

conflict of interest and should have resigned.

TRELEVEN: [William A.] Bill Wilson [ambassador to the Vatican]?

HALDEMAN: Not necessarily.

TRELEVEN: Oh, come on. Papacy? [Laughter]

HALDEMAN: Bill Wilson had no position of policy that would affect anything that related to the university budget. So I'll be happy to add Bill Wilson if you want to. I wouldn't object one way or the other. I don't care. Put him in or leave him out, I don't think it makes any difference. He was not in the kind of position that Dutton, Roth. . . . Actually, Roth really wasn't either, so if I take Wilson off I guess I have to take Roth off too, and just leave it as Bill Smith on the Republican side and Fred Dutton on the Democratic side.

TRELEVEN: I've got to turn this over.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

[End Tape 4, Side A]

[Begin Tape 4, Side B]

TRELEVEN: Well, you were mentioning several options, and one option was contributing overhead funds. How did you personally feel about the regents

beginning to or I should say conceding to do that?

HALDEMAN: I felt that it should not be done and that it should be. . . . We should not take that route. We should fight being subjected to that route. But I also felt realistically that we might very well not have a winning case.

TRELEVEN: Tuition.

HALDEMAN: Tuition I was less adamant on, because there I felt, first of all, that you had a situation that was ultimately not going to be sustainable. Someday we were going to lose the non-tuition battle and that we ought to hold it off as long as we could realistically, but that at some point we were going to lose and we were going to have to bow to reality.

TRELEVEN: Forbes of course was. . . . You've probably heard him twelve times if you've heard him once about his opinion on tuition. Well, maybe you haven't.

HALDEMAN: As stated how? I'm sure I did.

TRELEVEN: If the implementation of tuition prevents one potential Ralph Bunche from attending the university. . . . Does that ring a bell?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. He really felt strongly about it.

HALDEMAN: I feel strongly about the concept also, but I don't even begin to concede to him that that's a necessary consequence, because with the imposition of tuition you also bring on an additional source of funding for those who can't pay the tuition. I was. . . . We haven't gone into it at all, California Institute of the Arts, but the concept that I was arguing for at Cal Arts--which was an intentionally very radical concept in the funding of higher education, I guess, but I thought we were the kind of institution that could get away with it and should and take the lead in having it happen--is that every student should pay as tuition, be charged as tuition the actual as best we could determine cost of his education total, which meant a music student would be charged a lot more than a creative writing student, because education of a music student requires lots of facilities. And it would also mean that the physicist at the university, which we didn't deal with at Cal Arts, would be charged a lot more than the liberal arts major, because he has to

have a lot of facilities and backup. And the med student would be charged the most of all. I remember a lot of the stuff we'd get on cost of medical education, which was mind-boggling. And I happen to feel that it's not right for us to pay all of that to produce a person who is going to make the incredible amounts of money that some of the people in the medical profession can make, and that there's got to be a balance there somewhere. The argument that I had with Cal Arts is that there is no such thing as free tuition or anything else. It costs x dollars to educate a student through a four-year course in whatever he's taking the four-year course in. That student should know what that cost is, first of all, because he should understand that someone is paying it: the taxpayer, or the giver of a scholarship, or his parents, if he's actually being charged the cost of his education, which nobody is. There is no student in any university in higher education today I don't think that's paying the cost of his tuition, the cost of his education. I think they all in all of them should be, but I couldn't do anything about all

of them, and I knew I couldn't do anything about it at the University of California. I wasn't about to raise the issue there, but I did at Cal Arts. And if I had not pulled off of that [Cal Arts] board when I became chairman, I might have gotten that through. I wish I had, because my concept then was, take all of what you're going to use for funding students' educations and pretending therefore it didn't cost anything and use that to provide to the students who can't pay the tuition the means for getting the tuition. Don't eliminate any student for financial reasons. Then we were going the other way, which was to provide the aid in a lot of creative forms. We had a lot of. . . . There were some good ideas that came out of this, and we were generating them, but my objective was to say to anybody, "There is no free lunch. Somebody's paying for your lunch. It may not be you, because you may not have the money for it, and I'm not saying you shouldn't. . . . If you don't have the money you can't have lunch. What I'm saying is if you don't have the money, we've got to find another way to pay for your lunch, and

