip it apart and how I would ask the question, "What in God's name am I doing at this deal or that deal?" And, "Why in the world would I want to speak to this group," or "Why in the world would I want to speak to that group?"

And it got to the point where it was almost untenable for any of us because it was just a constant battle.

As a candidate, you can have some input but I found you just can't second-guess. You just have to go with the flow until you either get too tired you can't go any longer, or you figure out there's a better way to do it.

And so we went through the campaign early on, I guess, with the idea this was the way you had to do it; middle of the road with the idea that, my God, we might be winning, this might be working, so we'd better keep it up; to the point at the end where pride was telling me that you can't be a quitter, you have to push. Sort of the three ways I describe what kept me going, and it was a mix of all three at all different times. And you just didn't let yourself get sick. You had to watch your p's and q's from everything as to how much you drank at night to how much you slept at night and how much you tried to do during the day and how you met your obligations.

It was grassroots in that for a long time, early on, I did all my own driving and would just get myself from one place to another. They did have a Maddy's Air Force because the people in the agricultural community had a great number of private airplanes, and so they always joked about that "Maddy always had two airplanes waiting for him at every spot." I did have a lot of good supporters who provided me with

aircraft.

My son, Donny, at one stage of the proceeding, joined the campaign. Donny was sort of rebellious, to the extent that when I say rebellious, he was just a typical 17-year-old. I might have told the story but it's only funny from the point of a young kid who comes into the campaign. I can't remember exactly what phase but he went to Don Jackson. I said, "Don would like to help but he's afraid to ask me. Let's get him involved in the campaign."

Don Jackson went to him and said, "Your dad needs a gopher: go for this, go for that. You're the guy who carries his bags in. I can't have him going up there and getting mad at every motel clerk and everybody because the room's not this, this, and that. You do all that kind of stuff."

When I had worked at Hodge & Sons way back when in the 1950s, Don, when he went to school, later on worked for Hodge & Sons. And so what I always depicted as my Hodge & Sons suit was what I called the uniform. The uniform was a blue blazer with gray slacks and the Rep ties, because it was sort of a Southwick kind of store.

So when Don came to work for me he said that he was going to do this but he didn't want to take any crap from me. We had had a little falling -- not a falling out but I had pushed him around a little bit at one point or another he thought, and so he said, "I'm going to come to work. I'm getting paid." He said, "I'll take care of all of the stuff that you hate

to do. I've got a list. Do you want to add to the list?" Anyway, we had this understanding, so he starts out. So that becomes my first real helper, where he's driving me and doing this and another thing.

The funny part of the story was -- I forget, it was someplace around Bakersfield or something at one event -- one night he pulls me aside and he said, "Dad, we'll be in Fresno" -- I think I was going from Bakersfield to Fresno. He said, "I'm going to stop by Hodges and pick me up a uniform."

And I said, "What are you talking about?" Because he was wearing Levis and what 17-year-olds wore.

He said, "I find that when you're out speaking at night, we're out there like last night, I found that even though I was not dressed the way I wanted to be, I could move around. I can help you out there in the audience."

And I said, "That's fine with me. Pick up a uniform."

So that made this big transition, that ultimately Don became one who at night would then also dress up, would put his uniform on. He would start mingling with the crowd. And, of course, if you recall in the campaign in the last fourteen days, he took the fourteen northern counties and we won all fourteen northern counties. So whatever it was, the last few days, he ran the campaign. Got on his own little bus. He and Karney Hodges' son [Tom Hodge], they rented a motorhome. I'm not sure if she

loaned it to us or rented it to us – [that is] Sonny Mojonnier, who ultimately became an Assemblywoman. And they went up and traveled to the northern counties giving speeches.

So it was a great interest that he began as a blossom, but when we started, he was strictly -- I mean, I'd go get on an airplane and we'd go someplace and I'd go to the motel and we'd just drive one place to another. And again, the arguments always are rhyme and reason: Why am I going? How can you have me in Oakland tonight and tomorrow morning I've got to start off in San Mateo, and do you know how far it is? And just all of the rigors of campaigning.

SENEY: But you found you just had to defer to Sal.

MADDY: I just had to defer to my staff and the people. They had to defer to them. We were stuck in a lot of places without transportation home more than once. We have a million stories. Joannie Kitchens, who is now still over in the Capitol, she was in charge of the airplanes. Whenever that group all get together and start talking -- because none of them were getting paid two cents. There were no high paid people. It was a lot of just barely enough to get by on and work the campaign. It was a grassroots from that point of view which made it sort of unique and historical and certainly no big money. We just did it.

SENEY: Do you have any stories about this?

MADDY: I was trying to think. Well, Joannie, I don't know how many times -- I

wish I could think of the specifics -- where I'd go from one spot with no airplane to the next stop would have three airplanes waiting for me. Those kind of stories.

But there was one that Bev and I almost divorced right there. I can't remember what that was. It was someplace up in the ridge route, I know that, that we were stuck in the ridge route with no way to get home. It was some special holiday, and I can't remember what the holiday was now. That's how blurry it is. I can't remember any specifics as to what were anecdotes necessarily that would prove anything other than the fact of how hard it was.

I guess the thing that is most in my mind, I can go to sleep in a car so quick it makes your head swim, as they say. I mean, I can sit in a car and just lay my head back and immediately go asleep. It was my way of resting. No matter where we were going, if I had just awakened from a nap, I could sit back in the car, and my first reaction to the day or to where I was going, what I had ahead of me [sleeping like that], was sort of a defense mechanism was to lay my head back and go to sleep until I got whatever was happening to Ken Maddy in gear to go do it. And that, plus an absolute clear memory today, and I don't know where I was, except I was leaving Sacramento, I think going out towards San Francisco [on Interstate] 80, and going down a roadway and watching -- it was like Friday afternoon at 5:30. And what I remember is pickup trucks and

others pulling into quick food outlets. You know, where you drive and you get gas, the Arcos? Where you go in and get gas and a six-pack of beer? And how I was so envious of the guy who was in the pickup truck who had just pulled in and gotten himself a six-pack of beer, and he was going to drive home on Friday afternoon and see momma and have a beer. Literally, my week was starting again. I had no end of the week, and it was just kind of a depressing moment for me. The question was, what am I doing and can I keep doing this thing?

Donny was up in Los Banos, California at one time, at some crucial moment. I can't remember the set-back moment. By this time he was in his uniform, because I can see him doing it, and I was saying, "I can't do it, guys. Screw it. Let's get in the car and go back to Fresno. I'm not going to do it." He came up with the expression; he stood up and he said, "Stand up straight. Stand behind me."

You remember the Barbie dolls where you had to pull the string out?

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: He stood me up straight and he patted me on the back and he put his finger back at my back and he said, "I've just pulled the cord in the old Barbie doll. Now here's the Ken doll. Get in there and go do your job."

They told that story about Donny pulling the Ken doll string. He said, "We just had to get him in the front door and pull the Ken doll string and send him in, and he would start and then he was all right again."

But little things like that were more of my memories of the hardcore grassroots campaign. That and drinking, that when I first started how good I could be after one drink. And then one day, again someplace up in the valley, I can't remember where, where the second night I decided to have the second vodka and how I, in the midst of the speech, break out wringing wet with sweat, in my mind, how my words are slurred, how I'm saying everything as if I have a bowl of mush in my mouth. And when I get through I come back and I'm just panicked and Don, "What's the matter? What's the matter?"

I said, "My god, I couldn't say anything. My mouth was…"

He said, "Dad, you were fine, you were great. It was the same old speech. You've given it a thousand times. Everything was perfect."

And I said, "No, no, it wasn't." And that was the last of certainly any two drinks. I like a cocktail at night and certainly every time we'd get ready to go give a speech to have -- my drink then was bourbon and soda, then I shifted over to vodka and rocks -- to have a little drink, and that was just a nice relaxer and I could be funny. You know, my humor got a little better because I was all sort of adlibbing anyway within the framework. I learned that there was a point you can't go over. Even though it didn't show, the sweat was pouring down my forehead in my mind. My mouth was full of mush and I could barely get the words out.

SENEY: That's an interesting alarm bell, isn't it, that went off for yourself.

MADDY: Yes, a huge alarm bell. I praise those things as a way of saying your body does, I guess, react. Those experiences are ones that just cut through everything else in contrast to one particular event or night that I can't remember ever being particularly good or bad.

Oh, and the other thing that I learned quickly on, it got to be a phobia, that I couldn't be at the same level if possible. It got so that the speaking got so routine, and I said, "You have to get me elevated at least six inches so that when I stand up there" -- because you found also in these events there are so many rude people. I'll never forget it. It was the Madera County Sheriffs and they were having a big dinner, and I was one of their big heroes and I'd done this or that, and they were all drunk and rowdy, and it was just not the night for me up there. And the press were there to cover it. I remember just getting my ass creamed by the hecklers and the guys who were just drunk. They liked me. They were just drunk and raising hell. I was at the same level so I couldn't really see who was giving me the trouble to try to sometimes face them down or look at them.

When I came away from it, I said, "From now on, whatever you do, that microphone has to get me at least six inches taller." I said, "I don't know how you'll do it."

"You'll refuse to speak?"

I never actually refused to speak because I went on a hundred times after that, because most places you can't do that anyway. But that became

sort of a thing with me, that I said, "Get me elevated. I've got to be able to see who's giving me a ration of garbage out there, so I can at least try."

But that was the Madera County Sheriffs, and I just left in the middle of that one. Once in a while I couldn't take it. I said, "You guys are having too much fun." And they liked it. For a jerk politician. I said, "I think I'm going to have another drink and join you. The hell with it." So they clapped.

SENEY: Yes, that was the best thing you could have said.

MADDY: Just acclimate and go.

SENEY: This speech you gave a thousand times. Give it for us.

MADDY: You know, I don't even know if I could.

SENEY: Well, try. Give us a little flavor.

MADDY: It basically kind of began with the theme that we talked about in the deal as to more the man of the people. We were still selling "the man of the people." And then intermixing, depending on where I was, the highlights of the issues. I always tried to do as many issues as I possibly could and tried to give us much insider as I possibly could, letting people know that I really knew what I was doing and how to make things work, but also knowing that I couldn't get too technical.

My whole thrust, whether it was with the top 200 execs down in there, was to relate to the people as best I could. And I found that if I read a speech, even though I was almost required to read a speech by my staff -

- you know, I had to get the news out the way they wanted it -- that it was almost useless for me. Even though I didn't abandon it totally in the primary, I know I aggravated them no end because I couldn't get rolling and going and feeling good if I became too (quote) "just going to read a speech." That I had to have it mixed in with anecdotes or if I thought something was funny at the moment. There were times, without patting myself too much on the back, I could be funny.

SENEY: A good sense of timing, that kind of thing?

MADDY: Right. But it was all spontaneous. It had to come right. If I came in and wanted to tell a joke, kiss it goodbye. Bob Beverly always had a bunch of opening liners that he had that were part of his speech making, and I would try to copy some of those and so on, and sometimes it would work, sometimes it wouldn't. But the hardest was always for me getting started. You know, how do you get the kickoff? Who do you appropriately thank?

I always used to watch Jack Kemp because he was so good. Jack Kemp never took any notes. He took the names of about six or seven key people and then interwound them in his opening. He got that audience relaxed with those. I never got good enough to do what Jack did.

But the speech was basically trying to relate: I had to start from scratch, and why would you get somebody who was new? I played a little bit of the nonpolitician, although I never degraded it by saying I was a nonpolitician. And then to try to say as much as I could to what they

wanted to hear. You know, what was their issues. But I learned quick. Twenty was tops.

SENEY: Twenty minutes.

MADDY: Twenty was tops. It was easy to roll. It was easy to get caught. It was easy to get going. Almost invariably, I found when you got caught you were dead, if you got going too much, if you tried to explain too much.

SENEY: Fall in love with the sound of your own voice?

MADDY: That's right. The Hugh Flournoy Syndrome. When Hugh was running, I said, "Just tell them you're against the boycott." Instead, he would try to tell you a legal definition of a secondary boycott.

"Hugh, you really have to just get down to one word: I'm against the boycotts. Period."

SENEY: Well, he's an academic, right?

MADDY: Sure.

SENEY: So he just lapsed into his--

MADDY: That's right.

I did have some shortcuts that I thought were commonsense shortcuts. Jack loves it when I'm in the audience. He'll say, "Maddy's going to kill me, it's past twenty minutes." And he said, "I already haven't said a word."

SENEY: He is longwinded, isn't he?

MADDY: And I'd always just yell right out, "Sit down, Jack, it's time. You were

great up to now. Let's quit."

Oh, I've done it to him many times. Big audiences.

He was so damn good. He had everybody eating out of his hands in ten minutes. But it's amazing how quick twenty minutes go by. And it's amazing also how tiresome the twenty minutes get if you're not going.

The other night, my youngster daughter, she was very praiseworthy, and she said, "You're still the best, Dad, you're still the best." She said, "You were almost forty minutes. Everybody was still just caught on every word." Well, part of that was I didn't have anything planned, but I was doing the Kemp thing because there were so many people I had to say something about that I wanted to say something about. I couldn't praise Zeno, who had been such a help to me, and not throw Ernie Mobley in there for something that he might have done when I was a freshman, which I really couldn't say anything more than the fact that he was a stalwart. But by the time you get down to them, you got a little time, but when you're talking about them it's a lot easier, as long as you don't leave anybody out.

SENEY: What you're alluding to is the dedication the other night of the Ken Maddy Center for -- what's the full name?

MADDY: I think it's the Institute for Politics.

SENEY: At Fresno State.

Let me say, as long as we're on this, did this come as a complete

surprise to you? It did, didn't it?

MADDY: Yes. Chuck Poochigian did it. I thought it was kind of a fundraising event deal -- they were going to try to raise money for the school -- but he ended up getting it funded. It was just a very sincere effort on his part, I guess, to pay tribute, and I think the college moved him a little bit because they've been trying to get something in political science down at Fresno, and there's a lot to talk about in terms of the Fresno leadership. Amazing how many Fresno and Central Valley legislators have gone forward in leadership positions.

SENEY: Yourself, Hugh Burns.

MADDY: In just my seat, Huey Burns was Pro Tem, Zenovich was Majority Leader, I was Minority Leader, and so the next guy in line is Poochigian. Now, on the other side we had Howard Way was a Pro Tem. We were talking about that there's two senators representing roughly the area. Howard Way was a Pro Tem. Jimmy Costa's always been either a majority [leader] or in one of the leadership positions. You go down the Assembly side, we've had now a couple of speakers, one Cruz [Bustamonte], now Lieutenant Governor. Bill Jones, Minority Leader in the Assembly, now Secretary of State. Back and forth through the valley a lot of leadership. And nobody even knows they've got a poly-sci department down there.

In any event, he sort of surprised me with it. I thought it was a way that I had to send out, as I mentioned before, 5,000 letters to my 5,000

closest friends and ask them to build a $5 million building that will have my name on it, and I said I wasn't about to do that anymore; I've done enough. And he says, "No, Ken, it's paid for. We have it all done. Burton put the money in."

But my speech technique was as personal as I could make it.

SENEY: See, what I really want you to do is to give the speech. I don't want you to talk about the speech, I want you to give the speech.

MADDY: But I can't remember the speech.

SENEY: Can't you? Okay.

MADDY: No, I really can't.

SENEY: All right, fair enough.

But it is hard--

MADDY: It is hard. I gave the same [speech] because there were certain things we were trying to get, but it varied also as we moved around.

SENEY: You know what I suspect is if we had 30 or 40 people in the room and someone said, "Senator, give us an example of your Governor's speech--"

MADDY: I might have to do a little bit of stuff, but I could probably find it.

SENEY: Do you know what I mean? If there's a crowd there it might be more stimulating.

MADDY: I spent a disproportionate amount of my time worrying about openings and closings and a disproportionate amount of my time about the jokes and so on. The substance came easy. And when I say a disproportionate

amount of time it was because I worried so much about it. I wanted a good opening and I wanted to make sure I closed, and so I spent a lot of time on that. I think from a defense mechanism, it became easier for me to ad lib; just skip, don't even try, because you're going to ad lib anyway. And therefore, play it by ear, play the Kemp thing, which at that time I wasn't familiar with, but get into it and soften them quick and get them going and then let's see if we can't make some hay with these folks.

SENEY: I expect that you didn't have to learn a lot. That you were probably fairly good at this from the very beginning.

MADDY: My long suit, if I had one in law school and in the practice of law and everything, the more substantive you got you started to lose me. But on the first take, after we had the first hearing of the first bill, you pretty well could count that I had a good idea of what was happening and where I was going and who was going to try to make this happen or that happen and understood the issue. Now, when you're down to the details and how you work it out, then it took me a little longer.

But going into a meeting or a hearing or giving a speech about what the ten most important things that just happened were, in my opinion I could give an insight that was a lot closer to being on target and made more sense than the guy who was sitting there trying to read to them: "Well, here's a bill that takes two-tenths of one percent of…" and blah, blah, blah, you know, and give that.

Wherein, you could say, "Here's a bill that needs to fund [so-and-so], and this is a special project for [so-and-so], and that's why we're doing it."

It's really a north-south fight. You say something like that versus trying to explain what a bill was and suddenly you have everybody thinking about what's going on. No great magic, just the way I understood things.

SENEY: Some people can't keep their nose out of the details and keep from confusing rather than illuminating matters.

MADDY: And trying to say what you're really trying to get across.

SENEY: When the ads came out, those must have helped pave the way for these other meetings.

MADDY: Then you get to a point of how do you say no? Then it becomes impossible. Then the staff's spending all of their time trying to say no and how to fit people in. As I said, every chairman of the rotary club who had a speaker's bureau wanted you, and so on and so forth, and you had to be careful.

"How many times did you go to Humboldt County?"

They wrote a story that I had to win Humboldt County because I'd gone to Humboldt County more than anybody else. Herb Caen wrote the story. It was funny because Ed Davis came out and said at that time, "Anybody who went to Humboldt County once in this campaign is nuts,"

because he said, "That's too far out there."

"Maddy has been there five times," Herb Caen wrote. Well, I was a hero in Humboldt County, and part of the reason was there was two or three people -- I think one was the timber industry and so on -- that were close to Sal, and Doug and our campaign people in Humboldt County was a big source of dollars for us. But I had to get up there. Ed didn't realize it, but they were sort of the more moderate wing of the Republican Party. And one of the guys up there, he's the head of Pacific Lumber, and if he wants you to come up to do his big dinner, you got on the airplane and took your life in your hand and flew to Humboldt, because that's what you did when you flew there. You flew up there with your life in your hands, it's so hard to get in and out.

I think I went into it five times, and of course, Donny, my son, wrapped it up in the final. He drove up there at the end to Humboldt.

SENEY: Ed Davis does end up taking a Northern California tour.

MADDY: He may have because he caught a lot of heat because Herb Caen didn't let him off the hook. But I didn't know that he'd actually gone to Humboldt.

SENEY: Yes, he did the tour of the northern part of the state. In your files there's a picture of him looking very uncomfortable, sitting at a table with--

MADDY: Ed was a sweetheart of a guy, but by that time he was being driven by the right wing.

SENEY: Well, we'll talk about him later because he turns out to be a very effective

Senator, doesn't he?

MADDY: Oh yes. A very close friend of mine.

SENEY: And much to people's surprise. I mean, they thought bombast and braggadocio, but he turned out to be a very practical and reasonable fellow.

MADDY: Always bragged at the end that he was more liberal than I was. He said, "You finally got me over past you."

SENEY: Well, I want to talk about him because he's an interesting man.

And speaking of Herb Caen, you wrote him a letter thanking him and sending him something that one of your uncles, I think, had written.

MADDY: I think so. Herb and I would bump into each other periodically, so I didn't (quote) "know him." He wouldn't pick me out on the street, although there was a time when he would have certainly recognized me and then later on in life, because Willie and I were such good friends we'd have lunch occasionally. Not very often but we were together up at San Francisco and I'd bump into him.

There's no doubt in my mind, one mention in a Herb Caen column was worth the front page in the *Chron[icle]*.

SENEY: Well, you said to him in this letter, and perhaps it was flattery, but his comments drew more response from Northern Californians than anything else.

MADDY: That's right.

SENEY: And he wrote back saying thanks. This was all after the primary, saying that he thought that the Republicans would regret not having picked you for Governor.

MADDY: Yes, he was very kind to me.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

SENEY: Go ahead. You were saying about Herb Caen?

MADDY: I was just going to say, of all the reporters and people who write columns, in my experience I think he did have more influence. Anything he said in his columns was read by a great number of people. Perhaps it was true only in Northern California that I saw it. But he did write some nice things.

SENEY: A lot of people thought that was the first thing because they read in the paper was his column and then went on to the rest of them.

MADDY: Yes, whatever else was going on. There's damn little else in the *Chronicle* to read anyway.

SENEY: I want to talk to you about the Wilson campaign, because we talked about that when Sal was here, and whether or not an offer was made. But there were some other aspects of the campaign. I think he must have been surprised, do you think? when you edged him out in the polls.

MADDY: I would have to guess that he was surprised because he had been campaigning for so long. Pete and I were never necessarily close friends.

SENEY: You were in the Assembly together.

MADDY: We were in the Assembly for about three months or four months, because I came in in January, and I think in April he ran and became mayor [of San Diego]. So he was gone right away. He was gone soon enough that we never really got to know each other, other than to say hello, I guess. We never had much contact thereafter except routine political contact. So when I got in the race we didn't obviously call him and inform him.

I have no idea what they were thinking, why they thought they could keep me out, or whether if I had called them they would even discuss it with me. Because they were flying pretty high. The Pete Wilson people, the people around him, were pretty self-sure about his strength and his abilities to run statewide, and we were clearly the novices who got involved in the campaign. And for the same reason we caught everybody else totally by surprise we caught them by surprise. To this day, no one ever came to me and said, "You owed me something," or that "You should have called us" -- or you did this or you did that -- "We're from the same wing of the party," etc. I was running actually on a much more conservative run at that time than he was, primarily because, as Sal mentioned, Pete had made the ag people mad. So I had been the darling of agriculture, and he had been for the [California] Coastal Commission and he had been for--

SENEY: That's something you opposed.

MADDY: Yes, I think I opposed it at that time. He had done a great number of things in the environment, and the environment was a natural enemy of the ag community.

Well, the campaign ran smoothly enough, I think, until the surprises all hit. Suddenly, rather than him being a possible second or a third person in the campaign, trying to knock off ol' Ev Younger, he's suddenly sitting there sucking wind as fourth. I mean, it wasn't long before we went right by him.

What I felt was unfortunate was that it all occurred at the end when it didn't mean anything. We had both been beaten. And whether or not it carried over, in my mind I didn't forget any of these things. I don't think in terms of our personal relationship it ever had anything to do with any of our relationship. I did a tremendous amount with him and for him and together, and he did things for me, a tremendous amount all through the eight years he was Governor. And I consider us good friends. Were we ever very, very close friends? I think there's very few people you could consider Pete Wilson's very, very close friends. He's sort of known as that. But did I consider myself a good friend? Sure, I knew him.

But as I say, it was unfortunate because staff did get involved a lot at that time. There was a lot of staff nastiness that came out. But aside from that, it was just one of those little burps in the screen that meant nothing because we were both dead, politically dead, when it happens.

SENEY: One of the things that was said, and Wilson sort of circulated information to this effect, was that you had your voting record changed over your six years in the Legislature. I should say eight years in the Legislature. And that is that you became more conservative.

MADDY: Towards the end, he accused me of becoming more conservative and so did the *Bee*. That's why the *Bee* left me in '76. No, they left me '74 against Al Villa, that I had turned too much towards a Reaganite and had turned more conservative. As Sal tried to say here earlier on the tape, he always thought that I didn't change a whole heck of a lot in terms of my conservative philosophy, that I might have been more adroit at how I dealt with the issues and how I spoke about the issues but that I really didn't change much in terms of my overall philosophy of what I believe.

I think what Pete was struggling with at that time was who was going to nail down the moderate group. If I had taken away the moderates from him and was cutting into the conservatives a little bit, what was he going to do, I think, to get back in? Briggs was completely out of it. Ed was far to the right. Ev was just out there all by himself in front. And so it was between Pete and I to (quote) "get the so-called middle ground people," the middle of the road, the business roundtable kind of folks.

SENEY: You've said that, well, you had voted more conservatively but your district had changed; you now had farmers and it wasn't just an urban district.

MADDY: If I had stayed down in downtown L.A., I undoubtedly would have said damn little about the farm labor issue because I had nothing but the workers living in my first district and I had nothing but the farmers in my second district. I wasn't stupid, you know.

SENEY: What I'm getting at with your record and Wilson is that he circulated material that said: Look at this voting record here. This man is not what you're talking about. He voted in favor of the consenting adults bill and decriminalizing marijuana.

MADDY: It's probably a compliment that of all the candidates, I think I never spoke a word about anybody, and I think I was the only candidate to have all these records being circulated about them, either my record of votes or my record of morality or whatever. As Sal said, we were the only campaign in town and everybody was certainly concerned about us. To Evelle Younger's credit, they never said squat about anything. They didn't have to, they were too far in front. But certainly the other two contenders, Ed Davis and Wilson, spent a lot of time worrying about Ken Maddy.

I was about as good as you could get in making sure that my record was, at best, ambiguous, and I still voted the way I wanted to vote. I made sure that I voted on a lot of issues that looked like I was all over the map. But it's very hard to sit down and tell people, "If I'm going to vote yes on a bill that is important that's going to pass, and my yes is critical, then I'll vote yes. If I can vote on the same bill, knowing it's going to die and it

means nothing, and I can get away with a cheap vote by voting no, then I'm going to vote no."

Now, you can say that's hypocritical or you can say whatever you want to say. It's why I stayed in office for so damn long. There's a time to be smart and a time not to be smart. There's a time when you have to deliver. And that's the way politics works, and people don't like that part of politics. They really don't. They think it's something, as you say, hypocritical, immoral, it's not right, you're not standing up for your principles. Baloney. You don't do any good if you're gone.

SENEY: There was a letter from William French-Smith in your files -- who, of course, was a very prominent Republican and part of the Reagan group and he was [President] Reagan's first Attorney General -- asking you about this.

MADDY: He was part of the Wilson group: Holmes Tuttle, William French-Smith. Now see, they had a little problem internally because Holmes Tuttle and William French-Smith and all of the Reaganites--

SENEY: [Henry] Salvatore?

MADDY: Salvatore. All were in the business roundtable and were all the guys that Pete was relying upon in the last closing days of the gubernatorial campaign. Yet, in 1976, when it came time to go back to Kansas City with a delegation in support of Ronald Reagan running against Gerry Ford for President, the Whip of the California delegation was Ken Maddy who

had come forward for Ronald Reagan, where Pete Wilson had gone around New Hampshire and Vermont and the rest of the New England states badmouthing what a poor governor Ronald Reagan had been when he served with him. And so Pete Wilson was--

SENEY: Speaking on behalf of Gerry Ford.

MADDY: So here's William French-Smith and all these guys who are sitting there thinking that they wanted to help Pete, because probably he made more sense and all this and that and another thing, yet what were they going to do with Maddy who was out there when it counted? If nothing else, what Ronald Reagan always espoused was loyalty. As I said, I think Nancy Reagan and President Reagan and others were saying, I think, though we never knew it or verified it, that they were saying you're not going to take any cheap shots on Maddy because he was with us. Nancy Reagan told me, "You were with us. We remember that."

But Pete had a problem: How's he going to explain away what was probably more important for Reaganites than voting on consenting adults or anything else, which was loyalty to Ronald Reagan, which they just idolized, versus these cheap shots they were trying to take at me? So they had a hard time. As you can see from the letter, they were having a hard time trying to put me on the spot on these issues. And I went back to what I thought was the gut which was loyalty. My letter wasn't necessarily nine facts; it was just kind of laying out what's important in life.

Pete had a little hurdle to overcome too.

SENEY: And that was an example of--?

MADDY: That was an example of what he had to overcome. He's back there asking these same guys who he'd gone south on, and Ronald Reagan's everything in their life. But they were part of that group. That was a group that controlled the Republican Party then.

SENEY: Right. And controlled the money in the Republican Party.

MADDY: Let me say one other thing that was interesting behind the scenes on that issue. They didn't give really, frankly, a rat's tail, in my mind, about any Pete Wilson or Ken Maddy or Evelle Younger or anybody else. That group was for Mike Curb. Behind the scenes in the '78 election was they had given up on the campaign to beat Jerry Brown, in my opinion. This is my opinion now. And what they were going after was how to make sure that Mike Curb became Lieutenant Governor so that he could be the next Governor in the State of California.

And so, when it got down to dispersing money and giving money away, if you look at all those folks and where the money actually went, far, far more went into Mike Curb to make sure he won the Lieutenant Governor's spot against Jerry Brown so that he'd be the man in 1982 to run for Governor instead of anybody else.

And so we were little pawns out there that were just being played around. I'm not saying that I knew this sooner or faster than anybody else.

And I will tell you, Pete and I have never sat down and really analyzed it from that point of view. One of these days I might think to bring it up and say, "What do you think was really the truth?"

[BREAK]

SENEY: He came back to you--?

MADDY: I think he saw me one time.

SENEY: Holmes Tuttle.

MADDY: Yes. He showed up at a deal when I sworn in after winning the Senate seat and said, "You know, we probably should have done more for you in '78," you know, sort of a concession. But I think they abandoned all of us because Mike Curb was their golden boy and Mike Curb was the guy who they wanted to become Governor next.

SENEY: Why was that, do you think?

MADDY: Mike Curb had gotten on the inside. I think I told you, the first time he was ever appointed to a State Central Committee was because of me, Ken Maddy. Don Jackson, my law firm, another one we talk about all the time, Don Jackson was in business with him at that time a little bit, doing some law work for him. So Don introduced me to Mike on the basis that Mike wants to get involved in politics, and he's looking for some people that he can support. He doesn't want to be involved himself, but he's got plenty of money, and he's a bright new star running all these Warner Records, and he was doing all kinds of things. And he had a political consultant

that I knew up here real well: Ken Reitz. As a matter of fact, Ken Reitz was very kind and offered me a job here before I took this job.

But Mike fell in love also with the whole deal, and so pretty soon, when I'm back there as the Whip of the delegation and trying to make sure that Mike had a spot on the delegation in '76, Mike was already up there as co-finance chairman and was making sure that I could keep my spot. So he moved in quickly into the love of the game and then decided he wanted to run himself. He was no longer my angel but he was looking for angels himself and was going to run for office. Which was perfectly legitimate. It's the way things happen, the way with people who have positions like Mike.

Of course, what Mike never, I guess, ever understood is how bad a candidate he could be. He just was not a great candidate and just didn't sell very well. He was well-meaning and all the rest of it.

There was no animosity between Mike and I, although I always felt there was a certain level of doublecross at some point in time. No one could figure out why I jumped on as early as I did and was such a strong supporter of George Deukmejian. When people always want to know "Is Ken Maddy really a nice guy a hundred percent of the time?" the answer is no, I'm not.

SENEY: So that was a little payback for--

MADDY: There was a little payback involved in that one, plus there were other

things. But the big thing was that I just felt that I had been left in the lurch. There were a number of other factors that pushed me. Well, number one, by that time I didn't believe Mike was a good candidate. I thought Mike had a hell of a time politically telling the truth. You know, this little story about a guy who couldn't tell the truth even if it was going to help him. And Mike never could get zeroed in on what was the truth when it came to political campaigns and so on because he was always ducking and weaving. So, I mean, Mike had lost a little favor with me in just to how he ran the campaign, and then there was some small instances. Nothing businesswise, because Mike and Don Jackson stayed involved and I stayed involved a little bit on the outside, but things have changed a little bit in my life.

But there was no doubt that Mike was supposed to be my angel, and by this time he had gotten in so tight with the Reagan people in '76, and then he was co-finance chairman, then when '78 came along, instead of being an angel for Maddy, which was sort of assuming something not in evidence -- he had never written anything down, it was nothing like that. It was strictly my own little thought process that I suddenly was taking a back seat.

And I would swear, and I know that Pete would think the same thing, that the Holmes Tuttles, the big boys, the so-called Kitchen Cabinet, were intent upon making sure they got the governorship. They'd given up on

the governorship under Jerry Brown. There were some who felt that leave him there until he kills the party off totally, and they were not doing that badly. And that's the other thing you always have to understand, is big business sometimes is just as happy with Gray Davis as they're going to be with Joe Blow, the Republican. But is it honest with the candidates who are out there breaking their ass and struggling around and running? Not necessarily.

The interesting thing was there was a lot of tie-in. It's only fun from the standpoint of looking at how Mike Curb first gets appointed to the Central Committee by Maddy, who then ultimately, and so on and so forth.

SENEY: Sure, sure.

MADDY: A little intrigue.

SENEY: Speaking of your support for Deukmejian in 1982, I'm sure you know that Deukmejian was pressured heavily in '82 not to run for Governor, to leave the path open for Curb, and that it was, I think, Salvatore who may have made that phone call to him. [Stephen A.] Merksamer told me this, and he said it on the tape and it's all been approved, so I'm not saying anything that he didn't approve to be said. But it just infuriated Deukmejian. They told him if you want to be U.S. Senator, that Senate seat that Wilson got was open. We'll back you for that but stay out of the Governor's race.

MADDY: Deukmejian was never part of anybody's inner circle, and he was not part

of a close friendship of mine or anything. For one thing, to the extent that I was prepared to go forward, and I have a vague memory of this -- Don Jackson remembers so much more than I do about it -- that I was not holding anything really against him in the sense that I was going to oppose him. I kept urging him not to do what he was doing, which was to bludgeon everybody to death, because Deukmejian was an honorable man, and I said, "You can't go by and insist that you have every Congressman and every Assemblyman and everybody lined up," which was his style--

SENEY: Deukmejian's?

MADDY: No. This was Curb. Curb's style was to make sure that every elected official was on the dotted line for you early on in the race. It was not like me to sit down at that point in my spot, because I had been sort of the bright shining light and yet had been shuttled aside a little bit. I mean, I had a little hurt feelings that I was supposed to be the new guy in '78, yet now I was being shoved aside a little bit.

SENEY: By someone you didn't necessarily respect.

MADDY: That's right, by somebody I didn't necessarily respect. Now, the new marriage was involved. I suddenly was wealthy. There was a lot of different things that were taking place that kept me a lot less concerned than I had been before. But I just didn't like anything that was going on, so at that same February convention, the first guy to organize -- because Deukmejian had no one. I mean, he had zero support. I put together the

first press conference in which a few guys got up – [Assemblyman] Ray [E.] Johnson and Bill Thomas and [Assemblyman David G.] Dave Kelly and [Senator William] Bill Campbell -- and we came together and put together an endorsement for George Deukmejian. Shocked him, I'm sure. And no one had gone up against Curb before that time. You see, Curb was everybody's favorite, and of course, when the big boys all came to see me, they wanted to know what was going on.

SENEY: Did you get the phone calls?

MADDY: Oh sure. You know, "What are you doing?" By this time I didn't give a rat's ass in the sense that I wasn't struggling anymore.

SENEY: By this time you're married to Norma Foster.

MADDY: That's right.

SENEY: So you don't have those worries.

MADDY: Absolutely. I certainly didn't have any financial worries, and I wasn't worried about my career anymore.

SENEY: That's what I meant, right.

MADDY: And I was back here as Republican Leader. I'm suddenly back as Republican Leader. They need me, I don't need them. And they've kind of shoved me aside a couple of times. They really never pushed me after I lost in '78 to do anything because on their agenda was always Curb.

There was a United States Senate seat open when we ran nobody. We ran Paul Gann or somebody against [U.S. Senator Alan] Cranston.

Somebody mentioned it to me, but nobody came after. There were a lot of logical things I thought should have been in place for the guy who was supposed to be the up-and-comer, but once we lost, they kind of pushed me aside and that was it.

In fact, Pete was much smarter. I always said, "Why did Pete do it and I didn't?" I said because Pete came right back, went right back to work, started the next campaign and said the hell with it. I get a divorce and I go through a trauma, and I do this and do that and get married again, and go up one side and down the other fraught with anger and all these things. Ol' Pete Wilson just shifted gears and went right back to work again. I said that's why he was probably much more deserving to be Governor ultimately than I was, because he wanted it more than I did.

SENEY: Well, then he runs for what was [U.S. Senator S. I.] Hayakawa's seat and he was told you don't try again you're out.

MADDY: The thing was that it all kind of meshed together in a funny way. Probably inconsequential almost to anybody except for me because I was a little piece of all of it.

SENEY: Were you aware before you began this Governor's race of how powerful and important this small group of individuals was?

MADDY: No. I don't think you ever know that stuff. I don't think I know it now. I don't think I know the extent of it. I think that it's overblown in some ways, and it's certainly far more powerful than many people believe in

some ways. I don't think there's anything anywhere close to it today.

SENEY: Like Reagan's former "Kitchen Cabinet."

MADDY: Absolutely nothing anywhere close to it. There are so many fragmented groups out there now with Silicon Valley and this group and that group. There is no small cadre of wealthy people who command enough wealth to make it happen who are all interested in something at this time. I think it happens daily in other states in the nation. I think there are these little groups of people who control politics in other parts of the nation, but I think California is still big and diverse that I just don't think it's out there.

San Francisco, in a small, small way, may have it. Johnny Burton and the boys up there could control San Francisco, but get much beyond the boundaries of San Francisco and you don't have much. Which is good, because it means a lot less corruption. It means a lot less graft. It means a lot less of some bad things in politics. That's why anybody can win.

I was naïve to the nth degree and so all of us were. Sal talks so sophisticated now, he knows everything. He knows probably more than most people in California about what's going on. But I would like to have him sit down and tell us where really all of the eggs are buried and so on. I don't think he can tell us, it's just not there.

SENEY: But at that time people liked Justin Dart and Robert Fluor and Holmes Tuttle and Henry Salvatore and William French-Smith. Were there a

couple of others?

MADDY: There was a whole group of the real close personal friends -- the [Leonard] Firestone. All the group of people who were close friends of Ronald Reagan. He had been associating with that super rich, in which that super rich was sort of a mix. We didn't have the young Silicon Valleyites. There was no young rich in those days. The Hollywood rich were the same old Hollywood rich. That's where it mostly was. It was Hollywood rich. And then the Bob Fluors. There were a few activist Republicans. I got Bob Fluor on my team and Jimmy Boswell. Boswell obviously because of agriculture and Bob Fluor loved horseracing.

SENEY: So that was your connection.

MADDY: That was my connection. Bob Fluor loved horseracing. He's the one that said, "I never met anybody that loved horses that I ultimately didn't think was a great guy," and so he endorsed me because I had grown up around the racetrack, and that was his love in life. So little things like that make a difference.

But other than that, that was a tough -- that'd be a story. I mean, it really would be a worthwhile story in the history of how hard they worked to put Curb in and how it flopped, mostly because of Curb himself. He might even admit it. I doubt it but he might.

SENEY: Well, he became a very controversial and in many ways unattractive candidate.

MADDY: Oh yes. And I don't know what it is. I think when I say you can't tell the truth even when the truth helps you, it's a little bit like a personality flaw. There are just some things that keep you from being credible. You can be almost anything else in life. You can be the biggest liar and thief in the world, but if you come across credible it makes a big difference. Mike, for some reason, never came across as credible. I have no idea why not.

SENEY: His campaign against [Lt. Governor Mervyn] Dymally made a lot of people up here angry, didn't it?

MADDY: You know, I don't know whether it did or not. Dymally was not well liked either. Dymally was not anybody's favorite. I don't know anybody who'd walk too far down the road [for him]. Merv used the black thing so much. Merv was not a kind man necessarily either but always kind to me. When I say that, I always make that preface because I don't have anything personally against him, but I'm just speaking now in general and reputation.

Mike was being controlled by the same ol' boys, the Stu[uart] Spencers, the same guys who had been running the same campaigns that many of us thought were obsolete by that time.

SENEY: Shall we leave it there for the day, Senator?

MADDY: Yes, I think we can.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Session 7, October 11, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Senator, I wanted to talk some more about the gubernatorial campaign today, but I want to start by talking about something that you've alluded to because it is important, and that is your role in the '76 National Convention supporting Reagan.

How did all that get started? How did you decide to support Reagan over the incumbent Gerry Ford?

MADDY: As with politics, so many things sort of fall into place and there are coincidences, and your future ends up evolving more by luck than by brain.

Bruce Nestande and I were two moderate Republicans who had been involved politically together in the Legislature. I became chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee -- part of the deal with Leo McCarthy after things sort of settled out -- and Leo did begin then to try to recognize those of us who had supported him. He made me chairman of Welfare and then made me chairman of Criminal Justice. And that committee at that point in time was, again, the safeguard: trying to protect the houses, because the State Senate was sending every tough criminal justice bill over known to man, because that was the big attack by the Republicans over here was to

attack them. We had a six-person committee in which Bruce and I were the two Republicans, and I was chairman, and they alternated the four Democrats. For instance, Deukmejian's death penalty came out of that, which was an interesting story, as I remember it. I'm not sure Duke remembers it the same way. But we were there to try to protect the house and to try to put out some reasonable criminal justice laws. As I've used in my brochure for years, the toughest criminal justice laws in ten years came out of that committee during that period of time. Well, they were, but they were minor compromises in some cases compared to what the Senate Republicans wanted from their side of the aisle.

Let me also say, compared to today, we are much, much more conservative today than we were then. Much more liberal in those days in terms of criminal justice.

SENEY: Again, this was, as you say, to protect the two houses, to kill off bills.

MADDY: Kill off the bills that any reasonable government would have trouble [with]. In those days, "Carry a gun, go to jail" was just a minor thing. In those days, everybody was falling in love with "Carry a gun, go to jail," "Rob a home, go to jail," "Stick up a 7-Eleven, go to jail." Everything was mandatory sentences. The way they were getting around the weak judges and liberalism was to mandate sentences and to put strict penalties. All you did was put it in the law and judges took away discretion. So there was just this whole wrath of bills that came down. So our job was to

try to massage and maneuver.

In many ways it enhanced my reputation as independent because I kept a couple of liberal Democrats on as staffers, yet we did sort of very efficient work and we made sure lawyers prevailed. In other words, the law had to say what we intended to say before the bill got out.

Bruce was close to Ronald Reagan. Bruce worked in the Ronald Reagan efforts.

SENEY: Let me go back. Did Leo McCarthy give you marching orders when he put you in charge of the committee?

MADDY: When I took over Welfare Committee, Leo had nothing. That was just "You want to be a chairman?"

"Sure, I want to be a chairman."

"You were one of my early, strong supporters. I want to put a couple of Republican chairmen in, so you can have it."

When I went to the Criminal Justice Committee, and part of the underlying theme here -- as Sal mentioned, I should have run for A.G. Not a firm agreement but part of a conversation Leo and I had before he moved me over to Criminal Justice, which was a much more prominent committee and I was more than willing to take it, was--

SENEY: Despite whatever political grief it might bring you.

MADDY: Yes. I was ready to move up. I was ready to start doing some things that were important and so on.

Leo discussed the fact that we were not going to run against each other for higher office. He said, "I'm not going to do a Bob Moretti. I'm not going to do a Monagan-Moretti: I'm not going to put you in a position to where I'm going to enhance you in order to run against me."

I'm not sure how it all fit in about his Canadian citizenship and so on, but at one point in time there was sort of an understanding that if I was going to go to Criminal Justice that the question of running for the Attorney General, if I wanted to run for higher office, may be out of the question.

SENEY: Because Leo McCarthy might have a desire.

MADDY: He might want it, he might have a desire.

SENEY: But he was a Canadian citizen?

MADDY: Leo was, right. It didn't prohibit him. I was trying to think what he couldn't run for. There's something he can't run for because obviously he ran for Lieutenant Governor.

But whatever it was, and it just passed through my mind because it didn't have anything to do with our part of the discussion, but where we did have a discussion was where I was going to run and what I could spin off of. In other words, what could I take from. And he didn't put any great restrictions, as I recall, but in my mind there was this potential that I was going to kind of prohibit myself from running for A.G. if, in fact, that's what I wanted to do.

But I took it anyway. I was more anxious to take the spot, particularly because the death penalty was coming up. There was a whole group of major issues that were going to be worked on.

Bruce, a good friend, was getting to be a better friend as we served in the committee together and then chummed around together, had been close to--

SENEY: Before we go on to Reagan, talk a little bit about the death penalty, because that's something you took credit for was getting the death penalty through the committee.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And you hinted that George Deukmejian might see it differently. But how did all that work out?

MADDY: Deukmejian, in those days, I'm not sure he was chairman of the committee, but he was clearly the author of the death penalty statute in the Senate. And what I remember distinctly is Deukmejian was famous for never giving up. I mean, he would come back to your committee seven million times. You could nit-pick him to death and tell him, "Senator, we think the bill is dead," and so on and so forth.

We were not close friends. Part of the whole story about my closeness with Duke and all that was that we were not close friends going in because, as I said, Duke did not have a large number of close friends.

What he had on the death penalty, of course, was all the law

enforcement people and all the cops and all the people that were involved in trying to get a strong death penalty statute in California; and of course, the California Supreme Courts kept striking it down.

Being strongly supported by all Republicans and a lot of Democrats who were absolutely pushed over the wire -- they had to do something on the death penalty -- Deukmejian put out a bill from the Senate that would pass the Senate, and I'm not sure what the vote was, it was pretty strong. It came over to our committee in which we attempted to take the law and to narrow the problems that people had faced around the country on the death penalty, that had allowed the [U.S.] Supreme Court to strike the death penalty down. Our whole goal was to put out a death penalty statute that would work under the prevailing law, with all the conditions that, in fact, a court could not say no to.

The famous night was it got all the way down to the very end and we were getting close, and Duke had gone back and come back and come back and we would just refuse to accept it. Now, the pressure was extreme because Leo knew and I knew, and we all knew, that if we killed that bill that there would be a move on the floor of the Assembly to withdraw the bill from committee which would challenge Leo's speakership.

Of course, in those days if you were a chairman and you were appointed by the Speaker, you stayed with the Speaker, which means that I

would have had to vote against the death penalty theoretically, or go against that edict, or resign my chairmanship, or whatever. There were so many political ramifications that I told Leo, "We have to do something, Leo."

SENEY: Where was all this pressure coming from? Can you describe how that felt?

MADDY: It was political pressure. The editorial writers were not urging the death penalty. That was not the case. But there was tremendous political pressure because of both parties: the liberal Democrats saying, "Stand there and fight, we shouldn't have a death penalty statute at all." Number two, "If you're going to have one, make sure it's correct." And the significance of the small changes, and I wish I could remember them better but I cannot, but there were one or two things that were crucial in terms of procedure and criteria that allowed you to move forward on a death penalty statute.

Now, I might say that everything we did in that bill that we put out, ultimately it's always been upheld. I mean, the death penalty in California got screwed up again because John Briggs came forward with a new initiative to (quote) "strengthen the death penalty" (unquote).

SENEY: Prop. 7,[1] wasn't it?

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[1] Proposition 7, November 7, 1978.

MADDY: Whatever it was. Whatever it was it passed, just like we always knew anything would pass, and it ultimately was what the Supreme Court attacked later on and ended up why we've had so many problems with the death penalty subsequently, because they messed it up. We had a solid bill, and that's all we wanted. We wanted a solid bill so we could all go home and say, "We passed the death penalty statute."

Well, I gave Duke a certain period of time and couldn't figure out how I was going to deal with it in the sense of telling him "This is it. Either this bill or no bill." And so what I came up with, Bruce and I, I had quietly put a bill in on the death penalty statute in my name, as the author, and had it just floating in the back. And so on a key evening, and I know it was late in the evening because he had invited me down to his office, and Bruce and I went down there. It was just full of all the law enforcement officers. My recollection of it is, and I think Bruce would substantiate it, although memories fade, but I went in and I said, "Senator, there's nothing that I want to do more than to see you be the author of the death penalty statute, and tonight there will be a death penalty statute leave [the committee]," and they all started to smile. I said, "This is how: We're going to vote, and it's going to be a unanimous vote." What we had done was we had switched some people around so that we now had four Democrats and two Republicans all going to vote for the death penalty.

SENEY: Leo McCarthy had removed and replaced some people.

MADDY: He had switched a couple of people, right. Alatorre, I think, came on; [Assemblyman Meldon D.] Mel Levine went off. I forget exactly what the dynamics were, and I'm not even sure it was 6-0, but it was close. We knew we had the votes.

And I said, "Let me tell you what's going to happen." And I said, "The bill is going to come out as the (quote) version." We had a name for it which covered this process, which Deukmejian did not want.

And he said, "That's unacceptable."

I said, "You didn't hear me out." I said, "That bill is going to come out, and it's either going to be the 1975," or '76, whatever it was, "George Deukmejian death penalty statute of California, or it is going to be the 1976 Ken Maddy death penalty statute. Either way it's coming out." And I said, "Give it some thought. I don't want it, I don't want to be a coauthor. I want you to have it, but it's going to come out my way, either your name or my name." And I said, "Obviously it'll pass," because once people could find an excuse, the Dems were going to jump on it.

And so he came back and accepted it. That's how the death penalty came out.

SENEY: It was important enough to him to have his name on that.

MADDY: Damn right. He knew that.

SENEY: My understanding is that that's pretty much all the kind of legislation he

ever put in.

MADDY: George, I think, can look back at his eight years and say "It wasn't a bad eight years," but if he has a legacy, and he has a tremendous legacy in the sense that he changed--

SENEY: You mean his eight years as Governor.

MADDY: His eight years as Governor. Beyond that, no, his principle legacy in the Legislature was taking care of his local district but basically law enforcement issues. But, I mean, he was the change in the judiciary. The Rose Bird thing, Jerry Brown set all this up. This was all a setup. It was just the dynamics of politics at the moment that people were against Rose Bird.

Here was the death penalty floating out there. You couldn't get a bill through. Deukmejian knew that whoever was going to author the bill -- I mean, whatever kind of bill it was, as long as it could be said it was a death penalty. And the differences between our two bills were all technical things lawyers could argue about. In fact, we probably had more lawyers on our side saying that "They're correct. This statute and this statute, all have been dealt with by supreme courts around the nation, and these are going to hang you up." And of course, then you've got the crazies: You had John Briggs and the other guys who were trying to put everything into the death penalty statute, which they ultimately succeeded in messing things up even worse later on.

The Deukmejian legacy was he really pushed then to get rid of Rose Bird. He changed the court system around here for years. The fact that he was able for the next sixteen years, he and Wilson -- not so much Pete because Pete made a much more moderate court -- but George really did change, if you will, the law in California for a long time to come.

In fact, the *Royal Globe* case, which the Governor just signed the bill on bad faith insurance cases, was a Supreme Court case that I think they're correct. Of course, the Legislature has to turn it down. There will be a great number of bills, I'm sure, that'll change the law over what Deukmejian of course had set forth because they became much more conservative.