you've got to know that we had to find another way to pay for your lunch. I'm not going to tell you that there really is a free lunch." And I think it's a mistake to go tuition-free philosophically. However, realistically within the university, I was definitely opposed to the imposition of tuition. I was consistently opposed to it, but I also felt as I said that someday we were going to end up with it.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, one of the problems is once you open the door, the door swings wider and wider.

HALDEMAN: Absolutely. There's no question.

TRELEVEN: And we look at the statistics today and I think those are definitely borne out. Even though we still don't have tuition. You know, it's called a registration fee.

HALDEMAN: See, that to me is ridiculous. Call it tuition. But it isn't. . . . In a way it's ridiculous to call it tuition, because it doesn't even begin to approach the cost of the education. What we're charging now doesn't even begin to, but what Stanford's charging doesn't either. I mean, there's all those people that gave the money, the \$100 million, or \$500 million

campaign that are underwriting the cost of little Charlie's education, and little Charlie ought to know that.

TRELEVEN: But it benefits California society.

HALDEMAN: Of course it does, and I'm not arguing it . . .

TRELEVEN: Cost-benefit.

HALDEMAN: I'm not even beginning to argue that we shouldn't pay for that education. What I'm saying is that Charlie ought to pay for it and that we ought to reimburse Charlie so that Charlie knows that this didn't just happen. Then I feel that you'd have a greater student appreciation and student use of their education. And I don't. . . . I'm not disparaging the student of today. I would disparage some of the students of the sixties and I would have thrown a lot of them off a lot faster than they ever did.

TRELEVEN: Well, they . . .

HALDEMAN: I mean, when you decide to tear down the institution that's giving you your education, you've lost the right to it.

TRELEVEN: And since you raised that, was tuition a form of punishment?

HALDEMAN: No.

TRELEVEN: No?

HALDEMAN: Well, it may have been in some people's minds. But it would not. . . . That's not in my mind. Those are two totally separate issues. I believed at that time that we were better off with a tuition-free university and I would have liked to have kept it that way. Not only tuition-free but registration-fee free. I mean, no tuition per se or de jure or de facto. I would also like to take any student who starts to implement the destruction of the institution, who throws bombs into faculty members' laboratories and things like that, is not only subject to dismissal but is dismissed and dismissed forever. I would say he's lost his chance for an education, higher education at the expense of the people of California. I'd throw him out, fast, and without a jury trial. So that's my, you know, overstatement of the case on that sort of thing.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Where was . . . ? I should say in all of this, did you get to know Alex [C.] Sherriffs?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

TRELEVEN: Because he was Reagan's educational adviser,

whatever his title was.

HALDEMAN: I've got the wrong guy. I'm thinking about a professor in physics maybe who had a constant flow of secret information about all the things that were being done undercover to take over the university by the communists and all sorts of things. I made a mistake in identity. I jumped at the wrong thing.

TRELEVEN: Alex Sherriffs was in the Berkeley administration during the student uprisings to begin with, and after Reagan became governor he became . . .

HALDEMAN: He went over as the education guy?

TRELEVEN: Right. Right. And as his educational guy, adviser, whatever the title was, I guess regularly would go to regents' meetings with Reagan and so on. But I guess you don't. . . . I guess he's kind of vague in your memory.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, he sure is. Was he at the early-on time or was it later in the administration? Because, see, I was only there for a few meetings with Reagan, and Reagan didn't spend a lot of time at meetings. He came floating in with his flying guard of security men and everything and did his thing, and especially after that student. . . .

Well, first of all, when they almost rolled us off the hill in Santa Cruz when we were in the bus, and then when that guy stood up and shouted the obscenity at him at UCLA, Reagan sort of lost his interest in hanging around I think. Although I know he continued attending meetings I'm sure.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. I was going to ask you, even though you were there a short time, what the difference was if any in the meetings between Reagan's presence at a regents' meeting and Pat Brown's.