But that's George's legacy. He really did change the bench around. And suddenly this idea, which Jerry Brown started, unbeknownst -- I mean, Jerry Brown--

SENEY: You said he set all this up. I was going to ask you what you meant by that.

MADDY: Jerry Brown is the one who sort of set the stage because Jerry Brown came in from a judicial point of view and tried to do two things: One, the old tradition of having old-time experienced lawyers become judges, and you waited your turn and if you were established enough you became a judge, Jerry overwhelmingly turned it upside down overnight. He wanted young people who were progressive or liberal. So if you're 35 years old, you can pass the bar, and you felt like he did, you could get on the bench. The bar

members who nobody knew in town were being appointed to the bar.

Deukmejian took the other step then when he began to get powerful and he came in. He took 35-year-old prosecutors who believed like he did. The difference being between 35 and 65, instead of serving on the bench three years and setting forth your philosophy, those 35-year-olds who have been there now twenty years have still got another 15 or 20 years to serve. They're still throwing out conservative doctrine.

And so Jerry, as I say, laid the stage. I mean, he did so many radical things that he really moved us to the right, in my opinion, far more in the state. And Deukmejian was the perfect follow-up to it, at least in the area of criminal justice, because Jerry was so conservative in one sense; you always have to think back to his Jesuit training. There's many things that Jerry said in terms of raising children and handling people and responsibility that were very much conservative. But by and large, he couldn't have gone out and found judges in Fresno to pick, to appoint, that were more easy to defeat than he did. I mean, he found anybody who nobody had heard of, and so on and so forth. You know, he's wild.

So Deukmejian was able to look to that after that, and it fell right in his category, his specialty, which was criminal justice.

But the death penalty thing was my one experience with George in which I called the bluff and it went.

We're still working our way as to how I got with Reagan.

SENEY: Yes. Have we said enough about the Criminal Justice Committee?

MADDY: I think so. The committee went on. It was one of my better experiences. In terms of my camaraderie in working with the Legislature, that was a savior committee. We covered everybody's base, my job, and the whole house began to recognize that they didn't try to sandbag me or they didn't try to doublecross me. It was my idea of the way the system should work, is that we work together, we knew what the house basically wanted as a policy, and we tried to accommodate that policy. We tried to get the very best policy by bringing everybody together.

Criminal justice, you know whose ox is being gored, but I'm talking about nobody is making any money out of it. We're talking about public policy and what we should be doing with people.

The indeterminate sentence law came out of that. That was the idea that you sentence people not for a fixed time. The way we used to do it, you sent them to prison until they behaved themselves and the whole idea of rehabilitation and so on. We moved that around. I'm not sure that was a good decision either, but we did what people wanted at the time because, again, of the Jerry Brown era in which these people were wackos as judges and they were releasing people soon and the folks back home began to say, "This is no good. We have to take the power away from the judges." And I don't believe that. I believe the courts should have discretion. But then again, when you put somebody on the bench who doesn't believe in

incarceration, it's pretty damn hard to not have laws that say you should put somebody away for a while. And really, it's an area now that we really need [to look at].

SENEY: In a committee like this, and all legislatures have them of one kind or another, I guess -- G.O. [Government Operations Committee] used to be that in the Senate, although that made policy from the very conservative point of view -- but would there not be times when people would put bills in, criminal justice bills, that would be very conservative and harsh and come to you and say, "We expect you to kill this thing?"

MADDY: Oh, many, many, many times. The idea of putting a bill in was to say you authored a bill that was tougher than nails. Save me from myself, you know.

SENEY: Right, exactly.

MADDY: I did all those things. I mean, in my view that's what a good chairman would do, up to a point where you don't disrupt our committee process too often and you don't cause a hardship on the staff and you don't push my staff around. In other words, you give us a chance to hear your bill, if you want a little show and tell day.

My view was, and I sort of gained some of that in the military when I was an air police officer on base and lowest rank, running around as Second Lieutenant trying to take care of colonels -- you know, there's a few things you can do to make everybody's life [a little easier] -- well,

that's just commonsense. If I could help a member I helped members. Not by pushing bills through but by giving them what they wanted.

Well, I'll give you an example. I don't think it's grievous in any way. Mel Levine put a bill in to prevent wearing swastikas, and this was very important down in the Jewish community in West Los Angeles. I don't know about Mel personally, although I think strongly Mel had some certain obvious reservations about First Amendment rights when you began to say you can't wear a swastika.

This committee was not about to put out a bill that would turn around First Amendment rights. But at the same time, Mel Levine was a cherished friend of mine and was on my committee. Within his community this was big. I mean, this was not an easy day that day. We had the whole front steps [full] and all that stuff that went along with that issue.

SENEY: A lot of demonstrators you mean?

MADDY: Demonstrators and the whole business, because both sides came out.

The long and short of it is we put on the appropriate show and then killed the bill.

SENEY: He understood that.

MADDY: And he understood it. My arrangement was "No way in the world, Mel, I can let this bill out."

The only sort of reservations I had was I wouldn't let a bill out of my

committee with the hopes we're going to kill it later for the show and tell. I'll do everything short of doing that. But if I lost control of the bill as chairman, which I could easily do. The Speaker, all he had to do was say, "Put the bill out." There's four of them and Maddy and Nestande. They don't mean anything. But the one thing about Leo was Leo let me run it. And so it was a good working relationship.

SENEY: Did Mel Levine come to you and say, "You know, I know this is not going to go anywhere but I've got to do this?"

MADDY: I'm not sure how it all came around but there was clearly an understanding. We all knew what was going to go on. We all knew what was going to happen.

And there was two or three others. I got some of the nicest notes from some guys who served with me, and I don't remember where they're at now, but were the nicest notes during the time I was chairman of that committee in terms of trying to deal with members. And I tried to do the same thing with the Welfare Committee, although I was a little less experienced at that time. Much more difficult committee to structure because everything welfare was nuance, not so much major policy. Criminal justice is major policy. You either allow them to wear swastikas or you don't.

SENEY: Did any of this ability to be able to handle this tough committee have to do with the fact that you had made it clear you weren't going to run again?

Had you done that by the time Leo made you chairman?

MADDY: No. I had made it clear that I was certainly thinking about getting out, but I also made it clear that I was probably going to go up. What[ever] Leo would remember about what I said, it was pretty clear in my mind my obligation to Leo for this chairmanship was not to run against him. Now, how far that went and whether it meant I couldn't run for A.G., and so on and so forth, I'm unclear. But I would not have run against Leo.

SENEY: Right. And that's just a matter of your word.

MADDY: Well, that's common. My word. You know, I wouldn't expect you to give me a shot. Although as Sal says, in hindsight now, if I had run for the A.G. that might have been the stepping stone that got me all the way there. Things didn't work that way.

SENEY: Right.

Okay, now let's talk about Assemblyman Nestande and Reagan.

MADDY: Well, this is all during this process, and Bruce had been tight with the Governor. I don't remember all the details or how it all worked out, but there was a meeting called by Governor Reagan, coming back to California with a couple of his staffers, in which he asked some key people to come to a meeting to speak to him about putting together a run against Ford for the presidency in '76. At that meeting was Bill Richardson, [Assemblyman Michael] Mike Antonovich, Bruce Nestande, Ken Maddy, and [Senator Newton R.] Newt Russell. Those are the ones I

remember.

SENEY: Now, the other three -- Russell, Antonovich, and Richardson--

MADDY: Bill Richardson was Senator Richardson, hard right wing, and had long time been a supporter of the Reagans. Newt Russell, again, had worked, I think, with Reagan; had been involved with him. At one time had really been screwed in the sense that I think he was supposed to get an appointment to Congress or something. Anyway, Newt was next door to Richardson in his district. What that means, I don't know. But Newt was around. And then Mike Antonovich was an up-and-coming, at that time, Assemblyman who is still on the [County] Board of Supervisors in Los Angeles.

SENEY: And very conservative too.

MADDY: And very conservative. They were all very conservative, except Nestande and I. Nestande invites me: "Come on down, let's see what's going on and see what happens."

What I can recall from it was the overture that we've got to do this.

SENEY: From Reagan?

MADDY: From Reagan. "I'd like to do this. I think it's possible. I think the country needs a change. I think I can do it. I'm ready," and so on.

SENEY: Who else was there on Reagan's side?

MADDY: I can't remember. I can't remember a soul. I haven't thought about it. I don't know if Bruce can remember a soul who was there, but he probably

could come closer than I can.

SENEY: [Edwin] Ed Meese[III] maybe?

MADDY: I don't know if Ed was there or not, or Mike Deaver. I mean, the person I was closest to in all the Reagan people was Deaver. But I don't know whether that was then or now or who was actually there.

Richardson just gave Reagan, as I recall, a ration of crap. Just went over his eight years and what a shitty Governor he had been. I mean, it was typical Bill Richardson if he got you. Nothing against Bill, but I think he felt he was doing him a favor. But anyway, my memory of that is he just beat him up.

Mike [Antonovich] was quiet, he didn't say much. Mike was always very shy and quiet. Newt Russell just waited always for Bill Richardson to speak. And Bruce and I said, "Good."

From there we go then and we're suddenly involved on the inside, if you will, sort of speak, to the Reagan thing.

SENEY: Can I stop you just to say about Richardson's tirade.

MADDY: When I say tirade, I recall it as being instead of sitting down and saying, "What a great Governor you are, and we'll walk to the ends of the earth for you," which is always the way he sort of depicted himself, my recollection is he just ate him up and told him all the bad things he'd been doing and all the liberal things he had moved to.

SENEY: But that was true, wasn't it?

MADDY: Well, Bill Richardson saw it that way. He thought Reagan had deserted the ship.

SENEY: Many conservatives felt that way.

MADDY: Absolutely.

SENEY: Signed the abortion bill.

MADDY: Yes, the abortion bill, the therapeutic abortion law. All the things that I enjoyed that he did they didn't like. So I was the more logical guy to go on board.

And of course, Mike Curb comes into this thing at this stage in time too, because as I said earlier, Mike was supposed to be my appointee to the State Central Committee and I had made that move as sort of an angel. I was thinking about the future.

The end result was, in terms of direct involvement and then in '76, Reagan had control of the delegation when it got time to pick the delegates. And so it was not a Gerry Ford delegation that was going back to Kansas City, it was Holmes Tuttle, Leonard Firestone, et al., all the "Kitchen Cabinet" guys, and the young Assemblyman out of Fresno who was the moderate, was Whip of the delegation, was Ken Maddy, 1976. And of course, Nestande was on the delegation. And so we went back to Kansas City, and suddenly, an obscure Assemblyman who nobody knew is now on the inside and nobody can quite figure it out because voting for consenting adults and voting for all the things that Ronald Reagan didn't

necessarily stand for, I was out there. It was mostly title. I mean, I couldn't do diddly-squat. The one thing I had to do was get some irate young woman who snuck into our delegation in some fashion and was going to vote against us at a key moment, and they put me in there to charm her out of the seat. I went over next to her and she said, "I know what you're here for." And she said, "If you even think you're going to interfere with my vote, every television in America will be standing here because I'm going to be hanging onto you, screaming at the top of my head that you're trying to harass me," and so on.

So I went back to Holmes and said, "We're just going to figure out there's going to be one vote in the California delegation against us this year."

She was funny. I have no idea what her name is anymore. But my job as Whip, of course, was to organize and to help people and make sure their seats were correct.

SENEY: Holmes Tuttle was the chairman of the delegation?

MADDY: I don't know if Holmes was chairman, but it was all the "Kitchen Cabinet." No, William French-Smith, I think, was the chairman.[1]

SENEY: Another big guy.

MADDY: Another big guy. All the Reagan "Kitchen Cabinet" people were there,

[1] Unable to verify.

and they didn't do much. You know, the day-to-day activity on the delegation was done. It was fun. We were back there, and of course, the dynamics of the '76 delegation was a thrill and an excitement as Reagan tried to pull this thing off and had Texas and we had other states. We barely saw him but he was magnificent when he'd come in.

In fact, there's been stories written about how Betty Ford would try to wear a flashier dress than Mrs. Reagan, and back and forth. One sat on one side of the podium, the other one sat over here. It was fascinating. It was a fascinating drama all sort of put together by the two major delegations and we in California playing our small role.

Merksamer was an alternate on the delegation at the time.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

MADDY: Those '76 ties stood me well with Republican conservatives who I was not necessarily tied with. It held me in good stead with them through the years because they knew that no matter how they wanted to cut it, no matter what I voted, no matter how I did it, by god, I'd been with Ronald Reagan when it counted. That's when it counted.

SENEY: Talk some more about the convention. I've been to one many years ago, and they're very exciting. It's a very intense atmosphere. I mean, these moments like the one you described with this woman. Everything seems to hang on them and then it doesn't.

MADDY: It means nothing, right.

I think it's for the faithful. I think it's for those who live and die the politics because it certainly is drama. It can be very strategic if you're on the "in," and it's very, very, very hard to be anywhere close to the "in." I mean, the number of people that are really on the "in." In most delegations and most conventions, I don't think it makes any difference because it's all set, cut and dried, and everybody knows what's going to happen.

But certainly in '76 was a dramatic time because they weren't sure around the nation. And Gerry Ford was giving away the store. All you had to have was for there to be a loose vote and you've got a bridge in your district. You know, the kind of things that a President and an administration can do to make sure delegates come his way and congressmen are taken care of, and so on and so forth, are just unbelievable. And it can be tremendously dramatic.

To the extent that we had a little look, because Bruce was in a little closer than I was, but when they had the meetings and when they had to call and say, "What are we going to do here?" and "What are we going to do there?" at least they called me in to give the orders: "Let's get these guys together. We want to make sure everybody's on time today." We have to do this, we have to do that.

And then the little crummy stuff I did, which was just make sure

who got seats. If you're a delegate and you have an absolute right to a seat, then I knew who wanted their seats no matter what versus who might be an alternate, who might be a deep alternate: somebody who was sitting way up in the balcony. And they would come and say, "Can you get me on, Ken? Anyway you can get me on." I'd just say, "Here, take mine. You go down. I'm going to give you thirty minutes."

SENEY: To sit on the floor.

MADDY: Yes. "Go down and sit down in my seat. You sit right up front. Just make sure you do this or that."

Well, those are just very nice things to be able to hand out, and you get a crucial moment, and for some people it's everything. It's everything. And this was monumental. They are exciting. There were so many things going on in the Reagan issue because it was hanging by a thread from one day to the next.

SENEY: He came close to unseating Ford.

MADDY: Oh! really close. When he went and got [U. S. Senator Richard A.] Schweiker as his vice presidential candidate, they were not certain at that time that that swing, if they got all of Pennsylvania's delegation, couldn't have moved it over for us, particularly if we had picked up another state or something and had gone along and said, "Pennsylvania's going to go and now we'll jump on." Of course, he chose Schweiker early in order to grab the delegation.

Whatever this Proposition C move, it was just that one vote that one woman was going to vote "no" against. It meant nothing but it was one of those big procedural votes. So when Holmes, or French-Smith, whoever, got up and said, "The California delegation, it's 54 yes and 1 no," you know, then "Oh, boo!" We lost one someplace. But the Schweiker thing was big.

SENEY: Were you there when that decision was made, or did you just hear about it?

MADDY: They walked in. It was so funny because nobody had the vaguest [idea] -- at my level I had no notion. Those are the things that the average delegates were not even close to. I don't know if any members of the delegation were even involved in that. I certainly didn't know anybody who said I was in the room.

The other key one was just the Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Ford dynamic of one was at the far end of the table and would wear bright red and one would be in bright green.

I would say that in terms of politics, in terms of the greatest moment I've ever seen in terms of being there, what I was impressed the most by was the speech that Ronald Reagan gave at the end of the delegation in '76. And I'll only make a quick note.

We went back there, Bruce and I, and we were staying at the hotel with Maureen Reagan and her crew. We had access and things were

rolling around: We had a lot of ways to come and go. That night, they knew Gerry Ford was going to win. So Maureen said, "I'm going back to the hotel, Daddy's place, and we're going to have a reception for all of us. But I'm going to leave early. There's no use for me to hang around. Daddy absolutely told them that he is not going to come in on President Ford's night. This is his night. He will not speak, he will not be involved at the end, and it's going to be over. So you guys split early." In other words, come on back and let's get to drinking; it's over babe. Whether she actually left or not, I'm not certain.

But we had this in mind, and I can recall it, that we were down on the floor, and the big thing was we were on one side and Texas on the other. It was something like "Olé," we would go. That would be the chant: "Olé, Olé!" You know, you start all these little goofy things that people get wrapped up in.

Gerry Ford came down for his acceptance speech and, for him, gave as good an acceptance speech as anybody thought Gerry Ford could possibly give. I'd love to go back and see if all of this is true now. This is all memory. I haven't seen it or reviewed it in all these years but that he gave one of the greatest speeches ever.

I'll never forget, he goes back up, and Ronald Reagan is up there and Nancy, and they begin to chant about "Ronnie, Ronnie, Ronnie." He's going [gesturing] "No, no," like this. And finally Gerry is down there and

Gerry's going like this [gesturing], "Come on down."

Now, I knew from Maureen later that Ron had written an acceptance and had worked out in his mind an acceptance and a speech if necessary. He had all these cards and had all these thoughts that he had listed together.

SENEY: Both an acceptance and a concession speech.

MADDY: And a concession. But had made his mind up he was not going to do either. Didn't think it was appropriate to do either. Whatever happened, my memory is that Ford got him to come down, and he went down and by mixing the cards, everybody says later, but off the top of his head gave a speech that if they had voted at the moment he said "thank you," there would not have been a Republican delegate in that room who would not have voted for Ronald Reagan for President of the United States. And again, I'd like to go back and see if it was that good or what happened, whether it was the moment or was my sympathy, being on the wrong team and we hadn't won, but it was the greatest ever.

There was a kid I went to high school with that had been on the Hawaiian delegation, and they had been on the other side, and he came over and guys were hugging and he said, "You guys were right, we should have Ronald Reagan," and so on.

But he was a master of the moment.

SENEY: I've heard that about this speech, that it was an incredible speech.

MADDY: I'd love to go back, and one of these days I'm going to try to find that because I would love to see if the facts back up my memory: if in fact Gerry Ford was good, if in fact Ronald Reagan was great.

And of course, the way we traveled around and the things we did at the meetings and so on, we were able to move around with access to a lot of different things. It was fun.

SENEY: What do you mean by that?

MADDY: Oh, just that we had Maureen. You know, we could move. If there was a lineup and somebody said, "You're going to wait 58 cars before the Reagan people get through. Are you part of the group?" we're part of the group. We leave a little early. It's perks. It's how to go to something the right way. There's nothing like going to the Superbowl with the right seats is what I'm saying.

SENEY: Talk a little bit about Holmes Tuttle and William French-Smith and some of these other guys. We talked about them last time in terms of the election. What were they like?

MADDY: They were all the old style business then that I thought depicted Ronald Reagan. These are all self-made guys. You generally liked them. They came up the hard way, most of them. They appeared to have come up the hard way. They had all struggled. They were all older. They all had more commonsense. They were all pretty conservative. There wasn't too much phoniness about them. There was a little phoniness about them

because there was the social circle and the women that were involved in some cases.

But basically, they were the kind of people that Ronald Reagan thought should come in and give free service to the state in terms of serving in key roles and taking their business experience and all the things they had learned, and they were all up there in their 60's and so on, and share that with the State of California.

And I make it in contrast to the Bill Gateses and all the wizard kids and all the brains that run around now, because that wasn't any part of Ronald Reagan's people. It's obvious. It's just like [President William J.] Bill Clinton. I mean, he's younger than I am so he's not going to be out even taking 65-year-olds. He's down taking 50-year-olds and 40-year-olds, and what's happening in America has changed with all the new technology. But the people who counted then were the -- I mean, Holmes Tuttle was a car dealer.

SENEY: The biggest Ford dealer in California.

MADDY: Yes. He was shunned. If nothing else, some of the inside guys that were Ronald Reagan's old Hollywood elite, they didn't like him very much because he was a car dealer.

And who else? There was another good friend of mine who was one of the best guys in terms of personality, another car dealer. They had a lot of car dealers around in the business. And French-Smith was a good

lawyer and was well known. But these were all people who were there, and frankly, as I could see, not any personal problems. They were in there caught up in the Ronald Reagan notion that we have to get back.

They were not nasty people because that's not their style, but they knew what your place was and they made sure you knew your place. I never got to know any of them very, very well. They all knew who I was. As I said, at one point in time when I was elected to the Senate finally, Holmes or one of them came up and said, "We probably should have spent less time with Mike Curb and more time with you and we might have had the Governor by now." So there was a few concessions in there. Treated me nicely.

But as I say, it was a different breed of cat, but I don't think today, if you wanted to come into California and put together your "Kitchen Cabinet," that you'd find any people like this anymore. There are not too many around.

SENEY: There's some talk, generally by Reagan's enemies, that he was really sort of a front man for these people, that they were really in charge, that they had selected him and put him forward. Do you have a take on that?

MADDY: Oh, I don't think so. Well, let me say this, that anytime you have a group of advisers, you're subject to a great deal of what they have to say. Ronald Reagan, I don't think, ever admitted or even tried to admit or think that he was smart about all the issues that went on. What he was good at

was if you were a brilliant businessman in the area of energy and he chose you, then he expected you to go forward and put out an energy policy that made sense for California, what's going on. And I think he was smart enough to take all the various fields of interest around the country, around the state, and say, "What can we do to make this thing work better?"

He tried to get welfare specialists. They couldn't all be private citizens who knew what it was like to run a welfare system because the welfare system was run by bureaucrats and so on. But he tried to get people who sincerely wanted to change the system so that it was accountable and that it would work to get people off welfare.

I don't think Ronald Reagan ever let anybody be a tool of his. I mean, all these biographies and stuff that are being written now all go back to the same thing: How smart was he? That seems to be a big issue. For me, as I said, one great thing I had that benefitted me--

[Interruption]

SENEY: You were saying you had the advantage of meeting all these people.

MADDY: Yes. And for me to sit down and tell you who were the brightest and the best and the smartest, I couldn't do it. You get a feel for yourself in life as to how bright you are in comparison to other people and how well you comprehend and so on. I don't know how smart Ronald Reagan was and how bright he was. I know that he had this tremendous ability to influence people and he had tremendous ability to convince people that what he was

trying to do was correct and that he had the proper motives. And I have no reason to disbelieve that.

In terms of who wagged the dog or whether he was really the one who came in and said -- I think it was like when I ran for Governor. I knew what I wanted to do in some sense, but let me tell you that what I knew I wanted to do was more or less based on what my experiences had been. I knew that I had key legislators. In my mind, I daydreamed about maybe I'm going to get this thing, what am I going to do? I knew the key legislators who I was going to rely more on in terms of certain policy issues. I knew some key people around that I could trust.

SENEY: Who would have been those key people?

MADDY: Well, I can't even think now as to go back, but at the time, I would run it through my mind. But I didn't know anybody in the energy business. Who would I have chosen? So you have to go back and find somebody.

I guess my point is that when Ronald Reagan got to that point he did put together this working team of people who hopefully were going to be able to meet these demands.

Peter Ueberroth's a good friend if mine, and I watched part of Peter's organization for the 1984 Olympics and how he hurt a lot of people's feelings that were close friends of his because he had all these assignments and Peter was an absolute taskmaster. If you were in charge of volleyball, he set forth this tremendous agenda as to how he was going

to put the Olympics on. And I'm just using volleyball as an example because I knew the guy who ran the volleyball and he ran all the way through, so he was not one of the fatalities. Peter picked close friends, big shots, people who were well known. If they didn't make his demands about being on time and having all these arrangements made by foreign countries, this, this, and this, they were going to bring forth a powerful Olympics, they were fired.

Well, the idea that he was able to put people in all these regimens, or disciplines, was one thing, and I think Reagan went out and tried to that. The question of how you held them to the line is much more difficult. If you're my good friend and you're just volunteering and you happen to be the smartest guy on energy but you've got your own business to run, I can't fire you. I'd just hope like hell that you'll give me as much sound advice for the state as possible.

As I think about it, it's tough to take too much of what you read about Ronald Reagan other than to say that I think he had this great instinct for commonsense and wanted to do well and I think was on the right track at that time in trying to choose who should come in and run the state.

Now, you take in contrast where Deukmejian went was basically he went back to people who he knew best, but basically he and Wilson and, to a large degree, Gray Davis, who've all come out of government, have

stayed more or less with government people. I would have gone from a legislator intent and probably leaned towards government people because that's where I came from. And they've all gone towards government people. You know, who's the best bureaucrat? Who's around here who knows more about this or that? He didn't go to the director of a major energy company. He went to the lobbyist maybe or the bureaucrat who has administered that program.

So there's a lot to be said about how you approach a new administration with this much work to do. Or, as what Gray is being challenged for now is to try to do it all yourself.

SENEY: Right. He's being criticized for doing too much.

You know, Reagan had a real talent for putting across his point of view, even changing his mind about things and not getting away with it but even prospering from it. One of the things that I remember particularly is his stance on payroll withholding.[1] At a press conference he said--

MADDY: "Concrete around my ankles."

SENEY: Yes. "What you hear is the sound of the concrete cracking around my feet," because he said his feet were set in concrete. Got a great laugh.

MADDY: Yes, a great laugh. Took the hit and became famous for it. It showed he

[1] For a period of time, then Governor Reagan had opposed withholding income tax payments from individual paychecks.

did have independence, it did show that he could change his mind. There were any number of things that benefitted him, and yet, he handled it, and made a lot of conservatives and lot of business people unhappy and mad and so on.

But I'm sure if you go back down through the list, to welfare reform, I'm sure there's one thing after another that governors would have to eat crow and still handle it, and he seemed to do it without any problem. Because people believed in him so much, I just think.

Right now that's part of Clinton's problem. Clinton can sell ice cream to Eskimos, but afterward, I think if you've hurt people so many times, that it's much more difficult for them to say, "We don't care what you've done or said, we still believe in you." People are having a hard time now with Bill, trying to say that whatever he says makes any sense to anybody.

SENEY: There's this notion of Clinton fatigue. People are just tried of him.

MADDY: He still may be right, but we just can't take him any longer.

SENEY: And people are ready, it seems, for a change.

MADDY: I think they are. I think that's the biggest thing [Democratic Presidential Candidate Al] Gore's got hanging over his head is this idea that we've had enough of you guys for a while. You know, we don't care who it is. And I think on the other side of the coin, I think some of the good traits of Ronald Reagan, George W. [Bush] is following. In other words, you don't

have to be the smartest guy in the world to try to be honest.

SENEY: Have you been solicited to be active in his campaign?

MADDY: I was before I became ill, and then there was a great deal of conversation before January.

SENEY: I guess it was this last January that you knew you had health problems.

MADDY: Right, when I came in in January, in '99. I had been talked to several times before that, before they ever got rolling. I think Jim Brulte was involved. There was some conversation about Jim and myself being involved. So I have not had any contact after that.

[Former President] George [Bush], Sr., I told you, wrote me a very nice note, and I told him at that point -- he knew I was ill -- and so I said I still was going to be with George W. but not in any kind of activism mode.

SENEY: I don't know that you did mention to me that you had gotten a letter.

MADDY: Yes, a very nice note from George, Sr. He's the head of the Cancer Institute down in Houston, Texas. That's how he happened to write me a little note and said if there's anything he can do to help. I'll try to find that. It's a nice personal note -- handwritten. At that time I wrote and said I'm hanging in with George W. and hopefully will talk to him.

SENEY: Let me ask you, from your last campaign you had almost $55,000 left, from your last Assembly campaign [in 1976]. At that point you could have put that in your pocket, couldn't you, if you chose to you?

MADDY: Sure.

SENEY: Did you?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: That wouldn't have been illegal, by the way. I want to make that real clear.

MADDY: No. You had to quit.

SENEY: Ahh. So if you ran for another office, then it had to go in.

MADDY: Right. You couldn't pocket it, no. I don't think. It was never a discussion, but I think you had to actually retire. Ernie Mobley, who we talked about the other day, I think Ernie had a couple hundred thousand. That was one of the things there was all this unhappiness over the fact that he still had a couple hundred to spend and still got beat.

SENEY: You mean he hadn't spent it all.

MADDY: Hadn't spent it all. Too confident and [Assemblywoman] Rose Ann Vuich beat him.

SENEY: Ahh. That's interesting.

MADDY: But my money all went back in.

SENEY: You know, another thing we talked about, and I want to get you to say a little more about it, was how some people -- and again, this I want to do because there's some media coverage of this, particularly by people who weren't friendly toward you -- said that you had supported Reagan in '76, and that you had turned more conservative in your voting record, and you were accused of some sort of opportunism here in terms of what you were

doing. How would you respond to that?

MADDY: I think an analysis of my voting record would indicate that as I became stronger in my seat and had less to worry about, that I began to be a little less tricky on my votes: You saw me show up on a few less roll calls so that where my true sentiments were I didn't try to hide as much as I did to begin with. When I say all those things, use those words, those are not necessarily bad words. I just use them as smart. There's no way for me to go cast a vote that I knew was not going to prevail and at the same time would hurt me politically, so why vote? Either abstain or figure out a way to show the people that you had something in mind but you weren't going to go this far.

Anyway, the long and short of it is I think any kind of an analysis would indicate that I became a little bit more Republican and I was a little bit more loyal in the sense that I could not move up in my ranks without showing it on same basic issues that I was going to be a little bit better.

I was always a fiscal conservative, so there was never any problem with that. The social issues were the ones that people took issue with me. And the thing is, I never changed on the social issues. The bottom line vote was the 1975 consenting adults bill which was sexual orientation. That was the biggest vote for Republicans in years, and once I cast that, that was over. From that time on I was known as having cast that vote.

Then I sort of, I think, stabilized in the sense that I wasn't going out

of my way to vote for gay rights and all those other things, I was being a little bit more careful. Because there are always six or seven bills that are out there to push people. And then there are the crusaders: We want to make sure.

I don't know what [Assemblywoman] Sheila [James] Kuehl's going to do for a backup now. As strong an advocate as she is for lesbian rights, she's gotten a lot this year. And the hard part for Gray Davis is going to be for him to say to her and the lesbian movement, "Look, you've gotten things that were impossible for the last sixteen years, and there's a clear line that I'm willing to follow you, but then beyond that line, I would hope that you would give me cooperation." That's what I would say if I was Gray Davis. "That you cooperate with me but you don't force me to take a stance on some things that I frankly believe that you've gone too far or that I disagree with."

SENEY: Gay marriage might be one.

MADDY: Gay marriage may be one. And he may even say, "Look, I'm for gay marriage. I could sometime in my career support it. But timing is everything." And the public has to be behind you; otherwise, you're taking a suicide move politically. So I think that he's going to face that.

And I think if you analyze all of mine, there were periods of time in which I became more confident and worried less about some of those things. Then towards the end I became actually more liberal on civil

rights issues and sort of went back to a point to where I'm much less concerned now about domestic partners and a lot of other things. I'm still strongly opposed to the notion that we can advocate in our schools and so on separate lifestyles and so on. I don't believe that's good. There's lines I clearly draw, but I'm absolutely unequivocally against discrimination. Where I disagree with the gays, I don't think we need to lay out each class of person. If you're discriminated against, you're discriminated against for whatever reason -- whether you're tall, short, black, brown, gay, white, whatever. We shouldn't have to sit down and give you special designation, which is what most of these groups want. They want to be designated.

SENEY: On this point, prior to '78, were you perhaps positioning yourself a bit for the Republican Primary for Governor, which is always a more conservative forum?

MADDY: I don't know if I consciously was doing it. There was no doubt that I was getting ready to run statewide, and there's no doubt that I was getting ready to fish or cut bait. Whether or not I felt that I could try to become more of a conservative, I don't really believe that any of my staff people, or Sal or any people who were advising me, felt that I could make that jump.

When [U.S. Senator John] Seymour went from pro-life to pro-choice on the floor of the Senate, I said, "You can kiss it goodbye." I don't think

you can pull those kinds of things.

SENEY: You mean in the United States Senate.

MADDY: Yes. Some period of time he made a big speech about how he went from pro-life to pro-choice, whatever the hell it was. But I don't think you make those big significant choices. Those are not things that you think about and one day you wake up and figure out. That's the way I believe. I didn't feel stupid but I also was not going to be a fool about these things.

And it was not driven by some strong morality on my part that it's unconscionable for me to change my mind. It wasn't that at all. I would like to say that most everything I did was done out of some analysis and out of some intellect and not being driven by some moral standard that I felt I could never turn my back on, because that's not me. It wasn't something I belabored.

SENEY: Shall we stop there today?

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Session 8, October 11, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Senator, I wanted to ask you about something that was reported in the *Fresno Bee* in January of '77 -- and this leads into the Governor's race. This has to do with the politics of the State Central Committee. You were supporting Truman Campbell for vice chair of the State Central Committee. He would be, I guess, chair of the next year, wouldn't he?

MADDY: Correct.

SENEY: And he would be in a position to help you if you became a candidate. Talk about the politics of that a little bit and what you had in mind there.

MADDY: Actually, the central committees in my district were of very little importance to me because I sort of fought them through the years and didn't participate a great deal. I was asked to be there and I would show up more as a token gesture. Not being facetious about it, but my organization was sort of separate and apart.

When I first ran in '70 against the establishment, the people were lovely, they worked hard, and they adopted me as soon as I won, of course. So through the years, from '70 then all the way up through, I didn't spend a great deal of time nurturing the central committee or trying to build an organization through that. I had a separate committee. We

played the games because that was what you were supposed to do, and I felt that was my obligation as an elected incumbent.

SENEY: Right. And you had an appointment to the State Central Committee.

MADDY: Correct.

SENEY: The one you mentioned that you bestowed on Mike Curb.

MADDY: Yes. And so I had several to the State Central Committee -- like eight, I think, over all -- and I would use some local folks but then I'd also use those for my more political purposes on a statewide basis.

At the local central committee, and the activities going on in Fresno and Madera counties, I let those folks just run their own show and did not participate to any great degree. I would make my appearances because they expected you to. You were an incumbent, and I was sort of the incumbent hero, and so I did all the right things. I gave the speeches when I was supposed to give them.

But when they had their battles, like Tru Campbell -- Truman Campbell was a lawyer friend of mine, and I don't even know who he was running against or what -- but it was always a conservative/ liberal battle, so I didn't have much to say about it.

To the extent that we organized, what Sal did, going back prior to '78, we moved around other counties. And the one place I did become a little bit more politic in central committees was to go out in counties that were not my own and develop some friends within the county central

committee area so that you had someone talking about your name, mentioning your name, because then, when you get ready to run in '78, you went to these big conventions, and if you had one person out of every county pumping for you, you at least had something going.

SENEY: And you didn't have an organization of your own obviously in these counties and you needed some sort of framework.

When you said on the State Central Committee you had eight appointments -- some you would use locally and some, you said, you would use for statewide political purposes -- what did you mean by that?

MADDY: Don Jackson had the business association with Mike Curb, and Mike Curb was looked upon as one who could be of benefit financially and so on, and he did not have an appointment to the State Central Committee so that I appointed him as one of my delegates. Sal Russo has always been a delegate of mine to the State Central Committee, even though he has not lived in Fresno or my district for years.

There were a few people that I placed on the State Central Committee who wanted to participate and who wanted to be part of the efforts but not go to the work that you have to go to. For instance, for Sal to donate to people up here or someone just "Hey, Maddy, put me on the State Central Committee."

SENEY: And you were glad to do that?

MADDY: I was happy to do that because the activities of the State Central

Committee and so on I never thought were that important, except as I go back when we began to organize in '78. And then, again, when we thought Deukmejian might appoint us State Treasurer, Sal did have a complete plan for us, if we got appointed Treasurer, to work that year as Treasurer to build our base for running for Governor after Deukmejian. In other words, that was the whole thought, that if Deukmejian appointed me Treasurer, that I would run for Governor following him.

We clearly had a plan then, and of course, Sal has utilized that many, many times in other campaigns: You have to have some base in every county, and one of the easiest ways for a politician is to have a base within your party. It made far more sense for me to have a representative or two in Orange County than it did in Fresno County.

SENEY: As long as you brought up the Treasurer business, maybe we should talk about that. This, of course, was occasioned, this opening, by the death of Jess Unruh.

MADDY: Deukmejian had to appoint the replacement.

SENEY: And you let him know pretty quickly that you were interested in that.

MADDY: Correct.

SENEY: Did Sal Russo communicate that also?

MADDY: Correct. This was another Sal move. This was a real move.

Just to lay it in perspective, I had remarried in '81, and I had adjusted nicely to the new life, which was one of wealth, and yet was very

happy and wanted to and would not give up my job in the Legislature to live some other sort of life with Norma, either running chicken businesses or doing something else. I wanted to stay. I loved the life up here. I liked doing what I was doing. I thought it would fit our lifestyle. She had been independent for a long time.

Everything seemed to work, but I didn't want to give up anything. I didn't want to give up the Legislature. I still was involved, but I had made up my mind, clearly, that I was not going to venture out and do anything bold. In other words, I was not going to run statewide. I had sort of made up my mind I'm not going to run statewide; I'm not going to go through the agony of it anymore because it is hard work. You get a little soft and you get things going well, and you wonder why you grab off something new. Plus, Norma and I were investing a little more in the horses, which is really my true, true love. Work the Crowd had not hit yet. It might have made a difference, too, if Work the Crowd had come a couple of years earlier. I might have changed my style too.

But we hadn't been lucky, so I'm out there. And where I think I always put down -- and it's a disservice, I'm going to take it out of that little resume[1] -- that my biggest disappointment was Deukmejian's failure to appoint me -- because it's not totally fair. It's my biggest

disappointment in myself. I let myself get caught up again with the thought that I could run statewide. And when I say caught up, you do have to have a mentality. You do have to develop an attitude.

In my opinion, to do what I wanted to do, for me to do it, I had to gear up, which means I had to begin to think about being a statewide politician and make the trips to give the speeches, to do so many of the things that I really did not like totally. I was willing to do them, and when I got involved in them I liked it. I will say that. When I got involved and was in the run, I loved the race. It was just hard to get me started. But Sal got me pushing, and he said, "No, no, we've got it, we've got it," and it dragged out for probably a year as Deukmejian made his decision.

My disappointment was I let myself get so wrapped up that I actually wanted it, and I had reached the point in life where -- not that I wasn't always that way -- I had never wanted anything so bad that I thought I couldn't just smile and say, "Okay, that was a good try, it's over."

So when he said no, and I knew why, I think I was disappointed in that I wish he had said to me early on that "If Dan Lungren wants it, he's one my closest friends, that he was going to get it."

Then I would have said, "Okay, chances are not very good, don't get geared up."

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[1] Here, Senator Maddy alludes to words in resume. That resume ends with the following sentence: "His biggest disappointment in his twenty-eight years of service was the failure of Governor Deukmejian to

But in that period of time, in that hiatus, we really went to work. We went to work in terms of analyzing counties, as far as breaking down our old '78 list, pulling out our lists: Who's still around? Who's still alive? Who's still doing this? Who's still doing that? -- because we had good support around the state -- and who can we mobilize again? What's really out there? And then developed a strategy for how I could spin off what would look to be a job that did not have a lot of statewide appeal, the Treasurer's job, spin off and get enough publicity so that I could not only build a financial base but a public awareness base, and so on, and be ready to roll in 1986 [to seek election to the Treasurers office].

And thinking Pete Wilson had the world by the tail was a downhill pull, as we say. I mean, who could ask for a better job in politics than to be a United States Senator? So no one in their right mind thought that Pete was really coveting coming back to run for Governor. And I think he was. I don't think there's any doubt that he always wanted to be Governor. So I may not have had the choice anyway, but the reality was that I let myself get wrapped up in it.

So we did begin to formulate plans because the difference between -- and I don't blame Matt Fong, who's a lovely guy. My son worked for him and Sal worked for him and so on. But I personally had a different plan as

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appoint him to the Treasurer position in 1985."

to how I was going to go after the governorship than what was used. And he didn't make any mistakes. He just wasn't me. It would have been a different story.

SENEY: You mean Matt Fong?

MADDY: Matt Fong. He just did his job. He did a tremendous job as Treasurer and worked like hell to be Treasurer and thought that might be enough.

SENEY: You would have handled it differently though. You would have used it more as--

MADDY: As my campaign [for Governor]. I mean, that was campaign day one. If the boys confirmed me, and it was pretty clear--

SENEY: Well, you wouldn't have had any trouble.

MADDY: No. Are you kidding? There were all kinds of fights. They knew they were going to have me for the next challenge for Governor. There was no doubt that I was going to be rolling.

SENEY: And the Democrats would have let you have it anyway.

MADDY: Oh, the Democrats were happy. I mean, the big "Gang of Five" was a result of Democratic Assemblymen who didn't make a mistake by going to Willie. Willie said, "I would have endorsed him, but you made a mistake of endorsing him before you asked me first to do it." He said, "I'm the one who said to give Maddy the first endorsement out of Assembly Democrats, not you." That's why the "Big Five" came. One of the reasons. The straw that broke the camel's back, as Willie said. They

defied him many times, but when they defied him on that little issue, he told him that "You've gone too far."

SENEY: This is Steve Peace, Rusty Areias--

MADDY: It was actually a gang of six to begin with. It was [Assemblyman] Gary Condit, [Assemblyman] Steve Peace, [Assemblyman] Gerald [R.] Eaves, [Assemblyman] Rusty Areias--

SENEY: How long did you know between the time you had sort of made yourself available to Deukmejian that it was going to be Lungren and not you?

MADDY: Alan Zaremburg was assigned to call me on a Monday morning at nine o'clock to tell me that at eleven there was going to be an announcement that Lungren was going to be Treasurer. So he called me at home in Modesto. It was Monday morning. And I said, "Alan, in fifteen minutes a television camera [crew] from Fresno is going to be sitting here because they got word last night and they wanted my (quote) 'reaction and disappointment' as I was told that I wasn't going to get it." So I said, "Why don't you go back to the administration and tell them what I think about a one-year wait and then a chicken shit deal that you have to call me up," and he was almost in tears.

He said, "I know it." He said he could not believe they did that to me. Could not believe that I had to wait until this morning to tell me. I said, "The *Bee* knew about it." I said, "They're going to be here so they're going to get my candid reaction to the disappointment." And I said, "I'll

be a good soldier."

In any event, they're little things. Somebody screwed up. I'm sure it wasn't the Governor, it wasn't anybody else. Somebody just said it'd be easier to call him tomorrow morning and tell him.

SENEY: You know, my understanding is that Deukmejian is a guy who didn't forget slights.

MADDY: We never have talked about it, I don't want to talk to him about it. All these things are personal to me. It's my reaction to things. I think everything that was involved could have been and might have been smoothly handled by somebody that was in charge of doing it all correctly: "We ought to inform Maddy early on." I did have a meeting with Marv Baxter and the Governor when that Supreme Court Justice was disqualified for having smoked pot way back when.

SENEY: Paul Halvonick?

MADDY: No. This was a United States Supreme Court Justice. Eisenberg [Douglas Ginsburg] or something like that.

Duke and Marv Baxter and I, and they brought that issue back up again, discussed it, said it didn't have any relevance. This goes way back.

SENEY: You're meeting now with Marv Baxter and--

MADDY: This was shortly before they made the decision, and some of the newspapers put out the fact that I was hurt by the appointment to Treasurer because of the story that rose again over a Supreme Court

Justice who was actually turned down because he had admitted smoking pot way back when.

SENEY: Right, he withdrew his name. He was from Massachusetts, and I can't think of his name.

MADDY: Something like Eisenberg.

SENEY: Something like that, yes.

MADDY: So it was my disappointment. I'm sure the Governor--

SENEY: You know what? I'm thinking of something else, and that's going back to this death penalty business when you lay it out Deukmejian that he would have to accept the bill in a certain form.

MADDY: Could be. If you want to be conspiratorial, if you want to think we never get mad, get even, someplace along the line?

SENEY: Yes. You've got a pretty big smile on your face.

MADDY: No, no.

SENEY: You don't think so?

MADDY: No. I think George Deukmejian was so straightforward and sincere that I don't think that there was anything he did that was intended to and/or was purposefully a slight. And I know it's come back to me many times by key people -- Merksamer and very close friends of his -- in which there's almost a swearing going on that I was always in the contention, that there was never any decision made until it was actually made at the end.

Where I felt slighted was, I always started out by saying, "If I had known that Lungren was in the game early on and about that relationship," because there was no one else mentioned besides me through all this process, the only thing I would have changed was my style, how I would have addressed it. I would say, hey, it's one of those things. If I get it, good; if not, I don't.

SENEY: But you've gotten yourself geared up.

MADDY: I've gotten myself geared up. I didn't like the weakness. I didn't like the fact I let myself do it. That was all.

SENEY: That you let, in a sense, your ambition get the best of you?

MADDY: Yes, that I should have been beyond it. I should have been able to handle it a little better. And I haven't done much better since that time because I've made a point of it.

SENEY: What do you mean by that?

MADDY: I made a point of it. I was mad enough to put it down in the bio and say I'm still mad. I'm still sorry that happened because that was a disappointment. And it's gilding the lily a little bit because there are a lot of things that were worse in one sense or another in my career. And that wasn't the worst. Who knows what it would have been like to have been Governor those eight years if I had won in the first place? Or whether I could have beaten Pete Wilson. So many ifs.

SENEY: Well, you said to me the other day -- not on the tape -- that Wilson got the

worst eight years in recent memory.

MADDY: The worst eight years of anybody I could remember. I either would have wanted to be a miracle man or some savior out there because it would have been very difficult to do.

SENEY: Absolutely.

Again, let's go back to the '78 race because there's some more things I need to ask you about. One of them is that Wilson, which he has done since, had attached his campaign to a proposition. This one was to do with public employees and forbidding strikes by public employees. Something that the Supreme Court under Rose Bird had ruled was permissible. You wrote him that this was a bad idea, pointing out the 1958 debacle for Republicans who wanted a right to work.

MADDY: That's about as far as it got. We debated it on the Buckley show one night, I think, something like that, in a commentary.

I never studied Pete's modus operandi, but you say it was one of the first times he did it. It was good. Pete had an ongoing cadre of people -- George Gorten, etc. -- who worked with him and planned strategy way, way ahead. And that's why I said he was so good and he's such a good politician, because he really lives and breathes it.

I have never been for the so-called confrontational politics or the wedge issue. I always figured out the risk was more than it was worth it. Of course, I could clearly be wrong on all these issues. I could clearly be

wrong in this philosophy because the people who win do win with these wedge issues. They do win for Republicans in the minority. But I just felt strongly on a lot of them. We disagreed on a number of issues.

There's no doubt in my mind I never would have been on immigration[1] and a lot of the other things, even though I think on the issue Pete is right. There's no doubt in my mind that people in this state of California are not praising necessarily today this demographic makeup, and the fact that we're a changing demographic state, and that we're carrying the load for so many people around the world, and that we're going to have far more problems ahead of us than has occurred behind us because of our attitude towards immigration.

But, do we go so far as to create a situation in which Republicans are identified as being the bad guys? This wasn't Republicans who had voted for this stuff. Anytime you get 60 percent of a vote in a state in which there's 60 percent Democrat, you've got to figure that you might have more Republicans voting but you sure as hell don't have everybody. So why take the heat? And the right to work issue has always been -- I mean, with organized labor, they've been really sort of dead on their heels for years around here and we've given them new impetus. They're stronger than hell now.

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[1] Proposition 187, November 8, 1994.

And SEIU's [Service Employees International Union] an example. And the nurses. What policies could we have followed that would have kept nurses and teachers more in line with being (quote) "professionals," (unquote)? That's the way to stop the unions is to give them a professional status. Because everybody looked upon them as being professional. We always admire teachers and nurses as being professionals, not labor union people, if you want to be derogatory. They're not nine to fivers, they're not people whose job is to empty the wastebaskets three times a day. It's to take care of you. By making the issue labor, we've pushed them into the category where they're going to act just like somebody who does empty the ashtray three times a day. That's all they're going to do until they get paid more.

SENEY: I'm sure in writing Wilson [in 1978] and urging him not to go along--

MADDY: That was all politics.

SENEY: Sure. I mean, your worry would be if he had succeeded in putting this on the ballot and you had got the nomination, you would have then been yoked with his loser--

MADDY: Everything's politics. That was just politics, not a moral outrage or anything.

SENEY: I wanted to ask you about this thing. I think we spoke a little bit about it last time but I brought it along, and this was something that the Wilson campaign sent out. They claimed this was just an internal document, but a

low-level staff person had included this in a mailer that went out to press people and other people. I think 1600 of them were shipped out. And you got a letter. This is a letter from William French-Smith, who we've spoken about, and attached to it is part of this. And you do respond to him. In your files was a long response.

MADDY: [Reviewing document.] Right.

SENEY: What Senator Maddy has just been looking at is a series of voting analyses that came out of the '76-77 session where you were highest ranked Republican Assemblyman by the American Civil Liberties Union, second highest ranked by the California Labor Federation, the lowest ranked Republican by the California Conservative Union, tied for lowest ranking among Republican Assemblymen by the California Peace Officers Association, and among the highest ranked Republican Assemblymen by the California Teachers Association. And this is all meant obviously to do you damage in the Republican Primary.

Did it have much of an effect, do you think?

MADDY: I don't think so. I mean, I ran extremely well. I ran stronger than almost anybody else, the newcomers. I ran right by Pete. I think my response was several: Sometimes I defended myself on the basis of the district I was representing, and two, I would sometimes shift over and defend myself on the basis that if we don't have more Republicans like myself, we're not going to win any general elections, it's great to win the

primaries. And then three, sometimes just outright defiance in saying, "This is where I am."

The miracle was I did as well as I did with the voting record I had, to get as far as I did in the Republican ranks. Which probably adds to all this luster I have now, now that I'm retired, all this image that seems to flow around me as to what a phenomenon I was. I wasn't a phenom at all. All I did was what I wanted to do and survived. The key, the phenom, was surviving. Not that I was so brave or anything else. It was just the fact that I did it all and lived through it and did it my way. So that takes on a certain luster now as to whoa, what a guy he must have been. I just did what I wanted to do and was able to survive.

SENEY: Well, your descriptions of how you handled your district -- that is, with these town meetings and cultivating the press and media on a regular basis with taking out ads in the small town newspapers -- that was smart stuff.

MADDY: Going back, day one, Karney Hodge, my old clothier and close pal, Don Jackson, my on-and-off law partner and still very, very close friend, Sal Russo, those three principally, and a mix of a lot of staff who had been with me a long time -- Pete Bontadelli and Ted Hilliard -- and a whole group of people who staffed me for a long time, to such a stalwart as Jo-Ann Slinkard who handled everything else -- I mean, no strategy but Jo-Ann handled everything else about my life and my politics and all of the good guy stuff. You know, when you're not a good

guy, how do you make people think you're a good guy? By being attentive. And Jo-Ann did all of that. Letters, commendations -- make sure people knew you were concerned -- all that stuff, which she did for twenty-some years for me. Plus a couple of other secretaries: Janice Debenedetto, who worked in my district office in Fresno and did the same thing there, and Frances [Stizzo] and Liz [Guerrero] up here. I have about four or five people who for nineteen years all worked for me up here.

But going back to probably Jackson and Sal as the key strategists and Karney Hodge as sort of an overseer, in terms of just real close friends who were only tied to Ken Maddy and concerned about Ken Maddy, we made a great number of smart moves. And there's a lot of other people there, but I'm talking about people who were there day one, are still there today, and are still the people who I wouldn't do anything politically without making the move to sit down and say to these guys, "What do you think?" I never have to push Sal because Sal's always about seven new jobs ahead of me. But Karney and Don Jackson are just sitting there waiting for me to want [something] and then, "What can we do to make it work?" It was a great team and we did some very smart things along the way as to how to win a seat.

So part of what intrigues me about even the state college in Fresno and having a deal, I would love to get Zeno and [Assemblyman Richard] Lehman and Costa and sit down and talk about how you stay in a district

and so on and how you make the most of your opportunities. In one sense, how easy it really is. How easy it was in those days, if you reached out and really believed in the grassroots concept -- not that you could ever touch everybody's life or you could even come close to it -- but how you made the smooth moves to give impressions and people ideas as to who you were and what you stood for and how you can still do it. They do it all by money now and they do it all. And let me say this one thing: Do it in a positive way rather than a negative way.

The difference was we did everything positive for so many years that it's just hard to find [anything negative] -- none of that stuff. You could never find "Ken Maddy did a dirty trick." Ken Maddy used poor judgment; Ken Maddy hired Carson Rapp; Ken Maddy, we disagree on a bill; but you never saw where I either accused anybody of doing something wrong or did anything that was negative, going after somebody. I was always the attacked, the attackee. They were always going after me.

So whether it was just our instincts and the right people came together, I don't know.

SENEY: Let me turn this over.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

SENEY: Along these lines, there's one thing that I meant to ask you about or comment on, and now is the time to do that, I think, is when you first got

into office, one of the first things you did, apparently on the motion of a fourth grade class, if I'm not mistaken, is the butterfly, the--

MADDY: Dogface butterfly.

SENEY: The dogface butterfly is the official state insect.[1] What--

MADDY: Pure lark.

SENEY: Is that right?

MADDY: Pure lark. Somebody brought -- I don't know who it was in my district office -- brought forth, some teacher with a little innovativeness, and the dogface butterfly had been proposed several times. It was unique to California.

Fascinating, the person on the other side who worked the hardest to kill that bill was Sal Russo because of the monarch butterfly from over in Monterey, and Sal was working with [Assemblyman] Bob Wood, and Bob Wood was a legislator from Monterey. Of course, the monarch butterfly, which didn't qualify because it was not unique to California -- it had to be unique to California -- but the monarch was what everybody knew. Everybody knew about the monarch butterfly coming to Monterey.

So these kids came up, and it had been proposed several times before in different ways, and so we put it through. It was a joke. It was one of those things -- What's a young legislator do? -- and I took razzing for it.

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[1] Assembly Bill 1843.

But talk about the publicity I got for it.

SENEY: You got tremendous publicity.

MADDY: Tremendous publicity for it.

SENEY: Of just the kind you wanted.

MADDY: Just the kind I wanted. Good guy. I'm out there to do something different.

SENEY: Yes. Sense of humor.

MADDY: Young. Out with the kids. I was good with fourth graders. I mean, I had fourth graders. Kids knew me. I went to schools. I used to go to schools all the time and knew how to handle kids.

It was just one of those things, you know: "The only thing Maddy's done in his entire two years is the dogface butterfly. Let's hope he does more," or something like that.

SENEY: Well, another thing, and I expect this is the woman you talked about in your office who was behind some of this other stuff, that you're kicking off the local blood drive.

MADDY: We did all that. We did all of the kinds of things that you're supposed to do, which most -- 99.9 percent of legislators -- go ahead and they do those things.

To me, I think it's a question of having purpose and knowing which ones. You can go to a Kiwanis Club every single day you're home. Some program director will want you to speak. The key is to begin to break

them down and figure out what you're doing and what you're trying to accomplish with all these things. You can go to a teachers organization and/or a school function every single minute of every day you're home from Thursday evening to Monday morning, if you let them, because somebody will be asking for you. They're large like a lot of other groups, public agencies. They want access, and whoever's in charge wants to prove they've got access. And so the key is to get you there. And you find pretty soon that you've only met 2,000 people. You haven't met anybody -- same old folks. You know them well but you're not getting anywhere.

SENEY: And you're preaching to the choir.

MADDY: And you're preaching to the choir, you're generally talking to your friends. You're not going to see labor. I think the first year I came back I won the MAPA [Mexican American Political Association] endorsement. Well, MAPA wasn't anything in those days. I mean, hell, the Mexican American Political Association was next to nothing, all voted Democrat. And my line at that time was "The Democrats are taking you for granted." Of course, I was young in town and I had been involved in some things, so I had a whole group like Juan Flores, guys I went to school with, were all Mexican and they were all "Adelante con Maddy." You know, we're with Maddy.

Not brilliant but just a combination of coming together, working and

doing all the right things.

SENEY: There was a case -- and I think '74, if I'm not mistaken, and I may very well be -- where you got the local labor endorsement.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And Jack Henning--

MADDY: Fought me.

SENEY: Fought you and got it overturned.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: What was that all about?

MADDY: Jack didn't believe any Republican legislator should get a local labor endorsement, particularly one who was in the most vulnerable seat in California. I mean, that's the one they were supposed to beat.

But my dad had been in construction. I had had an apprentice plastering card when I was fifteen. I had actually worked as a laborer. I had been involved from the get-go in terms of activities in Fresno that involved some labor organizations. I knew the people. I had the best voting record in the Assembly in the first year on behalf of teachers. My sister was a teacher. I knew working people. I said, "My dad was in construction all his life, a construction worker."

I worked on the jobs. I could go to a laborer's union and the hod carriers loved me. When I talked about hawk and trowel, I'd just say something simple: "Hey boys, it ain't the load, it's the trips." I mean, you

talk that to a hod carrier and there isn't a single hod carrier who didn't know what the hell you were talking about. They'd build their hods up as big as they could make them. It wasn't the load; they could carry any load. It was how many times you had to go back and forth that killed you.

So, I mean, it wasn't hard for me to walk in and throw a little sidebar out there with some guy who had never been on a construction job in his life, and I'm looking down at some 250-pound hod carrier who knew what the hell it meant, and I said, "Look boys, it ain't the load, it's the trips." I got their votes. There was no doubt in my mind.

SENEY: He's our guy.

MADDY: Yes. So you spin that off, my life experiences. There's a lot of things I had been involved with touched a lot of different people, so commonsense tells you to move it around a little bit. And that helped me.

And I didn't discriminate per se. I didn't ever discriminate openly that they knew I had prejudices and so on. I wasn't losing any blacks and browns in all my War on Poverty days. All that stuff were all the blacks and browns. In fact, the other day at Fresno State College, two or three of the guys had been there since day one, when I first got on the War on Poverty; came up from scratch like me, same couple of black guys that have been around for a thousand years: "Hey, baby, it's still you hanging in there." Those are relationships and stuff you just can't beat, and it depends on how many people they know.

SENEY: Well, this is where personality overcomes voter registration and all the rest of it, doesn't it?

MADDY: Absolutely. Tough to do it. As I say, it's getting more and more difficult because people don't have contacts anymore. You either have to go back and have this long experience of working in the district and the community and building that up, because if you walk in cold turkey and you say, okay, I've decided to run for office, and I'm Don and I've been working in college for all these days; I really don't know anybody; I've got my teachers' friends and I've got some others, but I've got a lot of close neighbors, and you start out versus, you know, Maddy's been on fifteen boards and commissions; he's volunteered; he's done all these things; he must know 7,000 people, and that's a 7,000-foot jump right there and hard to overcome.

SENEY: And a positive relationship.

MADDY: And a positive relationship.

SENEY: You know, one thing that's said about you, and I can certainly see that, and I don't want to blow smoke--

MADDY: I appreciate that.

SENEY: Your amiability. I mean, you have what I would regard as a political personality in the sense that you're open and friendly. Do you remember people's names well?

MADDY: Not well. Terrible. Terrible but I fake it pretty well.

SENEY: But you can overcome that.

MADDY: Yes. I'm really getting worse as I go along, but I recognize faces almost without a fault, but I have trouble remembering names. But there's a lot of devices.

SENEY: For example?

MADDY: Well, introduce yourself first. As always, you're self-effacing: "Hi, Ken Maddy, you remember?" And they throw their name out, ninety percent of the people. People you hate worse in politics is the guy who walks up, "You don't remember me, do you?" That's the hardest one in the world to deliver. I learned, finally, it just got easier for me to say, "No, I don't. I know your face but boy, I can't place you where." And you get over it. It's just one minute, one second, one nth of a second, and generally it's over. Generally speaking, any guy who pushes you is a jerk anyway. I just sort of figured that one out too.

SENEY: Well, that's something you don't learn. That's something I think you come with. You're born with that. You drop from the womb with that kind of attitude.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: But let's go back to the '78 election because Brown is a big ally of yours here, Jerry Brown, because he's made the agriculture sector so angry, hasn't he?

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And one of the things that was done was that Food and Agriculture -- and I think this was done actually under Reagan -- it was not of cabinet status. It was part of a larger--

MADDY: Well, Jerry brought in the Agricultural Labor Relations Board activity and created that law, and at the same time the farm workers went with Prop. 14. That's like the guns in the first year that Duke made the gun issue. There's their mistake. You talk about wedge issues going the other way. I mean, where Pete Wilson might have made a mistake on immigration moving the farm bill, in Jerry's case it was taking the ALRB and making it so bad.

You know, that's one of the things that's going on right now. The rumors are that one of the things that, I'm sure, Gray Davis has warned hospitals: I wouldn't try to referendum me on this because you've got seven more years left of me. You know, on nurse ratios.

SENEY: And the rumor is that they may try to--

MADDY: Well, there's lot of rumors floating around. That's always the threat. The same is true with Royal Globe; same is true with the insurance companies. The Supreme Court ruled and instituted the *Royal Globe* case, and it saved millions and millions of dollars in terms of litigation, and you can certainly make a case.

SENEY: This has to do with bad faith by insurance companies.

MADDY: Bad faith, right. And all the money goes to the lawyers. Bad faith cases

are filed by a group of trial lawyers who file every case as a bad faith case and hope that they'll settle every case.

These are just huge rip-offs by a group of people -- in this case the trial lawyers -- who've gotten so strong, unfortunately, with their greed. But I know the rumors are that Gray has said to both Royal Globe people, I'm around for another seven years, guys, so be careful about what you're going to try to upset. Because it does become easier in many ways to overturn a bad bill than it is to try to pass an initiative[1] trying to pass a bad bill. And the reason is you can make the case against, particularly if you let Royal Globe -- notice how Davis, the whole nurse staffing doesn't start up for four more years. He's going to be gone, baby. He's going to be gone before that baby catches hold.

SENEY: He'll be past the next election.

MADDY: Yes. We're not going to sit there and suddenly find out that healthcare costs have skyrocketed ten-fold under Gray Davis because of a bill he passed.

SENEY: Because he'll be gone even before the chickens come home to roost.

MADDY: That's right. Sure, nobody will know what's happening. If he took it in tomorrow and suddenly every insurance company, every hospital added $50 to their room rate on the basis that nurse staffing -- I mean, how long

[1] Proposition 30, March 7, 2000, was placed on the ballot and approved by the voters. The initiative overturned the legislation allowing suits for bad faith.

would it take for the people to say wait a minute, this is crazy?

SENEY: And that's exactly what they do.

MADDY: Absolutely what they're going to do. Absolutely. Money isn't grown on trees. Somebody's got to pick it up.

So anyway, I didn't ever think about it before, but I just made that analogy between Pete Wilson throwing an initiative out there and the farm workers trying to go a little too far and the people balked.

So it brought Agriculture, and it made the '78 scenario reasonable.

SENEY: Right. Now, according to the news report, John Thurman, whom you know well, was a Democratic Assemblyman from Modesto, and he got Jerry Brown in '77 to move Agriculture into a separate department on its own.

MADDY: May have. I'm not positive.

SENEY: You don't remember.

MADDY: I'm not positive that he was the moving force.

SENEY: Okay. Well, the press reported it. Who knows? It may have come from Thurman.

MADDY: Could have been anybody, absolutely.

SENEY: But Thurman would certainly have an interest in that, would he not, in the interest of his own survival?

MADDY: Absolutely. Everybody in the ag area always tried to move Agriculture up on the list of things that were important.

SENEY: Another thing that happens in '77 is that Bakersfield Congressman [U.S. Representative] William Ketchum was toying with the idea of running for Governor and decided against it and supported you.

MADDY: I don't think Bill ever got that close. I don't think he was ever close. Bill was the kind of guy who always wanted to do something. A great guy. A very close friend of mine. Was one of my original two or three that endorsed Deukmejian with me the first time we had a press conference. We were very close friends. Had been my most strongest supporter when I ran for Assemblyman in 1970. He loaned me more members of his staff to help me in my campaign in '70. My first administrative aide came out of Ketchum's office over in San Luis. Bill was a good friend. Bill always threw his name out, so I don't think he was ever serious.

SENEY: So it didn't really matter much one way or the other.

MADDY: No.

SENEY: You did comment in June of '77 that lettuce prices were down and there were way too many cantaloupes around and cantaloupe prices were soft, and this was making fundraising from agriculture difficult because the profits were down.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And the bulk of your money did come from agriculture, didn't it?

MADDY: When I started in '76-77, we felt that we had to ride on the coattails of the only issue that I had which distinguished me from anybody else, which

was the ag issue and I came from the Central Valley.

SENEY: And you had been strong on the farm labor issue all throughout.

MADDY: I had been the hawk. So where I got editorialized against by the *Bee* for being too hawkish--

SENEY: That couldn't have helped you more.

MADDY: Couldn't have helped me more. And I was criticized. The ag people, even though they rolled over and did the deal, all in their heart knew that we'd given away the store on the ALRB. The thing that saved them, obviously, for the next sixteen years was that we had Republican Governors administer it. We'll know now just how strong the ALRB is and whether it means anything--

SENEY: Because it's back in Democratic hands again.

MADDY: Right. Or whether it's just run its tide too. There's also labor and agriculture in terms of how they operate. They've changed so much. They're so much more bigger now today. So many things have changed in agriculture.

SENEY: And they've adjusted to one another, have they not?

MADDY: Oh absolutely. I mean, you get the big corporate guys who own the major ag companies in the world, they're not worried about what's going on in Modesto, to a large degree. They look at the bottom line. If you're sitting down in Beverly Hills you're looking at the bottom line: We've got to do something about almonds, you know? What? Do something.

SENEY: What's the margin if we increase the workers?

MADDY: Yes, right. Why don't we cut the sellers 20,000 acres? And that's the decision being made. It's not Joe can't shut down. It's Joe and six of his friends who have 10,000 acres in almonds, who might affect all these workers who live in Modesto, before they moan and groan and sell off their crop and sell it to a developer, they'll think about it. But a guy sitting down in Beverly Hills is looking at his major operation and saying, "Sell, 20,000 acres."

"Well, it means "X" number of jobs."

"So what?"

You know, that's what's changed. Labor has changed, ag has changed. A lot of things have changed. There still are a lot of family farmers around, but it's not the same folks that were around in '76-77.

SENEY: When Sal Russo was in the other day talking about this, you both alluded to when the money dried up.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: When was that? What was the--

MADDY: We had a goal. When things really hit me the hardest was we had spent and had a program all ready to go up through about the February convention and about the March Field Poll in which I was tied, and we should have jumped, we thought, because we had finally made it. And as Bailey Deardorf said, "We have brought you to the point to where you're

now known. Now we have to put some substance behind you."

At that point in time, right in there, I made a decision against Prop. 13.[1] And all of agriculture felt that regardless of whether I was right or wrong -- and so many of them thought I was right, that I was correct on the decision in saying that Prop. 13 would never work -- I owed enough to agriculture and the people that were behind me that I should have undoubtedly gone forward and said, "Prop. 13 may be a theoretical bad decision but the people deserve it and were entitled to it." I should have gone forward. If nothing else, out of a sense of loyalty to the people who brought me there.

When I came out against it, I could not rationalize in my mind -- we had the old "Dirty Seven." Monagan was in the group, Murphy, and Beverly, and Dixon Arnett, and we all sat around, and Senator Beverly was the only man who said, "I don't care whether it's right, wrong, or indifferent. You better come out in favor of Prop. 13 or you're dead," and I did not. And I went from a group of people who would cheer me when I'd walk in a room to almost boo me. More out of just the loyalty that they felt that I owed to Prop. 13. It had taken on a new crusade.

I always tell a story. The police officer were supporting me in the primary up and down the state, all the law enforcement people. When I

[1] Proposition 13, June 6, 1978.

would land in Burbank, there was a series of cops who, on their off-duty time, would pick me up in their private cars and that's how I moved around. Even my son started joining me as a gopher. If we could not rent a car, we didn't rent a car. We had somebody pick us up. I can't remember this fellow's name -- come back to my name problem again -- but we got in the car and he said, "Ken, big mistake."

And I said, "What are you talking about?"

"Prop. 13."

I said, "Of all people, you should know that this is going to go right into the heart. I mean, this is you."

He says, "I don't care. We're getting gouged by taxes and I don't care whether it affects me or not or it affects me more than somebody else. You should have gone the other way."

I knew then that I was in [trouble]. I know I spoke to some San Marino men's club or something later and got the same reaction from the rich. But here was a cop, ordinary guy who we were really trying to--

SENEY: You said that kind of under your breath. San Marino is the rich, the very rich.

MADDY: Yes, San Marino was rich, and I gave a speech there that night because there's some guys who were angry at me too.

But the key was that day, when this police officer picked me up, even though that was the guy that was going to be saved. There's a case

in which the issue became bigger than anything anybody could say from that moment on.

SENEY: Well, this one really got away from the political people like yourself.

MADDY: Oh, everybody.

SENEY: In February of '78, I think it had 23 percent.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And, I mean, it just shot up from there.

MADDY: It was like March 18th or something I made my decision. Whatever it was it was someplace in there. It just was phenomenal.

SENEY: Right. Well, at that point I think the latest poll still had said 23 percent in favor of it.

MADDY: What we did not know, and the only fly in the ointment that gave an edge to the people, was we didn't realize at that time we had $12 billion in surplus. See, the amount of surplus had not been revealed. There would have been easier ways to reconcile this, but we had accumulated so much money in budget surplus by that time that the [Prop.] 13 was not going to have nearly the impact that any analysis would have indicated it should.

SENEY: Right. In fact, to jump ahead a little bit, everybody is crying wolf that this is going to destroy local government. It turns out, of course, as nothing, zero.

MADDY: It meant nothing. Nobody even felt it for a while.

SENEY: And by the time they felt it, it's too late.

MADDY: Part of the great story of '78.

SENEY: Yes, the State Legislature bailed out Jarvis and Gann [the authors of Prop. 13] and made them look like successes, where if the state had not returned that money, there would have been an immediate pinch.

MADDY: Huge, deep caca at the local level, where the people react.

SENEY: When you went back to the Legislature after the primary and this legislation came up, did it cross your mind or the minds of others, let's let them stew in their own juices, give this money back as--

MADDY: No, we came back with Prop. 8.[1] We came back with all kinds of other backups, but that was the one case in which I can truly say -- and there's been maybe one or two others, and I have to go back and think what they were and I wouldn't have an easy time doing it -- in which the issue became totally beyond rationality. It became beyond logic. It became beyond study. It became beyond anything. It had totally gone. It was done, it was over with, and if you were on the wrong side you were going to pay some sort of a penalty or you sure as hell were not going to get any help.

Now, every Republican, [from] Evelle on down, went the same way, but the difference was I had to have something that would have pulled me apart. Now, I think by the time I made the decision as late as March, I

[1] Proposition 8, June 6, 1978.

probably would have had to be on earlier on that issue than I was.

SENEY: That would have been a little too late.

MADDY: I think it was even too late by then. I think by that time there was like 16 percent undecided in that group and Evelle got them all.

Republicans had just given up by that point in time and just said, "Okay, whatever it is. The thing we're going to do now is pass Prop. 13. That's it. Whatever else happens." Of course, all the undecided went to the guy they knew. One guy had 95 percent name ID and the rest of us were struggling.

So what happened also was all the money then just stopped. There was no money. There was nothing. I mean, the race stopped. I think for most purposes you can just say the race stopped.

SENEY: You know, to recall some context here, why this issue took off, housing prices were escalating during this period in California.

MADDY: It was inflation.

SENEY: Heavy inflation. And so if your neighbor sold his house for $100,000 and your house was valued at $20,000, you would then, within a few weeks, get a new tax bill that had raised your assessment to the level of this house next door.

MADDY: Well, we had been going through an inflation spiral so that the people that were being hurt the worst were the people that I called, in Fresno, the "swing voters." They were the lower middle-income folks who had paid, just like I did -- paid $17,500 for my house, the first house I bought in

Fresno, in a decent neighborhood, and I'm speaking now more of the people who are in the middle lower-income section -- had paid eight or nine or ten thousand dollars.

The assessors and the city councilmen and everybody who was running were telling you, "We haven't raised your tax rate in fifteen years." Yet the guy who was paying, oh, a one-and-a-half percent rate on $10,000 when he bought the house in 1952 was suddenly paying, in effect, four and five and six and seven and ten and twenty percent of the value of his house in taxes because the assessed valuation had gone up.

SENEY: The base had gone up.

MADDY: The base. That house he could now sell for $30,000. So the rate was still one-and-a-half, but one-and-a-half of thirty is a hell of a lot more than one-and-a-half of eight. And that's what he was paying his taxes.

And people kept saying, "Well, we haven't raised your rate."

"You're right, you haven't raised my rate, you just keep raising my taxes." So I had come out and actually carried a bill in the Legislature to freeze the rates back to 1975. I could have been a hero in the area. But the long and short of it is that people were getting killed by the inflation.

Now, there were other inequities. Let's take the guy who bought that $8,000 house who now could sell it for thirty. The house he sold for thirty in his old neighborhood, and if he wanted to go buy another house that was comparable but maybe a little step up or just something he could

live in because he wanted to get his profit out, number one, after he paid his profit on his taxes, even if he has a chance to transfer the sales price, what he could buy for thirty or forty thousand someplace else in town wasn't near the old house in the old neighborhood that he had before. It was a junker. And so he was not only losing his value in his house, he's being taxed more and somebody was lying to him all over the place.

And Jarvis and Gann, a couple of curmudgeons came back and said, "We're going to get these dirty politicians."

SENEY: And there had been these initiatives on the ballot. There was the Watson initiative in '72.[1]

MADDY: That's the old forerunner.

SENEY: And Jarvis and Gann had been around. They were thought to be fools. I don't exactly remember what word you just used.

MADDY: Old curmudgeons. A couple of old jerks who nobody had listened to in their whole life and then suddenly they become heroes.

Jesse Ventura is trying to make himself one already, you know? He started out as populous as hell and then suddenly makes a couple of stupid statements.

But no, these guys suddenly became prominent. Jarvis became a major player in politics.

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[1] Proposition 7, June 6, 1972.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: I mean Paul Gann. Jarvis died right after that. But Paul Gann became a major player. He, frankly, did not act like he could pound sand down a rat hole.

SENEY: He was the Republican nominee for Senate in 1980?

MADDY: That was the one I was supposed to run in. See, they were all pumping me. By that time I was about ready to go through a divorce, and so everybody said no, you can spin right off and run against Cranston for United States Senate.

Now, that is the one place I would have had a free ride and gave up a chance. So I don't have everybody to blame except Ken Maddy. I did have a chance to run free and run a campaign, and Sal wanted me to do it and get back in. But I freely admit that I was physically, mentally, and every other way exhausted and just could not have pushed on for another campaign. But if there had been a chance for me to spin off of my glory in '78 in that race, and if I had been financed.

Now, I have to say a little sidebar caveat: We still had Mike Curb, and the "Kitchen Cabinet," who was the person. They weren't going to let anybody get involved between the next Governor being Mike Curb versus anything else that was going on. So there was no Republican. I mean, for the Republican Party to let Alan Cranston go by with a token Paul Gann as their candidate with not a dollar in his pocket, they weren't playing the

game. Which goes behind, again, all the scene.

SENEY: That's a fairly cynical judgment, isn't it?

MADDY: Yes, a cynical judgment on my part, but I'm absolutely convinced--

SENEY: No, I mean I'm thinking of their part.

MADDY: Oh, their part, sure, sure. I'm convinced it's all part of the scenario, that nobody was going to get in between Curb and what they had planned for him, which tells you some of the downside to the big planners.

SENEY: Well, why don't we leave it there?

MADDY: Yes, I think we should because I've got to roll.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Session 9, October 18, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Good morning, Senator.

MADDY: Good morning.

SENEY: I wanted to still, believe it or not, talk some more about the '78 election because we didn't finish with that.

We were talking about Prop. 13, and I found some numbers on that. I had referred to that because it wasn't very clear at the time you made your statement how far it was going. But a February 23rd Field poll showed it at 20 percent, and the April 3rd poll -- and your opposition had come in between that, right at the end of March -- it only showed at 27 percent. By May 8th it was up to 42 percent. And by May 31st it was up to 57 percent. I don't recall what the election results were.[1] Somewhere around there, weren't they?

MADDY: It was high. About the time I had made my decision, it was still open. Let me say that it was not clear when I made my decision in March that this was a slam dunk, but it was not far away in which it was clear, no matter where you went, the public had suddenly believed that Prop. 13 was a

[1] 4,280,689 (64.8%) yes votes and 2,326,167 (35.2%) no votes.

savior, and it was something that was going to pass overwhelmingly and that you were foolish to be against it.

The great story about Prop. 13 in one sense, to give you a little background, and I might have said part of this, but the issue of freezing tax rates, there was one of those tax groups that was part of the Jarvis gang, had an office in Fresno, and the last several years there had been bills introduced to, if you will, limit the amount of property taxes: put a cap on taxes. I carried that bill a couple of times just before Prop. 13 came up, principally because I was pushed a little bit by this group from Fresno.

SENEY: Which group was that?

MADDY: It was a taxpayers group. I'm not sure what the Jarvis-Gann group were called but whatever they were.

[Assemblyman] Joe [A.] Gonsalves had carried it one time, I think, also, but after he carried it, I carried a bill to freeze tax rates at the present rate. The whole thing was that California was screaming with inflation. So folks who bought $11,000 homes who were told by their city councilmen and their supervisors that "we were not raising your tax rates" were still seeing these double-digit jumps in their taxes because the assessed valuation of their home, that $11,000 home, was now worth $50,000, even though to try to sell it and buy another comparable home, it really wasn't possible. What you were doing is forcing people out of their homes because of the increased assessment of the taxes.

Sal Russo and Doug [Watts], when they first came in, at some point early on had a connection with the Jarvis-Gann people, and I can't recall the details, but at one point in time I was offered early on in the campaign -- now, this goes back before March; this is when the first campaign started -- to chair or to be in charge of or to take a leadership role in the passage of Prop. 13. It's one of those would have, could have, should have.

If you're going to pick an issue that might have won the Governor's race in '78, and all the details of it I'm not absolutely clear in my mind, and Sal would know more of the details, but the struggle was that, as I looked at it, I could not believe that if we froze rates absolutely at that number that we would have sufficient monies available at the local level. I couldn't intellectually get to the point to where I could accept it, even though it was clear the public was beginning to build their demand over it.

SENEY: The difference, if I may, between what you had supported was simply a freezing of the tax rates, where Jarvis-Gann was a rollback.

MADDY: They wanted a rollback, right. And I just said freeze rates at the '75 level. If your old $11,000 house was now being assessed at $60,000, you didn't get an increased assessment in terms of the value of that house until some -- I can't remember what the time period was. But the key was that local government, as values of homes were going up, they were making more and more money off these little homes. A great pressure on people that

were in the middle income area.

The other thing was no one knew all the way up until April or May, maybe even further into May, how much of a budget surplus we actually had on hand. Jerry Brown and his administration really were able to keep that quiet. And of course, that made a huge difference in trying to decide intellectually, like I was trying to decide, whether or not you should support Prop. 13. Because we had a $12 billion surplus, it was easy if we froze rates, or, if we did support Prop. 13, that we could jump into this thing and jump right back out again. In other words, we could hold rates and be a hero. Just pure politics: How could we avoid this issue?

I think I mentioned that we had one big meeting of the "Dirty Seven." It was Bob Monagan, and it was Bob Beverly, and Frank Murphy, and some of the old legislator friends that I had who had been my pals in trying to make this decision, and Bob Beverly was the only one who just came down to what Bob was famous for, just pure politics. He said, "It doesn't make any difference what is right, wrong, or indifferent, or what people think. What is going to happen is this thing will pass so big, and if you're not on it you're going to be dead." Yet, I turned around, along with every other candidate -- there was no other candidate that came out for it -- and came out opposed to it.

What was devastating for me, perhaps more than others, and why it hurt me perhaps more, was that my mainstay was agriculture. Who was

getting burned more by higher assessed valuations on property than the people who owned most of the property, which were agricultural people? Now, it doesn't always apply to them because it was homeowner directed. But they felt more betrayed than perhaps others may have.

If I had gone back and taken a leadership role, God only knows what would have happened, but certainly by the time I made a decision in March, if I had come out in favor of it I might have beaten Pete Wilson worse and might have caught [Ed] Davis for second. But I'm sure it wouldn't have made a difference in the campaign; it was too far gone.

I cannot remember an issue that so turned so dramatically and so overwhelmingly, and I'm sure there are lots of them that have occurred, but where the people just automatically, someplace in that timeframe you're talking about, where it went from 27 to 54, where absolutely, literally, everybody said this is it. I mean, this is absolutely something that's going to have to pass, where people are going to stand up and rebel, and Prop. 13 was the rebellion.

SENEY: Well, there was the sea change, wasn't there, in attitude? I mean, the Watson initiative had been on the ballot, I think, in what? Seventy-two?

MADDY: Oh, for years. The whole notion of freezing tax rates had been around from the time that we began an inflationary spiral in California; as soon as inflation hit and homes were going up in terms of assessed valuation.

You know, for a while clerks and various counties would only

periodically assess. Oftentimes you wouldn't get a new assessment on your home in L.A. for six or seven years. But then assessors began to learn too that the more often they assessed, particularly in inflationary times, the more money they got. You know, they could go back and say, "We didn't raise your tax rates. It's the same old 58 cents. But it just happens that your house has gone up 2,000 times." And for the poor people, not necessarily poor but the middle class, that $11,000 house that they bought, and now they're 65 years old, even though it's worth forty to sell that house and make the profit, you couldn't pay the taxes on the capital gain, you couldn't go out and find a comparable house in another neighborhood that you liked, and so they really felt that they had been squeezed completely out of homeownership and had been really deprived by government from realizing what they'd always wanted, which was the ownership of a home. Gosh, I've got it paid for, yet I still have to move out.

That was an amazing issue.

SENEY: It hit people very clearly, the homeowners, where they can relate to it, and I recall the landlords saying to renters, "Oh, we'll lower our rents." I'm not sure that ever happened.

MADDY: I think it swept everybody. I think this thing became more of a rebellion against government.

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: I think it was far more than who you were or what your individual situation was. This was just absolute rebellion against government. And, in part, it was amazing Jerry Brown survived it because he was the man in office at the time. He should have gone down with it. I mean, absolutely should have gone down. Of course, he wiggled out of it so quick. Evelle Younger went to Hawaii for a week's vacation after the campaign and came back and Jerry Brown was Prop. 13's biggest friend.

SENEY: Jerry-Jarvis, they called him.

MADDY: Jerry-Jarvis, right.

What we tried with Prop. 8, or whatever that backup thing was, was a reasonable idea to freeze rates. We had some alternative ideas which were just as good.

SENEY: Well, one of them I recall was to let the taxes accumulate without making them come due until the house was sold, and then you'd realize the taxes out of the profits on the house.

MADDY: There were several ideas that were floating around. But by the time the Legislature got its grips on the issue, again, it was over.

SENEY: The whole political leadership and commercial leadership, big business, was against it.

MADDY: Because it didn't work.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: In reality it worked the first couple of years because of the surplus, and it

worked after that just because everything worked. You know, it's just a matter of where you get the money. There's no secret to it. If you do it with property taxes or someplace else, there's no magic to it. So what we gave up philosophically was where should money [come from] -- and this issue's been on, even though I've tried it, lots of other people have tried it; I haven't worked hard at it but there's the basic reform question that nobody wants to tackle -- is where should each level of government receive its revenue and in what manner? In other words, should there be a tax base for cities and a tax base for counties and a tax base for the state? For instance, who should finance schools? Should it be from the local school districts or should it be statewide?

Those issues are issues that no one wants to really tackle because it's easier to do it by slight of hand. It's much easier to tax statewide and not take the blame for it if you're a city councilman -- you know, it's somebody else's fault.

In the last several years, when we had all the deficit, cities and counties would come up to me and the first question I would ask a city councilman was, "Have you imposed the utility tax yet in your city?"

"Hell no. Do you want me to get kicked out of office?"

I said, "Why do you want me to do it?"

One guy from Fallbrook or someplace said, "Do you think I'm stupid? Hell, I'm not going to put on a utility tax. They'll throw me out

of office tomorrow."

I said, "But you're up here telling me on a statewide basis put on a utility tax for everybody. That way it's my fault."

So nobody wanted a tax, but logic -- or at least, let me say, no one knows for sure -- the whole notion that schools ought to be financed locally so you could have some local control. Then there should be ways in order to have the bulk of the say, because there's no doubt that where the revenue flows the power flows. And so if a school board has no power to collect revenues, or has no power to spend revenues, or has no power to control what's going on at the schools, then you wonder what their function is. I mean, their function is mostly advisory. It depends upon the dollars that are coming in and how you spend the dollars. And everybody would like to figure out a way so that the state collects all the money and then allocates it. But they don't like that because when the state does that we ask for control. You know, if you're going to spend money on parks, then we at the Legislature decide what parks, not you. Then government gets fuzzy after that.

SENEY: During this period you were thinking about taking a leadership role, or it was being suggested to you. Did you meet with Jarvis or Gann?

MADDY: Sal did. I have a memory of meeting with at least Jarvis once, going way back. I wish I could remember more of the details. I'll have to ask him about it.

It is my recollection, based on what he told me, that early on we could have been the leader of the Prop. 13. Let me say, if I had been John Briggs, who felt as strongly about taxes as John felt about homosexuality, I probably could have been up there. And who knows what would have happened with Prop. 13? because it was a good farmers' issue. I mean, it was an issue that would have captured everybody's imagination.

But intellectually, let me say, number one, you have to start out by saying nobody thought that Watson, Jarvis, and Gann had enough brains to come in out of the rain. I mean, they were not what you call heavyweights. Nobody had any respect for them in the Republican Party or anywhere else. They were just old curmudgeons who ran around putting things on the ballot. I mean, that was Watson's whole deal down there in L.A. So no one had any respect. They carried nothing with them.

So there was a part of me, I'm sure, thinking back -- not remembering exactly -- but I probably wouldn't have wanted to be a part of it anyway. It wasn't what Maddy stood for.

SENEY: You weren't going to associate your name with them.

MADDY: Hell no. That was not going to be the situation. They were just guys who ran around--

SENEY: Kind of buffoons.

MADDY: Buffoons, and actually gained more fame than people ever thought was possible. Paul Gann, what the hell, he ran a couple of times for the United

States Senate.

So there was that, and no matter how much I attempted to figure it out, even though Bob Beverly was right--

SENEY: Do you usually listen to Beverly?

MADDY: Bob is extremely cunning and very, very bright on the issues. Talking about zeroing right in on what's going on from a populous point of view, Bob Beverly is as sharp as anybody I've ever been around. Politically on campaigns and so on.

And among my group of advisors, everybody was trying to figure out the real smart things to do, but we were hustling: How do you pull yourself from the obscure Assemblyman out of Fresno with a zero name ID? How do you get rolling? But by that time, my name ID had picked up because of a clever campaign. And that was what Bailey Deardorf was saying: Now we have to get you an issue. Now we have to get you something that works that pulls you aside.

What happened was that, for the same reason that Prop. 13 so dominated, it eliminated the rest of the campaigns for everybody. There was no longer any campaigns. What happened after that, things just stayed the same. Brown won and Evelle Younger just went...[gestures].

SENEY: You move up a little bit in April. April 3rd, you were 18 percent; May 8th, 19 percent; and May 31st, 21 percent.

Wilson, on the other hand, goes April 3rd, 12 percent; May 8th, 12

percent; and then 6 percent, May 31st.

MADDY: And that was the animosity that developed, I think, between campaigns. Either they felt I shouldn't have gotten in at that stage, but it was clear that I was taking away from him directly.

Ed Davis was being handled by Bill Richardson and had dominance over the far hard right wing. I was a little fly in the ointment because of my support for Reagan in '76, and a cadre of people who were in the various conservative groups who knew that I played the Reagan card, when I let them know I was part of the Reagan delegation, that got me some votes.

Briggs was off the wall. Evelle Younger was just a leader. It was very hard to break away from Briggs. What you had left was really Wilson and Maddy out there, the two younger guys. Wilson, with more of a reputation; he'd done more things. And me, obscure. I was out there with little or nothing going for me. But this phenomenal new campaign, starting early with TV, fairly attractive ads, and the cry out there that the sleeping giant, agriculture, was ready to come forward because Jerry Brown and Cesar Chavez were a threat. Jerry Brown was so anti-growth that I came out with this very strong pro-agriculture, pro-growth -- let's build highways, let's do this, let's do that -- to offset myself.

We pulled a good campaign. We pulled a campaign that spoke to issues that had to offset us from Jerry because Evelle just was going to be

an alternative. He didn't offer anything other than the fact he was a Republican.

SENEY: Up in Humboldt County you went out of your way -- I don't know if you went out of your way, but you criticized Adriana Gianturco, who was highway director for Brown, who was, I think -- you're kind of smiling now.

MADDY: I was thinking everybody always criticized poor Adriana. She was building these two-lane highways. Going back to the old three-lane highways where you both passed in the center, they were killing people and so on.

Jerry came up with some really -- you think about his first four years and the phenomenal things he proposed in terms of restricting growth. You know, Ron Robie, who's now a judge here in Sacramento, but Ron Robie was his Water Resources director, and Ron Robie -- I'd used that in agriculture frequently -- he wrote a *Law Review* article in which the thrust of it was that all water below and on the surface of the ground should be owned by the state.

[Interruption]

SENEY: You were talking about Ron Robie.

MADDY: You take a Water Resources director and go out and say, "Here's a man that wants to take all of your water, the water below your ground," and say that belongs to the state -- not that he was advocating that, but you could

certainly tie him to it.

Adriana Gianturco cutting back on freeways. Here everybody was worried about--

SENEY: Let me say, as you know, under California water law you're free to drill for water that's under your property and take as much as you like. All you have to do is notify the State Water Resources Control Board.

MADDY: Go tell a farmer that the water down below his ground is not his.

And his whole proposal, the concept that we will live in areas within the state that are totally self-supporting, I mean, he had some phenomenal no-growth, pro-environmental [views]. He came out with some very wild proposals. And Adriana, who was told to cut back on freeways and cut back on transportation, that wasn't where people were. People were trying to figure out how the devil they could go from one place to another. When you build a stretch of highway -- I used to think from Modesto you'd cut across over the Altamont

[Pass] -- instead of having a six-lane highway you end up with a three lane in which you have to pass in the center when the time came -- those were the old days where you took your life in your hands every time you pulled out in that third lane.

He was gutsy. When you think back now, of course, many of the ideas that he proposed were way, way, way ahead of their time, if he had had any commonsense and ability to try to move people in that direction.

So he was a good target but nobody really kind of zeroed in on him. Everybody just kind of said "what a goofball." I think what we did was we zeroed in on some of those areas and could be very critical of, but at the same time you had to be aware that the environmental movement and the cleanup and all those things were also on people's mind. I mean, people wanted it to be perfect.

If you represented farmers -- I never played around. I just always said it's very difficult to represent the farming community in this state and to be an environmentalist to the extent that you would like me to be an environmentalist. You just can't do it because you don't want dust. I mean, if you had your preference, you wouldn't have any agriculture.

"Well, we would, but it would be organic."

SENEY: Greenhouse or something.

MADDY: Yes, they all lived in Marin County anyway. We used to joke about that.

SENEY: The environmentalists, do you mean, or the farmers?

SENEY: No. I'd joke with the environmentalists. I said, "None of you ever get close enough to breath it." You could be facetious about the environmentalists.

We zeroed in on -- I mean, I was for nuclear [power]. There were things we were saying we had to do to keep ourselves going in this state. And of course, Adriana became such a sounding board because a lot of Democrats jumped on her. They beat her up more than we did. That was

always an easy target.

SENEY: On the nuclear power thing, did the utilities -- PG&E [Pacific Gas and Electric Company] or any of them -- become interested in you?

MADDY: Not very much. I was probably more pro plus energy and nuclear than most of them; but no, there was no real movement. I was such a long shot that you didn't have too many people out front for me except the naturals, which were agriculture and the truckers. Of course, I got some state employees, the cops and so on, because they were unhappy with Jerry. For the same reason he had twelve billion in surplus, he was not a spendthrift. He was careful with his money. They were not necessarily happy with him. I've been always basically good with law enforcement in terms of allowing them to have decent salaries. Not necessarily some other things they wanted but decent salaries.

SENEY: One of the things we've said, and it's clearly important, about the campaign is the media part of it. There's an article here early on. It says, "Maddy's Campaign Media Snag." Apparently, KNBC in L.A. and KGO in San Francisco wouldn't sell you spots as early as you wanted them. Thirty stations did, and these were five-minute spots that you wanted.

MADDY: We were doing these bios: get to know Maddy.

SENEY: Did that give you any real trouble? Does that ring a bell at all?

MADDY: It rings a bell, but it was very minor. Pretty soon they began to do it. We bought all we could buy before it was over. The whole thing with these

little spots was that twist of trying to give a little story, and many people have used it since that time but not many people had used it before. And it was a spin-off of what Bailey Deardorf had done with Gerry Ford and some other things that were real good ads. Mine weren't great but they were not bad either. How do you introduce somebody quickly and try to get an appeal across? I had a wife and kids. What we were trying to do was distinguish between what people are really like and what Jerry Brown was like. Not unfair but easy to do.

SENEY: Well, of course, Jerry Brown refused to live in the new mansion.

MADDY: Oh, he did all kinds of things.

SENEY: And slept on a mattress on the floor -- or so it was said. I mean, everyone believed it was true.

MADDY: I think he did. He was different. He's still different.

SENEY: He's mayor of Oakland now, as we speak.

MADDY: I see him periodically -- have seen him. Gave him a hundred dollars to his campaign about two months ago.

SENEY: For mayor of Oakland?

MADDY: Sure. Oh, he's a character. He deserves to be in government.

SENEY: Well, he's very creative in a way.

MADDY: He's creative, a thinker.

SENEY: If we talk about him for a moment, you said he threw out these ideas but then he never tried to mobilize behind them. I don't know if he thought

they'd float on their own or--

MADDY: The general rumor was, and people who worked for him [said], he didn't have any interest in going from idea to implementation to see it work. He was more idea: Who do you put on a horseracing board? Three people who hate horses.

SENEY: Is that what he did?

MADDY: That was sort of the mentality. Who do you put on the energy...Three absolutely environmentalists who are opposed to all... And his idea was it was confrontational politics that brought about solutions. Now, he's not wrong about that in many ways. I think he was correct in saying that to take a strong dissident that's intelligent and put him onto a board or commission in which they want to oppose everything does spark the best out of everybody. Now, you can ruin everything because you can get people on there that refuse to cooperate and so on. But by and large, he did it almost as a fancy: This is something we ought to do.

He did so many things that were different, but I don't think he ever cared once he did it. Once he started it then that was it: Let's go on to something else. And that's probably unfair because he did care, I'm sure of it. But he had ideas. He still has ideas.

SENEY: You know, one of the things that you said in a recent, not long ago, article in the *California Journal* is that the third paragraph in every biography of you is the marijuana question. Of course, I have to ask you about that too.

This apparently was with an interview with KIIS Radio in L.A.

How did that come up, the question?

MADDY: The campaign was over for all intents and purposes. That was too far down the line. The marijuana had nothing to do with my winning or losing, in my opinion.

It was the week in which Dick Birkholz, who was sort of the dean of the Capitol Press Corps, had decided to trail me or be with me for a week as I campaigned. In those days they did that occasionally. Now, the reality was that not every campaign would let him do that. My theory was that everybody was walking and traveling with me and writing a day-to-day exposé of me, but Evelle Younger sat home and just waited for them to call him and say, "Maddy said this," and he would reply. There was a tremendous degree of unfairness the way the press covers you, but when you're the young guy and you have nothing to do, you carry it.

During that week there had been an accusation coming out of the Wilson campaign from Stu Spencer. Bruce Nestande was one of my close friends and Assemblyman. And my accountant--

SENEY: Let me turn this over, Senator.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

MADDY: But the charge was that Bruce Nestande and my accountant had contacted somebody in the Wilson campaign and essentially (quote) "bribed" one of

them to get out of the race for something and I was going to turn over some money to them, or something of that nature.

SENEY: Promising them support in the '80 Senate race against Cranston, I think.

MADDY: Or whatever it was. Some quid pro quo. Which was absolutely untrue, as far as I was concerned. But old Dick Birkholz was the kind of guy who just never let up. He was with me every single day. Campaign was going bad, I was traveling, and it was not easy. I only say that as sort of a backlog of how you get to a point where you really have to have strength when you're doing these campaigns, and you really have to have support. I had plenty of support -- my son was traveling with me -- but somebody like myself who was a competitor, I was mad as hell over the accusations because the one thing I had done through the entire campaign was I had not uttered a word about one single Republican. I mean, I had played the Eleventh Commandment not because I was morally superior; it was strictly because my feeling was that was what I had to do. I just campaigned on Maddy and not anybody else.

SENEY: The Eleventh Commandment you refer to is Mr. Reagan's--?

MADDY: Mr. Reagan's "Don't speak ill of another Republican."

And Birkholz was always after me to go after Evelle Younger on pensions. That was the big issue. Birkholz loved it, the fact that Evelle Younger had ten pensions, or whatever it was.

I said, "So what? Everybody knows it."

SENEY: Well, he'd been a judge and a DA and was drawing pensions from those.

MADDY: That was supposed to be an Achilles heel for Younger.

Anyway, I got along well with Birkholz but he was the kind of guy that no matter where you were, at that moment you'd look at him and he'd ask the same goddamn question: "Let's go back and talk about Bruce Nestande."

"I don't know anything."

"Are you looking for it? Are you trying to give me the information?"

"Yes."

Constant. And I forget what it was--

SENEY: He was asking you, what, about Nestande? Whether he had smoked marijuana?

MADDY: No, no, no. About the bribe.

SENEY: Oh, about the bribe, I'm sorry.

MADDY: This week that this marijuana thing came up was in the context of this charge by the Wilson campaign that we were trying to bribe them out of the race. Birkholz asked me about this constantly, and I was just wearing out.

My point is that he just kept hammering me on it. And this is my recollection of it now, it probably was not nearly that extreme. But he kept asking me about that bribe issue, bribe issue, bribe issue. And we're

down towards the end of the week in which I had, I think, one more interview which was at this little rock and roll station. I was tired and I was tired of going to these dumpy little things that I felt my campaign staff just couldn't figure out anything else to do so send him there. You know, you start to get that notion too. You start to wonder what I'm doing here and why I'm doing it.

Whoever the young kid was he gets into the questions and he begins to ask a few questions. By this time I'll answer almost anything, but he says something about chairman of Criminal Justice. He said, "Well, you change a lot." He said, "You used to be for legalized marijuana and now you're against it."

I said, "Wait a minute. What are you talking about? I was never for legalizing marijuana." I said, "Since I became chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee I do not believe that we should have it a felony for the possession of marijuana. I've always been for a wobbler." In other words, that you could have a--

SENEY: Decriminalization? Is that what you mean by a wobbler?

MADDY: A wobbler is really having a penalty for a felony or a penalty for a misdemeanor. But decriminalization is correct. I was prepared to support and did support decriminalization, and I said, "I've been there and I didn't modify my view."

The point he was trying to make was I've gotten more conservative

as chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee where I was much more liberal. And he made some crack about how "You old guys pass judgment on it." This was just kind of a wisecracking.

And I said something about "What do you think, I grew up in a vacuum?" I said, "I went to Inglewood High School, friend." Inglewood High School, in those days, was a much different high school than what it was when I went there, but it was an area that was certainly not known for -- it wasn't Beverly Hills.

He said, "Well, did you ever try it?"

I said, "Sure, I tried it." I said, "It did nothing for me." And that was the end of the interview.

We go out and Birkholz has his tape recorder, and he says, "Well, statesman, you made a statement in there that I have to follow up on. So when did you try marijuana?"

Well, then I started waffling around as to when I had tried marijuana. Probably ten column inches down his story appeared that next day in the *L.A. Times*. Now, I left L.A.; we get in the car and we take off. I think I go to San Jose, and the Republican Women are up there, and I have to get back because I'm going to give my crime platform in Sacramento the next morning. By this time I'm hot as far as the candidates, but for all intents and purposes the race is over, but the women like me and I'm doing well. I think I'm second on the roster in the morning, and I say a few things and

the women all clap and I leave.

Ed Davis gets up and he said something to the effect, "Well, it's now come out. Maddy's finally admitted, and we understand this fuzzy thinking liberal Republican. He said he's a pot smoker."

That's front page of the *Herald Examiner*. Front page: "Maddy Smokes Pot." That's the big story.

SENEY: Now, this is May 18th, at least in the *Modesto Bee*. So it is quite late in the campaign.

MADDY: Very late.

I don't know if you know who Dennis O'Patrny is. He's a reporter out of the *Chron* who wore bandannas. If you were going to pick a reporter who might have indulged in marijuana someplace along the line, you might pick Dennis O'Patrny. All these guys are sitting there smiling and joking.

And I will say that I attended certainly most every party that was around. In those days the Jerry Brown group parties -- I mean, you could cut the marijuana smoke with a knife it was so thick. Every party that anybody in his group ever attended, marijuana was frequently being used. I personally did not. I had smoked it, as others had, but I was not a frequenter. I don't think I ever smoked it up here in Sacramento.

SENEY: You said you'd smoked in Jamaica.

MADDY: I smoked in Jamaica.

SENEY: And then in the Army, I think.

MADDY: In the Air Force actually, when I was in the Air Force, when I was back in Texas.

Those are the two things I used. I used out of the country, which was kind of a faux pas because then that opened up Jamaica. That was really stupid because that opened up the whole thing about Jamaica, which never got written about, all of our trips to Jamaica.