HALDEMAN: My recollection. . . . Of course I was only. . . . Brown didn't attend many of the meetings that I attended. Brown did not come to meetings very often. At least my feeling is that he didn't. He was at that dinner that night. I don't think he'd been at the meeting that day though. He dropped by the dinner at my first meeting. I don't remember Pat Brown being. . . . I remember him being very much involved at one meeting on some significant issue, and it may have been that first one. I don't think it was. I think it was a later one. But I don't remember him being in regular attendance. I have the impression, but I was only at a few of the meetings, that Reagan

was pretty much in regular attendance and that Reagan did take a role in the discussion and that sort of thing, took part in the discussion, as did Brown at whatever, at that one that I do remember his being at. I think you had the feeling that Reagan was being tougher on the university, didn't have the down-deep affection for the university that I think you had the feeling that Pat Brown did have. I'm not so sure Reagan didn't have just as good an understanding of the university as Brown did in terms of the specific issues that were being discussed. And I can't remember what the big issue was that I remember there was one of with Brown, so I can't remember what my view is of the position he had. He had a strong position on something. There was something that he was really involved in or some series of things, but I don't remember what it was. And I remember I was concerned about some of the way of approach that Reagan took with the university, because it tended to be more of an us-versus-them thing. I was very pleased to see or to hear what I was told about [Governor George S.] Deukmejian's start with the

university, which obviously [David P.] Gardner and Deukmejian established some kind of rapport at the outset that was constructive from an administration versus university relationship--a rapport that clearly did not exist between Reagan and the administration at the outset. Again, I have the feeling that Reagan and Hitch got along pretty well and that from the viewpoint of relations with the governor, Hitch may have been a pretty good candidate or appointment to the presidency. But that's again just a general impression. I can't give you a . . . I can't back it up with specific reasons for it.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Well, back to the big issue of the period, which was student rebellion or whatever you prefer to call it. Not only throwing bombs in buildings, but some very earnest protest. How do you size that up as not only a member of the board of regents but as somebody who was living here at the time, somebody who has gone to a university campus himself? And this comes to mind as well, because you're mentioning someone who would like to seek appointments with you to indicate that there was, you know, a communist

underground that was responsible for all . . .

HALDEMAN: I've got to tell you that he did a pretty good job of convincing me of that at a demonstration in Sproul Plaza that we watched from the second-story window in the administration building, or whatever it is, the one that looks down there on the plaza and the steps and all. He said, "Watch how this works. Watch how the movements work." And then he showed me, he said, "See that person over there." And I said, "Yeah," and he said, "Okay, I will tell you now that that is the guy that's running this operation. He is not a student at the University of California, never has been and never will be. He is not a known person in the movement. He is not Mario Savio," or whatever his name was or any of these, you know, the names and the flowing hair and everything.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: "He is pure and simple a communist demonstration organizer, trained in Algeria, knows how to operate and manipulate this kind of thing." Well, you know that all sounded very exciting, and I didn't buy all of that, but I can't

disprove it, so I don't know that he was wrong. But as you watched you could see what was happening. And then we went down to the plaza and got over by this guy, and you could see he was the guy that was running the thing. And I don't know that his identity was properly defined to me, but there wasn't any question from an operation viewpoint. As a political campaign operator, I've run demonstrations. I've run rallies. I know how you work crowd control types of things. I know how you stir things up and calm them down in a crowd situation. So in watching this guy, he was very good at it. He knew what he was doing. From my impression he was probably in his late thirties or early forties. He was not a likely appearing university student, but he could have been. I was told he was not, but obviously he could have been, because we had students there that age, but not a lot of them. And the great crowd was not that age. This guy was calling the shots. Somebody was running the demonstration from down there, and we. . . . My problem today in trying to give you evaluations on this is my viewpoint