From a personal point of view, and the actual truth was I never liked it because I couldn't inhale it. It bothered me. It bothered my throat. I wasn't a smoker anyway so it didn't do anything for me. And the reality was a bourbon and soda was as good for me as I needed.

But it hit with such a flourish. I mean, it hit at a devastating time because we were almost dead anyway, and it just really kind of took the wind out of me.

I always tell the story about my son, who was 17 or 18, whatever it was, and he said, "C'mon, Dad, we'll just get back out there and keep on pushing." As we were walking down the stairs to go get in the car to go do something else, some young kid staffer was running up the stairs, "Hey, Maddy" -- and he puts his fist up -- "Go get 'em, baby."

So, I mean, I had all this kind of rallying support that, in retrospect, when you think about it, sort of made me a folk hero to a lot of them.

I think it's only significant when you think about it in my campaign

as to how you can be worn down. I used to say to my campaign guys, "You let me wear down, you let me get in a spot where I'm unprotected in a sense." I had my son with me but not a staffer. Get caught into a lot of questions. I'm with Dick Birkholz. He's nobody's fool, but he's going to be honest: He's going to write them if I say them.

I think more as to what you can do in a campaign, in terms of just getting to the point where you can't afford to make a slip now, guys were making slips. There are people now who are making slips two years away from the campaign. But the closer it gets and the more tired you get, it's a factor that you have to really watch. And you either have to make up your mind if that's an issue that, in my view, I think you need to get it out early enough and over with and take the licks and/or make up your mind you're not going to tell, you're not going to say anything. I think George W. is perfectly within his rights to say "I've said all I'm going to say. The only thing that's relevant is the last 25 years and that's it. Go search whatever you want to." But you have to stay with it. You cannot go back, you cannot give up.

You know, Bill Clinton's done everything known to man, or somebody else has. And the Gores, here's little Tipper [Gore], for God's sake. She's Miss Sweets and she admitted to pot months and months and months ago.

But it was one of those little ironies in my campaign, and as a result,

not that it had anything to do with winning or losing, but as I say, it's about the third paragraph because all the people remember it, and it hit the papers in such a flourish.

SENEY: Do you mean if, say, Sal Russo had been there at this point, the guy asked you that, he would have said it's time to go or we would have interrupted?

MADDY: You would like to think that that probably would happen. You'd like to think that that would not be something that's relevant. You can't be sure, because I used to get pretty feisty. I can remember exactly my reaction: What do you think you're doing telling me that I don't know what I'm talking about, that sort of thing, as if I did or did not. Whether or not I smoked pot or not had no relevance as to whether I was a good chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee or not.

SENEY: And it came at a time when -- I mean, marijuana smoking was very commonplace in 1978.

MADDY: Of course, Jerry Brown kind of ducked it. What did he say? "I always try to obey the law." That was his answer, or something like. Some goofy answer.

Then some colleagues started jumping on the bandwagon to give me support: that "everybody does it" sort of thing.

SENEY: Who did that?

MADDY: Priolo did it I know, because he was Minority Leader at the time. I forget who else. Two or three others that got up.

SENEY: Said we've done it too, it's no big deal?

MADDY: It's not a big deal. And the Brown guys -- that was the era. Not that I cared, but I'd go to those parties and all those guys smoked marijuana. The women all smoked marijuana. It was just part of the deal.

SENEY: Well, it wasn't a party if there wasn't marijuana. It was more important than the hors d'oeuvre tray.

MADDY: Almost.

And the funny thing is it helps me now, I can tell you, in nausea with cancer. I don't mind my vote. I thought my vote on Prop. 15[1] was absolutely correct. Even though that stuff never has helped me or never has helped me to get a high or anything like that, but it sure helps get rid of the nausea.

SENEY: Prop. 15 you're referring to is the medical marijuana initiative. It passed by 55 percent.

MADDY: I supported it on the legislative floor. I told John Vasconcellos, "You may not be right as to how you want to allow people to use it, because I think it's any easy way to try to keep the pot smokers smoking it, but for medical reasons it sure can help." It helped me.

SENEY: Have you gotten a prescription for it as required?

MADDY: No.

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[1] November 6, 1996.

SENEY: You've just gotten it through other sources.

MADDY: Friendly sources.

SENEY: Right. I don't mean for you to say who because it's still a crime.

MADDY: It's still a crime. It always shows up on my doorstep.

SENEY: Well, that's thoughtful.

A couple of other things I wanted to ask you about, and this is in the middle of May in the 1978 Primary campaign, that the San Joaquin Nisei Political Action Committee -- this was the political arm of the San Joaquin County Nisei Farmers League -- they endorsed Davis.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: What was behind that? Because they had been your supporter.

MADDY: Not Harry Kubo, but there was a group out of Stockton which was Sal's original group. Either it was Sal or somebody, there was an internal dispute either over moving money around or something. You know, all these groups are there for more than one purpose. One is philosophical support, and then there's always everybody wants a little action, there's things going on. And I forget what the dispute was that allowed them to swing. Either they used the excuse of the marijuana or they used the excuse of Prop. 13, or something of that nature, that Maddy had (quote) "betrayed us" sort of thing. But what actually happened I don't know.

All the Niseis that were my original supporters and friends all were friendly. It was just a matter that they made this move, and that was a big

coup by Ed Davis and his crowd to pull some of my Nisei Farmers off.

SENEY: I'm sure it was. It must have looked like bad news to you and good new to him.

MADDY: Yes, it was bad news to me and good news with him, and of course, we were all so far behind Evelle Younger it didn't make a hell of a lot of difference. During the campaign of those closing weeks everything counts from one minute to the next.

SENEY: Right. The emotional highs and lows.

As you said, Younger ran a sort of front porch campaign.

MADDY: Stayed home.

SENEY: The few things he tried didn't really work out very well. He tried to get the FBI to investigate organized crime and they wouldn't do it, so he undertook himself as Attorney General.

MADDY: Evelle was drinking a lot and was not well. I really got to know Evelle better afterwards because he did get off the sauce at the end. He was really a good guy.

SENEY: Was he known for that, by the way?

MADDY: Yes, he had a drinking problem. But he should not have been in that '78 campaign, physically and mentally I don't think. And this is hindsight. As long as we're just talking, we're talking, but he's now deceased so you don't beat the guy up. But he was not really ready to move into the Governor's race.

SENEY: I have read that his wife was the one who pushed him into politics.

MADDY: His wife was a tremendously strong person. Tremendously bright person and very good person. She was always the driving force behind Evelle, that's my understanding. I barely got to know him during the campaign, but I was always kind and they were always kind to me.

It was kind of strange: Evelle called me, I don't know, two or three weeks before he died for some reason right out of the blue, just to talk to me, and I can't even recall now what it was but it was always sort of interesting to me that he would make that phone call so late. We just talked about the campaign. And there were some fun times in it because we'd go do these events together and figure out what was what and who was going to talk first and who could get out quickest because the crowd was small. All those little things; that you do share some things in any campaigns.

I was never close to him but he had a 95 name ID going in, I think, something like that. There was nothing to do except watch those of us who were struggling, and Pete Wilson being the logical guy to try to catch him because he was young and had done some things, but Ed Davis being this tremendous chief of police who was controversial and sort of "hang 'em at the airports." Oh, he always joked because he said, "I turned out to be much more liberal than you are." He's still alive.

SENEY: I want to talk to you about his second career because as I think we said

briefly before, he turned out to be a total surprise to everybody. He turned out to be completely reasonable, apparently very influential.

MADDY: Well, he certainly was one of my strongest supporters as leader. I mean, there was never any doubt as to who he supported from day one from a leadership point of view. He moved much more to the left than anybody would ever have guessed. Much more.

SENEY: Yes. He turned out to be a big surprise, didn't he?

MADDY: Yes, in many ways.

SENEY: Well, I wanted to just mention the Younger investigation where he puts out this list of Mafia people, one of whom is just some poor dentist over in Inglewood or somewhere, and it was very flawed.

Do you recall that?

MADDY: I don't remember. I don't recall.

SENEY: There was a fair amount of criticism in the press because of this, that he had not--

MADDY: That he had not done his work.

SENEY: That's right. But he still wouldn't self-destruct, I guess.

You know, a lot of this has to do -- and you've referred to it over and over again, though not quite in these terms -- with how advantageous it is to be south of the Tehachapis in terms of your political base.

MADDY: I don't know how you can win a statewide race in California unless you have a tremendous base in Southern California. I think if I had been

appointed Treasurer, there was no doubt in my mind we were going to have to make a move down into the southern part of the state, much like Matt Fong tried to do. I think Matt sort of did it. But I think you have to be centered down there. You have to be in that locale. You have to have the connections in Southern California, because it's just numbers. Anybody with any brains can tell you that the numbers are there and how you relate to those issues down there.

SENEY: Matt Fong was actually a Northern Californian, wasn't he? His mother was elected to the assembly from a Northern California district.

MADDY: She grew up in Oakdale, near Modesto.

SENEY: Right.

You know, Ed Salzman made a point in the *California Journal*[1] that the death penalty, he thought, would be a minor issue in the campaign, that it was overplayed by the media.

Was that your feeling about it too?

MADDY: Sure. It was not an issue.

I think Jerry was pro-death, wasn't he? No, he was anti-death.

SENEY: He said he'd obey the law. You passed it over his veto.

MADDY: That's right, we did it. I was there. I was the chairman.

It was like abortion was not an issue. The issue was Prop. 13, and

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[1] Vol. VII, No. 8, p. 258.

the people wanted to pass Prop. 13, and after that nothing else mattered. The rest was nothing.

SENEY: I can't remember if I asked you last time about the California Republican Women who had endorsed and were circulating petitions for Mr. Wilson's anti-public employee initiative. And I think I did ask you about opposition to it, but I don't know that I brought up the notion of the Republican Women. Did you counsel with them or quarrel with them about that at all?

MADDY: I don't recall. In these deals most of those kinds of endorsements and so on are finagled and worked out and compromised and negotiated by your people like Sal and Doug. That was their job. If you had to make an appearance in which you went and tried to sell yourself to the Republican Women's executive committee, you did it as a matter of courtesy because the deal had been cut. You either were going to win or you were going to lose. You knew that. That's my recollection. So it was a matter of what sold them or who you had in the right spots.

It's like the California Women in Agriculture. There wasn't any doubt that those were Maddy folks, and how good or bad you made somebody look as far as being pro-agriculture was what bills you put up as the critical bills. All you had to do is take fifteen people and say these are the most important bills in the world, and Maddy voted yes on all of them and Davis voted no on all of them. If you're the one that picks the fifteen,

pretty easy to get a good record. You know, a lot of that goes on.

In those days the California Republican Assembly, the hard right, you worried about the right, but Davis had that sort of locked up, although I got a fair number of votes. But I was the only one that got any votes. It was Davis and myself.

Even though I was not hard right conservative, I did get some conservative help because of my ties back to Reagan in '76, that move. So when I think back on all the steps I took, even though I didn't plan it, some turned out to be pretty smart.

SENEY: You know, some of Reagan's "Kitchen Cabinet" people supported you: William French-Smith and I think you mentioned Holmes Tuttle. But perhaps to cover their bets, Leonard Firestone and Justin Dart were raising money for Wilson.

MADDY: Right. That was where the controversy came at the end on this bribery thing, where I talk about Birkholz and the marijuana, all of that surrounding. They were going to put up a quarter of a million dollars at the end, the "Kitchen Cabinet" was, for somebody, and we went to bid for it sort of. There was $250,000 to try to keep the campaigns alive. Our pitch was that--

SENEY: So you literally met with them.

MADDY: We met with them, right. And our pitch was that Pete was dead as Kelsey's nuts. I mean, he was gone, he was 6 percent.

SENEY: Where does that phrase come from?

MADDY: I don't know. It's an old racetrack expression.

SENEY: That's what I thought.

MADDY: That I at least had a shot, that I was in there someplace, even though it was hard to argue that I could overcome the name ID. Ed Davis was not that far ahead of me -- two or three points -- that it was certainly a waste for this cabinet to put this money into his race and made more sense to put it in my race.

What, as I said, was underlying it, and I think they put the money up, was what we didn't know, what I didn't know completely, was that they were holding back so much, basically trying to support Mike Curb. I mean, that was their man. They wanted Mike Curb for Lieutenant. They'd given up on the Governor's race, in my opinion. What they were really trying to do was make sure Mike Curb became Lieutenant Governor, and that was their shot. That was where they were going with their man.

SENEY: Let me find another tape.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

MADDY: --particularly if you're going to have your chosen member down here running for Lieutenant Governor, and the hope being that 1982 you come up with a winner.

But certainly those of us who were on my side of the coin and later on, and I would have to ask around a little bit, but I would think that there is that story there, that I think they spent their effort and time on Mike Curb. And it might have been good judgment on their part. It might have been in their mind that number two was going to be Davis. The "Kitchen Cabinet" didn't necessarily like Davis and didn't like the Bill Richardson hard right. Evelle Younger was a good guy and a lot of people liked him.

SENEY: He would have been well known to these people.

MADDY: He would have been well known to these people, but he didn't have a lot of their support and I think because people knew physically and mentally he wasn't probably up for the job. And then you just wonder how much the Mike Curb thing had sold them on, the idea that this was the future, that we have a President. I'm sure they're talking presidential by that time.

SENEY: With Mike Curb.

MADDY: With Mike, sure.

SENEY: Where was this meeting? Down in L.A., I take it?

MADDY: In L.A. someplace. At the Dart headquarters, if I recall.

SENEY: His corporate headquarters.

MADDY: His corporate headquarters.

SENEY: And who was there? Do you remember?

MADDY: I remember my son and I pulled away from there. I'm trying to think

where I went after that. I remember pulling away but I can't remember who was there.

SENEY: Dart certainly.

MADDY: Dart was there. I think Holmes Tuttle was there. I can't remember beyond that.

SENEY: You know, obviously I've never been a fly on the wall at those meetings. As you've indicated before, when Sal was here, you'd go address these businessmen and they could be kind of hard assed. I mean, they'd talk to you about your family: "We're not here to listen about family."

The tone of these, I think, would sometimes surprise us outsiders. Do you remember the tone? Can you give me a sense of what it was like to meet with those people?

MADDY: One of the things that was important for me was that Jimmy Boswell had set up, as I mentioned earlier, a way for me to meet 200 people. It was going to be ten meetings with twenty of the top business people in the state. He had enough credibility and reputation that when he had a lunch people would show up. They could be implied, but by and large, you had a protection, and that was to give the kid a chance to say what he had to say and why he wants to run for Governor.

I wasn't what I'd call brilliant but I wasn't weak either, and I had a lot of answers and I was putting forth a pretty good pitch. And I was also one that wasn't going to take too much pushing around in the sense that I

had thought about the liberal side issues and had answers. I'm trying to deal with abortion and some of those things that oftentimes would crop up. But I would come back to the business issues. I'd come back to the things that they wanted to talk about.

SENEY: They wouldn't be so much interested in abortion, would they, except as it was an electability issue.

MADDY: No, these guys were not. The Republican Party today is. In fact, the last time I traveled around with Jack Kemp three or four years ago, when he came out here we went to Southern California and Northern California, and we met with the top guys in the Republican Party that you must know now. In Southern California we spent the entire time with Jack trying to defend himself as to why he's pro-life but doesn't say enough about pro-life, and we went to Northern California and he had to defend himself as to why he was pro-life but he wasn't going to make it a major issue and that the pro-choice people up there didn't have to worry.

So here's this big cadre of supporters in the Republican Party in Southern California who could only bring up one thing -- these are big businessmen -- could only bring up one thing and that's the stupid abortion issue. You go up north and talk to the Republican Lincoln Club up there, the Lincoln Club being the bottom line, basic Republicans, but the heavy Silicon Valley hitters who seem to be totally consumed over whether or not pro-life or pro-choice was going to be the dominating

issue. We came out just shaking our heads.

I mean, how in the world do you get beyond, if the Republican Party hierarchy that you need to win a campaign, half are concerned about one side of the issue and half are concerned about the other half of the issue and the issue doesn't mean diddly in terms of winning a presidency?

Maddy, in the '78 days, it was all business issues and who could win, with this underlying theme that I don't know that they really were concerned about me winning as they were trying to get Mike Curb into the point where he could win.

And I might be wrong. It might all be perception. I don't know, but it's my feelings, and that's all we're doing is talking about my feelings.

SENEY: Well, I wouldn't quarrel with you.

MADDY: I don't think I would either.

SENEY: Knowing what I do from the outside and from others I've spoken to, I think it's a plausible explanation. As you say, this is smart money. This is long-term money.

MADDY: These folks had pretty good control over the state in terms of having come off of eight years with Ronald Reagan and a great deal of power in this state.

SENEY: Would they be so blunt as to say we expect this and we expect that?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: None of that would ever come out as explicit as that?

MADDY: No. I've never had that occur. I couldn't tell you an instance in my life in which I had somebody tell me I had to do this or this is to be expected. No one was ever dumb enough to say something that, if I was wired, they could go to jail, that I ever recall.

SENEY: What was election night like?

MADDY: It was an airplane; they flew me down. Emotional. We flew down to L.A. to stand up on the stage. It was more like a blur.

SENEY: Republican Headquarters party?

MADDY: Republican Headquarters, right. Evelle won it. Tears. More like a blur, just trying to get through it.

We had hired a train. It went down through the Central Valley towards the end of the election. We were going to cancel it because it was clear I had lost, but I had the twelve thousand bucks that had already paid for it and I had the money in my campaign so we did it anyway, and that became just a rollicking [party] -- Maureen Reagan was fantastic. She'd sing at every stop. We had the Maddy women with their T-shirts on and the Maddy song, a lot of booze, and we did the train ride. We tried to go out with some style. We tried to go out with a little style. And probably except for the tears that I couldn't hold back at a couple of points in time when you want to say who you thank, how much work went into it, you just try to do that with some grace and get out from under.

I think I did stay the next morning for the team because they kept

trying to get Evelle to stand up with the team. We had some guy who backed into the race that should never have backed into the race -- I forget who it was -- on some constitutional seat there. They were all trying to duck him.

SENEY: It always is a marvel to me on election night when the people who have not won get up, with their wives at their sides, and with brave smiles and congratulations, a great campaign. I mean, I'd be bawling like a baby.

MADDY: I have a hard time holding back the emotions, I really do. And crying when you're losing is not necessarily a great emotion to be showing, but at the same time that's the way you feel. And not so much that you lost, because you already knew you were going to lose, but you do have all this feeling about the people that put forth so much time and effort. I had people that really broke their stick with no money. Today, it's a little easier to get up and say a lot less about some yahoo you're paying a hundred and fifty grand to run your campaign who didn't get close for you. But in those days when you've got somebody who has borrowed fifteen thousand out of their own pocket to stay with you through the race--

SENEY: You had people like that?

MADDY: I had lots of people who [were] paid nothing, who stayed with me the whole time and worked hard. Sal and Doug worked literally for next to nothing all through the campaign. But they made a career that way.

That's how they started their careers. Many people made careers.

SENEY: For them it was very successful, wasn't it? You might have lost but you did a very credible job.

MADDY: That started their business. They both have been very successful from that point on.

But it is hard. There are people that are stalwarts and get up and lose. I never could lose. Man, I don't like losing. That's plain and simple.

SENEY: Well, that was your only time.

MADDY: Yes, that was my only time.

SENEY: You didn't have a whole lot of experience, though.

MADDY: No. No.

SENEY: You may not have wanted any more.

MADDY: I'd lose horseraces. I didn't like to lose a horserace.

No, it is difficult. We flew down and we did the thing. You know, it's pretty hard. The family's there. It's emotional but it was clear. I knew I had lost long before that, so it was a matter of how you do you handle it and do it with some style.

SENEY: Well, you had a lot of supporters. There's no question about that. Important ones and ordinary ones and people who were attached to you personally, and not so much for party reasons or any of the other kinds of things. And one of them was a person you've just

mentioned -- Maureen Reagan. How did she get involved in the campaign?

MADDY: Going back, Maureen and Michael Reagan were both very supportive of me as a result of my help for her dad in 1976. And then a connection between Bruce Nestande got us closer to Maureen.

In those days, from '76 on, we got to know them well and traveled and so on with them, so there was a personal connection. And she really felt that her dad and mom -- because I had supported him in '76 -- that there was sort of an "Oh," and dad and mom couldn't do it -- not aboveboard. My understanding is Nancy made a few nods in my direction -- don't hurt him and that sort of kind of thing -- but they got right into the campaign, both Mike Reagan did and so did Maureen Reagan.

She's a trooper. She loves to get out and do her thing and sing and loves the showboat and loves to be part of a show and laugh and joke. She made a lot of friends on that train down the Central Valley just because she was the former Governor's daughter who was out there campaigning for him.

SENEY: She was helpful, I take it?

MADDY: Oh, very much so.

SENEY: In associating the Reagan name with your campaign.

MADDY: Well, sure. It implied that the Reagans -- the very thing I said. They

couldn't help me but they were really for me.

SENEY: There were a good number of pictures of her. In fact, I wanted to say to you, and I'll say it now because I'll probably forget, there are a lot of pictures in the albums that you loaned me, and you really ought to take them out and label them, put on the back who it is.

MADDY: Yes, we've got to do all that. I've got a whole bunch of stuff, lots of stuff to do.

SENEY: Okay, put that on your list because otherwise--

MADDY: You forget.

SENEY: That's right. They'll say, "Oh, there's Ken Maddy and Maureen Reagan but who else?"

And I didn't see Michael Reagan in those pictures. Should I have?

MADDY: I think there was one.

SENEY: His face is not nearly as well known as his sister's.

MADDY: No. I don't think he was on the train. He might have been. My recollection is he looks a lot like Doug Watts, but I'm not sure he was on that train. I'd have to look back.

She was the one that got up and sang, and that's why she was the focal point.

SENEY: You know, Moretti supported you.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: I mean, I know why: You were personal friends and you were close to

one another. But what did he do for you?

MADDY: He endorsed me. He and [Assemblywoman] Pauline Davis and three or four other key Democrats came out and endorsed me in the primary, which was a big coup. That was a huge coup. If you're just looking for one-upmanship and so on, that was a big coup to have, the former Speaker of the Assembly. No legislator that I know of came out against me. I don't know of anybody on the Demo side. So to have a group of people that were Democrats.

SENEY: Well, some of them were not necessarily names that would be known widely outside of political circles but within political circles would be known. Herb Young was one of them.

MADDY: Mm hmm.

SENEY: President of Gibraltar Savings & Loan, prominent fundraiser from Beverly Hills. I take it he'd be a big moneybags.

MADDY: Moneybag in L.A., right. Herb Young was well known in Democratic circles.

SENEY: And Jerry Crowley who was president of COPS, the California Organization of Police and Sheriffs, for the reasons we talked about before. That must have annoyed Davis.

MADDY: Well, sure. He just dealt with them as whackos or something, that they're too liberal or something. Ed would just passed them off.

SENEY: And Tom Hunter who was the Plumbers and Pipefitters business manager.

MADDY: Tommy's been around us for years.

SENEY: And Dennis Schlumpf, Tahoe City general contractor. A [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter delegate in '76. He even went so far as to register Republican to vote for you in the primary.

MADDY: I don't recall that very well. I don't remember it now.

SENEY: He was one of those who was in this list of prominent Democrats who had come out for you.

MADDY: But Moretti was the one that was the key. I mean, to have the former Speaker that you served with was big. That was very big. Internal, a lot of inside stuff, but it meant a lot.

SENEY: Once you left the campaign, what did you do? What was that like after the campaign was over, all this rushing and--?

MADDY: In '78, in June, I had the first big ulcer attack, so I slowed down. I then went from June until December when my term was up, so I was still in the Legislature. I just sort of filled in my time. I know I got very ill back in Washington, D.C. with an ulcer attack. I had been going through marital problems.

SENEY: Had you had ulcers before, or was this new?

MADDY: No. I had stomach problems but never really had an ulcer, but this one was big. Well, not big, big. It was an ulcer.

So I sort of then went from "What am I going to do now?" because I'm from June now to December; finish up my term and what am I going

to do vis-à-vis life? So it became a string of interviews with people, trying to decide whether I wanted to stay in politics or not in politics, go back to Fresno and practice law. As I said, I was having some marital problems with my first wife.

SENEY: Was the '78 campaign sort of the coup de grâce, do you think, for your first marriage?

MADDY: Probably. Oh, I'm sure. The changes that took place and the feelings I had after I came out, whatever else was going on in life, I didn't think that we were going to be able to -- I didn't give it up totally. If I'd gone right back and perhaps had decided to go back and practice law, then everything probably could have been saved, if I'd actually worked at it. But lo and behold, it wasn't very long that--

SENEY: I don't want to dwell too much on this, but was that even a viable alternative in your mind? That is, going back to Fresno at this point and practicing law?

MADDY: What happened to intervene was the fact that almost immediately Zenovich was appointed judge, so the dynamic changes. Suddenly a Senate seat opens up. So one month after I'm out, suddenly, instead of being eliminated from politics, which I loved, and having no place to go -- you know, I could have still been a candidate for United States Senate, and people were saying, "We'll get you geared up for [this and that]."

SENEY: Right, there was a lot of talk about that.

MADDY: Bingo, instead of that something easy comes up -- we think it's easy -- which is, "Hell, Maddy can run for Senate; he's back in action."

SENEY: Did you have any hand in that at all? [That is, the appointment of Senator Zenovich to a judgeship.]

MADDY: No. None.

SENEY: Promise?

MADDY: Promise. Absolutely no.

SENEY: It came as a big surprise to you?

MADDY: Not as a big surprise because I knew that Zeno wanted the judgeship.

SENEY: This is the Court of Appeals judgeship.

MADDY: This is a Court of Appeals judgeship. My understanding is, and this is all inside Demo, how hard would Zeno work, and how much of a chance did [Assemblyman John] Thurman have of winning the seat? And the seat was overwhelming. It was big.

There was some question about my registration because I had gone back and registered at home, so bingo, I have another fight on my hands as to where I actually lived. My home was not in the district so I had to fight that one again. See, I went back and finally registered at my real home where I was living at the time, which was outside the new Senate district. So there were many factors the Demos had lined up.

SENEY: They figured you were out of the picture.

MADDY: Well, I don't think they ever thought I was out because I had proven I

wasn't easy, but they really thought, I think, that other things would come up or that I would take and go the other way. In other words, that I would wait for the next Alan Cranston seat which was up the next year. That I would do several things like that.

I really liked being in the Legislature. I really liked what I was doing. And so once that came out, there was very little decision on my part. I mean, it was like wham, bam, thank you, I'm ready, I'm ready to go. And we really had the notion that we couldn't get beat even though the statistics at that point were probably worse than I ever had faced, political statistics, against a candidate. Although he was a buffoon, they claimed, he was one of the toughest guys you ever want to run against, which was John Thurman.

SENEY: Why do you say he was a buffoon?

MADDY: Well, in those days you used to have who were the dumbest men in the Legislature, who does this, who does that? John Thurman was kind of a joke because Johnny acted that way. He was rated one of the three dumbest men in the Legislature. He was known for the things he said on the Floor that didn't make a lot of sense and so on. But in terms of being an individual, he was a terrific guy and straightforward and pro-agriculture. He out-agricultured me every day. He could be more agriculture because he was a working farmer, He knew what the hell was going on.

SENEY: So despite his inside reputation, he was a formidable candidate.

MADDY: Right, and huge registration edge. It was way up there in those days on that first race. No one had ever come close to him up in Stanislaus County and Merced County and those areas.

When we started out I had this big name ID -- I'd just come off from Governor. I was the hero of the Central Valley. But boy, it didn't take long for party registration to be a balancing factor there.

SENEY: Did you have competition in that race on the Republican side?

MADDY: Yes, I think there were five candidates in the race. If it all fits exactly the way I think it does, a staff member of mine who formerly worked for George Zenovich, a guy named Ted Hilliard, was largely responsible for getting me elected, because there was a businessman of sorts down in Fresno whose campaign theme was if he won he was not going to go to Sacramento; there was enough crooks up there. And then some other guy who always ran. He ran on some platform. So I think there were three Republicans. And then a supervisor from Stanislaus County, Joe Ash-Paul.

SENEY: Who would have been a serious candidate.

MADDY: Who was a serious candidate.

I know that Ted was a consultant with Joe Ash, an informal consultant, and had urged him to run against John. So that five-person race, and it's winner take all, and the race was May 22nd, which is my

birthday -- the final race was going to be on May 22, 1979 -- most people thought that I could win it outright. The reality was that I think it's 127 votes, that if John had received 127 additional votes, he would have won it outright. It would have been 50 percent plus one vote. Joe Ash got about 3,000 votes and my guys picked up a couple thousand here and there. And then Johnny beat me by a considerable margin, three or four thousand.

I never said a word about him. In fact, I campaigned, "You can have us both." I was playing the good guy again. I'd come out of the campaign for Governor with all this good reputation and bright shining light and so on and I figured I could play it that way. We'd been successful in my campaigns before at not being dirty and so on. We came within a hairbreadth of getting beat because John didn't let up. They started on me from the get-go.

What they did was take my record as chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee where I was the protector of the Assembly, and took all the votes and all the bills that I had killed, all the tough criminal justice bills, and began a campaign saying that "Maddy is soft on crime." Just one ad after another. And I can tell you that some of my closest friends were saying, "I can't believe you're so soft on crime." It was pathetic what they did. They hammered on me and I ignored it. I said, "It's not going to cut."

SENEY: Is that the brochure they used?

MADDY: This is one of them. Yes, this is Larry Stammer wrote this thing. Larry Stammer was a good reporter.

SENEY: This was one of the brochures that was in your file.

MADDY: Yes, this is one. No, this is one they did not use. This is the one that they got ready and did not use at the end.

SENEY: It was a pretty slick hit piece. What I've given you is a copy I've scanned.

MADDY: This was the catchall of all the bad things. What they began by doing, which is sort of a common Democratic theme in the Central Valley, John Thurman ran some ads in Fresno that built him up as a good guy, as a good, strong agricultural supporter, a good man, and so on. And they ran those ads for a while and then began to penetrate almost continuously and consistently with the ad that "Maddy is soft on crime," and were using my record as chairman of the Criminal Justice Committee in which we were killing all these bills.

SENEY: But as you said before, that was your job.

MADDY: That was my job. And, of course, nobody was coming to my defense. Obviously, Democrats were not coming to my defense.

My understanding of part of the deal with Jerry Brown and his appointment was that everybody would get behind Thurman in order for George to be appointed judge and that everybody had to get behind Thurman to win the Senate seat.

When I got finished, emotionally I don't think I was as bad off as I

was that night on May 22nd. I don't think I ever felt as down as I felt that day.

SENEY: On May 22nd.

MADDY: On May 22nd.

SENEY: When you looked at those results?

MADDY: When I landed in Merced and got the results there, and I could see we very well could lose this whole thing, that I was going to fly back into Fresno and it was over. You know, the one thing I did not want to do was lose like that. I mean, I could lose the Governor's race and take that with a stride, but I could not believe I was going to end up with my reputation going down in defeat like this.

SENEY: John Thurman beating you outright in the primary.

MADDY: In the primary. I can recall, because I landed at the executive airport right outside of Fresno, the Chandler Airport, and there's a telephone booth and I ran over there, and Pete Bontadelli -- he was director of Fish and Game for a while here and he still works with them -- Pete was on my staff and I had called over to the office, and Pete, when he got excited, his voice would go…[demonstrates]. You could barely hear him. And I said, "Pete, it's Maddy. Tell me."

He said, "Do you want the results of Merced?"

Whenever he'd get officious like that I said, "Tell me what's going on."

And so he said such and such and such and such, and he said, "If we can pull where I think we'll pull out of Coalinga, I think we've got it." He said, "We've got it. I think we've got it." He said, "They had us all night long and Coalinga looks to me like, if it keeps up," and he laid out all the precincts that were left. And he said, "If we just hold as we're doing in Coalinga, if you can win Coalinga by 700, we can do it."

The rest were in. North was in. In Stanislaus he had just whipped me bad.

SENEY: In his home county.

MADDY: Well, we get by in the primary, then we switched. Then I started running ads about John Thurman. We used, "You can't have it both ways, John." I'd show a photograph of him hugging Jerry Brown and the next time pointing the finger at Jerry Brown, and made light of the fact that he was trying to be all things to all people. And we went after him in the campaign. Joe Ash-Paul endorsed me big.

So here is Joe Ash-Paul who really swung the -- I mean, all you need is 107 of Joe Ash's Democratic votes and I'd have been gone. So then it comes down to Thurman and Maddy, and I think it was June 21st, whatever it was, a month later, less than a month later, and bingo, we came back and we beat him by that roughly 700-and-some votes.

SENEY: Right. It was your lowest ever.

MADDY: Yes, lowest.

SENEY: Let me turn this over.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

SENEY: Go ahead.

MADDY: Yes, it was close enough. It was very scary. We sat down the last thirty days in that general election and we really went to work. Of course, the race for Governor and the kind of things that had gone on before and all the glory and glamour and all the people who loved me, suddenly COPS were no longer with me and Public Employees were no longer with me. All the group that had supported me for Governor who wanted me against Jerry Brown didn't want me for Senator. United for California, which was the big business group -- "Well, John is just as good a vote as you are, Ken" -- they backed off. It was amazing.

There used to be a guy named Joe Farber who used to represent the COPS, and I always use him as an illustration. There were certain lobbyists who'd come up and would say, "We got to have you," and Farber spoke like [gravel tone], "We got to have ya." Joe Farber would always say, "Ken, we've got to have you on this one."

I waited for the day, after I won and came back as a Senator, and Joe Farber said, "We've got to have you, Ken."

I said, "Joe, don't ever use the term with me again. You never got to have me because you're never going to get me. When you've got

something to tell me, I'll talk to you. Give me your best pitch. But don't tell me you've got to have me, because," I said, "I don't owe you. I don't owe anybody anything right now." I said, "I'm as clean as I've ever been and I'm going to take off as a Senator and do anything I want to do, anytime I want to do it, when I want to do it, because I don't owe anybody anything." I said, "I've been either doublecrossed or shit on by almost everybody," and I said, "Baby, it's a different world." So I said, "I'm not going to take those words anymore."

I just vent my spleen on him. He was just the one. He was symbolic of others. And it was unfair in many ways, because that's the way Joe operated. That's just the way some lobbyists worked.

SENEY: What was his reaction to that?

MADDY: Nothing. You walk away and go ask somebody else. He took it all the time. That's just the way they do, you know?

SENEY: I wish the tape could see the wonderful smile on your face.

MADDY: Oh, it makes me smile thinking about his face.

There were lots of disappointments.

SENEY: Well, there must have been. I mean, here you come off with this Governor's race where you've put together a very good coalition. You're now going to run for Senate and they're turning their backs on you.

MADDY: Yes. And I always used that expression. I said, "Let me tell you something, guys. I'll tell you this, organized labor and teachers and all the

groups that were traditionally for John Thurman stayed with John Thurman, because that's what they should have done." I mean, they liked me, they liked him. On an even race, there's no doubt that for all those four groups, they belonged with John Thurman. That way he was going to help them day in and day out more than I was going to help them.

"Now, how do you explain all the rest of you guys?" because there's no way to argue that John Thurman could not help labor, public employees, teachers and so on and also be equal with business.

SENEY: Where it's really important.

MADDY: Yes. If he's going to help them more than I'm going to help them, then I'm going to be helping the other side. But the big business boys just sat back and said, "Well, you know, we don't want to offend John because he's still going to be here," because he had a free ride. He was running for the Assembly. See, he was in the Assembly anyway.

SENEY: That's right.

MADDY: So he didn't lose his seat.

It wasn't an awakening because I knew all that. It just was one of those things: The race for Governor, the thrust of all that, part of that disappointment, then coming back and running for the Senate and facing some of the things that I had to go through. And when I won it I was so related and so happy that I was back there.

It didn't change my personal life, unfortunately. The first question

that sort of started this was if I'd gone home, if there'd been no Senate race, would the marriage have lasted? Nobody knows about those things. But certainly by the time I got elected to the State Senate, bingo, we're back up in Sacramento and that part was over. And then it was just a question of where I went from there in terms of my future.

But I wanted it bad. I wanted to win bad. I liked being up here and I liked the job, and it was clear that I really wanted to win, and when I got as close as I did to almost getting beat, it was even more important for me to come back to win that race. And we did a good campaign, and we spent a lot of money. Bill Richardson helped me.

I'll say this, everybody helped me. The one thing the party did is they came together behind me hundred percent, and they worked their tail off. Bill was caucus chairman at the time and he worked very hard for me.

SENEY: Even though your politics and his were quite different.

MADDY: Quite different, yes.

SENEY: But as caucus chairman he's interested in the numbers of Republicans.

MADDY: Absolutely.

SENEY: And you would have been another and were another Republican in a seat that had been a Democratic seat.

MADDY: Absolutely. Huge Democratic seat.

SENEY: And Zenovich, I take it, was anxious for this judgeship. Was it created for him?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: Was there a vacancy?

MADDY: Yes, a vacancy. I never have asked George as to exactly why and under what circumstances that he sought the judgeship. The appellate court judgeships are very difficult to come by, and George had been sort of a fly in the Democrats' ointment in the Senate because he was up against Moscone two or three times and he was constantly agitating, and George was a leader. That was all Demo politics as to why they decided to make a move at that time. If they had waited, if they had just said, "George, next one's yours," or "some other time," that would have been the end of Maddy because one more race and I would have been out of there. Although, I'm sure people thought, "Well, maybe he'll run against Cranston," because Cranston was looking vulnerable back in 1979. Getting old and all that sort of thing. He ended up running against Gann and it was a slam dunk.

SENEY: When I interviewed [Senator] Paul [J.] Lunardi, whom I know you know, he was in the Assembly with [Speaker] Ralph [M.] Brown, who was Speaker then, and Ralph Brown was from the Fresno area. He had gotten out of Jess Unruh's way with an especially created appellate court seat. Paul Lunardi told me if you went down there to see him he just snagged you and wouldn't let you go, because from being Speaker of the Assembly to being an appeals court judge was such a different world.

MADDY: That's why George hated it too.

SENEY: That's what I was going to ask you. Did you ever talk to him about it?

MADDY: Oh yes, Zenovich hated it down there.

SENEY: Did he?

MADDY: Oh yes. He disliked it. George and I talk about it. The other night when we did this dedication out at Fresno State, George was there -- and he's sort of been my mentor; I've followed his steps all the way up to the judgeship deal -- and he said, "You're smart not doing that one."

SENEY: I think it would be a big adjustment for a politician.

You said this one [a Thurman campaign mailer] wasn't used, and yet, this has a copy of a mailing label on it. Now, I don't know if it came through the press or not.

MADDY: I know they used this part, "A Matter of Judgment." They used the editorial from the *Bee*.

SENEY: Again, we're talking about the hit piece.

MADDY: The only thing that I don't think actually went out -- although, it looks like it was sent too -- was this "Jets to Washington" thing. I may be wrong about that. The thing that they may not have used was there was another piece that I saw that they claimed wasn't used which had the Jamaica trip or something of that nature on it, in which they tried to put all this stuff together and say what could we do to bury him?

SENEY: Who was responsible for this, do you think?

MADDY: This piece?

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: This came out of the Thurman campaign out of Modesto. I know where it came from.

SENEY: And the airplane thing is you took a trip allegedly, or perhaps you did take it, to Washington, D.C. after the Governor's race when you were not going to be running for reelection.

MADDY: Yes, this is when I got sick back there. That was our standard Speaker's trip. That was a standard trip that we went back every year. It was the kind of thing that you couldn't defend it to the public but everybody in the Legislature went.

SENEY: And one thing that strikes you at this remove is that the total cost was $819.56. That would hardly buy you the ticket today.

MADDY: It wasn't long after that that I quit doing that with state money. I always went with my campaign money. Spent whatever I wanted that way.

SENEY: Because of this probably.

MADDY: Sure.

SENEY: How badly did the Prop. 13 business hurt you in this election?

MADDY: None.

SENEY: I take it Thurman--

MADDY: Thurman was against it too.

SENEY: I mean, how can you raise that, right?

MADDY: The Senate race turned out to be a battle of popularity to some degree. He had his half of the Senate and I had my half of the Senate.

SENEY: The district you mean. The two Assembly districts made up the one Senate district.

MADDY: Right. On paper, it appeared that Fresnoans were more likely to vote, that my half had a better turnout. The percentage in registration was astronomically -- you know, I was in the 20's. So on paper that part was bad. The question was how could we get them out? And what we could do to sell them on me versus Thurman. So what we did was just try to do what you do in a campaign: You try to hit him where it hurts among farmers and others. I had people who were disappointed over Prop. 13.

See, I was also kind of a disappointment running for some people who had been my very ardent supporters. When I came out against Prop. 13, many people, just like the Nisei Farmers, whatever excuse they used, many people became more disappointed in me than they were in other people. So the dynamic of what got elected in '79, it's hard to sit back now and say "This made the most difference." Of course, once I got there in '79, then we went into reapportionment, and the next twenty years we're set because I became Leader.

I mentioned Bill Richardson supported me. Everybody supported me. But as soon as I got into office, the very first day Richardson and Campbell literally came to me, both of them, and said, "We can't get

along." Campbell was Republican Leader and Richardson was caucus chairman, and both of them offered me a job as being number two, but I had to join one or the other. So I joined Campbell and we upset Richardson.

SENEY: This is literally the first day?

MADDY: Pretty close to it. Sixty days later I was--

SENEY: You were caucus chair, right. That was a nice play.

MADDY: Very good play. [Senator James R.] Jim Mills was [President] Pro Tem. When I took over as caucus chairman, I went from one staff to like twenty, and I went to Jim Mills and I said something about the fact I was caucus chairman, and Jim, "Congratulations."

I said, "Can we discuss offices?" and so on.

And he said, "Yes, whatever you want." I'm paraphrasing but it's pretty close to this.

I said, "I have all these staff now."

He said, "Go talk to Bill Richardson. Whatever he wants to let you have of his is fine with me."

That was it. I sat in the littlest office. I was caucus chairman. Jim Mills is Pro Tem and he went by seniority. I wasn't about to get Bill Richardson's office or anything else, so here I am in this little office, stuck away, the junior man. I have to go and take offices across the street, move Bontadelli, my chief of staff, and put all these people together, and here

I'm caucus chairman sitting out of a small office with one secretary. Everybody else moving around. And about that time, of course, then we were discussing and did move into the remodeling of the building. We were living in the Quonset huts. At that point in time, we then designed the building whereby the caucus chairmen had specific offices, so I ultimately just waited and moved into that.

Richardson was upset with me obviously on and off for a long time. Although, when I say we fight, we get along all right. I've said bad things to him and he's said bad things to me. You know, he was a believer. In one way, it was an easy choice to make because I never was really very close to Richardson, and Campbell was a lot easier to be close to.

SENEY: That was an easy decision on your part.

MADDY: That was no problem. And the fact that I took over as caucus chairman, then it was just a question of how long we could hold on, because always the right wing were going after us. At one point in time they all came to me and wanted me to upset Billy. They were mad at Bill. But I stuck with Bill. I said, "No, I'm not going to." That's when [Senator James W.] Nielsen, who I'd been his mentor -- he always called me his mentor. I had financed his campaigns. I had done everything to keep Nielsen around. But they blew a little smoke at Nielsen. And, of course, Seymour was the big doublecrosser. Seymour was the guy who was supposed to come up and was supposed to be loyal, but he's the first one that left, and so we lost

our leadership after about a couple of years.

SENEY: That's when Nielsen becomes Minority Leader and Seymour becomes caucus chairman.

MADDY: Right. That was the first turn. It got to the point where we thought we were doing it all, and we did make mistakes in terms of our leadership.

SENEY: How do you mean?

MADDY: In terms of running the caucus and so on, Bill and I began to [do everything] -- I sat on the budget committees. Those were the tough years. We were literally running all the issues, in part because nobody else wanted to do it and in part because that's the way we wanted to do it. In other words, we'd rather do the work ourselves and try to develop a strategy against the Democrats and try to develop a strategy on policy and all the rest of it, and we were struggling. Obviously, it was a tough year. I was close to Duke and not everybody else was close to Deukmejian. Deukmejian liked me to be on the Budget Committee.

So what we did was we gave the folks who were against us reason to get together and say "These guys are dominating." So they had to find somebody who was going to take over. Well, Richardson couldn't do it. [Senator] Ollie Speraw and some of the other guys who were the hard right didn't have any backing for leadership. The hard part was how they were going to peel off some of our friends.

Campbell had a tie to [Senator] John Doolittle, who was supposed to

be loyal to us, and John came to us and told us that we were down on the cutting edge, that we were almost gone, but we still didn't figure we could lose. Jimmy came to me -- Nielsen -- and Jim said that "We'll all support you if you'll take me or somebody else as caucus chairman and get rid of Campbell."

I said, "I never play that way, Jim. I came to the dance with Bill and will stay the dance with Bill."

But he strongly urged me to do that, and then he made his apologies and he said, "You've been my mentor. You've done everything for me. But I want you to know up front."

I said, "That's fine with me. I can take that." Well, the guy we didn't think was the guy we'd cut a deal with was when Seymour ran, because we sort of picked the candidate there. We, I think, could have chosen a number of other candidates to run in that seat and kept Seymour from getting it. Now, I'm not sure about that.

SENEY: This would have been the 1980 election.

MADDY: Right, when Seymour won his election down in Orange County. I think we [Campbell and Maddy] could have blocked his winning, or we could have gotten somebody else. But we went with Seymour, obviously with the promise that as long as we were the ones who were going to back him and help him that he stay loyal to us.

SENEY: Is this something that you would have negotiated explicitly with Seymour?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: That was your job, wasn't it?

MADDY: I was there. I was with him at the time in Orange County when we made the arrangements and I felt it was pretty clear. You don't put it in writing and there's nothing binding about it but loyalty, you know.

SENEY: He's the mayor of Anaheim.

MADDY: At that time.

SENEY: Fairly viable candidate.

MADDY: If we had threatened him, we may not have been able to beat him anyway. But at least we had the threat going.

SENEY: Tell me how that works. If you come down and I'm Seymour and you say to me, "We want to back you," and--

MADDY: Well, Nestande, again, was the in-between guy, and George Arduous, who was a big financial supporter in Orange County, who's a good friend of mine, they wanted Seymour. That was their guy. And we didn't have anybody in particular. All we wanted was to make sure that whoever was going to come in -- number one, Orange County is so critical to us that we had to have somebody who could--

SENEY: Whose seat had that been? [John Briggs]

MADDY: You know, for the life of me I can't remember right off. I was afraid you were going to ask that. I can't remember.

SENEY: It was an open seat, though, I take it.

MADDY: Yes.

SENEY: The other member had retired.

MADDY: Right. And so what you try to do is listen and talk and what are you are going to offer and how hard you're going work and so on and so forth. One thing we always want to know, if we get behind you we expect there's a degree of loyalty here that goes with it. It's not that you're going to give blood to us but you're going to support us as long as we're leaders.

SENEY: So you'd say that explicitly to them.

MADDY: Oh sure. You had to do it. If nothing else, just to throw it back. Most guys will react to it. It's good enough for most people.

But on their side things began to change because we began to elect more of the hard right who were less anxious to see Campbell and Maddy calling the shots from our more moderate positions.

This famous trip, you know, when Campbell said, "C'mon, we're all flying down to the big Spruce Goose," which is down in Long Beach, the Reagan deal, and he said, "Don't worry, I've got two airplanes. We've put the jerks on the other airplane." In other words, seventeen of us, and he put nine on one and eight on ours.

SENEY: Well, you were quoted in the press as saying, "How many are on our plane?" You knew then that your goose was cooked.

MADDY: We're in trouble, so we came back. Of course, then we let Doolittle off. Doolittle wanted to get off and he wanted to go on their side, because

philosophically he belonged with them.

SENEY: What do you mean you let him off?

MADDY: He came to us and said, "I want to vote the other way, even though I'm with you." We said, "Fine, do whatever you want."

SENEY: Doolittle has an interesting reputation. I mean, he's a very astute political guy, isn't he?

MADDY: He's a pretty astute political guy. I think where we get in trouble when you don't stand tall once in a while, you know, you get a reputation for that, but in this game it isn't all bad. I mean, he picks his spots and he stays very strong. When I say this is where he should have gone, he was correct about that.

SENEY: And he was good enough to come to you beforehand.

MADDY: Oh yes.

SENEY: And that makes a big difference, doesn't it?

MADDY: A huge difference. It makes all the difference, as far as I'm concerned. You know, they can all go against me and all tell me why they don't want me -- "You're not working as hard as you should work," blah, blah, blah -- and you understand that.

And you try to say, "Let me have another shot," or "I think I can do this." Whatever you want to do to try to stay around.

But in this case it was kind of over and done with. They had the list and so we were gone. We went back in and, of course, you have the big

meeting and everybody talks about unity and we'll come together. I didn't mince any words. I just said, "Jimmy [Nielsen], all I'm going to tell you is you've got to watch everything, pal, because I'm coming after you." Right from the get-go. "My time will come."

SENEY: Shall we take a break?

MADDY: Yes, let's go have lunch.

[End Tape 2, Side B]

[Session 10, October 18, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Senator, we were talking about your being elected to the Senate. I did want to ask you, that even though a lot of people backed away from you, you said, did you have trouble raising money?

MADDY: No. The caucus, as I mentioned, came through very well for me on both sides. I had plenty of money. In fact, we spent a lot of money; more than I'd ever spent.

SENEY: That was almost a million dollars.

MADDY: Over a million, I think, by the time we got finished. I raised a sufficient amount of money, the caucus provided a sufficient amount of money. The one thing that did not leave me were my financial supporters.

And when I say there were some disappointments, there were little things, little slights, that you think about now only in terms of coming off the race for Governor, being higher than a kite and thinking you had the world by the tale, and then suddenly you found what life was like in the real world. But I certainly had all the support, and, as I say, on both sides. Bill Richardson was there representing the right wing and as joyous as certainly everybody else on the other side, the middle-of-the-road Republicans. It was a tough, hard fought battle, and although I said I went

after Thurman, we went after him in the traditional way, not in any dirty sense. I never made fun of his intelligence or lack of intelligence. I never made fun of his drunk driving cases.

SENEY: He had some record of drunk driving?

MADDY: He had some record up here of drunk driving.

[Interruption]

SENEY: You were saying he had some drunk driving problems.

MADDY: Right, he had some drunk driving up here. John used to make more fun of that because that was sort of a joke, and so he would always make fun of it during the campaign.

SENEY: John Thurman himself?

MADDY: Thurman himself would make fun of it. Always hold up a glass of milk because he was a dairyman: "I'm sticking to this." Well, what it would do is it would imply that I was accusing him of something, which I never did.

But no, we played it straight. The main thing we did was "You can't have it both ways. You can't be with Jerry Brown one minute and against Jerry Brown the next," and went after him on a combination of votes. In the farm bill he always had more problems than I did in trying to make sure he had the right voting record.