now. . . . It's very hard for me to project back to my viewpoint at that time, because I went through what we went through in Washington for four years and I know what I know about the intelligence and the things that went on and all that. I can only from that knowledge project it backward to assuming that a lot of what I know there also applies to what I saw in Berkeley but didn't know or Santa Cruz or wherever at the time. So consequently, I have today a biased view, which I recognize as a strongly biased view, and I don't have the ability to disconnect myself from that present-day viewpoint to tell you what my thoughts were or to give you a dispassionate observation of the student unrest at Berkeley. I do know that at the time I was not sympathetic to the permission that was being The permissiveness that was allowing a lot of what was happening on campus to happen on campus. I've got to tell you that I think Chuck Young and Franklin Murphy did a much better job of managing the problem at UCLA than the Berkeley administration did at managing the problem at Berkeley. I've got to say that I recognize that

it's quite possible that the situation at Berkeley was a much harder one to manage than the one at UCLA, but I'm not so sure that's true, because it was pretty much the same cast or a very similar cast of characters with the same mission and the same institution in effect trying to carry it out. But we got into a lot of stuff right after I got to Washington where, especially after Kent State [University], where we had to Well, we set up the Heard Commission, which was a ridiculous, phony thing as most all those commissions are. But the problem of wishy-washy university administrators, I was already concerned about that from Clark Kerr before I knew anything about the overall thing. I became much more so when we saw what, well, what Stanford did when they let them knock out every pane of glass on the campus or virtually every pane of glass on the campus and didn't punish anybody. And I don't feel that that's. . . . I don't think that's a tolerable method of expressing one's views politically or any other way. And I don't feel it should be tolerated.

TRELEVEN: Systematic property damage with the possibility

of bodily injury.

HALDEMAN: Well, the thing we had in Santa Barbara, burning down to the ground the Bank of America. Or Stanford, the bomb, in that guy's that destroyed The bomb in his office that destroyed his life's work. He was some outstanding Asian scholar or something.

TRELEVEN: So when you use the word permissiveness, it's having a climate that permits people to do that and not having, what, a countervailing . . ? Not having a method . . .

HALDEMAN: Not having the courage to exercise any authority.

TRELEVEN: Which means what? Bringing in the police, I guess.

HALDEMAN: It may mean bringing in the police. It may mean closing down the institution and dismissing all the students and saying, "We'll continue your education when you're ready to be educated." Or it may mean dismissing every student who participates and saying, "We'll readmit all of you who are willing to come back and use the campus for what it's here for, which is to provide you with an education." That's what the taxpayers want, and the taxpayers are the people

that are paying for the institution. The right of dissent I totally support. The right of violent dissent I totally oppose. I don't agree that there's any justification ever for violent dissent, but there certainly wasn't on the part of those people for what they were doing. And having then left here and gone to Washington and been on the other side, I can tell you as an absolute fact, and I know this to be a fact and I believe it to the heart of my being, that the demonstrations in the streets of Washington and the rest of America are the primary and very possibly the sole cause of the continuation of the war in Vietnam past October of 1969, because they are what gave the North Vietnamese and the Chinese the feeling that they had a chance to overthrow the American war effort by internal dissent in America. And they came close to doing it.

TRELEVEN: Well, if you're a kid and you're going to get drafted, then you think a little bit differently of course.

HALDEMAN: It doesn't make any difference whether you think any differently. If you're a person out on the

street here in Santa Barbara and you're starving to death and your kids are starving to death, you're going to think a little different about feeding your kids. That doesn't entitle you to go rob somebody's home. And if you do go rob somebody's home, you get arrested and put in jail for doing it. They don't smile and say it's too bad that you had to do that to feed your starving child. There are other ways of feeding starving children. There are other ways of dealing with the problem of the draft and that sort of thing. But if you live in this country, you've got to live by the laws of this country. And the law of this country at that time was to be drafted if you were subject to the draft. I had a serious problem. I had a son [Harry H. "Hank"] who had whatever it was, a high or a low number. He was imminently subject to the draft, and I was horrified at the thought of his being drafted. And I was not at all of a mood to see him drafted, but he lucked out. The clock ran out just about an hour sooner than he was going to be called or something. The draft ended very close to when it was inevitable that he was going

to get taken, and he didn't have to go. So you know I have the luxury of saying that my son didn't have to go, where my view might be different if he had had to go, but I don't think so. I think you know we're all subject to the law. And I realize that's a viewpoint that not everybody agrees with. But I'll tell you if everybody disagreed with it, we would have a very tough society to try and live in, because anarchy is not a preferable system.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, I'm a little bit reluctant to sort of continue talking about the pros and cons of the Vietnam War because . . .

HALDEMAN: I don't blame you. I understand. We have varying views, and that's . . .

TRELEVEN: No, we're not. Not necessarily.

HALDEMAN: . . . perfectly understandable.

TRELEVEN: Not necessarily varying views, but we're going to get away from the University of California. In looking at the University of California specifically and how in many ways dissent got started, I look back in hindsight. I wasn't there at the time, but that the suspending of students for having literature tables at Sather

Gate seems to me to be very oppressive.

HALDEMAN: I completely agree with you.

TRELEVEN: Overly oppressive.

HALDEMAN: I completely agree with you.

TRELEVEN: You no doubt read the accounts of how the Free Speech Movement got started.

HALDEMAN: I think all these things were handled badly by the university. And I think that doesn't mean that they were too lenient all the time, it means they didn't handle them right. What's right and, you know, who knows? It's a lot easier to say after the fact that you didn't do that right than it is to be there at the moment and know what to do that is right. But I think that there are examples all over the country of better handling by far of the same situation than the handling of it at Berkeley. And I think in general in the country it was not handled well, and I don't think we in the administration handled it well in dealing with the problem in the streets in Washington. I don't know what we should have done better, because what we did was to try and keep the government operating in the face of a declaration that it was going to be shut down.

And I think the university had to take the same view. I think the university president's job is to keep the university running. It's not to provide a forum for violent dissent, and it's not to let even nonviolent dissent get in the way of the ongoing business of the university. But literature distribution at Sather Gate is not by the wildest stretch of the imagination interfering with the function of the university in my opinion.

TRELEVEN: There was a legalistic answer to that.

HALDEMAN: There always is.

TRELEVEN: It violated Article IX, Section 9 [of the state constitution].

HALDEMAN: I know, and that's the problem with lawyers. There's always a legalistic answer, and it's usually the wrong one.

TRELEVEN: Cunningham was a UCLA grad.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, Tom tried. That's a tough job, too. That was a tough job at that time.

TRELEVEN: One could look at the whole issue of the university attempting to maintain the kind of in loco parentis strictures that it had maintained, which flies in the face of some pretty

interesting changes that are taking place in mores.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: The pill for one.

HALDEMAN: Those are changes that I deplore, but I recognize as I was talking about change, change, you've got to accept the fact that change is going to happen, and so you deal with it. I'm not arguing that in this issue that the in loco parentis. . . . I don't think that's an issue at all. I think it's the maintenance of the structure that you're hired to maintain and govern. And I'm not saying that we should. . . . I was concerned about it at the time, but looking back now, that's a concern that sort of dwindles because of the rush of events. But the mingling of the sexes in the dormitories and all that sort of stuff was to me a very foreign thing. I've, you know, got to look at that a little differently today. And I do. But that doesn't change to me the obligation of the university to conduct the business of the university, which is not to influence or force changes in public policy. It's to do education and research and provide knowledge and develop

thinking that will lead to better public policy over time. I'm all for that, and the freedom and all that I'm all for, but I do feel that the freedom has got to go both ways. You know, the student who wants to attend class has got to have the opportunity to do that.

TRELEVEN: Well, to take another sixties issue, were I a dissident in the sixties I'd say, "Well, research, public betterment, how come the university is running bomb factories at . . . ?" And students did say that.

HALDEMAN: Sure.

TRELEVEN: I'm sure they screamed that at you.