But it was a tough race, probably more disappointing for me because I thought I had done so well as a candidate for Governor, and to come so

close for Senator was a little shocking. But when you look at it on the stats and the rest of it, it was absolutely what should have happened. It was a tossup. John was a tough candidate, a very tough candidate.

SENEY: Well, it wasn't a tossup, I mean, in numbers, was it? It was a heavily Democratic district.

MADDY: Oh, heavily Democratic district, but I mean in terms of--

SENEY: And this wasn't Camaroda, or Alex Brown, or Al Villa. This was a serious candidate.

MADDY: This was an experienced, serious, tough candidate, with the background experience, the voting record -- everything that I had going for me. Plus, one of the most clever campaigners. He could do anything, that guy could. He was good.

SENEY: So in the end it must have made you feel good, I would think.

MADDY: Oh yes. When I got back up to Sacramento and settled my life a little bit in the sense that the divorce was inevitable and I would settle down, I really felt that -- in fact, my old pal Bruce Nestande, who had sort of gone back and done the same thing, we sat back and said, "This couldn't be any better. Here we are."

In my case, I was back in office, it was 1979. I wasn't that old. I was already in leadership, so it means I had a pretty good chance to make sure that the next decade I was going to have a seat that was not going to be 30 percent Maddy anymore. It was going to be more 60 percent

Maddy. When you're in leadership you obviously have a lot to say about how the seats are drawn.

I was doing what I wanted to do and reconciling, if I could, and rationalizing the loss for the Governor, and would I ever do that again. I don't know. But I felt really pretty good. I felt really very good. I had the world by the tail and a downhill pull. The divorce and all that helped settle things. So I was feeling pretty good in '79 and '80.

SENEY: You said about reapportionment, this was a Democratic reapportionment, totally. I mean, they had both houses and the governorship. But still, as a member of the leadership, you are assured things would be taken care of?

MADDY: We were never assured but we were certainly in the map drawing business. And everything is finesse and everything is how well you put the mast together and so on and to take care of everybody. But it was reasonably certain that with my relationship even with [Senate President Pro Tem David A.] Roberti, even though they had total control, and even though they were going to mess with me, and I knew there were going to be lots of things happening, and I went all the way over to the coast -- that's when the coast thing came up.

SENEY: When you got Monterey County and San Luis Obispo.

MADDY: In reality, what they did was take almost every living breathing Republican that was in that whole central part of the state and give them to Maddy, and that was my seat and everybody else had what was left.

SENEY: How do you say they messed with you a little bit?

MADDY: When I say messed with me, they just didn't give me total carte blanche. I wanted to stay in the valley. I had a seat that would have suited me in the valley that I felt I could have carved out, that would have been as good -- I'm not thinking back now. I don't know why I argue this way except that I was sort of "good government." I mean, it didn't make any sense to have six counties spread all over the country.

SENEY: It does sort of jut in a southerly direction, your district, across the state to the coast, doesn't it, from Fresno?

MADDY: Yes. And it made more sense to have a very nice, very compact district. I was willing to take a 32 or 33 percent [Republican] seat. I mean, I was willing to take almost any kind of a seat because I figured there were some areas I had to leave out. But there were some areas that I knew that there just was no way you're going to beat me now, now that I've done it twice: I ran the Governor's race and this other race. You just weren't going to beat me if you let me carve out the Republicans and the areas I wanted in the Central Valley. And I would have taken a lot of the other areas. But by going off on the coast range and all that sort of thing was that Jerry Halleva -- he worked with David Roberti at that time -- and they kept throwing these things out at me: "How about the thoroughbred country over there in Ventura County?"

Well, ultimately, it was a seat that was so immense, so large and so

spread that you couldn't run against me, just because you couldn't put together a group that would do so.

SENEY: And it was a very Republican seat.

MADDY: Yes, very Republican seat.

SENEY: You had no opposition in '82 under that seat.

MADDY: I don't think so.

SENEY: No, you didn't.

MADDY: That's right. That was a great joke. We used to pull all these tricks. Campbell and I would think of things to do. Halleva, who was chief of staff for David Roberti, said something about somebody running, and I said, "Oh, that mayor filed over there. I've got a candidate."

Lo and behold, the next morning he says, "You dirty, rotten liar. That mayor didn't file."

I said, "Oh, did I say he filed?" I said, "What did I do, duck?"

I don't know whether he took my word for it or not, he was just laughing.

So I had none in '82.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: Which meant that four-year free ride.

SENEY: Now, I would take it, as caucus chair at this point in '82, you would be able to keep any Republicans out of your hair, wouldn't you, do you think?

MADDY: No Republican was going to really challenge me, although there was some conversation about [Assemblywoman] Carol Hallett or someone like that who was residing on the coast. If a conservative Republican challenged me on the coast, they very well could have beaten me in a Senate primary, because the bulk of the Republicans were all on the coast. But the reality was that when that Republican then ran over in the valley, they had absolutely no chance to win the seat overall. Even in '82 it was still not a good seat. I forget the numbers, but it was not a good seat. So the reality was there was no reason to try to beat me. And I wasn't making too many people mad by that time.

The reality was that I had a seat like that for a long time, that you could take me on in the primary and maybe beat me, but if you did then what were you going to do when you got to the general election? So it just became futile for anybody to try to take me on.

The Reps were not mad at me. The Republicans basically were not mad at me ever. For just that lingering thing of the old Reagan ties and whether I was careful enough in my dealing with the various issues, I didn't get too flamboyant or I didn't get too angry at the gun control people or the anti-gun control people until later. After '87, when I became Republican Leader, I threw them out of the caucus a couple of times.

I didn't pick fights with the conservatives. You know, I had Doolittle [as caucus chair]. I always had deals. My caucus chairman was

always a pretty hard conservative. So I tried to keep that balance going. I didn't go out and pick fights.

And I gave money. I gave lots and lots and lots and lots of money to the conservative causes on the Assembly side. Because we had no races in the Senate to speak of. In other words, we didn't have big investments.

SENEY: By big investments, you mean races that you had to pour a lot of money in order to win?

MADDY: In which we had a chance to win. We either had no chance to win, and I could just throw money away, or they were winners. So I mean, I could either give a little token money to somebody who had already won, and I wasn't likely to give money away just to have a candidate. You know, if you've got some money and you want to run, I can give you a hundred thousand to get yourself going, but I'm not going to go out and support a campaign that doesn't look like it's going anywhere.

At one point in time, I forget how much money I gave to the Assembly Republicans, who were then more dominated by the conservatives, who were very thankful for me for the amount of money I contributed to the Republican Assembly Caucus electing more conservative guys.

I tried to do things that would keep me on a balance with everybody in the party, without necessarily going out and trying to be a leader.

SENEY: Was this when you were caucus chair or--

MADDY: When I was Minority Leader. After '87. When I was running it myself.

SENEY: We'll get to that too. But wasn't it your responsibility to raise money as caucus chair?

MADDY: From '79 to '83, until we lost, I raised a lot of money then too.

SENEY: But that wouldn't be solely your call.

MADDY: No, Bill Campbell and I raised the money together, with Bill more in charge than myself. Actually, Bill was a better money raiser, because I had begun to develop my stance of not calling anybody, not calling lobbyists. I wouldn't ask for money. I just wouldn't do it.

SENEY: How do you do that?

MADDY: You'd get an invitation from me but you wouldn't get a phone call from me. In '87 I never made any phone calls. When I was elected Leader in '87, I was deeply concerned about people going to jail. It hadn't happened yet but it ultimately did, because I had been warned by a couple of very key people -- Judge Garibaldi was one -- that a large number of people, both sides of the aisle, were going way beyond the line, way beyond what they should be doing in terms of soliciting and asking for money.

So when Doolittle and I were elected, I told Doolittle that day, because he was talking about how we're going to have to step up our activities and raise more money, and I laid it out then. I said, "Just so you know, I will not make a personal phone call for money. I will not do it to anyone." I said, "Not to anyone." I said, "One caveat: You get a business

leader, the head of a roundtable or something, I can call the head of the business roundtable or I'll call so-and-so, or I'll call David Murdock, and I'll sit down and say, 'We'd like to have you participate in our money-raising activities as a business man and you help organize,' but if anyone who's a lobbyist who has some ax to grind with me, then I refuse to talk to him about money."

If you were a registered lobbyist, I never called you for money. You could talk to me about it. I mean, I'd send out invitations. You could go to the Maddy Golf Tournament for twenty-five hundred bucks a year. You could go to any other number of things that were Maddy events and you could say to me, "I'll see you tonight," and I'd say, "Fine, I'd love to see you tonight." But you never, ever sat down and said, "By the way, I'd like to talk to you about SB 10." You couldn't talk to me about SB 10 and talk to me about contributing to my campaign because I was concerned about what actually ultimately happened. Not that I was smarter than anybody else, but I had been warned that things were getting too dicey. People were asking for money at the same time they were talking legislation. That's a no-no.

SENEY: And Judge Garibaldi warned you about that?

MADDY: Judge Garibaldi was one who warned me about that.

SENEY: Who else warned you?

MADDY: He was the principal one but others would nod in agreement. Then I

began to ask. I began to ask my lobbying friends, "Are you finding that [so-and-so] is beginning to--"

[Senator] Paul Carpenter ultimately went to jail. Paul Carpenter had a system, allegedly, and I never actually saw it, where his computer sat right behind his desk, and you'd come in to talk to him about a bill and allegedly he would turn around and bring up your name and it would list all the contributions you had made. You're Joe Smith, lobbyist for ARCO: Let's see now, Joe you've given 'X' number of thousands of dollars to this many Republicans and this 'X' number of thousands of dollars to this many Democrats. Now, you want to talk to me about AB 10, which is important to ARCO. How do I reconcile the fact that you've given so much more money to the Republicans than you have for me when you're asking me for a vote?

I appeared before the Grand Jury and the Grand Jury doesn't need anything even close to that before they think you're a crook. And when you go that far, you're getting damn close to being, in their minds, fully convicted. And what Garibaldi warned me was about some of the Assembly Republicans, only on horseracing bills. His big warning was they brought him in a group of racetrack guys and had one of these lists out: "This is what you've been giving and this is who you've been giving it to. If you want Republicans to be friends with you, then this is way out of balance."

SENEY: Garibaldi lobbied for the racetracks, didn't he?

MADDY: Right. And booze. Liquor and racetracks. And he'd just been a long-time close friend and he had been around a long time, and he said, "This is dangerous, Ken. This is very dangerous. You cannot get to the point where you have to ask for money and talk legislation."

I determined at one point or another, and there was a lot of other factors involved in my own mind as to where things were going and what was happening and my own style, that I knew my responsibility was to raise the money, but I just felt that I had to do it in a way that I could live with.

I did believe that we were going to a point where we had gone too far, and even though if the Democrats were going to outdo us and they were going to do it, then I was going to have to accept the fact. And I told the caucus that: There's a reality out there.

In fact, I even was going to get stricter. I was not going to give any money to any member who was an incumbent because I felt if you can't raise your own money, then there's little or no reason you should be here.

I said a lot of things about money-raising. I said it's due diligence. My thought was that there is a schedule you can run in which campaign money can be raised in a legitimate way in which you can have events. And I said, "All this stuff is gauged. Does the legislator who calls you and says 'I know what you're doing and I want a thousand dollars,' have a

better chance of getting the thousand dollars than somebody who merely sends a letter? The answer is yes. Well, so what do you do about that? Vote no the next time? Tell the lobbyist that that's why you did it? Or you just eat it and decide in some fashion to try to communicate the role of the Republican Caucus to those interest groups?"

And I said, "I think the best thing we can do is try to communicate the role of the Republican Party to these interest groups. If you really want to see your issues succeed, then we suggest you take a look at the voting records and decide what people support your cause. In a generic way, we think you ought to support all Republicans. We think these are the people that are the ones who support your cause. And if that doesn't teach them, then you can do whatever you want to do."

I said one of the problems we Republicans have in so many cases is that if you believe strong enough in it, if I believe in what ARCO's doing, it probably doesn't make any difference whether ARCO gives me a thousand dollars or not, I'll probably vote that way. In fact, that's probably what happens.

I didn't have any idea. When you raise a million or two million -- I was raising two-and-a-half million or three million a year -- I had no idea in the world who gave me any money. I never looked at it. I never kept track of it. You never knew who your friends were and so on.

The point was that I refused to participate in the campaign financing game.

SENEY: Let me remind you of something you said earlier when we were talking, specifically about Judge Garibaldi and him reminding you that he had given you your first five hundred bucks. That's different though.

MADDY: Well, that was always in the context of the joke. It was not different in a way. It was the Judge's way of always pulling my chain a little bit as to who was first. We became very, very close friends. When I say you never discuss it, I mean, between Garibaldi and myself, and between a great number of lobbyists, I would have the same discussion I'm having with you: open, above-board, and discuss it. Which, in effect, was my way of telling all of them that I knew exactly what was going on. But as friends I discussed it in the abstract.

The word got out that I knew what was happening, and certainly the word got out that as Republican Leader, if they continued to want to see me stay Leader, that they were going to have to make decisions someplace along the line. I felt the message could be delivered without me committing a criminal act.

SENEY: You mean the word got out that you didn't want to talk, if I'm a lobbyist, to me about money and legislation in the same conversation.

MADDY: People knew that. That word got out. That's what happened in that case in which the young man, who I think we met at lunch here, who came up

and shook hands, who said, when he was being wired, "There's no use to talk to Maddy about money because as soon as you mention it, he will shut you down." That word got out.

I held golf tournaments. I did lots and lots of things with lobbyists. I would be fair to say I don't think anybody had a larger or bigger collection of lobbying friends than I did when I was in the Legislature. We'd get ten at a table, we're just sitting around having a beer, and I would discuss this without being specific. And I would discuss it in a way by saying, "What makes it tough on me as the Republican Leader, with my edict that I am not going to call you specifically to get money for a vote" -- in other words, I'm not going to break the law -- "It's really tough on me if you guys then just say, 'That's a good way to stiff Maddy all the time.'"

I also got the word out that you could do a lot for Maddy, if you really think that I'm a good leader by helping me, without ever asking for it. In effect, that's what I was trying to do. I was trying to say, "I'm going to be absolutely honest, and I will fail as a leader if you guys let me. But if you're sitting down with your agenda, and I know how it works -- you come in and your guys give you a hundred thousand dollars to spend, and you sit down and you say, 'How can we do this? Our people say it's fifty to Democrats and fifty to the Republicans. We can disperse out the money to the Democrats ten thousand for five guys or we can give Maddy all fifty

thousand and tell him to disperse it the way he wants to. Now, what helps the most? Well, give Maddy the fifty and let him give it out.'" But I said, "Those are the kinds of things you make those decisions." That way I don't make decisions like that.

SENEY: You know, I brought up the thing about Judge Garibaldi because he was a legendary lobbyist. There would be no question in that case with him that he would ever connect those two things.

MADDY: I think he knew for forty years or fifty years the FBI were trying to get him. I don't think there's any doubt in my mind that Garibaldi was absolutely aware of the fact that he had been set up a thousand times, but he was too smart; plus, he didn't do anything. If you had a $500 fundraiser, you were liable to get $500. That's what he'd do. But he was certainly not dumb enough to come in and accept in some joking way.

But then when you had to be lobbied, man, the old man would be outside the gate there, always using that old demeanor: "You don't have time for an old man, just to see him for a moment, do you?" He'd do that thing. Of course, anybody who Garibaldi sent a card into would come rushing out, you know.

"Do you think you can move just a little bit on this bill?"

But he knew the bills. He knew the bills, he knew how to lobby, and he just was a grand old man. And by the last twenty years he was such a legend that he didn't have to do a whole hell of a lot. He didn't win them

all but he came close.

SENEY: As long as we're talking about this, did they ever come to you on the shrimp scam business?

MADDY: Oh yes. I was part of the investigation. I think they were after me, but they didn't get me. I think I was one of the targets. I've got the whole files on it. And that's where I said one of the saving graces, one of the guys who went to jail who was a staffer is the one who said on tape, "Don't bother to talk to Maddy about money because if you do he'll shut you down. He won't even discuss the bill with you."

SENEY: Was this John Shahabian?

MADDY: No. Shahabian was carrying the wire. It was the guy that bumped into us at lunch the other day, and I can't think of his name, who went to jail, who was a staffer for a Senator who was next door to me. My mind is so bad in terms of my memory. But he was quoted--

SENEY: Your memory's actually great, Senator.

MADDY: But Shahabian was wired and Karen Watson was the Republican, and Karen Watson and this other fellow were there talking about who was going to carry the bill on the floor of the Senate, and Shahabian was trying to set me up. [Senator] Leroy Greene had carried it the year before when it passed and nothing happened.

"No, we don't want Leroy."

"Well, it's in Leroy's district," they said. That was the argument.

"No, no, we want somebody." And Shahabian was trying to put me on. They were trying to set me up, I know -- the FBI. Shahabian kept pushing.

And Karen Watson said, "Well, we can take care of that."

I wish I could think of his name, but anyway, Democratic staffer, he says, "Don't bother to talk to Maddy about money, because if you do, that'll be the last of the conversation. He will not discuss money."

So if there was any commendation, if there was any reputation or anything that perhaps saved me, if you will, from them pursuing further -- now, I did carry the bill, but they did it in a different way. They didn't come to me and offer me the ten thousand, which was their whole thing and so on. They merely got Karen Watson to walk over to my secretary at the front desk -- and Karen Watson worked for [Assemblyman Patrick A.] Pat Nolan -- and she said, "My boss said your boss said he would carry this bill." Ergo, she put it on the desk. When I went down to my desk that day, the bill was on my desk and it said, "Third Reading File. Should be a consent item." So when the time came, I picked it up and said two words and it went out literally on consent, and I was the person who carried the shrimp bill on the floor.

SENEY: It was Nolan's bill actually.

MADDY: No, it was not Nolan's bill. It was a Democrat's bill. Well, I'm not sure about that. But Nolan is the one they got. And so that testimony then

came out that Karen Watson had been told by her boss that I was going to carry the bill.

In the Grand Jury investigation, when I went in to the Grand Jury, they had this tape also of Shahabian who was then taping [Senator] Frank Hill, who said, "What about Maddy? Is he going to carry the bill?" and Frank said, "I just came out of a meeting with him. Everything's fine, he'll carry the bill." That's what they hit me with on this tape in front of the Grand Jury.

And they said, "Do you remember saying anything to Frank Hill?"

I told you from the start I had already testified. Of course, they were trying to impeach me. And I said I had no memory of this bill. It happened just exactly the way."

Of course, the attorney said, "Well, why would you carry it if that's all you knew about the bill?" So then I tried to sit there and explain to the Grand Jury how the process works, which is almost like talking to a wall. That's why I became so incensed with the FBI as to what snakes I think they were. I said, "I can't believe you guys are this stupid that you know as little about government as you pretend to know."

SENEY: Because the fact was that this Karen Watson lied to your secretary--

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: --saying that you had told her boss, Nolan, that you would carry this bill.

MADDY: Correct.

SENEY: Your secretary would never assume she was lying.

MADDY: No.

SENEY: She would assume that was the way it was. And that would have been the way it was if Nolan had come to you with this--

MADDY: If Nolan had come and asked me to carry the bill, I would have carried it. Where I came so close is that if they had sent ten thousand dollars to my campaign headquarters that day, my treasurer would have deposited it and you would have had the link and I could have gone to jail. That simple, with no other evidence, with nothing else going. That's how close I came.

SENEY: That's really scary, isn't it?

MADDY: Really scary. I mean, when I think about it, they would have indicted me. I came out of that room absolutely convinced in my mind that the Grand Jury only had to have one link: If I voted the way they wanted me to or did something like carry the bill, which they wanted me to do, and took money, that the money was for the act. Why they didn't send the ten thousand…

SENEY: That's what I was going to ask. Why didn't they send it?

MADDY: I have no idea. I mean, maybe somebody in the FBI did have enough conscience to say, "At least we ought to have him take the check or do something," because they had everybody else taking a check. They had Frank Hill on video in the room taking the check. They had Nolan taking the check and a conversation. They all had somebody actually picking up

the check and handling it and knowing that you were getting something for nothing, and they didn't have me on that because this young man, he said, "If you mention money, he's gone, he'll throw you out."

The most significant thing for me was on this tape with them laying out what my reputation was, which is what I want it to be, even though I didn't know it was that strong at that moment. But that's how close I came.

SENEY: People know, don't you think, in this environment?

MADDY: Oh, I think so. It wasn't a fly-by-night deal.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

MADDY: ...the way I was operating. It bothered some of my caucus people because I wasn't going out and doing the kind of hard hustle and pushing to raise money.

Now, at the same time, they couldn't find anybody to come close to me in terms of raising the same kind of money until [Senator] Rob Hurtt came along, in which Rob gave his own money.

SENEY: That's right. He's personally very wealthy, isn't he?

MADDY: He gave five million or so of his own money.

I got a kick out of [Senator] Cathie Wright. She said, "Rob, I don't know what kind of a business you're in, but this is not the same as where you invest five thousand and you get it back sometime." She said, "You

just gave us five thousand and you'll never get it back."

SENEY: You know, you said you were sure they targeted you. Who do you think targeted you and why?

MADDY: I don't know. When I say I think they targeted me, I think that the FBI -- I have such distrust for them -- I think they came in there with the idea that they were going to bust Sacramento and that they were looking for ways to do it, and depending on what targets you wanted to set forth, I think they wanted to make it bipartisan targets. I think they wanted to make it a situation in which they could walk away with a notch in their belt, although they did get some people who were taking money. There's no doubt about that.

SENEY: That was sort of inadvertent almost.

MADDY: Inadvertent, right. And I really think that the Frank Hill/Pat Nolan deal -- not just sticking up for the Republicans -- they were doing things that were wrong but there was no personal gain in it.

But the whole place had gone in a way that was headed in the wrong direction. There was no doubt. And I wasn't a player, but I think they wanted somebody of some substance on both sides of the aisle to get. So I just happen to think they tried to get me involved in it if they could. I only say that because when you listen to Shahabian, who was the wired man and the guy who was taking instructions from the FBI, he kept--

SENEY: Well, he was the first one to take a bribe and they turned him.

MADDY: That's right.

SENEY: He was Carpenter's assistant.

MADDY: Right. He was Paul Carpenter's assistant.

SENEY: And Carpenter was the caucus chairman of the Democrats.

MADDY: Paul was the one who was pushing the envelope pretty good.

SENEY: You know, I've also heard it said, and maybe this is true or not, that if you're a lobbyist and you come in to see me, and I'm a legislator, I might hold up a certain number of fingers as to how much I wanted.

Did you ever hear that?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: That's just talk?

MADDY: All talk. The young people that are there now, and a lot of the people that are doing the things right now are doing it through staffers who, unfortunately, I don't think have a real sense of how they're putting themselves in jeopardy, how they're putting their boss in jeopardy. I think there ought to be seminars by the members of the Legislature, with staff and other people, to say what's verboten. I mean, how do you approach money raising, what is indictable, and how easy it is to indict somebody, and what the average citizen in the Grand Jury thinks. That if you begin with the premise that most of those people believe you're a crook to begin with, anything that remotely connects you, you'd better be very careful.

You don't raise as much money. There's no doubt you do not raise

as much money if you merely send out normal invitations and attend normal events. But it's sure as hell better than being in jail.

And for these young staffers, the Karen Watsons who get all wrapped up in their responsibility as to how much money they're going to raise for their boss and so on, say outlandish things. You can't represent that "the caucus will vote your way on this one." You hear all kinds of things that are being said by people.

It's a very dangerous area, and grabbing right now, I would think next January that the FBI could go over there, or somebody go over there, and just say, "Look, we're going to find out just how this whole system works, and we're going to take everybody to the nth degree. We're going to go after everybody we can go after, and we're going to do it with wires, and we're going to do it with any number of other things," and I wouldn't even venture a guess as to how many people you could get. I mean, how many people you could get indicted by the Grand Jury.

SENEY: Rightly or wrongly.

MADDY: Rightly or wrongly. And they'll be close calls, but I would guess overwhelmingly you would indict just God knows how many.

SENEY: That must have been a very difficult time for you.

MADDY: Oh, a horrible time. It was a horrible time. It got to be very horrible when I figured out how close I was, when I started seeing the transcripts and getting copies of things that were being said. I was very lucky. And, as I

said, knock on wood [Senator Maddy knocks on his desk], you get a little lucky once in a while.

SENEY: And the fact that they didn't send you a check.

MADDY: And let me say I took money from everybody. I mean, I never turned down money. I was never moralistic about who I took money from or I didn't turn it down. If you wanted to send me a check, I cashed it. And I didn't really care. It was not my responsibility, in my mind, as to whether or not I was pro-gun or you were anti-gun. If you wanted to send money for me as leader of the Republican Caucus, I took the money. I felt that was my responsibility to my caucus.

I also felt that I was not going to be put in a trap to where I ever felt that I made decisions based on the money. Now, not to say that I never did and not to say that subconsciously I wasn't moved by one way or another, but by and large, that was never a principle that I ever had on my list. I had too many things to do. I didn't know who gave me money at the end. I was collecting thousands and thousands every year. I had my friends and I had my not such good friends. And I knew who supported me and who didn't support me. Every once in a while labor would give me a couple thousand I never heard of. I mean, I got money from everybody. So it wasn't a big moralistic stance on my part. It was what I thought was commonsense and just how you ought to operate and how I should stay out of jail.

SENEY: Why do you think Garibaldi warned you?

MADDY: Oh, we were very close friends.

SENEY: And you were Leader at this time.

MADDY: I was caucus chair at that time. That was before I became Leader. Because I made the decision after I became Leader. That was either '79-83 when I was caucus -- see, I was caucus chairman in '79.

SENEY: Because Abscam doesn't really start until much later.

MADDY: Much later.

SENEY: Did you give me that file? Or do you have it available?

MADDY: Which one's that?

SENEY: The one on all this stuff.

MADDY: Abscam?

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: I don't know if I have that on the clip file. I'll have to take a look and see if I've got that on Abscam.

SENEY: Because I'd love to read it and talk to you in more detail about it.

MADDY: Let me see if I do have that Abscam file.

SENEY: Because I think this is a really important chapter of the recent legislative history.

MADDY: Jo-Ann may have that at her house still.

SENEY: Okay. You've said a bunch here, but if I could look it over and ask you more detailed questions, that would be--

MADDY: Yes. I think she probably has it.

SENEY: Okay.

But earlier Garibaldi had warned you this had become a problem, in his view.

MADDY: Yes, that was in '79-83, when I was still caucus chair. We had been friends for most of my career up here, and close personal friends.

SENEY: I'm not suggesting that he warned you because you were going to be doing this.

MADDY: No.

SENEY: That's not what I'm trying to say.

MADDY: As I recall this conversation and the story, and I repeated that story so many times, that a great number of people were warned. Either I warned them through conveying Garibaldi's message or Garibaldi, who didn't say things more than once generally when he told a story and wouldn't repeat things. But he certainly let me repeat it many times. He loved the institution also, but he also was concerned about the activities. And he didn't like being gouged. He didn't like getting nailed.

SENEY: Would you have said to him, "Judge, do you mind if I repeat this?"

MADDY: I didn't ever bother asking him.

SENEY: You wouldn't have had to ask something like that.

MADDY: He wouldn't have said it to me if he didn't think I was going to repeat it. He heard me repeat it a hundred times. I repeated it often. I mean, we'd

be at Fat's and we'd be sitting around the table and we'd get on this conversation, and I'd say, "Goddammit, Garibaldi said it, has it changed Judge?" and he'd kind of look, throw his eyes up in the air, meaning it hasn't changed yet.

I have been a crier of this for quite some time. It doesn't seem to do any good. When I was Leader I would tell members. There are a lot of good members, like [Senator] Tim Leslie. Tim Leslie raised a whole lot of money. and Tim Leslie is about as moralistic and is about as straightforward, and I'm sure he sees himself as honest as anybody in the place, but Tim raised as much money as anybody by making hard-core phone calls. Now, I'm sure that Tim would say he never connected votes up, but he did not mind making a personal phone call, saying "I really need the money. I have to have the money. This is a tough race for me and I really need it. and I've been a friend of yours." You know, whatever you say in terms of the pitch. But he had no problem doing it. And there are lots of others.

Most members call because you get a better response: "I'm calling you. You're here asking for a vote everyday and I'm calling."

I felt, number one, I had lots of things going my way. One, I had the money; number two, I had the stature; number three, I had the leadership; number four, I had the friends; number five, I didn't need to do it; number six, I hated doing it. So I had everything. This was really to suit Ken

Maddy. This was pure Ken Maddy just doing what he wanted to do.

SENEY: Well, most people say they hate it.

MADDY: I hated it, sure. It's demeaning.

SENEY: Begging is never easy.

MADDY: Begging is demeaning.

SENEY: Something you do on your knees.

MADDY: That's right.

SENEY: Just one more point because I want to ask you about some earlier things. There were a lot of rumors or thoughts that they were after Willie Brown maybe.

MADDY: Oh, everybody said that.

SENEY: Do you think that's true?

MADDY: I think if they could have found Willie, they would have found Willie, sure. But I think they've been after Willie for years.

SENEY: I do too. He's either the world's most honest man or very clever.

MADDY: He's probably a bit of both, I would think. Willie has also been in the same position: He didn't have to do it. I mean, Willie's like I was. He was in better shape because he was a true leader with lots of power, and you don't really need to go much beyond where you're at.

And that sort of raises the question with John Burton now and a lot of the other Democrats: How much do you need and how far do you have to go before you've got enough? And there's one of the problems that all

the leaders have principally is what do we do? Do we just keep raising? How much do we spend and how do we keep raising, and how much will these guys take? How much can we beat them up? And how much money will they continue to give to us if we just keep asking? And I think there's some line that mentally you should draw.

[Interruption]

SENEY: I want to ask you about the reapportionment in 1980 where you did well, because even though they give you a little bit of grief, I suppose that's de rigueur, isn't it--

MADDY: Absolutely.

SENEY: --to hand you a little bit of grief?

MADDY: Give me a safe seat and plenty of grief, right.

SENEY: Right. You'll take the grief.

MADDY: This was a great battle.

SENEY: We'll get to that in a minute, or maybe later.

But how did the Republicans, how did you and the Senate caucus approach that 1980 reapportionment? I mean, you didn't have any cards really, did you?

MADDY: We had no cards and we really had nothing much to push on other than threats of initiatives and referendums and so on, which was not a very strong threat because no one had been successful, particularly on an initiative side. The average citizen doesn't care about reapportionment.

It's always been Russo's and my view, and we try to tell these guys right now in the year 2000 reapportionment, don't worry about an initiative. You're not going to get an initiative through. Wait for the Democrats to be greedy and begin to screw you, so that when you put the maps up, this is not a speculation as to what may come, this is what it is. You have taken poor little Ventura County and have absolutely killed it, and you've done this and you've done that. Then where we've had referendums in the past, where the people have said "This is terrible," they voted against them and forced it back in the courts.

The Democrats also don't want to be too rich. There's a point where you don't want to make every seat so critical that you've got every Democrat worried but you've got a lot of Democrats. You'd rather have a good cadre of safe Democrats who are going to be safe for the entire period of time, and also be able to isolate enough Republicans that you're going to have people out there who are going to be relatively safe but enough to where you can give them a little trouble; you can keep them under control.

So it's a delicate side from the winning side too. It's what these guys are going to face right now. Internal problems, number one: How do you satisfy all the folks with ethnic problems, this, that, and another thing? How do you take care of the old timers? Unless you get Congress, unless we're going to take and sacrifice, as the Democrats say, "Don't worry

about [so-and-so], we can dump him to Congress, we'll find a race for him there," and then it gets down to the point to just how much do we want? How many seats do we need before it gets dangerous? And they have to think about all those things.

And then, whether you like it or not, it's friendships and it's leaderships and so on. What can I do? What's your life going to be like? I'd rather have these guys at least thinking about what's going on.

And then there's no doubt, I'd be stupid to deny it, there are people no one likes. There are people that both sides don't like. You get the leadership sitting down at a table and there are some people in both caucuses that, given a little list, you'd just as soon see someplace else.

Well, when all that happens, then obviously the dynamics work. There's not always an agreement, but you can certainly find out that if somebody is nothing but trouble and nothing but a pain in the neck, and they may beat you, but you're not going to give them anything. And it all works subtly and it's all part of the reapportionment.

The one thing we did have, that I've had almost all the way through, and Bill Campbell certainly had it in the '80s with David Roberti and I had it in the '90s with David Roberti. Obviously, before that I wasn't involved so I didn't have much to say. But in the two reapportionments that were of some significance, Roberti and I made a deal. We had a deal in the 1990s. Of course, Governor Wilson vetoed it anyway. It wouldn't have

made much difference.

SENEY: Well, that was a unanimous vote on the Senate side in the '90 reapportionment.

MADDY: Whether it would have been a different picture today, I don't think not much different. We were pretty close to what the court decided was reality. The difference between choosing what you want versus the luck of the draw is a big difference.

SENEY: You know, it's no secret either that someone like yourself -- and I'm thinking, too, there would be others, that if I were more knowledgeable I would mention -- that yourself and Senator Beverly were two Republicans that the Democrats didn't have much trouble getting along with and who regarded as moderate and responsible members.

Senator Beverly has indicated to me that while they kept shifting his district south, they didn't really hurt him very badly.

MADDY: Senator Bob Beverly is so well liked by everybody. If there was a way to save Bob, they were going to save him, because he was one of the better liked. There was a reality that the people who lived around Bob were no longer Republicans, and so it was getting more and more difficult. He was getting older and it was more difficult for him to continue to win. Those things you couldn't change. But you're right, Bob Beverly was a Republican who everybody liked, and I was sort of in that category. There was a few of us who did enjoy the friendships of almost everyone.

Now, when term limits gets into effect, that obviously changes. As I said, my own personal, would I like to stay around another four, just to spend four with John Burton as leader, one way or the other, fun or not fun, or fight? Sure, I would love to do that, just because we know each other well. We don't agree on a lot of things but we also can make deals and we'd get things done. That was much of the job.

SENEY: Shall we go?

MADDY: Yes, I think we should.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Session 11, October 25, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: Again, Senator, I was asking if maybe you could talk about the Reagan administration in general and some of the personalities that are associated with it.

MADDY: The four years I was here with Reagan was the time in which I was a freshman -- so-called freshman; my first two terms. In relationship to the Governor's office, I was hardly seen or known, I'm sure, and there was not a great deal of contact. In fact, some of the early people were there. George Steffes had already left. There was a legislative aide -- I can't remember his name now; in fact, that's troubling I can't remember his name -- but he was the one we dealt with more often than not.

SENEY: George Steffes is a prominent lobbyist and has been for some time.

MADDY: Prominent lobbyist now, and he began with the Reagan group early on. But by 1970, when I came on, I think he had already left, or was in the process of leaving. The key was, I wasn't dealing with anybody. I was too new, and too young, and too much of a freshman to ever have much contact with the administration, even though I was a Republican. There was efforts at times for the people downstairs [in the Governors' office] to come up and give me an excuse for not having to vote for

something, that nature, but to give me some encouragement. But by and large, I knew very few, if anybody, downstairs and had very little or no dealings with anybody downstairs.

SENEY: When you say from "downstairs," of course, you mean the Governor's office in the Capitol.

MADDY: The Governor's office, right.

SENEY: And when they would come up and say, "We don't need you on this one," or "You can go the other way on this one," that was a recognition of your district.

MADDY: My district being a tough, tough district and barely enough percentage votes to win. You know, the marble was, I was the next target and so on. Other than that, there was very little contact with the people.

All of the Reagan people -- the Meeses and those, all of them -- I got to know much later when he became the President and got to know some of them.

SENEY: From the perspective of all of your years in the Legislature, going through, I guess, what? Reagan, Jerry Brown, Deukmejian, and Wilson, how do you look back on those Reagan years now from that vantage point?

MADDY: In looking at it, you make comparisons, because the Reagan people were a more business-oriented, businesslike group, and Jerry Brown, of course, was a total aside. And then, of course, you had the other two former legislators.

And for those of us who had been legislators, we always thought the legislators would understand us better, which may or may not have been the case. I mean, with Deukmejian and Wilson, you probably question whether or not they really understood us more.

SENEY: Well, that was the hope at the time.

MADDY: Sure.

SENEY: That when Deukmejian replaced Jerry Brown, that, thank God, we've finally got a guy here who…

MADDY: Who understands what we're doing because he's a former legislator.

SENEY: But right out of the box that didn't happen.

MADDY: No. Deukmejian had not been certainly one of the guys who hung out at Frank Fats, or anything like that, and he was very serious.

So some of the things that people thought, there would be a great deal more camaraderie and more coming together and sitting around, for Republicans to sit around and figure out strategy, I mean, we quickly found out -- and Wilson was more prone to sit around and talk shop and so on -- but Governor Deukmejian was very, very straightforward and had his work schedule and was not one to sit around and necessarily just talk for the sake of talking.

SENEY: Well, right out of the box with Deukmejian there was a freeze on hiring that he put in. I mean, within hours of his administration. Because he inherited a big budget deficit from Jerry Brown.

MADDY: Right. And I can't remember how the freeze hit us. In fact, I have very little memory of that.

SENEY: Well, you and Campbell were very angry.

MADDY: I don't remember anything.

SENEY: Don't you?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: There was a fair amount of press coverage.

MADDY: About him cutting back a little bit?

SENEY: Well, the feeling that was projected in this was it was more the fact he never let you guys know. That somehow he took more care with the people in the Assembly, the Republicans in the Assembly, who weren't nearly as good as friends as you had been. You had come out and supported him, after all.

MADDY: We can go back to sort of the start. We're kind of covering it.

Reagan was organized; you know, every fifteen minutes. Jerry Brown came in loose; everything was open. The best time to catch him was late at night, midnight. And then we went back to a Deukmejian situation in which everything was organized again, it was a kind of 9 to 5 job, and things were structured.

In terms of a relationship, you're right; the relationship with each of these governors was a little bit different for myself and for Bill Campbell and others.

With Deukmejian -- and I think I sort of outlined the background -- Deukmejian, I jumped on his team at a point when there was very, very few, if anybody, supporting Deukmejian. Mike Curb was the heir-apparent, and we discussed that, how the powers that be wanted Mike Curb. So Deukmejian was out there with little or no support.

SENEY: And I take it, maybe some of your motive might have been an annoyance with the powers that be.

MADDY: Oh yes. It wasn't all honorable in the sense that I thought Deukmejian was going to be that much better a governor. I mean, I didn't have much use for Mike Curb, and that was a motivating factor.

The one thing you never questioned was Deukmejian's honesty, and his integrity, and his straightforwardness and hardworking and all the rest of it. What you questioned was whether or not you agreed with him philosophically on some things.

He's certainly friendly. I'm not saying he's not friendly, but he was not necessarily our friend. I mean, he was not a person that made a lot of friends with a lot of legislators.

So that very first press conference in which myself and Campbell, and I [was] sort of the organizer, it was the first break in which Mike Curb began to find that he didn't have everybody on his team.

So I think that we went in expecting a great deal more in terms of -- again, our expectations for what a Republican governor would finally

do, how we would be able to cooperate, and how we would be able to have something to say -- I mean, this whole thing is power, and the whole thing is being let in. What you want is to be in and to have something to say of what's going on and the strategy and so on. And we found out that we were not getting too much of a say.

SENEY: You're kind of smiling when you that.

MADDY: No, I was thinking about the characters who were involved, because, see, Sal Russo, who had been involved in my campaign, and Doug Watts, were literally given the credit for winning the Deukmejian campaign. They were supposed to be extremely close to me also. So not only do I have this making the first right move, but I also have one of the key guys on the inside; a couple of key guys on the inside. So I was really supposed to be in, and plus the fact that we were in leadership. I think that what it did was just kind of build up the disappointment more in the sense that we, at one point or another,

felt -- given all our worth in the sense of talking to us about what's going on.

SENEY: Well, this instance -- I mention the disappointment but you don't remember much--

MADDY: Right. I don't remember much, no.

SENEY: This had to do with that kind of sense of reputation, that you didn't really disagree with what he'd done, but it caught you and Campbell flatfooted.

He hadn't been kind enough to let you know.

MADDY: We could have covered, as you say. Even if you're let in at the very last minute you can always cover, pretend.

SENEY: Yes. "We've been in touch with the Governor's office," that kind of thing. And were you trying to let him know by being so annoyed?

MADDY: We must have. I'm trying to think of the article or what was going on, but there must have been something. When we made a noise like that, it's very calculated. There's no way we're going to issue a press statement or make a statement that would insult the Governor without a great deal of calculation. That would not be an offhand deal. That would not be one of these things that we got up and just say casually, "The Governor messed with us today." That had to be planned. And Bill Campbell is one of the greatest in the world for doing these kinds of things. He loves this stuff.

SENEY: And you would expect that the press would understand that this was calculated and planned.

MADDY: Well, I'm sure that some of them probably did that printed it.

SENEY: Yes. Let me see if I can find that here. If I have the right file.

There were a number of articles. But there was a fair amount of blustering. I don't want to say blustering, because that won't give the right tone to it. There was a fair amount of talk about that, and it looks like I remember, simply from being here in Sacramento at the time, the sense, again, that Deukmejian was going to be closer to you all, you hoped

and thought, and wasn't.

Let me give you a perspective that I've been given by some of Deukmejian's people on this, and that is, that under Jerry Brown, Deukmejian's feeling was that Brown had let some of the powers of the Governor go, when it came to budget writing, when it came to the creation of certain boards on which he allowed the Legislature to make appointments, which apparently had not been done before, to that extent, and that Deukmejian's view was he was now going to reassert the Governor's powers.

MADDY: The one incident in which that played a role, as small as these things get, this was something that pops back in my mind, that we felt we were going to have more to say.

The fair board, on these little towns and these little counties, is meaningless except to the people who live in those little counties, and then it's a big deal. So there was somebody on the Fresno Fair Board, I forget who it was. I think she's a woman who had been a Democrat, who had been appointed to the Fair Board, who had sued me because of my residence at one point in time. And I said, when her appointment was up, "Kick her off. Here's a friend of mine, here's somebody that would really be a help. Put them on."

Now, in my mind that was so simple and so easy, and it became a long battle. What was told to me basically was the same thing you're

saying, is that the Governor is going to make these choices, even for the fair boards. He's going to, again, reassert their power: We're going to make the decisions on the fair boards and these things. These are not going to be just handed away.

See, Reagan had a policy in which Reagan said, unless something really was important, the fair boards within Fresno were the purview of the Republican legislators in Fresno. Mel Lee Wilson was a guy he knew that was Mr. Republican, so Melvin Lee Wilson obviously, and his daughter Shirley Brinker, who ultimately became my chairman, but they would be on the fair board. But other than that, Ronald Reagan didn't care.

Then Jerry Brown came in and Jerry Brown just -- I'm not sure what his style was. He just appointed people. They were, I think, again, more appointed like the Reagan people did: It's a small deal, it doesn't make much difference, we don't care about it.

And then Deukmejian came in with that new edict. He let me get away with one, I recall. The first one I just got really hot then, because by that time I was getting a little bit more assertive in the sense that I've been there, pal. And of course, with Russo and Watts, I could go down and just cuss and scream and tell them: "Goddammit, it's time you pay some attention to us."

SENEY: And that message would get through to Deukmejian.

MADDY: Well, I'm not sure if it got through to him. It got through to Merksamer [Deukmejian's chief-of-staff] and got through to people that made some sense.

And we had another incident early on, which I can tell you about, that also kind of, I guess, tainted the water a little bit. But the long and short of it was that I got that one appointment, as I recall, and they kicked that woman off.

And so then the process was going to be that they would appoint them all. Well, it never happened because they saw almost immediately that one of the most useless things in the world is to sit down and worry about the fair board appointments.

SENEY: To you it would be important as a legislator.

MADDY: It would be important to me, right. It was important to give us the appointments but not certainly important for the Governor to make that a big plum, although he could have played it as a plum. My theory was that you should have somebody who's involved in fair boards but relate to the legislators and see if you can't make it a worthwhile appointment.

I wasn't totally against the Governor being involved in it, but at the same time I always liked the fact that Reagan, that was kind of a nice move on his part; plus I was interested in the fairs, only because of horseracing.

The other incident, which was kind of a crucial issue, we got down

to on the first appointments under Deukmejian, who was going to be the Department of Food and Ag. Well, even though I had not been on the Food and Ag committees and so on, I had been involved in all these things that were going on in the ag community. So it was kind of critical to get a person for the director of Food and Ag[riculture]. And I came up with Clare Berryhill, a former State Senator, and recommended it, and suggested it, and thought that with all of the clout that I had that that would be one of the easiest ones.

And again, it's all image, and it's all your own perceptions and what you believe other people are thinking. But it would seem to me, that because I recommended that, it would be a slam dunk and it would go through in a hurry. Well, during the entire process, it was one of the longest, slowest appointments made. It just drug out forever.

And what I learned later on was that there were some people, one or two key people -- two key people -- in Fresno, or in the Central Valley, of Armenian descent, who hadn't signed off on Berryhill, and who, further than that, felt that he had personal problems and that he may be a detriment to Deukmejian.

What I guess angered me more than anything else, I never learned who those two people were until almost the end of this whole charade, until we went all through this thing. It was getting strained. I was getting angry. I mean, I was getting to the point where the Governor was going to

have a lot less cooperation from me, because, as I say, I was getting more assertive, I was getting a little bit more powerful. Obviously, I wasn't going to dump on the Governor or anything like that, but I was getting more angry, and I was making life more miserable for Russo, Watts, and Merksamer, and so on. And they never told me. And they are two guys [who objected to Berryhill's appointment] who were both people I had known.

SENEY: Well, they'd have to be, I would think.

MADDY: Right. But neither one of them had ever, in my mind, had ever contributed, been a factor in, or in any way had helped me, and so it wasn't even logical for me to call them. What I had done, I had slighted them: I hadn't called them. So then the big ultimate blow-up was, when I went down, I said, you know, I'm not beyond kissing somebody's ass. If you need to have me make a phone call to get this thing taken care of, then all you have to do is tell me who I have to make the phone call to. And, of course, as soon as I did, then they signed off.

But, I mean, it was a little power move on their part and a little power move -- not a power move on my part. I was just trying to get the Department of Food and Ag, because I didn't really care that much, except that I had Clare, who had retired by that time and had moved down to Mexico and was kinda getting out of politics. He had been so strong with me on Prop. 14 back in the old days, a hawk, and I said we ought to get

back in and get the team working again and kind of hawk again a little bit on farm labor. I just thought he deserved it.

There were a few little slip-ups in the Deukmejian administration, whether it was Merksamer, who was his chief-of-staff who operated that way, and Merksamer operated very close to the vest, and all the chiefs-of-staff are, of course, different in this process with governors, but he operated very close to the vest. Merksamer always wanted to make sure that whatever he did or whatever you asked him for, it was a chit. I mean, there was nothing ever free. So I began to keep chits too. I began to rag him pretty good about chits and who owed who what.

So a little bit of this ongoing fight for the last sixteen years, with me almost always in a leadership position. There wasn't any doubt in almost all the sixteen years of the two Republican governors I was in a leadership position. So it wasn't that they could just kiss me off easily. They had to have a little finesse with it if they're going to kiss me off and keep me out of a discussion.

SENEY: Let me ask you about the Berryhill thing, because I understand he was a very able person.

MADDY: Yes. Clare was good, he worked hard, but he did like his wine, and that got in his way a couple of places.

SENEY: And that was known; that was not a secret.

MADDY: Not a secret.

SENEY: And I take it, when you then pressed the Deukmejian administration to appoint him -- how did that work? Did you get a hold of Merksamer? Did you get a hold of Deukmejian?

MADDY: In those days I barely called Merksamer. When Russo and Watts were there, when Russo particularly was down there, Russo is who I contacted more than anybody else, because Merksamer was not a friend and wasn't anybody I had associated with before, and he went into the chief-of-staff's job. I knew him. In the '76 delegation I was a whip and he was a young alternate delegate or something of that nature, so I'd been around him. And he was building up his base here in town. But it was mostly Russo that I contacted. Later on Russo left, and then, of course, it was with Steve [Merksamer].

SENEY: People would know that you had put Berryhill's name forward.

MADDY: They did in this case, right, which was one of the problems for me. My whole point was, if he was disqualified, let me know early.

SENEY: Right. And so the longer it would take, the more--

MADDY: Aggravated I became and the more embarrassing it became for Deukmejian.

SENEY: Yes, right.

MADDY: That's what it was, it was an embarrassment for Clare. I wasn't worried about the Governor. It was an embarrassment for Clare, and it just kept dragging on.

SENEY: And what about for you?

MADDY: Well, I mean, it was all just ego, it wasn't really embarrassment. It didn't make any big thing.

SENEY: Sure, it's not unimportant.

MADDY: Not unimportant but it wasn't monumental, because by that time I was in pretty good shape in terms of on the power line, the power curve.

[Interruption]

MADDY: We were talking about the embarrassment and so on. It was nothing, but it did drag out way, way, way beyond the point where it should have, as I recall now, and it was one of the later appointments, and it should have been one of the first.

Again, my style was always to ask for very little but really insist upon what I asked for. I always wanted them to owe me a little. My theory was I don't need much, but when there's something important I'll ask you for it. And I rarely asked. I didn't ask very often.

SENEY: So in keeping track of the chits, you always thought you had more than they did in this relationship.

MADDY: By far.

SENEY: And Berryhill would not have had any problem before the Senate Rules Committee, I would think.

MADDY: No, no, absolutely not.

It boiled down to a couple of guys, local guys, that were important to

the Governor, but the rest of us really didn't think they were heavy hitters in Fresno. They were ag guys, but neither one of them were -- and when I say "heavy hitters," they were known but all they had to do was--

SENEY: These were not the first guys you were going to call.

MADDY: They wouldn't have been the tenth guy I would have called in terms of organizing.

But, you see, there's a slightly different twist there because George Deukmejian had run way back in '70. He had been through Fresno. Marv Baxter, you know, Justice Marv Baxter, a great number of people that George Deukmejian ultimately had and carried with him through an entire career and received major appointments were Armenian people, mostly Armenian people, when I say from Fresno, who had befriended him early on when nobody else would.

There was a fair board appointment and it was a bartender, a guy I knew real well, but a bartender from the Iran restaurant in Fresno, and none of us could figure out why -- I can't think of his name right off the bat, but a good guy, a great guy, used to call me all the time -- I could not figure out why in the world the Governor would come up with -- now, this was an insistence. I mean, he was going to be on the board. That was clear the Governor made this appointment.

In the old days, I guess it was in the '70 campaign, when Duke ran for Attorney General, I guess, and finished dead last, he would come to

town and the Iran restaurant was right there in the corner, he stayed near there, and this guy was a good guy and he befriended him, and this guy always liked the fairs. George would do that sort of thing.