HALDEMAN: Sure, and not so much though. That didn't seem to be the issue at that point. I don't recall a big to-do about Los Alamos particularly.

TRELEVEN: Maybe the contract wasn't coming up.

HALDEMAN: They came up. Obviously, there was a strong opposition there. And that, again, is a matter of if the public policy, if the policy of the country is to develop the bombs and the university under contract can provide valuable research or whatever in that regard, then I have no problem with the university doing it. The

national policy is set under our system by the procedures that it's set by, and I believe in the system, and I don't believe in anarchy. I don't believe that an individual student or a group of students or any other citizens have or should have the ability to disrupt the ongoing work of the nation as determined by the elected government of the nation.

TRELEVEN: Well, the academy has a, what, system of checks and balances, and one of those has to do with peer review, and in the case of the regents, a policy that can be checked up on if you will. That didn't seem to be the case when it came to the laboratories outside of, you know, a regents' Special Projects Committee I think it was called. Then its name changed. In other words, how do the regents govern a government entity with which it signs a contract? What does that have to do with academic standards?

HALDEMAN: I think there's room for a very valid debate in that area.

TRELEVEN: I'm raising it, because these questions still get asked.

HALDEMAN: No, I understand that. No, I know they do, and I

think they're a valid question. It's a question that I'm not able to my own satisfaction to answer strongly enough in either direction to satisfy myself. To me it's still a debatable issue. It didn't get debated in those terms during the time I was on the regents, and I wish it had, because it would have been to me. . . . That was an interesting debate. Why should the university be doing any contract governmental work? I guess. . . . I know Kerr had answers to it, and he was a strong defender of it on the basis of what it enabled us to do in the fields of pure research and the eminence that it enabled us to bring to the university by the funding that it provided. I'm not as enamored with the body count of Nobel Prize winners as Kerr and Murphy and some of those people are, but I guess those are good things for talking to fund-raisers and stuff like that about. So you know they do some good that way. But I think you have a debatable issue there. If they're doing pure research, that's one thing. If they're doing contract developmental or maintenance or ongoing work, there's a question there, and to me it's a tough

question. It's not a clear answer question. The question of allowing the students to tear apart the institution is clear to me.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. Well, the dissident student's rationale can be something like, "Well, we not only have a military-industrial complex, we have a military-industrial-university complex."

HALDEMAN: Right.

TRELEVEN: That is the establishment, you know. You've heard all this countless times.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but I don't have a lot of sympathy with antiestablishmentarianism for the sake of being antiestablishment. Again, going back to my basic approach to anything, I believe in structure. I believe in the necessity of structure. I think that an institution or a person or anything in between has to have structure in order to survive and to exist and to survive. The establishment by definition is the result of the structure, and I don't think the establishment is bad. I think the concept of the establishment is good. Whether you have a good establishment at any given moment is another question. But we have a system for changing the establishment if we

don't, and my view is that you've got to change it that way. You cannot make public policy in the streets. And if we don't want to have war, that's all very nice, but you've got to consider the aftereffects or the alternative effects of that. And when you consider those, the people that we elect to govern the country opt for war or for the capability of war in order to avoid war, if you want to look at it that way, which everybody seems to think is a ludicrous position. But how do you avoid war without the capability for war? If you have somebody with the declared intention of overpowering you and the clear capability of doing so, you're not real smart to say, "Okay, go ahead, I'll trust you not to do anything I don't like," and let them do it.

TRELEVEN: Okay. So what chance is there for me as a student in the sixties to change anything that needs to be changed? Participation in student government?

HALDEMAN: That's a start. Participation in federal, state, local, national government is open to you as a student.

TRELEVEN: But isn't there . . . ? Wasn't there a problem?

HALDEMAN: Let me argue another argument. That question puts the hypothesis forward that there should be a way for you to . . .

TRELEVEN: . . . make change.

HALDEMAN: Let me argue . . .

TRELEVEN: I'm picking up on something . . .