One time I had an appointment on the -- because we had a big beauty salon, my former wife and I -- the Cosmetic Board, and lo and behold, who would interfere with one of my appointments on the Cosmetic Board? I went down and he said, "Oh, this one's taken." Well, it was the Governor's barber. He was Deukmejian's barber. Which is what it should be. I'm perfectly content with that. I think that's fine. You ought to get people out of the rank and file and so on. But it was one of those things that you really had to pull teeth to get him to admit what was going on.

All he ever had to do with me, and that's what I kept trying to hammer on to Merksamer, I said, "Quit the bullshit. You don't need to give me a song and dance if this is your brother Steve. Do it, I don't care, just let me know. Don't shine me on," as they say. Don't let me fool around with it.

So with the Deukmejian people, and a lot had to do with the Merksamer personality and my personality, and the fact that, by that time, in the last sixteen years, I didn't wait to be asked to come downstairs or anything like that. I never asked to knock or wait for the secretary to let me through the door. I mean, they let me through. And I went back and would walk into the chief-of-staff ['s office]. I was never impolite or

never broke in. But my feeling was, that with all the little staffers and those people, I had been there longer than they had, notwithstanding the fact that they were working for the Governor and they were chief-of-staff, and I didn't come down there for the fun of it. I came down there for business, and so I felt that if they're sitting in their office I'd knock on the door and walk in and we could start doing some business. I didn't have to make an appointment. And that's sort of the way I conducted myself, which I'm certain made some people a little nervous or probably they felt it was out of place.

SENEY: Would Merksamer be one of those?

MADDY: You know, I think he got used to it. I don't think he liked it necessarily initially, because when I did it then it starts a precedent, and then the Assembly people would decide they might have the same authority and so on. And not everybody did it. I mean, it varies with members. A great number of members do it anyway. It's just a matter of practice.

You know, with the new administration, my understanding of Gray Davis, there's no walk-in through the doors.

[Interruption]

SENEY: With Gray Davis there's no just walking through the doors?

MADDY: No, my understanding is it's a very secure place. You don't walk through the secretary's office and walk right back to the Governor's spot. That's all now secure. Which was not the case with Jerry Brown, not the case

with the other two governors, the Republican governors. It's changed a little bit. Which is probably, I would guess, from the way Gray Davis operates, it's probably for the best.

SENEY: You know, there were a couple of things with Deukmejian that apparently angered him. One was the business with the Governor's Mansion that had been built. This is the one that Mrs. Reagan had wanted and it had been built. Jerry Brown didn't live in it, but Deukmejian wanted to live in it, and apparently the Democrats put the kibosh on it.

Do you recall that conflict?

MADDY: Very, very little of it. I remember the incident and discussions of it, because most of us wanted there to be a mansion. I've always been on the side of building a mansion downtown. I didn't support the idea of building one out in the boondocks, and of course, the Reagan mansion that was built looked like a big Motel 6 or something of that nature. It was not the best in the world.

SENEY: I've heard it compared to a Safeway store.

MADDY: It was terrible. But for whatever reason, I do remember that Deukmejian thought it was appropriate. He thought it was a house that he could live in and so on. And of course, you go back again, Governor Deukmejian had no money and was not one who lived well. I mean, he always commuted back and forth, and I think to have his wife up here and to be a Governor of the people, I think he probably felt that he had to live up here. So he

was fortunate in that his backers came in and bought him a house downtown and did those kinds of things which allowed him to live a fairly reasonable life.

It's ludicrous that a Governor of a state this large has no mansion, or home, or whatever, an entertainment facility . There ought to be a home and an entertainment facility for the Governor of a state this size. And I think Deukmejian saw the governorship as that being a part of it.

But at the same time, he didn't go out and vigorously fight to try to make that happen, as I recall. He just kind of let it roll, and his key people came in and bought the house and that was just as well.

SENEY: The other thing was the appointment of Michael Francetti as Finance director, and that the Senate Rules Committee refused to act on within the required year, and the appointment died.

MADDY: And, you know, I can't remember why. I can't remember why they got mad at Mike.

SENEY: It had to do with the Curb-Dymally campaign of 1978. Francetti had been chief-of-staff to Deukmejian in the Attorney General's office and had allegedly provided Curb with discrediting information about Dymally, which turned out to be false, to wit, that he was about to be indicted.

MADDY: I do remember something like that, right. And they just took it out on him. Refused his confirmation.

We're still going through it a little bit. I mean, if there's a smoking

gun in any way, I think that the Democrats were looking for both Wilson and Deukmejian people to turn down. Whether we're doing the same thing with the Gray Davis people, I would assume that's probably true.

My theory's always been the confirmation ought to be just automatic, appoint whoever you want to appoint, but I do remember the Francetti thing because many people liked Mike. He was an able person. The idea was that Deukmejian ought to have whatever he wanted there.

SENEY: Do you recall any pressure from Deukmejian's people to push this at all?

MADDY: None. In terms of pressure from the Deukmejian people on anything, you got very little. As leader, we received very little pressure to try to force an issue on behalf of the Governor.

SENEY: Let me turn this over, Senator.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

SENEY: Deukmejian had been Minority Leader, hadn't he?

MADDY: The whole idea of minority leadership and leadership posts in the Senate are fairly recent.

Early on, when I first got there, I think we had Republican leaders, but nobody paid much attention to it. I mean, there was the Pro Tem, and it was sort of an ad hoc situation, which Jim Mills was there, and his style of leadership was a do nothing, say nothing, and not bother anybody, and that's what the Senate wanted, because they operated in that fashion.

So being a Republican leader in the Senate didn't mean a whole lot. For one thing, it wasn't very partisan. It was only when Doolittle got involved and knocked off Al Rodda, and then Roberti ran on the platform that "we have to be partisan and we have to go after the Republicans and we can't let them have carte blanche to do whatever they want, and the Senate's going to become more like the Assembly." And things began to change a little bit.

And then, of course, when you do that, then leadership begins to evolve and you start getting people who are the hard-liners. You know, you want to lead the caucus to do this or raise money for that, and so on and so forth. But early on, in the early '70s, there was very little battle going on in terms of who the leaders were because the Senate was just going to get along with each other. The reapportionment in the 1970s was an agreed-upon deal. In fact, the Senate, in the '80s and the '90s, we tried to put together a deal. We could always generally put together an arrangement on reapportionment within the Senate without having a partisan battle. So things were a little bit different in terms of the dynamic. Now, that's changed a lot because it's become much more partisan, and much more cutthroat, and more money being spent and so on.

SENEY: My understanding was in the '70s that Mills sort of took the high road, in a way, and that if anybody played this role for the Democrats, it would be

the Majority Leader -- George Moscone until he was elected mayor in 1977 and left the Senate.

MADDY: Zenovich was up there as Majority Leader at one point in time, and a few of them. They did not raise a lot of money against each other. As I recall, that was not one of their major functions.

As I say, I think the turning point on this battle of partisanship in the Senate all goes back to the Doolittle/Al Rodda situation in which Rodda, I think, was defeated and still had a couple hundred thousand in his bank, and the reason there was because everybody loved Al Rodda. Nobody would go after him. And here this young conservative went out quietly behind the back with Bill Richardson. Now, Richardson, there was no camaraderie situation with Richardson because he did go after people. But he made it known. He was not hypocritical about it. I think that's when the changes began to occur.

SENEY: The Rodda defeat was a big shock, wasn't it?

MADDY: Yes. On both sides. Nobody thought anybody could beat Al.

SENEY: And yet, in retrospect, when people looked at the campaign, there was some feeling that, well, Rodda had not been out in the district much, sent his chief-of-staff to meetings.

MADDY: Al Rodda was one of the better, more intellectual, hard-working Senators who dealt with substantive issues and had really kind of grown past the point of being a politician in the sense he wasn't out shaking hands and

going to Kiwanis Club to speak. You know, he was beyond that point. The reality is, what told everybody, is that nobody loves you that much. You're never that far ahead, and so you end up getting caught, and that's what happened to him.

SENEY: Well, the reception to Doolittle was kind of hostile on the part of the Democrats, wasn't it?

MADDY: Very hostile because of that.

SENEY: And they wrote his district out, if I recall correctly.

MADDY: In the next reappo? He was certainly one of the targets, and I can't remember if they actually wrote him out, because whatever we did in that reapportionment, you know, we were trying initially to make a deal, and of course, when Democrats took over they did whatever they wanted to.

SENEY: Well, he ended up beating Ray Johnson to keep himself in a Senate seat, who ran as an Independent.

MADDY: Once he lost the primary.

SENEY: Right. And he lost that primary to Doolittle.

MADDY: Yes. In the UC Davis area. Ray was a very old friend of mine and couldn't believe that they would move him around like that and put him in the same seat and so on. If their intent was to get Doolittle, they got Johnson and not Doolittle.

SENEY: And Johnson was liked, was he not?

MADDY: Very well liked Very well liked by both sides. But he was also one who

everybody expected to retire and he had not retired. Everybody said, "Ray, you should quit. It's past the point." And he was getting older and a little bit senile, but he didn't quit.

SENEY: He was very bitter about that loss.

MADDY: Very bitter. Very bitter. For a long time.

SENEY: On the Brown administration, Gray Davis was chief-of-staff, and then B.T. Collins was, and I think maybe there was one other, but of no importance.

MADDY: Well, there was Duvagee [Jacques Barzaghi], or whatever his name. What's his name? The artist that was around, the bald-headed guy? Whatever his guru was, he was around a lot that sort of handled no substantive issues or anything. Nobody knew quite what he was doing, but he was out there.

But it was B.T. Collins and Gray Davis. Gray Davis being the studious guy and B.T. Collins the one who dealt with a lot of legislators and dealt with a lot of the issues.

SENEY: Did you deal with Davis much?

MADDY: Very seldom. Knew him and dealt with him a small amount of the time but very little time.

SENEY: What was your impression of him as chief-of-staff?

MADDY: At that time he was young, and I didn't have any insight about whether or not he was a task master or anything like that. I knew that he was very

studious and very directed in a situation in which you had a governor who was just off the wall. I mean, Jerry would show up when he wanted to show up, and appointments and time didn't mean much. If you were sitting there, you got a half an hour, and if he got interested, you might be there for three hours.

For members it was interesting because you could go down and sometimes start chewing the fat, and you could stay there a long time, learn a lot, and maybe get your way. You might get a point made, which was good from the standpoint for those of us who lived up here but didn't have families up here. It was, you know, part of a night life. You'd go to Fats and you could see him and so on.

And Davis was more definitely in the background and one who just took care of business. You know, as in the old song, "Just take care of business," he took care of business. And B.T., of course, was the wild man in the sense that he was flamboyant and said things that were sometimes very embarrassing to Jerry, I'm sure.

SENEY: He could get away with them.

MADDY: Oh, get away with them. I don't know how he got away with them. But he was at David's Brass Rail, the bars. He went to all the bars that we used to go to. Since I was one who was here all the time was out at night a good part of the time, I would see B.T. quite a bit.

SENEY: Anything else you want to say about him?

MADDY: You know, early on he was drinking too much and did a lot of things he probably shouldn't have done, but he was an interesting guy. I never admired the way he treated his boss, because I wouldn't have taken it if I had been Jerry Brown. That was not an admirable trait. From a Republican point of view and watching him say the things he did about Jerry Brown and embarrass the Governor, of course, we got a great kick out of that.

But I didn't admire B.T. for that necessarily. I got to know B.T. as a person. Of course, he was a wonderful guy personally and had a great deal of feeling about things, so you liked him certainly. But in terms of the way he dealt with his boss, I didn't like him very well.

SENEY: What about later when he became a Republican member of the Assembly?

MADDY: He became very, very close to a lot of us, in the sense that he was certainly one of the Republican crew and did what he could to help the cause. And being a celebrity like he was, because he got more and more of a celebrity status, it was good to have him on board. It was good to have somebody like that on the team.

He had some areas of interest, a few areas of interest, but at this point in time I couldn't tell you what they were because I never dealt with him very often. By that time, he was in the Assembly and I was in the Senate. It was a cooperative situation, and we did a few things together. I can't remember what they were now, if they were legislative things, but in

a personal way we got together quite a bit.

SENEY: I wanted to ask you about Rose Bird, too, who was appointed in March of '77 and under the Constitution had to be on the 1978 General Election ballot for confirmation to the balance of Donald Wright's term, which turned out to be until '86. So that was, what? eight years, the balance.

Did you play any role in the attempt to defeat her in that '78 election?

MADDY: No. No direct role. No personal role.

It got to the point where the legacy of George Deukmejian, as we saw it, was going to be strictly on the judicial branch of government. Number one, that's what he wanted to do. And the circumstances in terms of changing the court and perhaps what ultimately happened, the referendum and all of that, it was phenomenal. There was a huge, huge change in government in California, which people probably still don't realize the impact of it.

So Deukmejian, who really didn't have a whole lot going for him and would not have had much of a record in eight years, really ended up with this legacy, vis-à-vis the court system, with Rose Bird and with how far you can go with making wild appointments.

It may have been more of a comment on Jerry Brown -- I mean, how far can you go in making wild appointments? -- than it was a comment on George Deukmejian, who merely got in and decided to make the changes

and really worked to try to change the judicial branch and used it.

Jerry Brown set the stage. I don't know who gets the credit or what's most important. But there's no doubt that if you look at Deukmejian and say, "Well, what did he do?" almost anybody from a Republican point of view looks at and says it had to be the judicial branch that he changed.

And she was a person that was easy enough to get along with when she was in the administration.

SENEY: Did you deal with her much when she was Food and Agriculture secretary?

MADDY: Hardly at all. She just was on the list. Nobody in agriculture could stand her. I mean, it was one of Jerry Brown's primo appointments, to take somebody who you know everybody's going to absolutely dislike, everybody's going to want to see replaced, everybody's going to want to find a way to get rid of them and appoint them. That's what he did, which was kind of a crazy thing, but that was sort of the way he did it.

And then, of course, some of the Democrats made it just as bad because they criticized her. And there were some Democrats at that time who were as critical of Jerry Brown's administration as we were, if not more so, and they carried more weight than we did.

You know, the "giant turkey," one of them was called. [Assemblyman] Walter [M.] Ingalls, an Assemblyman, labeled [CalTrans

Director Adriana] Gianturco the "giant turkey." I didn't find any respect for the guys who did that. We laughed about it and enjoyed it because it was against the Dems, but it was not something you would praise as being the right way to handle things.

SENEY: I think the feeling that was conveyed was that Brown and these appointments had gone outside of what was perhaps a generally accepted circle of people. Democrats could appoint whom they liked, and Republicans whom they liked, but these would need to be people who were experienced and known quantities in agriculture, or transportation, or any of these other areas, and he'd really gone out beyond that.

MADDY: You got the impression that he went out to try to find somebody who was against whatever the norm was. I mean, get somebody involved in water who did not believe -- I mean, the biggest issue with water was you owned the water. There's three or four issues you could talk about with farmers, and if the water is under your ground you own it. Find somebody who doesn't believe you own it.

Now, he may have been right that water should be a finite resource and that it should be owned by the state. That's a position you could probably take. But at that time and place in the history of California, it has never been viewed that way.

And the same is true, here we have this massive transportation problem in California and he picks somebody who's going to reduce the

size of the highways, get rid of the freeways, and narrow it down and have three-lane rows which were called "death traps."

He did these things that were so opposed to the norm that it was almost as if he wanted a fight and thought from the fight would come some benefit. I think he probably was partially correct. I mean, he might have been partially correct, but what a toll, what a price, the people had to pay, for their ideas.

Secondly, I'm not sure that he did anything but just help the opposition. I think in retrospect, you go back to Jerry's eight years, all he did was help us swing back to a more conservative trend and just what we feared: If you get enough crazies in there, they're going to do something really crazy.

SENEY: Both in the Legislature and in the executive branch.

MADDY: And the executive branch, right.

SENEY: When Rose Bird was defeated in '86, did you play any role in that campaign?

MADDY: No. None. In '86 I was still caucus chairman. I was careful about money and stuff I did. I stuck with the caucus and didn't try to delve outside the area of my responsibilities. I wasn't giving money away for causes and things that I didn't think were directly related to my caucus.

Now, I was in all the meetings, on the Central Committee meetings, and so on, as they sort of mapped out strategies; but understand, during the

Deukmejian period, Merksamer kind of took over the State Central Committee, and most of the action that went on was directed through Merksamer and his people. They understood that part of the game. Not that the Central Committee means anything, frankly, then or now. So it was a matter of not being directly involved. Campbell and I kept our legislative activities within the legislative arena.

SENEY: You know, the general view is that it was the death penalty cases that did Rose Bird in. That Proposition 15 had been passed in the 1978 election and it was defective, it changed procedures, and the Supreme Court began voiding death penalty cases.

MADDY: No, no. I don't know if that's true. When you think back about it, it was such a cumulative thing. There was just so much stacked on top, what perfect way could the people get back at this whacko then and do what they did and just throw these folks out.

They talked about all these issues: which one was the key, or how many people really think the death penalty is that important? Enough do, because it raised the thought processes and the consciousness level.

But it was a rare situation, I think, where you ever get that kind of situation where the people would vote overwhelmingly and get rid of that many justices. I mean it was a huge.

SENEY: Three were taken care of: [Associate Justice] Joseph [R.] Grodin, [Associate Justice] Cruz Reynoso, and the Chief Justice Bird. I bring this

up because I've been given to understand that one of the issues that motivated the Republicans particularly against Rose Bird was the reapportionment decisions that she had made and her court had made.

MADDY: I don't recall anybody really thinking that that was -- I mean, reappointment is such that we know if there is a way for the Democrats to ruin the Republicans, or vice versa, within reapportionment, we're going to do it. I mean, there's no doubt about that. The key is whether or not you can make it work.

What happens is, you generally cannot make it work so you try to find a compromise. Again, taking your best hold, if you can. You know, you operate on a reapportionment plan and you've got old Joe Blow up here who's unbeatable. Two days before the plan goes into effect, Joe Blow dies or something, and suddenly there goes your best laid plans.

But by and large, the reapportionment is a situation in which legislators know that ten years worth of decisions are going to be made in one day. This is a ten-year decision. The people never understand it, but that is what sets the direction for the state the next decade. That's how important it is. The rest of it is really a minor part of what's going to happen in a ten-year period. So you stress that, and you try to go after it.

I think we were terribly disappointed, going back to Ronald Reagan, giving it over to [the courts]. I mean, we felt that he never understood it. How could you turn it over to a chief justice who ends up appointing a

liberal academician out of UC Berkeley who was a Democrat, to turn over our life to him? So it was clear they didn't understand it.

You never know for sure what a court's going to do. There are some judges you know what they're going do. They're very partisan judges.

There's certain federal cases right now and every case goes to one federal judge here in town.

SENEY: [U.S. District Court] Judge [Lawrence K.] Karlton?

MADDY: Right. Larry Karlton. He gets ever single, solitary decision.

SENEY: A Carter appointee.

MADDY: And it's very hard for any of us on the Republican side not to say that he's not a judge, he's a hired gun for the Demos, and I'm sure he takes umbrage at that, but pretty hard not to see his decisions and think that he's a partisan player.

SENEY: Regarded as a liberal, certainly.

MADDY: Yes. And beyond that, one willing to fudge to make it work. Our thought is, he'll cheat to make it work. It's kind of a terrible thing to say, but if you ask most Republicans, we think he'll do whatever the Democratic lawyers want.

SENEY: And these would be cases that would come up under the federal Voting Rights Act, having to do with reapportionment and redistricting.

MADDY: Reapportionment and redistricting; who's eligible for this or that. All the major cases we've had. Now, I've given Larry Karlton money because

I've been on the side of the bipartisan, when we tried to do some things in a bipartisan way to make things work.

SENEY: What do you mean you've given him money?

MADDY: Not him money, but help finance the campaigns in which cases were taken before him. You know, with the Democratic lawyers. That's what I meant. I've helped join the Democrats in financing campaigns and the lawyers' fees for cases.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: So I didn't give him money, but we ended up giving money to a case before him. That's what I'm saying.

SENEY: Well, there would be times that you and the Democrats would agree. The term limits challenge would be one, would it not?

MADDY: I did that. The ethics in government which we did, which was the pay raise. We did that. We did a whole series of things.

SENEY: What about the one when the wide open primary was put in? That was challenged by the parties.

MADDY: Right. I think Roberti and I both -- I think both sides kicked in.

I kicked in on almost all of those in terms of giving money, as long as the Democrats did too.

SENEY: Because there would be times when the Democrats and the Republicans would see the issue in the same way.

MADDY: Incumbents.

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: We were incumbents. There was no doubt about it. I took the incumbent point of view.

SENEY: And again, this would be things like term limits and ethics in government, that kind of thing.

MADDY: Pensions. You know, retirements, and all those things that were for the group as a whole. That was one of the things that we tried to cooperate on and tried to stay together on and at the same time be nonpartisan in those areas where it benefited all of us.

SENEY: Let me go back to Rose Bird for a minute, because if you remember this, as I know you do, the 1980 redistricting, that we talked about last time, that you were treated well. You were given a big district.

MADDY: Right. The Democrats did it.

SENEY: Yes, right. The Democrats controlled both houses and the governorship. And then along comes Deukmejian, who doesn't like this plan, but in the interim Bird has upheld it. It has been challenged and Bird has upheld it. The feds have upheld it. The state and federal redistricting has been upheld. And [Assemblyman] Don Sebastiani, who was a member of the Assembly, from the wine making family, tried to put an initiative on the ballot that would have redrawn the districts. And do you recall that Rose Bird and the Supreme Court ordered that that could not be on the ballot because the Constitution said that the Legislature shall be redistricted once

in every ten years, and the Democrats argued to her and the court that it had been done and could not be done again?

MADDY: I remember Sebastiani and I remember the decision, but I don't have much memory of it. I don't think we participated in it to speak of. In fact, I know I didn't participate in one way or the other. I'm not even sure the parties supported it. I'm not even sure the State Republican Party got behind it.

SENEY: Well, they didn't like Sebastiani.

MADDY: Yes, because he was a loose cannon and did what he wanted to do, when he wanted to do it, which is always difficult to get much support.

I know what the analogy is to Bill Thomas now with this initiative, except that he has the support of the Congress but not the support of the Legislature, which is somewhat similar in that he's going to try to change reapportionment this year with an initiative.[1]

SENEY: That also has to do with salaries, does it not?

MADDY: Correct. The hook is to cut our salaries so that people who vote for cutting salaries at the same time get a reapportionment. Which is somewhat, what we call, "C.S.er."

SENEY: That's how you make it saleable, I'm sure, for Mr. Thomas.

MADDY: I don't think that an initiative will sell. I don't think you can go out to the

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[1] This initiative, Proposition 24, was removed from the ballot March 7, 2000, by the California State Supreme Court on the grounds that it included more than one subject.

people and say, "The Democrats are going to cheat the Republicans, so therefore protect the Republicans: give it to a nonpartisan commission." Well, the people, I don't believe, believe that there's a nonpartisan commission out there that work. You say "retired judges?" We put that on the ballot[1] one time, and they just killed us with retired judges.

SENEY: Willie Brown just--

MADDY: Murdered it.

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: Find another group, commissioners, whatever you want. Try to find the right people and turn over reapportionment. Well, number one, people do not understand reapportionment. People don't understand the whole fight. People don't necessarily want to turn things over to anybody.

The bottom line is that it's all speculative. Nobody knows for sure what's going to happen. So I've always thought, and we fought for this but unsuccessfully, that we should wait and see whether or not we get screwed. See whether or not the Democrats do manipulate the districts in such a way. And then go back to it with a referendum and say, "Here are the maps. Here's what they're doing to your district. Here's what they're doing." At least you have a case to make that this is how bad things were, or how bad things are, and clearly outline the fact that what they've done

[1] Proposition 39, November 6, 1984.

is taken a state that has equal representation in terms of registration, and we have equal representation, more or less. The public is supportive of both Republicans and Democrats, and what the Democrats have done is, by these crooked means, or whatever you want to use, terms, have cheated you from your vote. Well, a sense of fairness is out there with both Democrats and Republicans. So at least you'd have a fighting chance.

At least my view is. I don't think you're going to win on speculation. You're going to win, if you're going to win it all, on trying to make your case that they did do something bad to you.

SENEY: Let me change the tape.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

SENEY: The reapportionment business in the Legislature, in the 1980s, drags on for a long time. You had the Sebastiani business, that you had that court ruling, and I think it was in that context of that court ruling that Willie Brown uttered those infamous words, "Rosie and the Supremes have saved us."

MADDY: Yes, right.

SENEY: Something like that.

MADDY: Something like that.

SENEY: And then you had the Deukmejian initiative which was put on the ballot, I think, in '84, that was defeated. I think that's the one we're referring to

here, where Willie Brown just beat that thing to pieces.

MADDY: Didn't we use two actors that just killed us? They used Jack Klugman, and they used a couple of guys that were comedians. There was one that they just killed the whole notion of judges being fair. Whatever it was.

SENEY: They were well presented. Devious, perhaps, but effective.

I've been given to understand from others that the whole matter of redistricting in the '80s, that it drug on so long that it became a very poisonous -- what do I want to say? -- not episode, but a factor in the relationships within the Legislature for that whole decade.

Would you view it that way?

SENEY: I'm not sure that had that great an impact. The reality with the reappo is that if you survive, who cares? If you don't, you're not around.

And the team thing is minimally there. I mean, reapportionment had become very, very local and very, very personal and parochial. I mean, it is you and has damn little to do with anything else. So when the folks come up and say, "Oh, the county of Ventura could never stand to see this district split in half," whoever may be saying that doesn't give, frankly, a rat's ass about Ventura. They're worried about them having their district split up.

And you find, at least my experience with reappo, and I've gone through three of them -- two of them which I was directly involved in the '80s and the '90s, it became very personal to them, not only their survival

but in some cases where they represented. And I shouldn't say that it isn't important for somebody from Ventura to represent Ventura, but bottom line, it was survival and how you were going to make it.

You'd go to somebody and say, "We want you to take five less percentage points than you have right now in order for us to have a chance to win [so-and-so]." Well, you could take the top fifteen legislators from either party and they'd say no.

The top fifteen. I don't care who they were, you'd say, "Look, you just got to sacrifice five percentage points; it won't make a difference. I know you represented this district, but you give us five percentage points and we can perhaps win a seat over here." I would guarantee that the overwhelming majority of both parties would say, "No, that's my seat. This is bologna. You're not going to cheat me out of that seat, you're not going to do this." So when it gets down to it, it gets very difficult to cut a deal because nobody wants to give up an inch of good territory. Give up all kinds of bad territory.

It also then, when I say that, it does make for some compromise, because if you're next to me and you're a Democrat and I'm a Republican, and I want to get rid of five points, or I want to make them, between the two of us we can manipulate. From a leader's point of view, it's not very good, because what the two of us are doing, notwithstanding our leaders, is making my district stronger and your district stronger, which isn't

necessarily what leaders want. Leaders want to make them more balanced because I might think I've got a chance as a leader to beat you.

The next door neighbour doesn't care. He'd just as soon have you stay there forever as long as he stays there forever.

The dynamic is really very personal. And I don't know what these new people are going to do because they haven't been there that long, but it doesn't take long to develop a real sense of what reapportionment's all about. It's probably one of the more interesting subjects around that isn't written about and isn't studied but should be, only because it is just interesting and the dynamic of how it works is exciting: the reality of people sitting down and knowing every block and knowing who lives in every block and all of that.

And then what's going to happen, particularly in the Demo ranks -- the Demo ranks are going to have the biggest problem -- is how do you balance the interests of these various groups and who really represents these groups? Let's start with demographic groups: blacks, browns, Asians, and so on. How are they going to split the districts? What do you do about a district? What do you do with the blacks who are a minority in terms of numbers, and because of changes economically are moving a few more into the middle class? Enough moving into the middle class that there are no, probably, large segments of blacks where you can clearly go in and draw a seat anymore. They're finding it more and more

difficult to find a black seat.

The Latinos and the Asians don't come forward and say, "Okay, we'll make a black seat here, a brown seat here," because that doesn't control anybody out in that district, you know. This may be a black seat, baby, but I'm running for it, and my name's Joe Hernandez. I'm going to run. I've got more folks out here than you do.

The Asians, of course, have not been a major factor, and I'm not sure they won't be partially Republican too.

SENEY: The strategy in the past would have been with those black voters and Latino voters, for the Democrats to put them in several districts to strengthen those districts. But under the Voting Rights Acts, now you have to make an effort, do you not to create minority districts?

MADDY: That's been thrown out, I think. See, that's what controlled us in the '90s.

Let's go way back when there was no blacks and browns up here and the Democrats, quote, "represented" all the minorities. They were all white folks that represented the minorities, because what the Democrats did was take the blacks and browns and spread them throughout all the seats. Made sure that you had a Democratic seat and they elected whoever you wanted.

That's been some of the big fights around here. In West Los Angeles, the [Henry] Waxman-[Howard] Berman issue was always who were they taking care of? They were filling in the seats with minorities

but electing West Los Angeles members to the Legislature, which got them a great deal of criticism. The same is true in all of the elections. If you use the minorities to fill in the areas, give you cinch votes but make sure that -- in those old days, the whites won it. Well, then the pressure got on and pretty soon you began to get more and more strength on the minority part, particularly the blacks, who came in and began to demand that they have seats.

This is all the decade of the '80s. In the '90s, when the Voting Rights Act came in, then we were mandated to create as many majority minority seats as possible. Majority minority meaning, if we could find a way to take an Assembly seat and have a majority of minority persons, then we were required to do that. So the whole restructuring of the west side of Fresno County was not to try to find out where Maddy had Republicans. It didn't make any difference where Maddy had Republicans. The question was, where could you draw a Senate seat down the valley that would end up with a majority of minorities? And you knew ethnically whether they were Latinos or whether they were blacks and so on. That was the seat you tried to create. So all of the zig-zag and all of the lines and the goofy thing of going in and getting Sanger and taking Sanger out, which is mostly all Latino, but make sure you don't go too far into Visalia, because it had too many whites in Visalia, and go back out, was all designed to create these majority minority seats.

That dictate, we followed in our model plan and the Supreme Court followed. That was pretty much of a toss-up for Republicans and Democrats. To get a majority minority was more than you needed.

You didn't have to fill it up that much. But see, under the law you did have to fill it up that much. You had to get a majority minority.

And so what you did is you forced seats to be drawn that were heavily non-minority and then heavily minority.

SENEY: How many Latinos did you figure you'd have to put in a district before that was a Latino district? What percentage?

MADDY: Under the Voting Rights Act, we were looking at a majority. The majority of registered voters. So we were playing it very close to the vest and saying, look, it has to be a majority of registered voters. You can't give us the idea that we're going to have just the majority of voters.

SENEY: It couldn't be just the number you'd counted.

MADDY: No.

SENEY: It had to be registered voters.

MADDY: Registered voters. Depending on the area, and depending on who the people were on the other side, on the Latino side, and what they were pressing for, was how they organized their demands.

The thought was that we would never have two seats down in the San Joaquin Valley running lengthwise; that we would cut across and pick up -- [Assemblyman Dan] McCorquodale was one. McCorquodale

wanted to be over there across the mountains and come back and forth from Modesto to the other side. You could draw seats that way instead of going right down the valley.

And there were a number of other places. We'd get down into Los Angeles, where we were just talking about blocks, there was all kinds of configurations where you could pick up various seats or try to skew the process a little bit.

At the same time, everybody had the same data and everybody basically knew how the seats would be created, or they would come close to seeing how they were created. And then occasionally personalities would get involved, depending on who's there, who's living there, and how should we move this around to help the incumbent who's sitting there? Or, in some cases like [Senator Lawrence E.] Walsh, how do you want to get rid of a guy? Can you just dump this guy? More often they dumped people that were tough. In other words, make it very difficult for somebody to move to a district.

I moved three times. I was very fortunate I was able to move and keep winning. And not too many people have moved through the years. Not too many people have actually packed up and changed their address to move.

SENEY: And if you do it right, they can't move, it won't do them any good.

MADDY: If you know far enough in advance, you can move, and they can't stop you

from running. See, that's all my case proved, that you can run. The reality is, you don't always win. Once you win, the rule is the court can't throw you out in advance. What happens is the house votes on whether or not you should be thrown out, and the house has traditionally taken the stance that if you win, you win.

So we could have possibly kicked out -- I think [Senator] Alan Robbins was one of the first. Howard Berman. Myself, obviously, they could have kicked out because it was clear I didn't live in my places. I mean, if you want to go out and prove the fact, does he live there, the answer is no. But once you won in that district, the rule of the house was you won; therefore, you're going to be accepted.

SENEY: There was a question about Robbins, wasn't there?

MADDY: He's the one that started it all, because this goes way back. I think he was one of the first people that moved and just created a district. I mean, he moved into a district when reapportionment got tough and then said, yes, I don't live here, you're right. He practically admitted it and said but what I've done is established a residence, and bingo, this is where I intend to live.

SENEY: And the two houses would be very loathe to overturn what the voters wanted in those circumstances.

MADDY: Correct. [Senator] Tom Hayden was, I think, a suspect at one point in time. So what I'm saying is when you take Alan Robbins and Tom

Hayden, who were two least popular people around, I think the precedent of the house, which says, "If you won you deserve to be here and will stay," I mean, there would be some nasty future fights if we began to tear that apart.

SENEY: Right. That just makes sense, doesn't it?

MADDY: Oh yes. Everything could be challenged at one point in time. You almost have to challenge. If you think there's voter fraud and there's somebody cheating, you have to catch him on election night. I mean, you really have to.

When [Senator] Henry Mello won, the first time in Santa Cruz, I mean, they found all kinds of voter fraud later on. But unless you catch it that night, unless you catch it when the votes are being cast, it's very hard to throw someone out for cheating.

SENEY: You know, if we could go back for a minute to the Voting Rights Act in these majority minority districts. I've heard Democrats criticize the Republicans for taking such a paternal interest in the majority minority districts, because, of course, doing that worked to the advantage of the Republicans. And you had organizations like the Rose Institute down at Claremont-McKenna College.

MADDY: The two guys at Rose Institute have been, since 1970, our principle reapportionment persons. When Jerry Lewis hid out in the little motel down there when I first met him way back when, he was working with the

guys from Rose Institute with some makeshift little machine that he could move his arm around and draw districts and so on.

SENEY: They have been viewed as the Republican consultants and they have been. And they went out and helped to organize Latino groups to press for greater representation.

Did you get involved in the '90s.

MADDY: No, not at all. In the '90s, I had an office across the Capitol, and I had two key staff people and a couple other folks who were more technicians, and Roberti had his office somewhere not too far away. Tim Hodson, who's now at Sacramento State -- in fact, he called me not too long ago; we're going to have lunch -- he had his office. We were drawing lines and trying to see what we could come up with.

SENEY: Well, your offices were sort of close, were they not?

MADDY: Not too far away, right. It might have been the same building, as I think of it now. And we were drawing lines. You know, we're sitting there trying to figure out -- number one, you gave some respect to people. I tried to bring the congressional people in. And Pete Bontadelli and one other fellow were the ones who kept trying to put the mechanics together and draw us a deal we could make.

The hard part on my side was to satisfy my hawks. The hawks were the people who had an absolute cinch seat themselves, no way you could touch them, and they wanted to fight because they know they couldn't be

handled. Those were the hawks.

SENEY: How do you mean?

MADDY: Well, they're the ones who never wanted to compromise: Let's fight to the end, Maddy; you can't give away a thing. We'll fight to the end and so on. That's because they were protected.

My point was, the people who wanted to fight were always the ones who had already won. The ones who were on the border, the ones that I had made a deal for, or I tried to find a way that conceivably could win us a seat, at the same time save somebody, they were the ones who were sitting there suffering, trying to figure out why somebody down in Orange County wouldn't give two census tracks up so that we could filter down another percentage point of Republicans someplace. What do you mean 62 percent's not enough for you? How much do you want?

SENEY: Sixty-two percent is an absolute slam dunk Republican district, isn't it?

MADDY: Oh yes. In the old days we used to figure 41. It's much closer now because Democrats vote just as often as Republicans do.

SENEY: Generally speaking, you'd have to make a district more Democratic to make sure it was a Democratic district than you would Republican.

MADDY: We used to figure if you had a 43 percent Republican seat, Assembly or Senate, you had a fighting chance at 43 percent.

SENEY: But if you had a 43 percent Democratic district, you wouldn't win.

MADDY: Not enough. You have to be close to 48.

SENEY: You know, the Election and Reapportionment committees are not important committees except--

MADDY: One day. A couple of days, yes.

SENEY: Yes. So very frequently you'll see that after the reapportionment is done that they'll be given over to people who don't really count. And as they're gearing up for reapportionment discussions--

MADDY: New committee chairman.

SENEY: Yes, absolutely. And new minority members as well.

MADDY: It has to be, generally speaking, totally trusted by the leadership. I mean, totally trusted by the leadership, the reapportionment.

SENEY: Didn't you put Bob Beverly on the Elections and Reapportionment Committee at that critical point?

MADDY: We had Bob as chair, right, at one point in time. We did it ourselves though.

When I was leader in the '90s, I did it. I was involved. My theory was I tried to bring as many people as I could into it and tried to handle situations, the tough ones: Doolittle down in Orange County, never quite satisfied with how good the seat got.

SENEY: You don't mean Doolittle.

MADDY: No, not Doolittle. I'm talking about John Lewis. John always had places he wanted -- Orange County is a mix of things. It's all parochial. It has to do with what blocks you're in.

Generally speaking, what I did with Orange County guys is cut out the parameters and say, this is ours, this is where we're at; you guys can do whatever you want with this territory. You know, cut it up whatever way you want, it's all right. And the Dems would generally say that's all right too. Although not always, because there was a concern and there was a thought, and principally it's paying off. Obviously, Roberti saw it coming, and we did too, is that Tustin and parts of Orange County are becoming very Democrat.

SENEY: It's becoming more competitive in Orange County, isn't it?

MADDY: Very competitive, right, because of more minorities moving there. And Tustin, that's almost all Latino now.

And we had this unbelievable thing in the '90s where Bob Dornan, B-1 Bob Dornan, was starting to -- all that stuff kind of mucked up Orange County, so it's no longer a simple situation where you just take Orange County and tell the Republicans to go cut it up. Demos are very much active and very much a player down there. They only beat [Senator] Rob Hurtt, for goddsakes.

SENEY: They beat Rob Hurtt.

MADDY: Yes. He was our minority leader then.

SENEY: Well, the Dornan thing you're referring to is Congressman Dornan, who was defeated in '96.

MADDY: Four years ago.

SENEY: Yes, in '96, by a Latino woman [Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez] in a district that had been somewhat altered but not altered a great deal.

MADDY: On the surface should not have been lost. Was going to be lost eventually, probably was going to be lost by Republicans eventually, but it took Bob to lose this one, and the agitation. She's a Latina, a former Republican, moderate, has all the right credentials.

SENEY: Right. Campaigns well.

MADDY: Sure. That's what Republicans are facing. We're running into Democrats who are lawyers, who are former prosecutors, who are, for whatever reason in their life philosophically, they go to the left. Or they run as Democrats. Whether they're at the left or not, I don't know; where they really stand politically. And so it's much more difficult to take out someone who has that background, simply on the idea that you've got to vote Republican because this is the good deal you get; you get this conservative voice. Well, sometimes you take an idiot, which Bob Dornan could be on more than one occasion, and run him against an articulate, attractive woman who has strong credentials and you're going to get beat on paper and anywhere else.

So our task as Republicans is much more difficult today, I think.

SENEY: Well, he was busy running for President too.

MADDY: Yes, whatever, at the moment. It was one of the jokes of the '90s, you know, the Republican suicide missions, when you talked about Dornan.

But as I say, the reapportionment is so intriguing, and it is an exercise in human nature. Nothing like sitting down with folks on reapportionment and discussing their wants and their likes, where they're at and what they're doing. I mean, it's a kick.

SENEY: How would you handle that as leader? I mean, clearly, there'd be people you'd want to protect.

MADDY: I tried to be as open as I could and to protect all of my incumbents. I made incumbents number one. And from that point on it was a matter of how much I could squeeze and move and manipulate the seats and try to take where there was surplus votes and move it into areas where I thought we could win.

I knew reapportionment pretty well because I had gone through so many battles myself and knew the dynamics of it and how a census track here or there would impact a district. The tough part is, of course, that no one, quote, "allegedly knows their district like the incumbent themselves." So even though you look on paper and you see all these things, somebody will come in and say, "I have to have this area." Well, sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. Sometimes what it means is Joe Blow, their biggest campaign contributor, lives in that area, or something of that nature.

SENEY: Ahh, rather than votes.

MADDY: Rather than votes. Yes, it just becomes something as simple as that. It could be even simpler than that. I mean, it could be just almost anything.

SENEY: You're thinking of something.

MADDY: No. I was trying to think of an example that would be more topical that would illustrate it, and I can't think of anything off the top of my head, because so many of these instances went by during the period of time we were doing reapportionment.

But it's intriguing, it really is. The idea is we used to always try to put up good government, the GGS stuff, the good government stuff, and say, "What should the law require?" There's compactness, community of interest. There's a whole list of things.

SENEY: Population can only deviate by a reasonable amount.

MADDY: Absolutely.

SENEY: Less than five percent. Probably less than three percent.

MADDY: Today we can get it down to a gnat's hair. There's no reason to have the deviation. You get down to a point where there is no requirement that a district must be diverse. There's no requirement for that. In fact, there's probably an argument against having diversity within a district. You want continuity of interests. You want people who've got the same interests. Because they're all living in the same area. You should stay within school districts.

I mean, there's all kinds of ways that, with the computer technology we have today, you could draw what would be called an ideal, I would think -- I'm not much of a computer person -- but I would wager you

could draw a district based on certain criteria -- a statewide reapportionment of California -- based on certain criteria that would truly reflect what we've all said were the most important things from a government point of view. And those are, as I say, interests, common interests, this, this, and another. But whether you could sell that or not would be almost a joke, because you'd have to get rid of all the personalities.

Theoretically, if we went to a supreme court and the court decided to do that, and they said, "We are not interested in who's who and all the rest of it. What we are interested in is having a legitimate reapportionment drawn on this basis, and hang incumbents and hang anything else but drawn up this way," even then, every time you crossed a county line, you'd have trouble. Every time you crossed a city line. Every time you put a city into two districts you'd have trouble. I mean, you would have trouble no matter what you did, but you could draw it, I think, and it would be called the best possible plan. Whether or not it would be accepted or not, I doubt it, just because there's too many personalities involved.

SENEY: In the '90 reapportionment, you had the Governor's veto to flourish around. Did you not?

MADDY: Right. Mm hmm.

SENEY: I mean, it was a lot easier to deal with Roberti on Senate matters or Willie

Brown on Assembly matters because you did have that veto to threaten them with.

MADDY: And they knew, but they also knew basically that I wanted a deal. They knew back in their caucus they wanted it. I mean, everybody wanted a deal. Certainty is almost everything because you might have to pat a couple of guys on the back and say, you know, we're going to try to get you to Congress, or you'll be the director of fairs and expositions, or we've got a job for you but you're gone because there's no way we can save you. That's a lot easier than going to the court and the courts coming up and saying it's "Katie bar the door," we've decided on this new set of criteria. Or go back to my hypothetical where they're going to really do it with the mind of just good government.

So it's Demos this time [for the 2000 reapportionment]. It'll be an in-house, very interesting exercise.

SENEY: What differences do you think it's going to make for the fact that I know if I'm an Assemblymember or you're a member of the Senate, we're not looking forward to a long career here, we've got maybe one more election in the district? Maybe none even for some.

MADDY: I hadn't really thought about that, but you're correct. In terms of a strong desire to vote, far less even -- because when I was doing it in the '70s, and '80s, and '90s, we were still thinking that was our future. We had to keep a seat that was good for the rest of our lives. So there's going to be a

whole group of people who don't care at all because they're gone. Now they'll be looking at the congressional seats and/or the Senate seats. If you're an Assemblyman who got termed out, you're going to be looking like crazy to see if I've got a seat someplace.

SENEY: Let me turn this.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[Begin Tape 2, Side B]

MADDY: They're going to be looking to the future. By Bill Thomas and both parties in the Congress going for a plan that hurts the Legislature, I would think they were going to have some serious question in their mind as to whether or not they should have bitten this little project off. Because if push comes to shove and you're sitting, trying to draw lines, and you've got the ability to screw a congressman and put in a state senator or a state assembly person to give him a chance to beat them -- and most of the Democrats will be in control -- the Democrats will, you know, "We're sorry, pals. You guys wanted to knock us out, didn't want to cooperate with us, we're not interested either. We know, sure, you've been a congressman for fifteen years, you've got seniority, but we don't know what to do with old Joe. So we're going to find Joe a seat. He's going to be in Congress. And you may be able to beat him because you're an incumbent, but you'd better work hard, pal, because we're going to make it so Joe is going to win this thing."

You can't literally do that, but you can come close.

SENEY: In the 1990 census, Milton Marks was the Democratic chairman of the Elections and Reapportionment Committee. Did you deal with him at all?

MADDY: He had nothing to say. Milt was chairman, but that was it.

SENEY: My understanding is, and I think you're confirming this, is that Roberti put him there simply as a figurehead, that Roberti was the one who really handled it.

MADDY: David and his staff were doing it, with me and my staff. We did not have a lot of input and so on from a whole group of people. We both operated a little bit the same way. David knew that the more people we brought into it, the more difficult it was to get the job done.

And so, in terms of getting to the point to where we satisfied people and could pick them off and say this is it, that's what we would try to do. And once we got them, once we said they're happy and they're satisfied, I'm not going to ask you to vote for something that screws three of your friends, but all things being equal, if this works and we can come together, would you go? Most people would say, "If it works for most people, it works for everybody," or we'd go to a vote. And I never pushed the vote. I always said we'll wait. I said, "I'm not going to mess with anybody if I can help it, and you're going to get to vote before we do it. And if in one case the majority don't want to hurt somebody, and the only way we can get the plan is to hurt somebody, we'll just say no. I'm prepared to go to

court. I'm prepared to do whatever you want to do."

SENEY: Marks' committee held hearings up and down the state on reapportionment.

MADDY: I never went to one of them. I think a few members went to some. It was mostly for local consumption to talk about something people wanted to talk about.

This is totally in-house. This is so in-house -- so in-house, and so behind closed doors, and so much under the table that this was all a façade.

Most everything was made public. Now, that's not to say the public was in any way cheated, but if you understood it, and you wanted to learn it, and you wanted to participate, you could learn as much as you wanted. If you wanted to figure out what Roberti and Maddy were thinking and/or get some hint where we were headed, then you were out of luck, because we weren't going to tell you. We didn't want to tell anybody. You never tipped your total hand ever, if you could help it, on reappo.

SENEY: It's a real poker game.

MADDY: Yes. It was a lot of poker, except that I think David and I operated in a way that was not too pokerish because more and more of it was being directed by mandate. You know, we could fudge a little bit with -- Hodson would say, "We can do a little bit here and do a little bit there; do what you want."

"But at some point, Tim, we're going to have to come back," and so on.

But by and large, it was more you take care of yours, see if you can satisfy your people. We've got the ones we know we have to deal with, which was the majority minority. We knew this, know that, and let's go see how far we can get. And the question is: What's a good split number? Is it 41/39? Whatever it is. How close can you get, and what are we entitled to on the minority side? The only thing for me is do I have a shot? I mean, is it a deadlock the next ten years, or do I have a shot?

SENEY: At being president pro tem.

MADDY: Yes, and that was one of the things that we tried to do, was to project out and say, are there changing areas demographically that perhaps in two years from now, or four years from now, that will be more Republican? For a long time it was easy to project ahead and say this is all going to be suburbia. So you kept the strength moving out towards suburbia, knowing that you would pick up votes ultimately.

If you tried to crank that in -- you know, how long could [Senator Newton R.] Newt Russell hang on, for instance, out in Arcadia, with this unbelievable change in dynamics there? How long would [Assemblyman] Joe Baca before he could win out in Riverside County being more and more Chicano? When was Orange County going to blow up? And then other things. Nobody for sure knew the impact of Southeast Asians and

what was going to happen in various districts.

But anyway, with any brains, you were long-term projecting out what year could I win this thing? And for Republicans always in the minority, is there a chance for us to win at some point in time here, or are we locked in forever? And they were trying to lock us in forever, for the ten years, and we were trying to find a way to -- knowing I had to give up at least one or two, I was going to be short one or two, I thought it was, you know, at 21/19--

SENEY: Is that how the plan -- the one that passed the Senate unanimously?

MADDY: Right, it was about 21/19. I had a shot at it because [Assemblywoman Rebecca Q.] Becky Morgan was in a -- if she stayed. That was a Demo seat, but a Becky Morgan type could win it. That'd give us 20/20, and that was fighting distance. But we had to win [Senator Patrick] Pat Johnston, and then in jumps the personalities. This was before term limits, so you're going to live with Pat Johnston forever. Pat Johnston couldn't get beat. I didn't think he could get beat. Not that he just was a good friend, but he was too tough a candidate to get beat; yet, he was, on paper, one of ours. That was our seat.

Well, that was devastating. How do you get around that? And the same is true with a couple of Demos. I'm trying to think of one offhand that I could compare the same way that was going to be ultimately ours, more because of the person than anybody else, but I can't think of it right

offhand now. You take a look at California's changes and Republicans are under the gun. It's a changing state, going the other way.

SENEY: With someone like Johnston, would you have tried there to work the congressional reapportionment so that he might find that attractive?

MADDY: The answer is yes. In broad cases, if there was even a hint that might be on the agenda, that you would try to find a way to do that without hurting [someone]. Again, the congressional guys were very jealous about what they could do, and for a while, in the '70s, '80s, and part of the '90s, the big threat was that they always put a bill in around reapportionment time to take away our per diem.

SENEY: That's right. You got tax-free per diem.

MADDY: Tax-free per diem. So they always took it away, or put a bill in to take it from us in order to try to blackmail us into doing what they wanted us to do. So that was always an aspect of the whole fight.

SENEY: Am I right in understanding that [now Congressman John] Doolittle was the sort of person, liaison person, between the Republican members of the House and the reapportionment in 1990?

MADDY: In 1990, Doolittle was appointed by the caucus in Congress, the Republican Caucus in Congress, to be the liaison with myself and our reapportionment. That's what I think I told you earlier on the tape was that Bill Thomas called me and indicated that he had been screwed, or he had been mistreated -- better word -- he and some other of the moderates

had been mistreated, that they were not going to be represented. The design was to try to manipulate seats away from moderates and put it in conservatives' hands and so on and so forth.

So then I stepped in and indicated that I don't know whether it's true or not but that Congress would have representation with me at anytime and that I would see Doolittle and I would see Thomas, and I would share the same information with both, and I would make some judgment. I said, "Trust me or not, I will make some judgment as to whether or not your plans are beneficial to everybody. We're going to approve them, we're going to draw them, and we'll listen as much as possible. But you have to understand that with me, with Maddy, it's going to be a situation in which I'm going to listen to both sides, if there are two sides."

So how that sold or what that said to anybody, I'm not sure, but it was said, and it was done. So Bill Thomas was out there as much as John Doolittle.