HALDEMAN: And what I'm coming back to is I'm saying to the degree that there isn't any way for you to change--you, a student--change the policy or whatever, I'm arguing that there shouldn't be a way for you, a student, to do it, because why the hell should you as one student be in a position to change the policy of a nation of 300 million people?

TRELEVEN: I'm sorry, I was talking about. . . . I meant the university.

HALDEMAN: All right. Why should you as one student be in a position to change the policy of a university of what do we have now? Five hundred thousand. I mean, fifty thousand? What do we have? Five hundred thousand students?

TRELEVEN: In the UC system? A hundred and . . .

HALDEMAN: No, one hundred. . . . We've got thirty times seven . . .

TRELEVEN: Two hundred thousand.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, about two hundred or two hundred and fifty thousand students.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Why should any one student be in a position to change it?

TRELEVEN: No, I'm not talking about an individual. I'm talking more about an available mechanism.

HALDEMAN: There's all kinds of available mechanisms. You have a student regent who has a voice on the regents now. You didn't when I was there.

TRELEVEN: No, I know. I'm talking about at that time.

HALDEMAN: At that time? All you can do, you can petition the regents. You can petition the administration. You can speak up in any way you want to speak up, and you can hope you can be heard. But you do it through the legitimate channels, and if you don't find any legitimate channels, you work through legitimate means to create legitimate channels. What are those? The state government has a position, a substantial position, in the governance of the university, and you have, as a citizen of this state, a route through the state government. As a student you

have the right to--not the right--you have the opportunity to petition the administration or the regents for a viewpoint. But as a student or even as a group of students or even as the majority of students, you don't have either the right or the opportunity to per se make the change of your own volition. You can argue for the change and hope your argument may prevail over time. And if you adopt what I believe is the mistaken notion that your argument has a better chance of prevailing if you throw a bomb than it does if you argue it rationally and intelligently, then in my view you've lost that right, because you've taken the wrong route. You've taken an illicit, illegal, improper route.

TRELEVEN: No, I'm not saying that . . .

HALDEMAN: So I think you've got to. . . . It's the system's obligation to see that there are opportunities for dissidents to be heard and for dissident views to be considered. And within the university system there is a substantial opportunity for that. The faculty has an enormous collection of dissident views that ultimately get heard in one way or another through their divisions of the Academic

Senate and through direct faculty petition to the regents and that sort of thing or through the president to the regents. But there's got to be some order, there's got to be some structure to it, or you do have anarchy. And you've got to . . . Everything is a matter of alternatives. You can't say this is no good unless you have something that's better.

TRELEVEN: No, I'm not necessarily . . .

HALDEMAN: But it's a problem. I think the student of the sixties had a real problem in that I think a lot of them were very sincere in their beliefs that what was going on was wrong within the university and within the country and were sincerely trying to make that feeling known as effectively as they could. I think that a lot of them in that process were misguided and got beyond the bounds of intelligent discourse and that that was unfortunate.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Does that get us somewhere?

TRELEVEN: I'm . . .

HALDEMAN: You worn out?

TRELEVEN: I'm a little bit fried. I think you're going to

outlast me.

HALDEMAN: Okay, why don't we quit? I think it's a good idea to quit anyway. If you have more you want to do, I'll be happy to pick up again for another session.

TRELEVEN: Well, I definitely do. You mentioned faculty, and that brings to mind some other issues of course at that time. You mentioned Angela Davis, and I think you were on the board when the [Herbert] Marcuse case came up.

HALDEMAN: I guess I was, yeah.

TRELEVEN: And the relationship between policy, promotion, tenure, and so on, and these are areas that we haven't really looked into yet, and I would like to.

HALDEMAN: Okay. They are not areas in which I have very good standing for commenting, but you know if you want to get it on the record, I'd be glad to.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Well, maybe for today, well, you outlasted me. [Laughter]

HALDEMAN: [Laughter] Well, I'm ready to quit.

TRELEVEN: Well, thank you for today.

[End Tape 4, Side B]

[Session 3, June 25, 1991]

[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

TRELEVEN: Well, it's June 25 and I'm back with H. R.