SENEY: Doolittle knows this stuff, doesn't he? He's good at reapportionment?

MADDY: He's good at reapportionment. Fairly good. Certainly up here in the north, because he fought some battles. He fought some battles on reapportionment.

SENEY: And was he easy to work with on these things?

MADDY: John has always been easy for me to work with from top to bottom, but as I say, I never know when I'm getting the full scoop from John on things

that delve on policy, because John is a very, very partisan conservative, and I know he looks at me as one who is a moderate, at best. He probably figures I'm a moderate, at best.

I don't think I've ever cheated him, but I've also told him that I am suspect a lot of times on things that come down the pike, that I believe that they get their philosophy involved too much in things it shouldn't be involved with. That we should be worried about collectively winning seats, and then if it turns out that we have conservative-moderate fights, then let's have the fights, but let's get the leadership first, which has always been what I've preached, to the extent that I think everybody appreciates it. I think they do. They don't always like it, but they know it's the right thing to do.

SENEY: Whereas, he would take a more ideological point of view.

MADDY: Yes, there's no doubt. I mean, there are a lot of bitter enemies back there in Congress within our own party. There's no doubt about that. I think there's some degree on the Demo side, the same thing, the far left and the so-called moderates and so on.

SENEY: You know, you can draw the congressional seats any way you like. They don't have to bear any relationship to the state legislative districts. But the State Assembly districts have to be nested within the Senate districts.

MADDY: That was the one decision that came out. That probably came out in the '80s' reappo, I think, and stuck with us. It makes sense in most cases. It's

one of those community of interest continuities.

SENEY: But is it something you tore your hair over, -- was it a problem?

MADDY: In our case, we just dealt with the Senate side and let the Assembly boys say, "You cut up the Senate seats any way you want, cut them in half any way you want, but we're not going to modify our Senate seats to any great degree."

SENEY: Ahh. So you delivered over the Senate seats and said have at it.

MADDY: Have at it. Now, that's not absolutely true, because as we went along, we tried to accommodate and make the seats if we could. The ideal situation would be to have the three and three; you know, to have all three seats: have the Senate and two Assembly seats and all be Republican. But I'm reminded that every time we did that, of course it made three seats someplace else all Democrats. So you keep going on that.

SENEY: Did you meet much with Wilson's people on this?

MADDY: Wilson never appeared to have any interest in it, as I recall. I'm trying to think if we ever sat down and talked reappo, and I don't think we ever did. I'm not sure whether I asked him to sign the bill or not.

SENEY: One of the myths maybe is that he was lured out of tha U.S. Senate seat in part because of reapportionment, redistricting. That here you knew that there was going to be a Democratic majority on both sides and you wanted this Republican hammer, this veto. Is this not true, you think?

MADDY: Yes, I don't know. I think all things considered, it was a crap shoot, and

when we got finished with the reappo drawings, we were behind in both houses, and he was Governor, so why should Pete Wilson sign a bill that made sure that we're behind in both houses? Why not just roll the dice and say maybe we've got a magic court -- you know, the dice will roll and the magic court will come up and give us a plan that suddenly, for whatever reason, fate ends up with us winning.

I'm not sure I could have done anything else. I'm not sure any Republican would have done anything else. Because we went in knowing these were not majority seats, these were not plans that gave Republicans a majority in both houses. And so why should a Republican governor sign something like that?

SENEY: I've also been given to understand that there was unanimous vote on the Senate side but not on the Assembly side, by any means.

MADDY: I can't remember.

SENEY: The Assembly Republicans were not so happy with what had happened over there. And that Willie Brown insisted that both of these Senate and Assembly redistricting bills be stuck together, and that there was some thought that if you had been able to split off the Senate one, maybe Wilson might have signed that.

Did you have any sense of that?

MADDY: My sense was what I said before. I don't think Pete would have signed a bill that would have guaranteed us a minority status, the more I think

about it. At the time we sort of played with the idea we could get it, but I really think from his point of view, and knowing that he was still running for President -- I mean, you've got to think about Pete Wilson was still running in those days -- that he was not going to do something that the first thing they would say, "Well, he signed the bill that guaranteed the Republicans be in the minority for another decade."

SENEY: That'd make him look bad in the primary.

MADDY: Oh sure, Republican primary. And there was just enough people that -- it's such an unknown factor anyway, that why not run against those rascals?

No, I just don't think he would have done it. And I think he thought that through. If he had asked me, if we had sat around and talked about it long enough, I probably would have said fine, I think you're probably right, Pete. I think he's probably right now. Just didn't make any sense to guarantee us ten years with that plan.

SENEY: Did you get a better plan out of the court, do you think?

MADDY: Almost the same. Because the Voting Rights Act almost guaranteed us the same.

SENEY: Because you had to do it along certain lines, didn't you?

MADDY: Absolutely. And the Voting Rights Act forced almost all of those minority seats. What it does, it's all ripple effect; it all just kind of comes together. I think we almost got basically the same plan. What killed us in

the '90s was the personalities and the people and who happened to be in one spot or another at the moment. We had a couple of deadlock losers who were going to lose someplace along the line. We had a couple, two or three losers, they had a couple of sure-shot winners. They had a couple of people we knew we couldn't beat, were good people, that came in and run.

SENEY: And you had a couple of losers?

MADDY: And we had a couple of losers.

SENEY: Who would you be thinking of in that regard?

MADDY: I'm trying to think who lost right after that. [Senator] Ollie Speraw lost, I think. A guy from Modesto lost, and then somebody else came back and won. I can't think of his name.

SENEY: Do you want to get some lunch?

MADDY: Sure, let's get some lunch.

[End Tape 2, Side B]

[Session 12, October 25, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: I think we said enough about reapportionment and redistricting. We may get back to some more as I look at your later papers, and I may have a question or two to ask. It's an important subject, and I don't know if you can say too much about it really.

MADDY: Number one, it's very intriguing; at the same time, it's all past. It's only interesting to understand a little bit about it for the future reapportionment, particularly the one here in 2000, where people are going to be able to create districts that, in this case, Democrats control both houses and the Governor's office, to see what they can do themselves.

The Republicans will be out of it unless something occurs, whereby the courts will step in, which I have no idea what it would be. I don't think the Democrats will allow the issue to go to court. I think they will settle it themselves, no matter how much pain it invokes.

SENEY: Are you likely to be called on by the Republican Senate leadership, do you think, in the 2000 reapportionment?

MADDY: I doubt it. I doubt it very much. There are a number of people who know that I did a great deal, but it becomes, as I said, very personal, very much an individual situation, in which those who are being involved, I don't

think they want any objective review. They don't want anybody in there telling them what to do. It'll be very much kept close.

SENEY: Right. I understand your point. I want to ask you about Mike Curb. You talked about him in terms of your bringing him into the political business and his relationship with the Southern California Kitchen Cabinet people and their plans and hopes for him. But I wonder if you'd comment a little bit about his tenure as Lieutenant Governor from '78 to '82.

MADDY: Actually, during that period of time, he was sort of the leading Republican, but we didn't see a lot of him. Not too many people saw much of Mike Curb, as I recall.

When you say that I helped him get involved, actually, he was a good friend of my law partner for a short period of time -- Don Jackson from Fresno -- and the firm was doing some work for Warner Records and for Curb Records. The way I got approached is that Don came to me, saying that Mike would like to be involved in the political arena, and would I appoint him to the State Central Committee.

At that time, Ken Reitz, who was a long-time associate of Mike's, who now is top man at Burson Marsteller, which is a public relations firm -- in fact, I almost went to work for them before I went to this job. But any event, Mike was going to be an angel in the sense that as we were planning my future, Mike was going to get involved in my campaigns and was going to be a financial angel because he had a lot of money and he

wanted to be involved.

Well, by the time we got to '76, where Bruce Nestande and I, I had mentioned earlier on, were involved with the Reagan delegation, Mike Curb had moved very, very quickly, and I'm not sure what the dynamics were, and I have no memory now how it all worked. But Mike was no longer my angel. I mean, Mike was now looking out for himself. He had decided that he was going to be good for elective politics. And so, as we went back to Kansas City, and I was a whip to the delegation, Mike was much more than the whip; he was one of the key players within the group and was, at that time, very tight with the Reagan people.

Again, part of what I've already said, but it was my assumption, my belief now, is that the Kitchen Cabinet decided that '78 was gone and we couldn't win '78, so they never got involved, to any great extent that I saw, in anybody's race. Pete Wilson started out as their choice, some of the Kitchen Cabinet. Evelle Younger was out there. Clearly, he looked like the person who would win the primary. I tried to entice them over, and some of them who liked me were moving in that direction but really never put any big dollars and/or much concern into the Governor's race. What they wanted to win was the Mike Curb Lieutenant Governor race, and that was going to be their next big Republican. That's my belief and based on all the things that occurred.

Needless to say, during that transition period we did not become the

best of friends because I had felt a little doublecrossed, plus just the lifestyle and everything that was going on in life didn't bring us any closer together.

SENEY: How do you mean?

MADDY: Based on what I said before, it very well could have been that Mike Curb and I would have become very close friends and hung out together because he was going to be part of my team, headed for movement in 1978 -- whatever I was going to do in the future. But by the time we got there, I was gone; I was no longer a factor. He was now Lieutenant Governor, and he was the major player. So there just was no association after that.

I had felt a little bit that the Kitchen Cabinet had let me lay out there -- not that they owed me anything -- and I had felt that he had not necessarily been totally honest with what his intentions were. That's a little unfair to him because, certainly coming in cold like that, finding out what money could do, finding out what he could [do], were all logical things that you could expect somebody to assess. And he loved politics too. He liked being involved.

So in thinking back to those, what? four years, I guess, I don't ever recall seeing him or being with him, if at all. There was no time in which we had much or any contact. He did swear me in when I was sworn in, but other than that, very, very little, if any, contact.

SENEY: Do you recall that when he defeated Dymally for Lieutenant Governor in 1978 -- Jerry Brown, of course, is re-elected Governor -- there's that period of time between the election and the inauguration, and apparently Brown left town, left Dymally in charge, and Dymally signs some Executive Orders which essentially stripped the Lieutenant Governor's office of any functions other than the constitutional one of presiding over the Senate? Do you recall that?

MADDY: I don't recall that. Kind of a Merv Dymally type of action, but I don't recall it.

SENEY: What about when Brown would leave the state?

MADDY: I do recall that Mike tried to pull a stunt or two.

SENEY: Right. That's what I'm getting at.

MADDY: And I think they ultimately came to some agreement -- you know, if I have to stay in town; whatever we're going to do, we're either going to cooperate or this is going to be a difficult four years.

SENEY: Well, he made judicial appointments.

MADDY: Yes, right.

SENEY: Which Brown then withdrew when he came back.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And the court ruled that Brown could withdraw them.

MADDY: I didn't recall specifically, but I knew he did take some steps that were unwarranted that hadn't been done before and made a little noise that way.

He had the boys behind him, the Kitchen Cabinet boys. They were moving for Governor for him.

[Interruption]

SENEY: I was asking about Mike Curb, and you said that really, in all that time, you didn't really have much contact with him.

MADDY: Little or none. I don't know if anybody did. I don't know of anyone who knew much about him, or chummed with him, or palled with him, or anything else. I have no memory of him being around, except at special events, and there were very few of those from our point of view.

He did not come in and become the new titular head of the party, as I recall. Not with me at least.

He was building all the time, obviously, because there was nothing like the '82 [Primary] when Deukmejian -- when the campaign started, he had almost everybody in the world signed up. That's one of the things that yours truly was kind of out there, being kind of nasty about the whole business and not having endorsed anyone and so on.

In fact, I advised him at one point in time, I think I advised him not to get everybody. You know, "Don't be so insistent upon getting everybody." Because there was a time on and off, because I think he was still a client -- I'm trying to get straight in my mind, and I can't quite get it straight, as to how and what manner I was dealing with the issue. Whether I was ignoring him -- and when I say "ignoring him," what I mean was

just not concerned about it -- or exactly what was happening. Because I know he was still close friends and still working with my law partner on a business point of view.

SENEY: One thing he did do was something that apparently was unprecedented and not looked upon with a great deal of favor. That is, he got involved in a leadership struggle over on the Assembly side between [Assemblywoman] Carol Hallett and [Assemblyman] Paul Priolo, which Hallett won.

Were you--

MADDY: I think my photos--

SENEY: Well, in looking at this article,[1] which I showed you last time but we didn't get to it--

MADDY: This is the Campbell-Maddy-Deukmejian versus the Richardson-Hallett-Mike Curb. I forget what we were fighting over at the time. It talks about leadership positions and--

SENEY: Well, part of it has to do with leadership, and you and Campbell backed someone for an Orange County seat -- [Gloria] Hamm -- and Richardson backed [Dan] O'Keefe, who ends up winning the seat.

MADDY: When I came to the Senate -- in 1979 I was elected -- I think it was 63 days later I became caucus chairman. And what happened was, when I first came in, Bill Campbell and Bill Richardson were fighting. Campbell

[1] California Journal, Vol. XI, No. 2, February 1981, pp. 40-43.

was minority leader and Richardson was caucus chairman. They couldn't get along, and so they both came to me and said, "I'd like you to be my caucus chairman." Campbell said, "I've got to get rid of Richardson. I can't continue to work with him." And Richardson came to me -- and he had helped me, now. We had gone on and off, hot and cold, Richardson and I. But there's no doubt that he had helped me win the Senate seat.

SENEY: He put money into your campaign.

MADDY: Put money into my campaign. He never ever put a lot of money in, but he did get the right wing to come onboard, and when push came to shove did help me. So we were not at odds, and I always got along with him. I get along with everybody, but the point is that I wasn't mad at him.

He had, of course, been a forward factor in the Ed Davis campaign when I was running for Governor and used every trick in the book. I mean, not every trick in the book. He used every tactic in the book to try to hurt me during the campaign. You know, all kinds of things that I was accused of and so on.

The fight then began over the same old thing: Who were we going to back for an open Senate seat? And I guess this goes over Dan O'Keefe, and the other candidate was Hamm, as you say, and I'm trying to think about him, but he got himself in trouble just about the time -- oh yes. Hamm was running against [Ron] Deardon, who was a very liberal guy. It was going to be our seat, we were going to win. We picked out the more

moderate candidate, he went with the conservative, and Hamm got in trouble. And I guess they speculated this thing all the way to the point where they're talking about Carol Hallett wanting to be Mike Curb's running mate in 1982.

I guess Curb finally said something here, which, obviously, we must have gone a little further in our dispute, because he said, "Curb will deny any direct involvement. He does say it's a very big mistake for Richardson to be dumped as caucus chairman in favor of Maddy. He's good at electing Republicans. The Campbell-Maddy insiders meanwhile make little secret over their dislike for Curb." I think somebody called him a "lightweight." Doesn't sound like my words but close.

SENEY: Yes, I think it was a staffer they attribute that to.

MADDY: I do remember this story, because we have one of these photos. I think we have this hanging up in one of the bars here in town [Brannan's], that drawing.

SENEY: Oh, the drawing of the six of you?

MADDY: Right, that caricature. Part of the difficulty you had when you were up against Bill Richardson and the hard right, when you were trying to control the caucus and trying to elect people, was they would come up with somebody who you could not support. Or either you could not support or you had no stomach for supporting. And the whole key was not to necessarily, in my mind, to win the seat, because I used to say "shit

disturb": Just try to get things upset. You know, we ought to settle on a candidate. Nobody in their right mind would not just settle on a candidate.

My view was, I always let the primaries go without being involved. I didn't put any money in. I think this was the case with Hamm, that I refused to take campaign money I would raise or other people would raise and give it to someone in the primary.

SENEY: Well, this was actually a special election.

MADDY: Right, because somebody quit. [Senator] Marz Garcia quit or -- I don't know.

SENEY: It was [Senator Jerome A.] Jerry Smith.

MADDY: Oh, Jerry Smith was appointed judge.

SENEY: Right. Appellate court judge.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: And then you selected Gloria Hamm as your candidate, you and Campbell.

MADDY: Gloria Hamm, that's right. A woman. I forgot it was Gloria Hamm.

SENEY: And Richardson threw his support--

MADDY: Threw Dan O'Keefe, who was one of the worst legislators we ever had. I mean, he was a terrible legislator. He just defeated himself the next go-round. It was a terrible campaign. Just a terrible candidate. But he won for four years. He was there for a while. I guess they sort of manufactured that story after that.

SENEY: It does strike me as odd, or maybe it shouldn't strike me as odd, here's Richardson, who is your nemesis, and particularly Campbell's nemesis, he's trying to get control of the caucus by using his gun owners and other political action committees to raise money and support conservative candidates.

MADDY: To clear up Bill Richardson, Bill Richardson never raised any money to speak of, of any kind. Bill Richardson was a lot of blow and not too much go. Bill Richardson did have the gun guys and, under certain circumstances, was capable of generating a great deal of activity on behalf of a candidate. But these folks didn't put up a lot of money, and the gun people didn't put up a lot of money. The hard right didn't put up a lot of money. What they basically did, in my view, was to always create a problem within the ranks and always try to find the candidate who, by most objective analysis, would say this is not a good candidate. Not a bad candidate to win a primary but a horrible candidate to win a general election.

SENEY: Too conservative generally?

MADDY: Yes. Generally, way too conservative. As I recall, Gloria Hamm was a -- that seat we never won, having been held by a Democrat. Was over there near Palo Alto and the places. It was a liberal seat, and the fact that we had what we thought was a great candidate, this woman Gloria Hamm, who fit everybody's model for a good candidate, and then they come in

and beat her on her liberal tendencies.

Now, how Dan O'Keefe won the thing was that only Ron Deardon, who's been around for a hundred years as a supervisor over there, got himself in worse trouble, I think. I think that's what happened. He got himself in worse trouble with some exposè, and even though he survived that and still stayed on the board of supervisors, it was just one more hurdle that you had to overcome. Which made the job as caucus chairman, made the job as a moderate to liberal Republican leader, more and more difficult, constantly being challenged by the conservatives who believed that you had to find this candidate, you had to get this candidate, you had to get this candidate. That was sort of what Richardson's goal was.

SENEY: So you had to be constantly looking over your shoulder.

MADDY: Yes. Not only looking over my shoulder, they didn't want to put much money up and didn't want to do any work to speak of.

Bill did not do a lot of work. He liked to huff and puff and talk about it. And I give him credit. He did know politics. I mean, Bill knows politics and he knows how to get these groups going, but by and large, his direction was always on the far right. I used to argue with him all the time in caucus that he'd rather have six tried and true than having a majority of good people who could work together.

SENEY: What'd he say to that?

MADDY: He almost admitted it but not quite. And he would have good days and bad days. He'd have days in which he cared and other days he didn't care.

SENEY: Well, he never supported legislation much. Did he introduce legislation?

MADDY: Didn't carry any, didn't deal with it. Had various things he would kind of target in and zero in. He'd write letters. He picked on Republicans more than he did on Democrats. One of the big editorials they nailed me on once was about the detectors you put on prisoners to keep them in home, and he wrote an editorial. He could write an editorial and it would be carried by 50 newspapers. So he finds me. Of all the guys he takes, he takes the Republican leader and beats me up for carrying a bill that was too liberal.

SENEY: How did you manage in '82 to come up without an opponent for the Senate race?

MADDY: Eighty-two was the--

SENEY: Your first four-year term in that seat, your new seat.

MADDY: Oh, the new seat.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: That's when I had Santa Barbara and so on.

SENEY: Right.

MADDY: Jerry Haleva was the top man for David Roberti and his chief-of-staff for reapportionment. The closest I came to knowing what I did, and whether it worked or not, was Jerry was talking to me one day about who had filed.

It was very close to filing time. There's a filing requirement, and I always call it "the trap for the unwary." If you file a Declaration of Intent, your opponent must file a Declaration of Intent at the same time, within a certain period of time. If that period goes by, then your opponent's out. If you don't file it, you can come back and file it later as an incumbent.

Anyway, there was one day that I said something to Jerry, and he said, "Did anybody file against you?"

And I said, "Oh hell, yes. The mayor down there, [so-and-so]." I named this person. I said, "She's going to file."

Well, then that night was the 5:00 night, and I always used to wait until five minutes to five. I have somebody at the county clerk's office in the district, not in town, in the district to file my Declaration of Intent because I didn't want the newspaper to carry that "Maddy Files Declaration of Intent." It was just one of those little tricks. I would wait until the last five minutes so that the next day, if a guy was waiting to say, "When was I supposed to file?" he was going to wait until tomorrow. Well, by tomorrow it was too late.

Now, whether Jerry Haleva knew all along or just let me get away with it, or whether in fact I did fool him a little bit by saying, "Well, the mayor already filed," lo and behold, nobody did file.

SENEY: You mean he might have stimulated someone to file.

MADDY: Yes. Number one, it was his job to know who had filed and whether or

not they had filed. My understanding was that he did get somebody, he did get that mayor, and the mayor, who would not have been much of a candidate, either got lost -- or there's some goofy story that Jerry Haleva talks about, sending that person over and they ran out of cash or they ran out of a taxi cab, or some kind of strange thing. Anyway, they failed to file their declaration of intent. So lo and behold, my first big campaign outside the district and I had no opponent, which was fun.

SENEY: What did you do? Did you still campaign? You had raised $40,000 plus--

MADDY: My theory in those situations was I loved billboards from the standpoint of exposure. A lot of people don't use billboards, but [you do] when you're in rural parts of the state. So I went out and bought a good-sized collection of billboards, and I went out and ordered the cog signs, which are these little strip signs that people hate, but they're also an indication of involvement. And I think I spent a minimal amount of dollars just for those two things. I didn't do much else. My theory was that people would think Ken Maddy's out with a full-blown campaign just like always, and yet, I wasn't spending any money, and I just saved my money and spent it for other people. No use to run if you don't have an opponent.

SENEY: That must have been a nice feeling.

MADDY: Oh, it was fantastic. I mean, I had gone through some tough battles. Come out of the Governor's race in '78, a devastating and unbelievable tough race in '79 for the Senate. We fight reappo, because

reapportionment, I'm not sure what I'm going to get, but I end up with a seat you couldn't beat me anyway. And then, lo and behold, come up with no opponent.

So I just had a free ride. That's a big four-year free ride, particularly when you needed it. And I'd just gotten married again, and that was good because it allowed me to have a little bit of a start.

Actually, from that time on it was easy after that. I never really had another race of any kind.

SENEY: Let me ask you about getting remarried in the sort of political context, because last time, I think, or the time before last, we talked about your backing Deukmejian, when clearly the Kitchen Cabinet people were behind Curb. And I asked you if they got after you for that, and you said, well, you didn't really care because now you were not only in the Senate, you were a leader, but you were also financially secure at this point and didn't need to worry about that.

So in that sense I want to ask you about it in terms of politics.

What did that mean to your career? Because I take it, Norma Foster was very wealthy.

MADDY: Very wealthy.

SENEY: Can you give us a sense? I don't mean to pry into personal things, but is there some useful way to help us understand what you mean by wealthy?

MADDY: Well, financially there was nothing to worry about at all. We had the

ranch. We had places to live. Everything was financially set. There was never a financial problem.

What happened for the future under those circumstances changed my view in many ways, in terms of ambition going out. I was beat up a little bit after the Governor's race in terms of how I felt and the politics. But suddenly, getting through '80, and in '81 we get married, suddenly I'm sitting in a job that is somewhat ideal for me and for my marriage, with Norma. We had nine kids between us, and we had a whole bunch of grandkids. Life was very good.

SENEY: Did she like politics?

MADDY: She enjoyed portions of politics, and certainly by being in politics, I had as free a schedule as you could probably get. I think if she had had her druthers, it would be that I come and stay and work within the business. Do something in the poultry business or something where we were together all the time.

There was a part of me that had been away from home since the first marriage, since 1970 when I first got elected. I frankly liked, a whole lot, being up here three or four days out of the week in Sacramento, doing what I liked to do, which was the strategy and staying up late at night and planning the politics, and all of the excitement and thrills that I got out of this business, that I would have been really hard pressed to go back and begin a kind of nine to five endeavour or whatever numbers you want to

put. I would have been really hard pressed to do anything else.

At the same time, it kind of took away some of the hard push to go out and become President, or to become Governor, or do some of the things that at one point in time I would have thought, I've now got the chance to do it because I've got the money to do it, I've got all these things to do it, but I had sort of lost some of my enthusiasm for actually doing it.

I really looked at the Senate job as being not bad where I was at and not bad from where my wife wanted me to be. In other words, I don't think she would really have wanted me to do much beyond that. With higher office comes a lot of scrutiny, and none of the Fosters, the whole Foster family -- it's a very closely held company, very closely held--

SENEY: Privately held?

MADDY: Privately held. Still privately held, very close. Nobody knows their business. There was just Max Foster, who was the founder, and his three sons. Norma had been a daughter-in-law. It was a group who did not want a lot of publicity and did not want a lot of scrutiny. And she didn't want it necessarily.

So campaign reporting and how many people work in our yard and all that stuff would have been very difficult.

SENEY: Did you, in campaign disclosure forms, have to say much about that?

MADDY: I had to list everything that was hers or mine, yes. But in reality, it is so

broadly based--

SENEY: These are broad categories.

MADDY: Broad categories. That you have just a basic idea of what -- number one, you can't tell what somebody's worth or not. You can't really do anything other than just say that on lists of properties, you know, they'd put Maddy down as "richest in the Senate" or something. All speculation.

SENEY: And once the reporters got a hold of these--

MADDY: And they tried to speculate as to how many pieces of property you have and all this stuff, but they really can't tell and they don't know. It soon became accepted. I always report gifts. Everything was reported. It just became an old story after a while. There was no story after a while. They would make something to say about how many pieces of property you owned and what businesses you had and so on and so forth.

But by and large, it just sort of fit the niche for me to stay where I was, enjoy the hell out of myself, enjoy the family life and Norma when we were together. From my personal point of view and probably where the mistake came in terms of the marriage and all the rest was that…

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

SENEY: You were saying it got a little bit it got easier for you?

MADDY: Yes, as I say, in those early '80s, it became easy for me to continue what I was doing, what I enjoyed doing. I was still caucus chairman. We hadn't

lost our leadership by that time. We were traveling at will. Norma and I were traveling at will. I was traveling on legislative business at will. We were in the leadership here. Had Republican governors. Still having fun. I mean, life became pretty easy, really easy, and yet, I was still getting a huge kick out of what I was doing, without having a whole long list of goals.

And so I think what happened is a lot of the goals dropped off. I decided not to go forward. There was maybe one opportunity in there where somebody said we ought to just really push and get involved and see if we can't get a state-wide office. But then, of course, you have to think that here's Deukmejian dying. It wasn't long before he got in his campaign this thing starts falling apart. And Wilson's coming into town.

SENEY: When was that? Nineteen-ninety?

MADDY: Well, '82 is Duke. By the time he had four years, he was starting to get in trouble. The political climate was shrinking a little bit in terms of how much fun it would be to try to go from there. Although, I said, there was that one little hiatus.

SENEY: You mean run against him for the primary?

MADDY: No, no. Go back to where I was, where I say I got very comfortable and enjoyed what I was doing and liked where I was at. So the idea of running again for higher office or doing something else politically just sort of pushed out of my mind. I was content to be where I was.

Now, as I say, later -- we already talked about it -- but later on, when the Treasurer's appointment came up, was the thing that got me back into it again for a moment.

SENEY: But that disappointment was so thorough that that was probably it for you.

MADDY: So in the early '80s, when I married Norma, life was very good. We were doing anything we wanted to do in life. I was enjoying a good job. I could still go home and have all that life. It was just a very good time.

The ambition side of me, the part that was pushing and maybe desirous of being Governor or having a thought about doing more in politics -- a United States Senator or something of that nature -- I was not out trying to figure out a way to do it.

SENEY: You said to me, I think, when we were having lunch one day, off the tape, that -- how many children did she have?

MADDY: She had six.

SENEY: And that you really became a father to those children as well.

MADDY: Her husband died at 41. He died in the mid-'70s.

SENEY: And suddenly, without warning.

MADDY: Right. Died of a heart attack and was totally healthy and so on.

So when I married in '81, our kids overlapped. The two youngest were both the same age. Let's see, in 1981 -- they're 34 now -- they were 16, or something like that. We had kids the same age. My three kids fell into her category. We started having grandchildren.

She had had one grandchild by that time, and by the time we got married I had a grandchild. So those numbers are up to 16.

SENEY: You're now up to 16 between you?

MADDY: Between us, yes. The reality is that I became very, very close to her children, and I'm the grandfather to those kids because they didn't have a grandfather and they didn't have a father. So all of her kids have been very, very close to me. My kids had a little advantage, their mother is still alive, and so they had that.

But they liked her. We got along well, and we had many good times together.

SENEY: You told me a story, that I hope you won't mind repeating, about one of the daughters, and you were playing tennis one day -- one of the Foster girls?

MADDY: Janet. There was obviously between the six kids differing feelings. Two or three got very close to me almost immediately. Janet was the second youngest and was one who always seemed to just be on the verge of her emotions breaking down because she really missed her father. But we were playing tennis on one given day and it was one of those earth-shaking -- I mean, it was emotional because she came up to me and she said, "I just want to let you know that you're my father."

SENEY: From this--

MADDY: From this time forward, I want you to know that you're my father. Which

was a very--

SENEY: Well, you're tearing up, and I don't blame you.

I wanted to make that point because I think it helps to continue the point you were making, that life was good and things were going well and all of that.

By the way, did you ever have to say "I can't vote on this bill. My wife's family's interests are too bound up here?"

MADDY: We had so few, if any. I don't think I ever rescued myself on any vote because Fosters was so similar in almost every -- we had no special legislation that ever just directly affected Fosters.

SENEY: If it was poultry legislation, it affected everybody?

MADDY: It affected everybody. The conflict is when it helps you and only you.

The Foster enterprise and all those things really never affected my legislative problems.

Norma and I just became more -- it just became more and more difficult for me to continue to -- I didn't want to leave this, I didn't want to leave up here. I didn't want to leave. It boils down to the same thing, first marriage, second marriage: I didn't want to leave.

SENEY: Did she want you to leave?

MADDY: Well, I think she would probably say no, she wasn't demanding that, but there was a point in time, particularly after I -- well, it was right around the loss of leadership time. The Treasurer's thing was kind of a setback

because we all got geared up for the idea of running, even though in hindsight it might have been very difficult to run because there would have been a great deal of things the Foster family would have had to listen to and be exposed to, in terms of their holdings and so on. They were just very, very, very tight in terms of wanting information to be kept private. They believe in privacy.

SENEY: You know, not necessarily that I would, but I have never heard anything untoward about them or shady.

MADDY: There is nothing.

SENEY: They're upright--

MADDY: Oh, absolutely.

SENEY: They just would not want people to know that they sold so many chickens this year or that year.

MADDY: It's just that Max, the old man, who only died a couple of years ago, two or three years ago, as long as he was alive, in particular that would never have happened. He just was absolutely dead-set against the idea--

SENEY: And you don't think your opponents somehow would have left you alone on that.

MADDY: Oh no. Number one, there was nothing really to expose, except to just how wealthy she was, and how and what manner I might have voted. Obviously, you can find areas where there would appear to be conflicts. But they wouldn't have left me alone. Not that that would have made that

much difference, but I don't think it would have changed anything or made any difference, frankly.

But the set of circumstances as it came together just took me from a point to where it just didn't fall into place, in terms of me running statewide or to go back again, and maybe my own exaggeration and my own feeling about the Treasurer's appointment bittered me a little bit where I shouldn't have been.

A lot of little things. Just so many little things.

[Interruption]

SENEY: Did you think maybe getting the Treasurer's position might have made up a little bit for the loss of the Governor's position?

MADDY: We had constantly talked about running again statewide, when the logical big jump would have been to go against [U.S. Senator] Alan Cranston the first jump out of the barrel.

SENEY: In 1980.

MADDY: Right, and that was in the midst of the first divorce. It's hard to explain exactly what was driving me and making me feel the way I did later on with the Treasurer's spot. As I said, I made too much out of it in my own mind, I'm convinced now.

SENEY: You have a whole different perspective on it now?

MADDY: Sure. But it was conclusive. It did do that for me. It did say, you know, look, this is not going to work -- at that point in time. You know, just sort

of the falling into place of that, and a new marriage, and financially not having anything to worry about again in your life, and doing all these kind of things just made it easy to say, "oh what the hell?" What am I worried about? I'm in my fifties. You've got the world by the tail with a downhill pull; you've got a great job; you're doing what you want to do. You're certainly not obligated to anybody; you can say what you want. Not that I didn't always before, but part of my reputation was enhanced by the fact that I did have such a good position in life. I mean, it's pretty easy to be holier than thou when you don't have to worry about anything. I could do a lot of noble things, and I was convinced by that time they couldn't beat me in elections and so on. All those kind of things made it somewhat easier to progress through life if you don't have too much to worry about.

SENEY: You know, you strike me as sort of a legislative animal really. The Legislature's a hard place to prosper. A lot of people don't have the personality for it. I mean, it takes a certain kind of person to be able to develop and sustain relationships that are necessary to be successful in the Legislature. Wouldn't you agree?

MADDY: I think so. There's no doubt that there are successful and unsuccessful people, and it's pretty hard to figure out on every occasion why. I always point to what I think is just general personality traits: respect for other people, that you either receive or give. I mean, all the things that you would normally write down and say, how do you make it in any business?

Well, these are the traits that you have to have.

But in terms of the Legislature, I liked the wheeling, and the dealing, and the challenge of trying to make things work. I liked winning. I mean, I liked winning. I say that only because you can't win unless you try, and I liked being out there when the games were going on, so that when I could be a player, try to make the most of it. And it got to the point where I think I was good at it because I was zeroing in on what, from a experienced point of view, as to what was important.

SENEY: Let me read you a little flattery here, Senator. I don't think this will offend you. This is from a Democrat. "Maddy is seen as a man going places," this is '82, "and people like that. People listen to him. They see leadership qualities in him. I do too. No matter what happens on the floor, no matter what is being played out in the back room, he will give you an honest, fair appraisal."

MADDY: That is a nice compliment.

SENEY: From a legislative point of view, that's a very nice compliment, isn't it?

MADDY: Right. My belief, and I was taught when I first came up here, that the guys I came up here with and began to serve with, I was told early on that your word is everything and you have to tell the truth. And for whatever reason, I think I stuck to that certainly as much as I possibly could stick to it and tried to stick to it all the time. And also, there's kind of an ingredient. It's one thing to tell the truth, but it's also be willing to talk.

It's a combination of the two. Anybody can keep their mouth shut and never tell a lie. The key is to be able to negotiate and tell enough to give the people that you're negotiating with a feeling that you're not only telling the truth but you're also trying to get something solved.

Oftentimes, in a negotiation I would come in and I would purposefully make a double jump. You know, just purposefully make a double jump, meaning this. That if you're sitting there and you had sort of a progression that you knew you were going to follow in respect to negotiations--

SENEY: You mean you'd come in with, in mind, what you were going to do.

MADDY: I'd come in, and I've got two other colleagues, and there's six of us on the conference committee, and everybody sort of knows the steps you have to take -- one, two, three, four, five -- before we get someplace.

One of my not necessarily tactics but it was kind of a tactic, I would come in and instead of going from Step Six to Step Five, I would go from Step Six to Step Three and just cut through Three, or Four, or Five; otherwise, hard difficult issues would have to be hammered out. But I would either concede and/or partially concede, and/or get us to Three right away.

SENEY: Can you give us an example of that?

MADDY: I can't give you specifics. I'm trying to think of a specific example.

On Healthy Families, I concluded -- and this was the big

welfare [package] -- I did two big compromises towards the end: Healthy Families, in which we gave insurance to poor kids; and then the previous one I did before that was the big conference committee on behalf of Wilson in which we did welfare reform. Those were my last two big conference committees in which I received a lot of credit for resolving.

SENEY: Rightly, do you think?

MADDY: I think that I was probably a factor in making it happen, sure. Yes, once I got Pete's go, I thought I was the right one to be there.

On Healthy Families, Pete was hung up on the idea that at some point in time, that if these families didn't do what was correct, there was going to be punishment involved. In other words, they're going to lose this or lose that.

I concluded early on that as long as he or the Republicans held on to the notion that in some fashion we were going to hurt kids -- in other words, we're going to punish children at some point in time -- that we'd never, ever get anywhere. That we would just not get anywhere because, to me, that was a position the Democrats could hold onto forever, they would win on it forever, and that we would never, ever get off the dime.

So when I came back on one eventful evening, and I was supposed to go down to Carmel to play in a golf tournament down there, I told the Governor's office that I was going to leave, I wasn't going to stay to negotiate any longer; that I was tired of it, that he put too many roadblocks

in front of me I couldn't negotiate. It finally got down to the point, there was where I had made up my mind that if I could get to the point where I could make that concession, or in some fashion say I was going to make the concession that children were not going to be hurt, that I would get [Assemblywoman] Dion Aroner and I would get the Democrats -- in that case, Pat Johnston -- and that we would have this big stride forward.

And so, I told Pete I was going to leave, and that's when we had a little swearing session, and "You can't leave."

And I said, "I'm going to leave," and so on.

SENEY: You mean you're swearing over whether or not that you can, the hell I can?

MADDY: That's right, yes. "Fuck you" -- that sort of thing -- "I'm going to go play golf." [Laughter]

So we get down to the point to where I said I'm going to go in. At three o'clock, or whatever the time it was, I said, "I'm going to go in there, and I'm going to make a phone call, and when I make that phone call," I said, "If I don't get the right answer, then kiss it goodbye. I'm going to leave."

So we got down at a point -- and I'm not exactly sure what the facts were -- but it was sort of the equivalent of double-jumping to the point where I was willing to say to Aroner and the others, "I'm willing to say this will not happen. This will not be any part of our solution."

SENEY: If the parents had not acted in some fashion he wanted--

MADDY: Then we'd cut everybody off.

SENEY: Okay.

MADDY: And my view was that we'll never win that; we always have to have a failsafe for the kids. No matter what else happens, kids are going to get a failsafe. They're going to be taken care of.

SENEY: So at some point did you stop and say, "I'v got to call the Governor on this?"

MADDY: We get to this point, I make the proposal, and the Governor's people were there, and I said, "Call the Governor." I said, "I want him to accept this." So we waited thirty minutes and he called back and he said, "Okay."

Well, thirty minutes later, 80 percent was wrapped up, and I left for the golf tournament. We resolved it.

My point was, and I can't remember the details now on any of this stuff, but in negotiation it was taking a position that, for me, I knew was inevitable but not waiting three days to do it. In terms of the people I was negotiating with, it gave me the extra credibility that not only is he willing but he's willing to do it right now. And therefore, it was always my view you picked up a lot. You really got yourself a huge edge. Now, occasionally you run into people who just see that as a concession or see that as a weakness and therefore push you to the next goal the same way.

And I also was one who would say, "We're finished. Goodbye."

"Where you going?"

"Look, I don't mind negotiating, I don't mind dealing, but it's not you take, take, take, take, take, and then you take again. At some point, friend, we sit down and there's a little give and take, and if you don't want to play that way, then fine, I'm out of here." I've been known to pack my books and just put them together and get up and walk out, and mean it.

SENEY: You were willing to do that.

MADDY: You've got to be. And mean it and not come back.

SENEY: Not be standing outside the door.

MADDY: No, no bullshit. No waiting for later. Not waiting for you to come down the hall to catch me. I'm out of here. Even if you do catch me I'm out of there. Just goodbye. You want to come back and talk? You want to get on the same wave length?

I did one big one.

SENEY: Then you've got to come with something on the platter this time.

MADDY: That's right. You want to come and talk to me, come and do it.

SENEY: Now, on this -- we were talking about with Wilson -- you had made pretty much an agreement with him, to say, "Listen, when that phone call comes, you go along with this or I'm out of here."

MADDY: Well, I had said what I was going to do, but there was no agreement. He didn't say he was going to do it or not. No, I had to wait for the yes. I didn't know what he was going to do.

SENEY: But that would give you an edge, wouldn't it, if you say, "This is the way we're going to go, now you guys go call the Governor and see if he's going to go along with this."

When the Governor calls back and says, "Yes, okay, we'll--

MADDY: The key was, I didn't know how it was going to come up or under what circumstances. He would have to say yes or no. All I knew was that I had about an hour and a half, or two hours, in order to have a breakthrough on something.

I wish I could remember more of the details now, because they weren't that complicated when we were sitting down doing it. But it sort of boiled down to the idea that when people didn't do what was correct, how much do you punish them? It's one thing to take the mother off the rolls, or do this or that, but my view was we could not win on a situation in which we were going to punish children. In other words, they were going to pay a price for bad mothers.

And as I say, as I recall it, only because I'm trying to think of the exact details, but one of the things that I thought always helped me in negotiations was I would try to figure out where I could go and in some cases make that jump early in order to solve the problem. In other words, to give quick on an issue, and then back way up sometimes and not go.

SENEY: But go in with the notion that let's get this solved, we can work together.

MADDY: I'm going to make a bold move quick. And if it works, then I know we're

going to get things going. If it does work.

SENEY: Let's say we're sitting in the room here, we're a conference committee, we've got some tough things to work out, and you come in and sit down.

What are you going to say first? Are you going to say, "We can work this out. Let's put our heads together, this is solvable?"

MADDY: I generally never said much to begin with. Only because I was never chair of the conference committee. And you always had to go through a whole series of gyrations, and speeches, and junk that was part of the game. Staff had to do this, and staff had to do that, and you had to do this, and you had to do that. There was always sort of a ritual that went to it. My feeling was how I felt, what I was going to do that day, how much time I wanted to spend.

Because I also knew that nothing was critical. I mean, if somebody wanted to mess up, you could mess up the day, you could take three days. I'm sure that what motivated me that day, going to Carmel, was to play golf. I mean, I was going to get out of there, come hell or high water. Either I was going to create a confrontation that allowed me to slam my books together and walk out on the basis that I was mad, or I was going to do something in order to get to Carmel, because I wanted to play golf.

It's not that simple, but close to being that simple. Plus, it depends on who you're negotiating with, the right negotiators.

SENEY: When we first talked, I sent you a copy of an interview Mr. [Bob ] Moretti

did. I don't know if you had a chance to look at that or not.

MADDY: I read it. I went through it once.

SENEY: In that, one of the most interesting parts was negotiation with Reagan and [Casper] Weinberger over the education budget and how much income.

Weinberger had put out a figure on how much income was going to be generated. Moretti and the Democrats had another one. They said, you know, we think there's going to be more money. Reagan looks at Weinberger, Weinberger has to say at that point, because they've trapped him, "No, there's not going to be anymore money."

"Well," Moretti says, "If there's more money, can we have it for education?"

And Reagan looks at Weinberger and says, "What are you going to do?"

And he says, "Yes." And it turned out to be over a hundred million dollars more.

I was very impressed with that.

Did that strike you as kind of typical of what goes on?

MADDY: Yes, it does, in so many cases. It only works when you're dealing with the top man, of course. See, Moretti dealt with the top guys. It's one thing with the Governor, when you're dealing with the Governor on those kinds of things.

I don't recall anything ever being cast in iron or stone with

Deukmejian, in particular. Nothing was ever resolved until he signed it. There was no deals, quote/unquote, based on some hypotheticals.

Wilson was also very careful about what he would agree to.

The Moretti style of arm wrestling and stuff like that was typical Bob. That was competitive Moretti trying to, you know, let's get this done. We'll fight for it if we have to.

SENEY: And apparently there was no question when Reagan said okay. That was it.

MADDY: Yes, he was good.

SENEY: And when the money came up, they put in a supplemental appropriations bill and they all stood around grinning.

MADDY: Clapped each other and patted each other on the back.

SENEY: Yes, even Weinberger.

MADDY: Yes.

SENEY: But you say Deukmejian wouldn't do that. And Wilson wouldn't.

MADDY: I don't recall them ever sitting down and making, necessarily, deals like that. The "Big Five" was a difference horse in which everybody had to agree.

SENEY: Then you would agree. You would agree to move one item and move on, and then another item and move on.

MADDY: Right. The "Big Five" was different than these conference committee negotiations. In the "Big Five," my job was always to try to push, if I

could, towards a solution with Willie, or depending on who the "Big Five" was.

Deukmejian started the "Big Five" because I don't think he liked to negotiate, per se. He didn't like the exchange, because it's kind of dirty. When I say dirty, negotiations are kind of dirty: you give me something, I give you something. And I think the Governor really didn't like that notion, didn't like the idea I'm giving you something for something else. I think Deukmejian preferred to say, "We're doing this because it's right." Or "We're doing this because it's the proper thing to do." Rather than say, "I'm going to do this to you because you're going to give me this." I mean, that sort of sounds dirty.

So I think he liked the idea that we're all the in the room and we're negotiating, and at one point in time all he would have to do is say, "That's acceptable." He hadn't been part of it. It was acceptable. And so, bingo, we have a solution. But he didn't necessarily have his hands on it. That's sort of my own analysis as to why the "Big Five" worked for him.

SENEY: So you'd be discussing, say, an education matter and you'd come to a 300 million, 200 million, 250 million, and he'd say, "That's acceptable?"

MADDY: At some point in time. Generally, only after he would take it out and they would analyze it and come back, and he almost always had one little nuance, or he had a little twist, or staff would put something in that would be, quote, "more his." That's just my own thought, that you always have

to walk in there and get something.

That way he could listen to the discussion, hear it all, see what the debate was, and then, when it was getting very, very close to the end, then walk out and have his staff analyze it, tell him what the ramifications of this whole thing were, and then we would be down to a point to where he could come in and say, "Okay, that's acceptable."

SENEY: All right. Why don't we leave it there, Senator?

MADDY: Okay, good.

[End of Tape 1, Side B]

[Session 13, November 17, 1999]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

SENEY: As I said, before we started, I had looked at some of the material in one of your later books that actually had to do with the Treasurer's confirmation, and that had to do with the relationship of the "Gang of Five." There were really six signatures, actually, on the letter. Mr. Costa's signature was on the letter.

How did all that come about?

MADDY: The group of the so called "Gang of Five," which was really the "Gang of Six," which was Jimmy Costa included, were having some individual problems with Willie Brown in relationship to his leadership and where they stood in that relationship. And I'm not sure what all the details were but that was more internal for the Democrats.

SENEY: May I say that there was some feeling that Brown was not letting the more conservative legislation come up on the floor to spare some people from voting on it.

MADDY: I think it was sort of a mix of that but maybe more power. Because the folks that were his closest buddies were more or less the "Gang of Five." The guys that he could count on, on a day-to-day basis, were the more conservative guys.

SENEY: This was Willie Brown.

MADDY: Willie Brown's. And the ones that were, it's fair to say, his closer friends. Now, I don't know whether Willie would admit that or not. But it always seemed to most of us that Willie's closer friends were the fellows that were part of the "Gang of Five" and so on. Now, philosophically, they were also much more conservative.

The "Gang of Five" were having their own problems. At the time that the nomination came up, what prompted them as a group to come forward and endorse me for Treasurer was unknown to me. I wasn't told in advance "We're going to endorse you," or anything of that nature. They just did it. And as a result, Willie then took some revenge, if you will. He began to punish the "Gang of Five."

Ostensibly, what he said was, and what he told me, he said, you know, "I would endorse Maddy. I'm the one to endorse Maddy, but it should be me, as leader, endorsing. It shouldn't be you guys getting out in front and endorsing Maddy, because he has the endorsement of all of us anyway." But he said, "By you guys moving ahead like this, it makes me appear as if I'm not the leader." Something along that line. That was sort of the dialogue that came back to me, that Willie was not in any way knocking me or in any way saying that he wouldn't endorse me for Treasurer or anything else. It was just the idea that these guys had taken the one step a little too far. It was one thing to meet down at Paragary's, it

was one thing to have a table that called themselves the "Gang of Five." I mean, the "Gang of Six" at that time. It was another thing to have little sidebar meetings and do things in the caucus that were rattling Willie's cage. But it was another thing, as he saw it, to do something out in the public, and that's how it came about.

Well, when the revenge came, or the little retribution came, then Jimmy Costa stayed home. He went back and said, "Okay, I'm not going to push it, Willie." But the other boys decided to say "The hell with you, we're going to fight a little bit," and as the nature of the beast, they did.

I think, again, the person who was leader was my good pal [Assemblyman Gary A.] Condit, which he has taken his experience, of course, and has made major hay with it back in Congress. I mean, there's no doubt that Gary Condit has become a major player of the 435 congressmen. There's not any doubt. A lot of people know who Gary Condit is.

What he's done is essentially taken the same concept, a "Gang of Five," and made it the "Blue Dogs," or whatever he calls the group, and they have broken off from the rest of the [Congressional] Democratic Caucus, and those fellows, or that group -- there's women in it too -- they break off and they do some of their own thing. It's a power move. It's a way to develop power.

As I said, I don't know whether Gary developed that first here. I

would assume that he learned a lot here and how powerful you could be when you sort of rattled the cage. And as a result, then, the sort of "Gang of Five" thing blew completely out of proportion, and the Maddy and confirmation became just a small part of it. It was just one small part of it.

SENEY: Well, the mathematics of it were that the Republicans had 36 members in the Assembly, and when you added those five, they could move bills.

MADDY: They could do things, correct.

SENEY: Right. Move them out of the committee without the Speaker's okay, which was kind of a slap at Willie Brown too.

MADDY: It was a scare. I mean, it was little threats, saying, lookit, you have to listen to us because we get six of us, that's all we need. The Republicans stay with us and it's over.

Now, of course, Willie always said, "What you're forgetting is the number of Republicans that'll doublecross other Republicans," and so on. You know, there was no big threat. But what started that, I really don't know. That would have always interested me because I'm not sure why. Because these were Willie's better friends. It's somewhat apropos, when Willie lost the speakership the first time, when Moretti tried to anoint him, you know, part of his problem then was that he somewhat turned his back on those of us who were his closest friends and tried to cut a deal with some of the folks that were less his friends, if you can say that, and so I think that he had had previous experience of falling victim to the idea that

he wanted everybody instead of just trying to get a solid group behind him.

SENEY: Well, he was probably pretty touchy, I would think, as you're saying.

MADDY: Oh yes. Everyday that Willie was in office, you can see what happens. Power becomes much more difficult to hang onto, and you make more enemies, and you have to placate more people, and you have to give more things away, and pretty soon you've run out of ways to do it.

SENEY: You're kind of smiling when you're saying all of this.

MADDY: I just think about Willie. I just think about how good he is at it. I smile at it because I just think it's so much fun. It's one of the great things we have fun doing, one of the things that's fun about being here.

SENEY: Playing the game.

MADDY: Playing the game and being in the Capitol is one of the things that those of us who really enjoy this business enjoy the most. And part of it is ragging Willie. It's fun to rag Willie a little bit, you know?

SENEY: There must be some admiration there as well for his skills.

MADDY: He's terrific. He's terrific at being able to do it. We all might have been able to do it differently, but it's pretty hard to question how successful he's been.

Even this mayor's race, I don't think he has a chance of getting beat, but I mean, he's taken an impossible situation. Imagine a city in the United States of America that would even think about this [Tom]

Ammiano, or whatever the hell his name is, who wants to tax every business. I mean, the guy's got some weird, far-out ideas. San Francisco probably deserves to get the guy for four years.

SENEY: Well, he rode a write-in campaign, as long as we're talking about this, and captured 39 percent of the vote.

MADDY: Oh sure. It was a major move.

SENEY: And, of course, he wrote an initiative which has to be popular, I would think, everywhere in the world, and that is to eliminate the ATM fees. I think that's one thing that unites the entire world.

MADDY: Hate the banks.

SENEY: Oh absolutely.

MADDY: Absolutely, absolutely. I don't think the court will ever uphold that kind of interference with business.

We had the same bill when I was chairman of the [Senate] Banking Committee. It just doesn't make any sense, unless you just want to punish banks.

SENEY: Who doesn't?

MADDY: Yes, everybody wants to punish banks.

SENEY: It's a great populist issue.

MADDY: Absolutely. This guy's a comedian. That's what he is, a standup comedian.

But to give Willie credit, it's all part of the folklore of California.

Whoever gets the job of Willie, there ought to be about twenty people who sit down with Willie and run through the years just because it's going to be so interesting. And then the question is, of course, how much he remembers and how much--

SENEY: How much he'll say.

MADDY: How much he'll say. Because there's a lot of things you can say and a lot of things you can't say. I think San Francisco probably has more things you can't say than you can.

SENEY: What would be in your mind some of things you can't say?

MADDY: Cannot?

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: If I was San Francisco?

SENEY: No. Sitting here.

MADDY: Very little. I mean, I think the only things you can't say, that you wouldn't say, you wouldn't admit guilt in some sort of a crime or anything like that. I'm not saying that there are those kinds of things that occur in San Francisco, but I mean, there isn't any doubt that San Francisco politics in relationship to who gets contracts, who are friends of whom, and how that all works is different in San Francisco than it is in most other cities.

I don't even have a memory in all my 28 years in dealing in Fresno in which anybody ever attempted to pay me or approach me with the thought that a payoff could be down the line, or I could help this person or

that person, or somebody could buy me a new house. None of that's ever taken place.

Now, I'm assuming something not in evidence because I don't know that anything like that ever occurred in San Francisco either.

SENEY: Right, exactly.

MADDY: But certainly there's more conversation, there's more been written.

In terms of the only other thing you just don't say or would talk about are personal things -- love affairs and those kinds of things.

SENEY: That's what I was going to ask you. If I asked you about a member, to talk to me about a member, you might say a lot but some things you wouldn't say.

MADDY: Yes, those kinds of things, because those are some of the better scandals, the better stories, and some of the things when the guys get around that the laughs come about, you know, so-and-so got caught up with so-and-so, and this thing all fell apart.

Even then, it's amazing how relatively minor some things are when you think about this, when you see an episode like happened with that conservative Christian school. The thing that just occurred where the head of the schools was having an affair with his daughter-in-law for years and she committed suicide. It just occurred. It's this week's news.

SENEY: Oh, it's this week's.

MADDY: Most unbelievable story ever.

SENEY: Here in California?

MADDY: No, in the East. And all the major conservative Christian politicians -- in fact, who was it? Bill Bennett. He's resigning from the board; he was on the board. I mean, every major Christian conservative individual, and they've gone full-board exposè. Bill Kristol headlined his [*The Weekly Standard]* magazine this week on the story. Their theory is that we're going to fully expose, that we're not hypocrites. That if we Christian individuals who are critical of other people's moral life and morality, if it happens in our own backyard, then we should be able to take the heat like everybody else. Of course, this is about as lewd as it gets, when a father-in-law and daughter-in-law. And I think she committed suicide. I barely read through it. I just barely watched it on TV. We never have anything like that in California. We have a couple of divorces, you know. That's about it.

SENEY: Kind of run-of-the-mill stuff.

MADDY: That's about really the only thing that you just wouldn't include.

SENEY: I mean, there are times, I suppose, when there might be a point, a political point, to a scandal. But if it's a wholly personal matter then that's different.

MADDY: Yes, it's nothing. It's a nothing thing. Other than that, the trips, the old trips to Jamaica, and the things we did prior to Prop. 9, they weren't illegal, but they were part of the folklore of Sacramento, and those were

the good days. We used to talk about the good old days.

There's no way to cloud it over to make it look good or sound good. The best I can do and the best most of us do is say we believe -- I believe -- no one got hurt. In fact, if I wanted to weigh things, I think probably we gained more from it. Even the state gained more. I think we developed more camaraderie, and we were able to develop better friendships. Not that you couldn't do it another way, and not that you couldn't do it just as well, and not that you couldn't have the state operate, and everybody would have felt better, the feel-good people, who want to make sure that no one gets one more minute in the presence of a politician than the next person, and everybody has equal access. All those theories that seem to guarantee good government is just so much garbage and that just doesn't work that way.

SENEY: When you were elected in 1970 -- we didn't talk about this, but it goes along with this -- there was a bus tour of the state that was put on by the State Chamber of Commerce.

MADDY: Well, what it was, was a combination of the local government officials, and I think the Chamber might have been part of it, but it was the lobbyists who represented local government -- most of them. Some of the classy old lobbyists who represented L.A. [Los Angeles] County and L.A. City and the ports of Oakland, and the ports of Long Beach. The idea was that here are eleven new members of the Legislature, a good guess that some

of them have never seen the state of California in its entirety or perhaps even partially.

SENEY: That would have been true of you, wouldn't it?

MADDY: Would have been true of me. True of everybody. I don't think there was anybody in our group who had any real extensive knowledge and/or who had visited some of the places. Now, those were chosen places. The oil companies picked up one tab, so I think when we left here by bus we stopped off someplace between here and Oakland to go by an oil refinery. You know, that's how you pick up part of the tab is you get a guarantee somebody will come by and take a look at your oil refinery.

And then the Port of Oakland. I'd never been through the Port of Oakland. And that's extremely important. You don't realize how significant the Port of Oakland is and/or the Port of Long Beach. These things that we have in California that are far beyond the concept or beyond the imagination of some people.

And there were in those days some great old lobbyists.

SENEY: Who do you have in mind when you say that?

MADDY: Henry Mespley was from Clovis. His brother was a client of ours, a client of my father-in-law's, and Henry represented -- I forget who he represented -- but was one of the great storytellers of all time. I mean, just unbelievable storyteller and was famous for his stories. He was on the trip.

SENEY: Was he a legislator?

MADDY: No, I don't think so.

And Francis McLaughlin. These names are popping in my head. I'm surprised that I'm getting some of them. But Francis McLaughlin represented L.A. County or L.A. City, I forget which, was another old drinker, old smoker, old storyteller.

I mean, they could start out on a series of stories and you'd start laughing at five in the morning, and I'm a great laugher. I mean, I really enjoy good stories. I came away with side aches everyday. I thought, "God, what a fun life I'm into now." I really felt that way.

I think I was quoted in the *L.A. Times* as saying something about that we had heard -- they were talking about the significance of it and how devastating it was, and I said, "Listen." I said something about the fact. I said, "We heard 990 great jokes and picked up like three pieces of useless information." I said that was the extent of the trip.

SENEY: Because it was criticized.

MADDY: It was criticized. And that was in the early days, and this was being critical. We just laughed at it because of all the people to be critical of, why would you be critical of local government lobbyists, which were nothing, they were not special interest lobbyists.

SENEY: I thought that was interesting because you didn't back off one whit. You stood right up and said this was useful, and since I'm not going to

apologize for it. Just a natural reaction? Didn't have to think about that?

MADDY: You know, I was a little dumb, probably, at that time, but I found early on, and it's only in hindsight that I think back to that way, that I took some offense at the idea that they would even assert that there was something wrong with this. That was number one. And number two, I just told the truth and said what it was: Yes, they picked up the tab; sure, they picked up the tab. Did one of our members not go? Well, there was a guy named [Assemblyman] Alister McAlister, who served with us for a few years. Alister is still around. I'm not sure, I think he lobbies or something. But he was a jerk. He thought it was corrupt so he pulled out of it.

SENEY: He bailed during the thing, didn't he?

MADDY: Yes, he got as far as the oil company and then bailed out or some damn thing. You know, and most of us looked, in terms of a scale of things. Why pick a spot? That never made any sense to me. If you're going to join a group of 120 people, why pick a spot to alienate everybody when it was unnecessary? So, I mean, I just never backed away from that stuff because I thought it was fair. Even on the trips to Jamaica and those places, obviously I didn't volunteer it but I didn't lie about it.

SENEY: Right. Well, I thought, when I read your statements about that trip, right out of the get-go -- and I thought, too, that when this fellow bails it's a big mistake; I mean, they looked good going to a district for day or two -- but the other people back in Sacramento are not going to like being put out on

the plank. And I thought that was a smart play, whether you intended it or not, in terms of your future colleagues. They're going to say, "There's a standup guy who doesn't take a cheap shot even though he's offered the opportunity."

MADDY: I found that the leadership breakdowns come very quickly. There's eleven of us that came in and it didn't take long before it was fairly clear who were going to be leaders, to the extent that you could start picking them out. Things changed, obviously. Not that I was trying to be leader, except it was always my natural inclination to be a leader no matter what I was going to do, so I always wanted to be leader whatever I was doing, trying to make the best of things. But I never gave it any thought. I just answered the questions.

SENEY: When you came into the Legislature and got to meet some of these people, did you have the feeling "I can do this?"

MADDY: I'm trying to think back if I had any thoughts at all. I mean, it was new and exciting for me. I think my concern and every focus was on how do I get reelected? Number one, I won in this unbelievable district. The significance of winning in that district began to hit home almost immediately. [But] not until after I'd won. When we were out there doing it and winning, it didn't seem like a big deal at all, because back in Fresno, to beat Pat Camaroda, even if it was a 29 percent district -- and I didn't know much about districts and the politics; I mean, I wasn't stupid; I know

what 29 percent meant: I had to do a

lot -- the idea was that the more I was there, and the more phenomenal -- you know, when they spoke about the "phenom" -- here's the guy that can do all these things -- they didn't know Camaroda either. They didn't know him from a bale of hay, so he might have been the King of Siam or he might have been fantastic, but in reality he wasn't.

That's when it became more significant as I stayed here. And when Moretti -- I asked for committee assignments, and he said, "I like you but I'm going to beat you, so you're not going to get anything good," and then things sort of fell my way.

I did learn. You get into situations. I learned early on that if I worked hard, particularly in the Legislature -- when I began in the Legislature, when I tried to work hard, it was not difficult for me to get a very good handle on things and also be able to stay well ahead of the game. And I always chalk it up to the idea that I had some lawyer training, that I had training on trial work, that I was not bashful, that I had sort of a broad-base of experience in a lot of difference places. I just wasn't a lawyer. Even working at the racetrack and working in construction jobs.

All those kinds of things made you more well-rounded in contrast to not picking on McAlister but McAlister being a lawyer who was a little stuffy. I mean, Alister was just not the type of guy to sit around and

cuddle up with the boys, but the boys want to sit around and cuddle up in the back room. I mean, I had done as many things in the shadows of the racetracks and going to Tijuana when I was 15 as anybody else.

All those things blend into camaraderie and stuff, I think, ultimately. You don't brag about them. It depends on how you handle yourself.

SENEY: Right. Well, there's something to being one of the boys.

MADDY: Yes, something to be said.

SENEY: The sophistication.

MADDY: Yes, and we had some good guys. In our little group we had five Republicans. Old [Assemblyman Raymond T.] Ray Seeley, he was in his 60's, and Ray had been a district governor of Rotary Club, and he had been a cowboy and a rodeo rider, and he loved racehorses, so we got along fine. Ray was just funny as a crutch, but Ray was not out there to set the world on fire. He was just a good guy and could tell a thousand stories. Also another great storyteller.

[Assemblyman Robert C.] Bob Cline, who didn't last a whole long time. He's still around; he's a lobbyist. Bob was very serious. He wanted very much to be a leader and was the first guy who wanted to be the secretary of our -- one freshman always became secretary, and he wanted to be the secretary, and he jumped right in and was more conservative on the conservative side and began to carve that out. That was where he was going to be with the more conservative element of the caucus. Not that

that had anything to do with it, but we had a Jeepers Jamboree. We went on a jeep trip one year, that first year, and he went on that. So Cline joined right in.

[Assemblyman Richard D.] Dick Hayden was a professor out of a community college up in Fort Dick. Just had almost a mental breakdown the first year. He just couldn't handle the volume of the work. Dick was the guy I first started going to dinner with and so on, for whatever reason. I always tell the story, I say every time we went to dinner, Dick's briefcase got bigger and bigger and bigger. Larger. Full. And I said, "What in the world are you doing?"

He said, "Well, my mail. I can't keep up with my mail."

And I said, "What are you doing with it?"

He said, "I'm answering the letters." And Dick was responding to every letter personally that came out of his district. In a heartbeat, the first day. I don't think many of us really felt it was necessary, although I'd be surprised -- there are a lot of people who did spend time making sure they read every letter and every answer and so on. And maybe, again, the lawyer part of me was that all you wanted to do was you wanted to respond, you wanted to say, "Thank you for bringing to my attention." Bingo, that's it. After that, there was no way you were going to win, so you said nothing if you could. And I didn't need to draft that. I had a top-notch secretary, which I'll go back to in a minute, the secretary being a

critical stage in all this situation.

I'm trying to think of our other Republican who was in our group. Oh, [Assemblyman] Dixon Arnett, who stayed around. He was in the administration for a while, became Secretary of Health and Human Services, and ran for higher office and lost. Dixon's now retired. And Dixon was kind of low key.

So we had five very different individuals. My situation being one in which I was probably -- Ray Seeley and I being a little bit more a group that had seen a little life, had done a few things. And probably, I think, on the natural they looked at me because of the big win as having a lot of potential but one that they had to be very careful about because of registration.

The first thing they did was make sure I had a great secretary, which Bob Monagan, who had been the Minority Leader, made sure I had a choice of three and no more. He would have killed me if I'd taken anybody but one of those three women, because they could do everything. They answered my mail, and they gave me the appointments I was supposed to have, and told me what I was supposed to do, and I did it. That's how we got the first year rolling.

And then watch; watch how you voted, make sure you took care of your district, and took care of the home base. Go home when you had to on Thursday evening and stay until Monday morning and touch bases, and

then try to be smart about home.

SENEY: Home meaning family in this case.

MADDY: Home meaning your district. Being smart about home is obviously separate. Your home, your family, that's one thing. But taking care of the district and letting the district know that you were conscious.

And there was a point there, at one point in the middle of my first term, I mean, I was probably as popular as anybody, any politician, in or around Fresno. Everything I seemed to do just seemed to turn to gold. Whatever I did seemed to be Maddy was in the right spot. I gave the right speeches, I did the right things, and a lot of it was because of the Fresno *Bee*, being a liberal paper, and myself being a Republican, who is a moderate. Of course, the *Bee* hated Reagan, and so every time I even glanced cross-eyed at Reagan, they loved it. So it was kind of a combination of things.

SENEY: What you needed to do in your district, in any case.

MADDY: Absolutely.

SENEY: Let me turn this.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

SENEY: You mentioned earlier on that he'd given you a choice of three secretaries. I think you touched on it briefly. Tell me this woman's name. Who was she?

MADDY: Lorraine Johnson, her name was. Lorraine Johnson had been secretary for [Assemblyman Robert E.] Bob Badham, who had just left for Congress, and prior to that had been secretary for a guy who had been Minority Leader, and at one time, I think, he might have been Speaker. I can't even think of his name now. From Bakersfield.

SENEY: [Assembly Speaker] Luther Lincoln?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: Further back?

MADDY: Not quite that far back. Well, he was there when Luther was there. Oh, I'll think of his name.

But anyway, she was a well trained secretary, and the other two were equally [good]. [Asssemblyman] Dick Hayden took one of the secretaries, and I think as it turned out, [Assemblyman] Frank Murphy [Jr.] stole one of the others. Even though Frank had been a veteran, he took one of the others.

But the key of the secretaries was to know who to contact, know who to speak to, what lobbyists to listen to and so on. They cut through so much. If there's any lessons you try to get through and people don't listen -- I always get a kick, there was some new fellow was just elected here not too long ago, and somebody said he brought in six new people. They allowed him to bring in six staffers, none of which had ever worked in the Capitol before. Well, if you're in a district that is solid 80 percent

Democrat and you're a Democrat, and you can't get beat, I mean, sure, who cares? But in the days in which we had to get there and hustle, it would have been a tragedy. And we had a few Republicans who did the same thing. Just did some stupid things.

In most cases when you're on the ropes and you've got a tough campaign, you do two things. You want to make sure that whatever you're doing at home pays off, and whatever you do up here doesn't get you in trouble. Up here you don't have to do anything; just stay out of people's way. At home you make like you're doing what's right.

SENEY: What would your workday be like? How much sleep do you need?

MADDY: Me, personally?

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: Not too much. When I came up here and started the role, I was never in bed before eleven or twelve at night and was generally up very early in the morning.

SENEY: Meaning?

MADDY: I started exercising and playing tennis, I would say, four or five months after I got here. So I would be up at seven easily. And then we started doing more organized exercise. Bob Beverly and I playing tennis a lot in the afternoons and doing a whole series of things in which we were up early and stayed late and drank too much and stayed up at night.

But it was all part of the game in the sense that we had to push that

hard, and then you get in your car on Thursday afternoon, it was just a killer sometimes. You'd been going all week and then drive back down home and have to be there for a dinner that night and work all day Friday and Saturday.

And then generally speaking, you tried to get off on Sunday. That was the big edict: I wouldn't work on Sundays. And that worked for a while, but then obviously more and more demands came on legislators to be available on Sundays. You could ignore it or you'd have to go to some things. I got to where I learned what was important and what was not important.

When I say important, it was all important except that you could avoid some things. And what you found out early on was that there's a group of people within every district who demand something of you constantly, always, continuously, and it's the same thing. I mean, they want your time, and they don't have anything new to add, and they don't have anything new to provide you with. They just want your time. And it's either because they're program directors or they're getting their chits, they're getting their pluses, by being able to produce you. You learn after awhile what that's all about and you try to be discreet. You don't insult them, you just ease them off and say, "We'll get back again when we have something more important." Not more important, but you try to finesse them.

And then that's what you do, to the point to where I got so I was doing considerably less. I was doing very, very little. The first six years, there wasn't any doubt, I really worked my tail off. There was very little that I did not do. Very little that I allowed to pass by without working.

And see, I was the only one in a tough district. Democrats controlled the rest. Ernie Mobley had an Assembly district that was pretty good Republican, and all the other seats were Democrats besides mine, and I was the only tough seat. And I loved going where the Democrats were. I loved going into the other districts. If Zenovich had a party, I loved going to where Zenovich was or where the other Democrats were.

SENEY: You mean you'd go to the party for Zenovich?

MADDY: Oh yes. I mean, if I was invited, I went, sure. Why not?

SENEY: You and he were good friends.

MADDY: Absolutely. And we began the whole business of nonpartisanship. It was to my benefit to pump the idea and to promote the idea that we were nonpartisan, that we were parochial. We were worried about Fresno. We worked together. We were compromisers. That was to my benefit. If you took everybody on a list and said, "Who does this help and who does this hurt?" it was clear it helped Maddy more than anybody else. Nobody seemed to be complain.

Nobody said, "Ah, that's a bunch of baloney. We don't include Maddy in on these things." If they wanted to hurt me, that's what they

would have done.

SENEY: I hate to jump back to the "Gang of Five" thing, but there were a couple of points that were made that may be just for newspaper talk.

One of them was that the "Gang of Five" had agreed to endorse you for the Treasurer's position, and you had agreed not to raise money against them.

MADDY: That's not true.

SENEY: Nothing to that.

And the other one was that Willie Brown was angry with them because he was negotiating with Deukmejian and they had undercut his negotiations over something or other with Deukmejian.

MADDY: If that was true, I don't know anything about it. I don't think that Deukmejian (quote) "negotiated" (unquote) with Willie on very many things, and I would guarantee, I would almost bet my life, that he would not negotiate on appointing me Treasurer as part of any negotiations. Deukmejian would not give up an appointment to the Treasurer's office, in my opinion, under any circumstances as a negotiable tool.

SENEY: Willie didn't have anything important enough to give him.

MADDY: I don't think Duke would ever even consider it. It wouldn't be on his card. He just wouldn't do it. That would not be something he would accept.

SENEY: After Lungren was rejected, there was some new talk about you again, and

you said absolutely not, you didn't want even to be considered.

MADDY: Yes. It was never really brought up to me by me, it was never a serious thing. They didn't come back to me and say we're sorry. They probably knew better than that. Or I let it out at that point that I was upset and I didn't want any part of it. So it was never brought back to me "We're sorry, take it now," that sort of situation. That wasn't anything I knew anything about.

SENEY: Another thing that was mentioned -- again, this material comes a little later in the books -- was the marijuana business. Deukmejian seemed to focus on that. Was that a red herring, you think?

MADDY: I seemed to think it was at the time. I thought it was phony because the marijuana thing had long passed. But certainly from a coincidence point of view and from a timing point of view, it couldn't have hit at a worse time.

What would have happened if the [Douglas] Ginsberg situation had not occurred and there was no marijuana situation to bring up? Would that have been a factor in our discussions? I don't know.

If my first theory was true, which my belief was true, and again, I'm trying to be a nicer person and believe that that was not the situation--

SENEY: Don't be nice, Senator.

MADDY: Well, it's just the idea that George Deukmejian is such an honorable man, I really want to believe what he says is true, and what he says is that he

never discarded me, that the situation occurred like he says.

My view was that he always had Lungren in mind and that Lungren was his choice and so on. The Ginsburg thing was a story. You know, bingo. They reprinted the marijuana story again, of all things. So I'm mixed on it. I tend to believe that it wouldn't have made any difference. I still tend to believe that at some point in time Lungren decided he wanted this job and that he went to Deukmejian. Deukmejian was too close to Lungren to say no to it. Regardless of how they handled it, which I thought I deserved better and all that sort of thing, but putting that all aside, the big disappointment was the fact that I was hung out there for so long and strung out. As I said, I blame myself for getting too wrapped up in the notion that I could do it again. Query: Who would have known whether I could have been Governor? Who would have wanted to be, in one sense, and the fact that the state went to hell in a hand basket.

SENEY: By the time you would have been eligible or 1990 when the office was available.

MADDY: That's right.

SENEY: You're too nice a guy for this question but I'm going to ask it anyway. Does it give you any satisfaction that the Lungren appointment and Lungren's rise to power in Republican state politics was about as bad for the Republican Party as anything could be?

MADDY: No satisfaction, none at all. Dan personally is just like George

Deukmejian. I think they're very honest, straightforward, believe strongly in their beliefs. They're very religious. I think they believe in every respect that they are being honest and were honest with me, and that it was just unfortunate that all these things took place; that it wasn't planned or anything.

As I say, I should just in my mind accept that and say that's the way it is, because there was nothing that Lungren did at any point in time. At one point I got angry because word came back to me that he felt I wasn't trying hard enough to get him confirmed, because I was Republican Leader at the time, and that I wasn't working hard enough to get the Democrats to vote for him.

SENEY: Were you?

MADDY: Sure. I was doing everything I could. I'm a team player. The reality was that at one point I think I got angry and told him that I thought that it was just -- I'm not sure exactly what obscene words I used, but I said, "The whole idea that we're out here busting our ass and trying to get you confirmed," and I said, you know, "You're making statements like you won't" -- he made some statement about the fact that he wasn't going to go down and sit around Frank Fat's and try to kowtow to a bunch of Democratic legislators having a drink in order to get confirmed. I said, "You don't want to do that, but you want me to do it."

And the Governor wouldn't speak to Rose Ann Vuich because he

was mad at her. I told the Governor, "If you want Rose Ann Vuich, I think you'd get Rose Ann Vuich, but you've got to talk to her." He wouldn't talk to her.

SENEY: He wouldn't pick up the phone, give her a call?

MADDY: My understanding is he never did. He was mad at her.

SENEY: About what? Do you have any idea?

MADDY: It was over the fact that she always utilized their friendship. When they first started out, she'd always brag about how close they were and how conservative she was, and whenever he was in town she'd say all the good things. But then when it came time to vote for him on some key issues, she wasn't there. So he finally got sick and tired of the idea that she was using him and he wasn't using her, I guess. That idea. It was just one of those things. I had nothing against Lungren, except the things he allegedly said, that he wasn't going to kowtow and hang around bars in order to get this job; it wasn't that important to him.

SENEY: That was a dumb thing to say, wasn't it?

MADDY: Particularly when it came back to those of us who were out there. And it never came directly to me; it all came indirectly, that Maddy's not trying hard enough, and if he really wanted to do it, he could do it, because he's got the friendships to do it; he can pull it out. Which wasn't true. I mean, if the Democrats didn't want Lungren to have it, it wouldn't make a difference whether Ken Maddy wanted it to happen or not. That's

baloney.

SENEY: Why did it go through the house without a great deal of trouble? The Assembly, I should say, without a great deal of trouble, and not the Senate?

MADDY: Well, I think they chose. I mean, I think there was an internal situation in which the Senate decided that we'll take the heat and kill it.

SENEY: Ahh. You mean the leadership of the two houses got together and--

MADDY: Decided we'll kill it in the Senate.

SENEY: What makes you think that?

MADDY: That's my understanding of what took place.

SENEY: You were told that, in other words.

MADDY: Yes. It's not surprising, because there's less people to get involved and less people for the Governor to get mad at, and so on and so forth.

SENEY: That's interesting.

You know, I know that [Senator Daniel E.] Dan Boatwright was going to vote for Lungren. Maybe he did vote for Lungren.

MADDY: He may have.

SENEY: And he was head of the Transportation Committee. And [Senator] Quentin Kopp, who is the purported Independent, voted against Lungren. And lo and behold, a week or two after the vote, Boatwright is off as Transportation chair and Kopp is on.

MADDY: Well, I don't know what Quentin has said, but there was certainly little

doubt that Quentin took the chairmanship for the vote. Whether it was a quid pro quo, but he decided he was going to go with Lungren and then did not.

Of course, he got to be a [Superior Court] judge. Whatever he's been forgiven.

SENEY: Wilson put him on the bench, didn't he?

MADDY: Absolutely, yes.

And so whatever happened, he didn't get hurt by it. But there was clear at that time that that was what was said.

Quentin was one that I was supposed to talk to, and Quentin just said, "I'm going to make up my mind. I'm going to do what I want to do."

And I said, "That's the most I can ask you to do. Nobody knows how this is going to turn out. Lungren is the guy."

And of course, whenever I would go, they'd all rag me a little bit and ask me, "You don't really want this."

And I said, "Sure, I want this. Let's get it done." By that time I was finished with it. I wasn't sure it was a stepping stone. I thought it would be a stepping stone for me. But I have to say, I had no idea that Lungren could blow it as bad as he blew it. I had no idea that he would be as poor a candidate [for Governor in 1998] as he turned out to be.

SENEY: For Governor.

MADDY: Yes. And do as little as he did as Attorney General. He did nothing to

enhance his position as Attorney General.

SENEY: And he barely won the first time around against Arlo Smith.

MADDY: You think about it, it worked out beautifully for the Democrats. If they had appointed him Treasurer, that would have been the end of it. Based on the way he operates, just nothing else would have happened. He would have been Treasurer and that was the end of it. It couldn't have worked out any better by the Treasurer's job going down and then him running for Attorney General and end up being the number one guy. It worked out perfectly. They couldn't have planned it any better, even though it wasn't planned.

I really think if he had been appointed Treasurer, that was the end of Dan Lungren. You wouldn't have heard any more about it.

SENEY: And there would have been another candidate for Governor.

MADDY: Then somebody else would have jumped in there and would have run at that point in time, and who that would have been I don't know. It would not have been me because I wanted the benefit of having a free ride. I wanted the benefit of being in a statewide position in order to spin off into another statewide race.

SENEY: Right. You mean you wanted the benefit of the Treasurer's office.

MADDY: I wanted the benefit of a statewide office.

SENEY: Well, you know, speaking of which, all during this period after you run for Governor, which I think probably surprised a lot of people -- it was a very

credible race -- but after you run for Governor you're constantly mentioned as a state-wide candidate. These things are forever coming up. And you're not closing the door.

MADDY: I stayed there.

SENEY: Did you do that because you were honestly thinking about running for office, or was that a way, in a sense, to increase your influence by being talked about as a candidate for statewide office?

MADDY: In my mind it was an honest uncertainty as to what I wanted to do. It was honest in the sense that I think I wanted to stay in politics. I had gotten married, didn't know for sure what was going to happen there. The idea that when they throw your name out, here should be the top candidate, blow a little smoke at you, you begin to say maybe I could go do it again.

So it was an honest uncertainty on my part. I was never firm in my mind that I wouldn't go all the way to the very end. It was rare when I absolutely said no, I won't do it.

The reality was, if I had been Pete Wilson when we lost the race for Governor in '78, I should have come back for the United States Senate and run that time when Paul Gann ran. That was a free ride I had because I still was in the Senate. Who knows what would have happened if I had been one more time in the barrel?

I hated losing so I wasn't anxious to get into a race in which I was going to lose again. I didn't have the stomach for losing that much.

Life became pretty easy, also, for me in so many other ways, and I was doing things that I hadn't been able to do before: owning racehorses, and traveling, and enjoying my career up here without too much pressure.

SENEY: You know what I'm thinking more of -- and I don't know if we're right as political scientists when we look at these things -- someone like Mario Cuomo, long-time Governor of New York. There was constant speculation, every four years: he's going to be running for President, he's an incredible presidential candidate. And he would never say no until the very last minute. And he always said no. And the theory was, and I think he's confirmed it, is him being talked about as a viable presidential candidate helped him govern New York; it gave him more credibility as Governor. And that was what I was getting at with you.

Did it help you as Senate leader to be talked about for statewide office?

MADDY: Once I ran for Governor, from that time on I think it helped me in everything I did. When I first ran, I just took myself out of the 120 and moved myself a cut above. I just said, by making that move I suddenly was a cut above everybody else. It didn't make any difference how bright these guys were, what good chairmen they were, no matter how brilliant Willie Brown was. There was very few times when I wasn't thrown in the group with the top three or four legislators.

It was a combination of running a decent race, getting out front and

running the race, doing it, and from that time on I was a candidate. There's no doubt that if I had run a terrible race and been a dog, I'm sure that a lot less was said; but my race was good. People were talking about the race as being a good race.

SENEY: That's right. And in many ways you were a victor, oddly enough.

MADDY: Oh yes. I was always the most attractive candidate the Republicans had, most this, most that. You know, why doesn't he do it again? So on and so forth.

And it was hard to explain why. It was hard to explain a free ride meant a lot, no free ride meant a lot. All these things that were all factors that made decisions were not easily analyzed in the public's eye. How do you explain it?

SENEY: I thought the press, as we said before, treated you very well. You clearly went out of your way to schmooze them and to be friendly with them, and as you said about Mr. Setencich, that you would feed him things and he would run things up the flag pole for you. And even Dan Walters, who I regard as kind of a prickly character, was always nice to you.

MADDY: Always treated me good. Once in a while Dan would write a little nasty blurb or so, but by and large, Dan Walters always treated me very well.

SENEY: And then something we'll get to again, and that's the Abscam business -- shrimp scam, I guess I should say. You talked about how you were within a hair's breadth, you felt, of being indicted, and yet, that never

got in the press.

MADDY: Never hit, right.

SENEY: And even the fact that you went and testified on behalf of Frank Hill and you were scheduled to testify on behalf of Montoya, and I guess the judge's ruling put something of a crimp in that.

MADDY: Yes, I'm not sure what happened.

SENEY: You were not pummeled for that.

MADDY: No. I think if I had been a candidate, they would perhaps have treated me a little bit differently. I believe the press do things. They're talking about it right now; you just watch how they deal with the presidential candidates. They build you up to tear you down. Right now it's [John] McCain. They're doing everything they can to make McCain some sort of a hero that he's not. I mean, he's certainly a hero, but they're trying to make him a nice guy, which he's not, and they'll build him up until he gets to a certain point and then they'll start to kick his brains in again.

The guy that I think is funny is George W [Bush]. They're having one hell of a time of hurting him, because he kind of smiles at them and says, "So I can't pronounce the King of Siam's name." So what? Who cares?

But they do; the press certainly do build you up to tear you down.

They did that with me. They wanted me to be important in that race to begin with because I was the better of the group, in the sense Pete

Wilson had tried and he had sort of flopped, and Ed Davis wasn't anything they wanted. So, I mean, I was a great candidate.

SENEY: Well, and the point you made about the members of the Legislature enjoying the game, the press loves the game too.

MADDY: They play the game.

SENEY: And they had an appreciation for your abilities in the game.

MADDY: I think so. I think they did, and how hard I was trying, and the naivete, and the fact that we had Russo and the young people that were running my campaign, and we brought in Bailey Deardorf out of Washington, which were a couple of pretty fancy hotshot guys who had not gone to the West before, or ventured West, and we're running some big campaigns and had some new ideas. And they liked a lot of what we were doing.

SENEY: Let me change this.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

SENEY: You know, one of the things I found in your files, speaking of statewide office, was a 1998 Lieutenant Governor filing that Sal Russo had done for an exploratory committee. Apparently, under the law you have to do this.

What was that all about?

MADDY: Sal Russo had the habit, from 1978 until the last flag fell, which was when I retired, was to try to run me every time we could possibly run for office, and I always just smiled and let him do whatever he wanted to do and then

told him that it's not possible, I wasn't going to do it. But he always thought we could come back in. He kept the faith in the sense that he felt that we'd be a good candidate, a strong candidate, and that we'd be able to fit the mold someplace. As I say, once the decision was made back along the Treasurer's line in whatever year it was, that was about it.

SENEY: So this was just Sal Russo's--

MADDY: Just Sal Russo.

SENEY: I don't want to say machination, but I suppose that's what it was.

MADDY: Yes, that's what it is; his machinations, right.

SENEY: People who look at this will know he came in and joined us briefly to talk about the Governor's race. You and he have been close, I take it, ever since then, really.

MADDY: Oh, we've been close for a long time. When I first met him, Sal was working for [Assemblyman] Bob Wood, who was an Assemblyman out of Santa Cruz, and he was working for the caucus also in part. And so in '76, when we first made this little venture by indicating I might run for Governor, which surprised everybody, Sal Russo was the one who put that together; he and this kid Doug Watts, who both were working for the staff and they both got fired. So I hired them and we started the campaign.

SENEY: Is he doing things outside of California as well?

MADDY: He does. He's been all over the world. He's had campaigns all over the world and has done a lot of campaigns, like many of these young

consultants who began were just our staffers, who have now moved off into the big horizon in which they do campaigns, multimillion dollar campaigns, in Russia, in foreign countries, and everywhere. So he's had a tremendous career. Probably in terms of oral history for the State of California, that's an aspect that no one's looked at before, but there are probably five people that I would say have backgrounds in which California consultant politicians would really be worth looking at in terms of knowledge for a class.

SENEY: Well, you know, the problem with people like Sal Russo and others is discretion is their stock in trade, and I doubt he would have told me the things he told me about your campaign if you hadn't gotten him by the ear and brought him in here and told him to say it.

MADDY: That's right. They basically don't like to--

SENEY: They don't like to talk.

And he did mention the problem he had with the reporter King, when we were talking, I think, off the tape, about he followed him around on one of the proposition and got him in a little bit of trouble. They just won't talk and that's too bad because they do have a lot to say.

MADDY: A tremendous amount of knowledge and a tremendous amount of experience. It's hit or miss. There's no sure-fire ways to make these things occur. It's interesting.

SENEY: One of the other things that stuck out, there were a number of articles

about Marilyn Quayle coming to speak in '88 to a women's event, which you sponsored. And you did this for a number of years apparently.

MADDY: I did it until I retired.

SENEY: How did that come about? How did you get in the business of sponsoring those?

MADDY: Bill Campbell had created this notion, or this idea, and I think he's the first one, of having a women's conference.

Number one, Bill and I always consulted on various things like what was going wrong with the Republican Party, and one of the things that we felt was the women.

SENEY: The gender gap.

MADDY: The gender gap was there. And Bill had started down in Century [City], where he lived down there in Southern California, a women's conference in which they brought together key women speakers and put on a women's program, and it became a phenomenal success. They were having ten thousand women there and bringing in these featured speakers, and so on and so forth.

I thought that, for a lot of reasons -- number one, I was always looking for things, and Fresno was an ideal situation, an ideal spot, and I had some staff there. Things were getting easy; not a lot of work to do. And so we came with "Let's do one. Let's do a women's conference."

SENEY: We're talking about the mid-'80s now, when you're safely in your Senate

seat.

MADDY: Yes. Everything cooled; not a whole lot of things to worry about. But still making sure that I wasn't going to be touched.

Bill [Campbell] had gotten into some trouble, primarily because he had hired his staff to work. And so that became sort of a problem. What I did was take--

SENEY: Well, that problem was that his staff person actually profited from--

MADDY: Correct. Got paid.

SENEY: Got paid. Got all the excess profits. No one thought there would be apparently but there turned out to be quite a large amount of profit from it.

MADDY: And the young woman who had created it, who had been the brains behind this thing and got it started, I hired her on a straight flat fee and did it all by contract and avoided all those problems, and then, further, took my staff and did it all as a "Ken Maddy Senate staff exercise" for the benefit of the consumer, the people in the district. We did everything for nothing. And the one girl, the one woman, got paid for her efforts, but after that we quit paying, and so my own staff did it. So we had no outside expense. We didn't pay anyone and we put on this conference, and bingo, just like Campbell's, women in particular loved the notion that they could network and that they could come together and speak about women's issues. A lot of men came. It was one of those situations--

SENEY: Well, it was hugely successful for you too.

MADDY: Oh, every year a sellout. Every year. And here's a Republican sitting in this difficult district doing the most woman-oriented thing anybody in Fresno was doing. I wasn't letting anybody in on that one. That was Maddy's deal. You want to come down? You're not going to speak at my deal. I'm the one who speaks at the Maddy conference, 3,500 women.

SENEY: You have a wonderful smile on your face as you're saying this.

MADDY: And the *Bee* could hardly stand it. They now sponsor it. They finally eventually came on board and started sponsoring. But they wouldn't sponsor. They were all concerned about it. And then, obviously, one thing we had to do was get a woman speaker. And I think what happened was that we had Brown, Phyllis Brown, whatever her name was. She was going to speak--

SENEY: The wife of the governor of Kentucky.

MADDY: Correct. She was going to be a speaker, and she had been a movie star, whatever it was.

SENEY: Miss America maybe?

MADDY: Something.

And lo and behold, she couldn't make it. Something fell apart. And I saw where Marilyn Quayle was going to be in town, and [Dan] Quayle was running for Vice President, and I said, "It would be tremendously interesting, and I think we can get this thing by without getting partisan," because the one thing I didn't want to do is get it partisan.

SENEY: Well, you had a loan from the Small Business Administration, so you had to be careful.

MADDY: That was part of the deal, too, right. We warned Marilyn Quayle. What I wanted her to speak about was "You come forward and talk about what it's like to be the spouse of a person running for Vice-President of the United States, because there's six of you out there. And give that insight."

Well, she came out and gave a speech on the goddamn world armament or something. I mean, just insane. People walked out, booed. All the partisan Democrats and the *Bee* beat me up on it.

SENEY: Well, she essentially gave a partisan speech, defended her husband.

MADDY: She just totally disregarded [what I had asked her to do]. I told them what I thought, what a jerk they were, and how they deserved to lose and everything else. It was such a stupid thing for them to do, because I gave them an entrée that she could have been a nice person, and they just blew it.

SENEY: It sounded like she'd given a sort of stock speech that she gave at every stop.

MADDY: Yes. Just a dumb thing to do. And so I took a lot of heat. So then, how do we resurrect, how do we save? And so from that time on, we were always very careful about the speakers. I got over it. I came back the next year; I didn't back off. Came back. The women, very few of them -- one woman who I knew was a liberal Democrat who generally liked me, but

she ranted and raved in front of everybody and walked out of the place, the first year when Quayle did, but she was back the next year because she liked everything else about it.

And so the thing become phenomenally successful. Plus the fact I was giving away 15, 20, 30 thousand dollars a year into women's charities.

SENEY: So the money you made off of that--

MADDY: Every dime I made I gave to women's charities. I'm the biggest donor of women's charities in Fresno. I'm out doing 20 thousand a year.

And the *Bee* wouldn't give me one ounce of publicity or anything about it, but all those women's groups knew that. They knew.

I smile about that. It just worked so smoothly it couldn't have worked any better. And when I say "worked," we just fell into it. It was a great idea, I thought, because this women's conference thing was just catching.

You know, the Governor's doing them now, and everybody. Campbell started it first and I was second, and guys are doing it all over the place now, but no one sustained it as well as we did..

SENEY: The other major speaker you had was Rita Moreno, the actress, who looked just devastating in these pictures. She looked wonderful. There's a wonderful picture in the materials you gave me of her looking up at Mrs. Quayle with this sort of [bewilderment mixed with contempt.

MADDY: Well, what we did was we brought them both in, see, at that time, and she came in to fill the gap. So there was a dual speaker at that time.

SENEY: Right. And Rita Moreno gave what was thought to be a wonderful speech about what it was like to be a woman in the arts and how difficult it was.

MADDY: Quayle had -- I mean, that's just how dumb they were. I have to chalk it up to how staff will -- I mean, I know about Marilyn Quayle. She was a very tough woman. I never have excused her from lying to me. I looked her right in the eye and I said--

SENEY: Oh, you did?

MADDY: I was right at her. I said, "If you're going to give this speech, then forget it." You know, "We'll pay your way back. Get out of here. I don't need it. I just as soon have no one, but I'm not going to have you go against what I've said."

SENEY: And she said?

MADDY: She said she wouldn't and then did it anyway.

SENEY: And didn't do herself any good because it was a reported as a controversy.

MADDY: Hurt herself. Killed herself. Hurt me, hurt her, hurt Republicans. It was just a dumb thing. So it's one of those things that you run into from time to time. But you learn a big lesson and I was very careful after that. As I said, it all came out in the wash. I knew better for it.

SENEY: Had you been at the '88 Republican Convention?

MADDY: I think so. I've been a delegate at every convention.

SENEY: Right. I know you were at the '92 because of your papers.

MADDY: There was one convention in which we held up the budget here, and there was one that we only got back for one day or something. I'm not sure which convention it was.

SENEY: Was that the '80?

MADDY: It might have been the '80. Because I was Whip in '76. I was Whip down in Kansas City. I can't remember which one. There was one that we missed one day, but that was it. I was at every other one.

SENEY: And I think you would think of the '76 one when you were Whip for Reagan as the most important one.

MADDY: Yes, that was the most important one.

SENEY: How were the others?

MADDY: They were like conventions. I mean, conventions are conventions. You're far removed from having anything to say about anything. The powers that be control them all. It's more for the fun of being there.

SENEY: Seventy-six, when you had the Reagan versus Ford controversy, or running it was a real horserace. Reagan might have won.

MADDY: We thought we were going to at first, for a brief moment or two. Damn brief moment. Nobody else saw it that way.

SENEY: But otherwise, they've all been sort of coronations.

MADDY: Yes, that's all they all are. There's no real battle line. Now, I don't know whether these other races will materialize into something that's really an

actual contest, or whether or not it's just all demonstration.

SENEY: Are you going to be going this year, do you think?

MADDY: I don't know yet; it's hard to say. I think that if I'm well enough and I wanted to, I could probably go.

SENEY: How would that work? How would you get to go?

MADDY: I would just have to ask the powers that be that I'd like to be a delegate.

SENEY: So you'd be on probably as a Bush delegate, right?

MADDY: Oh, I'd definitely be a Bush delegate.

SENEY: You know, one of the things I looked up was -- the Internet's such a wonderful thing. I'm trying to convince you of that, Senator.

MADDY: Yes, I know. I'll get it.

SENEY: On one of the politics pages, the Federal Election Commission campaign contributions are available.

MADDY: Is that right?

SENEY: So when I type in Maddy, what do I come up with but a thousand dollars from one Kenneth L. Maddy to the Bush campaign and a thousand dollars from Norma Foster-Maddy to the Bush campaign. I mean, I'm not surprised. That's all you can give, right, at this point?

MADDY: Is a thousand.

SENEY: After the primary, you can give another thousand, which I assume you intend to do.

MADDY: Right.

SENEY: Did you do any other fundraising for him?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: Just your own personal contribution.

MADDY: Because with the thousand on the limit, that's the most you can do. I had about, oh, I don't know, maybe a half a million dollars at one point in time when I finished that I've given away in the last two or three years of campaigning, my old campaign money, money that I had raised.

SENEY: And had left over?

MADDY: And left over.

SENEY: When you were termed out you took it with you?

MADDY: I took it with me.

SENEY: Could you put that in your pocket?

MADDY: No.

SENEY: You couldn't.

MADDY: I could give it to charity. Up to a certain point I could give it to campaigns. And then as of January 1st of this year, I could give it to charity. So I have close to a hundred thousand that I give to charity, that I have a charity fund in which I give money to various charitable events and things.

SENEY: Would that thousand then have come out of these funds?

MADDY: The thousand is direct.

SENEY: That's out of your pocket, directly out of your pocket.

MADDY: My pocket.

SENEY: So how much you got left of your half million?

MADDY: A hundred thousand.

SENEY: And that you'll be giving--

MADDY: To charity. I can give it back to my donors, if I could figure out a way to break it out. I can give it to the general fund, or I can give it to charity.

SENEY: I see.

MADDY: So what I have traditionally done is give it to charity.

SENEY: Was there a time in the past that the law would have allowed you to put that in your pocket?

MADDY: Sure.

SENEY: How long ago would that have been?

MADDY: I know Ernie Mobley did it. Ernie, which he got beat in '74, '5, '6 -- like '74 or '76 -- I think he took $200,000, roughly. Someplace around in the '70s, I know. I don't know how much in the '80s. I think it cut off someplace in the early '80s.

SENEY: I know some members of the U.S. House of Representatives have taken millions.

MADDY: Oh, gobs. Gobs. So when I had a lot of money, you know, on the campaign money in the last year or so, I gave quite a bit of money away to various -- you know, I gave Lungren $250,000. Talk about throwing up.

SENEY: You have a funny smile on your face. What are you thinking?

MADDY: Actually, I raised him a hundred thousand and gave $150,000 of my own money, and I was one of his biggest donors. That's only ironic because of the whole kit and caboodle.

SENEY: The Treasurer and going…

MADDY: Yes, the Treasurer and all the rest. I always just thought that if you're going to have any class you show a little class, if you're a Republican.

SENEY: And you're a team player, as you say.

MADDY: Absolutely. And I basically told the Republican Party and other guys who came to me, campaigners, that my belief is, if the Republican Party doesn't win the Governor's race, we're going to lose both houses of the Legislature. I've put all of this in writing. I mean, it's in some little thing I sent around to a couple of people. I said, to me, it's useless for us to raise money on behalf of difficult candidates and difficult races. If we don't win the Governor's race and we don't get control of the Governor's office, we will be a minority party, meaning that both houses will be controlled by the Democrats and so will the Governor's office. So it seems to me that if there's going to be any kind of a campaign, every dime should be poured into the Governor's race. We should win that one, if you don't kiss it goodbye, because the rest of it's meaningless.

So that's what I did. I mean, I raised 100,000 first in a little fundraiser and then I gave him--

SENEY: You put on something for him?

MADDY: I put on an event, yes. And then ultimately I think gave another $150,000, which was not bad dough. It's quite a chunk. And that's what I meant. I said that's the Republican Party. I mean, I didn't get that many people who thought the same way, although Lungren certainly had plenty of money. It wasn't the money.

SENEY: Right. And you said you wrote him a five-page letter, which, I guess, as a big contributor, to say nothing of an experienced Republican, you had probably a right, maybe even an obligation to do.

MADDY: I felt I did. I wrote him about essentially what I felt early on were the Achilles heel for Republicans, and his case was the whole issue of abortion and those kinds of things. The homophobia, the abortion. The three or four things that seem to separate Republicans often into being bad people.

I thought he had an edge, being Roman Catholic, and being as strong as he's been through his career and in his own personal life; that he had an edge in terms of explaining his Catholicism and edge in explaining his pro-life stance, and that as long as he could make that point and at the same time let the folks know, let the people know, that this was not going to be a litmus test and/or was not going to be something that controlled his every thought, that he could get away with it. In other words, that people would be able to say, "I fully understand the fact you're Roman Catholic."

I mean, let's face it, Gray Davis did the same thing. Gray Davis

said, "I am pro-life, I am Roman Catholic, but I don't intend to make it part of my campaign."

[Al] Checchi. First time Checchi said, "I'm Roman Catholic, I am pro-life; I am not going to make it part of my campaign; it's not part of my emphasis as Governor."

Bingo, our guy comes out and says, "It is a major factor in my entire career, in my entire campaign. I mean, he didn't say it will be a litmus test but he literally said that "I will not support two of the justices of the Supreme Court who voted against partial birth abortion." So he made it a litmus test. He did everything that was absolutely contrary to what I had strongly urged.

SENEY: Well, these two were Justices running for terms who had been appointed by Wilson and now had to face the electorate.

MADDY: Correct. And so he refused to endorse them. They were good Republican justices. He literally made it a litmus test. And then the homophobia. I don't care how strongly you feel about the question of homosexuality, there's all kinds of ways to deal with the issue of homosexuality without, again, making it such a major factor in your career. It has no bearing on anything we do.

In 28 years around here, I might have voted three times on the question of homosexuality. To have it thrust upon you as a major factor in your political career is just silly. I mean, it seems silly to me.

And the same is true with guns. Just the whole notion that Republicans get nailed down. I mean, most Republicans aren't any different than most Democrats when it comes to the issue of guns. The whackos, we might have the whacko pro-gunners, to the extent that there are.

So anyway, those were the issues that I thought were very important to me, and he just didn't respond. He thanked me for the letter and that was it.

SENEY: During the campaign, and I'm trying to think if it was -- was it Justice Kinner?[1] Was she one of the ones up for--?

MADDY: I don't think so.

SENEY: I can't remember who the two were.

MADDY: [Associate] Justice [Ming W.] Chin.

SENEY: Yes.

MADDY: I can't think who else.

SENEY: There was debate within the Republican Convention about whether or not to take a position on this endorsement. The right wing wanted to come out against them, and others were opposed. Did you play any part in that at all?

MADDY: No. Not at all.

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[1] Associate Justice Janice Rogers Brown.

SENEY: Because there was some question about that as well.

MADDY: I backed way off. I mean, I was there but I was not playing or trying to influence, because I'd gotten pretty disgusted by that time.

SENEY: Why don't we leave it there for today, Senator? How's that?

MADDY: That's good.

[End Tape 2, Side A]