Haldeman at Hope Ranch, and we're going to do our concluding session I think today. We'll give it a shot. To open it up I thought I would provide some information that I should have known when I was here last time, one involving Richard Nixon. In '46 he won over Voorhis, of course, the Twelfth Congressional District. In '48 he won very big over someone by the name of Rice. And on December 1, 1950, and here's where we were a little confused, he was appointed to fill the Senate seat of Sheridan Downey, who had resigned as of November 30, 1950. So that's the point at which Nixon went into the Senate.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: And Helen Gahagan Douglas had the Fourteenth Congressional District, which she held from '47 through '50.

HALDEMAN: Well, how did he run against Helen Douglas then?

TRELEVEN: Well, it wasn't a . . . He went after her as a left-leaning individual.

HALDEMAN: But wasn't running against her? When did he go after her? In what election?

TRELEVEN: Well, it was in the forties. She ran in '46, won the seat; she ran in '48, won the seat. And then, of course, the terms begin January of the succeeding year.

HALDEMAN: But then she ran again in '50?

TRELEVEN: She ran in '46 and in '48.

HALDEMAN: But not in '50?

TRELEVEN: No, she finished her congressional career in '51-'52.¹ Chancellors at Berkeley, your memory is correct. By the time you got to the regents, Strong was gone and Martin Meyerson . . .

HALDEMAN: That's it!

TRELEVEN: . . . was the interim chancellor until Roger Heyns came.

HALDEMAN: That's it! Meyerson was chancellor when I came

1. Nixon defeated Douglas in November of 1950 in the United States Senate race to replace Senator Sheridan Downey. After the election but prior to the end of his term, Downey resigned, and Governor Earl Warren appointed Nixon to serve the remainder of Downey's term before beginning his own term.

on the board at first, right?

TRELEVEN: He had been in the Berkeley administration and held that position.

HALDEMAN: Right.

TRELEVEN: We talked a little about Charley Hitch, who became president in '68. And the regents' meeting at which you must have had the dinner in Los Angeles, there was a regents' meeting in November right in the neighborhood of 18, 19, 20, 1966.

HALDEMAN: So it was right after the election really, a couple weeks after the election.

TRELEVEN: A couple of weeks after the election.

HALDEMAN: Right, okay. That's fine. That would be it.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Because we had speculated it was December, but looking back . . .

HALDEMAN: I knew it was after the election and I assumed it wasn't that close after the election, but obviously it was.

TRELEVEN: So those are a few of the nuggets I've dug out since we last met.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: But to begin with today, I have a few follow-up questions here, in fact maybe ten or so, as I went back through the tapes and took some

notes. One question I meant to ask you is whether you had any siblings.

HALDEMAN: Yes. I have a sister, Betsy Raine, and she lives down in Palos Verdes. She went to UCLA, graduated from UCLA, I guess, or no. No, she went to UCLA and the University of Arizona, and I'm not sure which was which. I think she ended up going to Arizona. Then she married a fellow that she met at Arizona, France Raine, and he has since passed on. She has five children, all married, and she is still living down in her family home in Rolling Hills actually. And I have a younger brother, Tom, who is president of the company my father started, the heating and air conditioning company. And he lives out in Pacific Palisades and has four children. And those are my siblings.

TRELEVEN: Okay, his name is Thomas?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: And your sister is older?

HALDEMAN: No, younger, they're both younger. My sister is a year and a half younger than I am, and my brother is six years younger.

TRELEVEN: Oh, so you had additional responsibilities.

HALDEMAN: As the oldest child? I guess so. I'm not sure I

assumed any.

TRELEVEN: Second thing I wanted to ask you is, when you came back to UCLA in this period when there were quite a number of military veterans, did the veterans as a group have an impact on the campus or campus politics?

HALDEMAN: Well, I guess so. I was trying to remember. . . . There were some veterans' organization groups on the campus. I don't remember them as being particularly important in campus politics per se. The veterans themselves as individuals, because most of the guys that were on the campus at that time were veterans . . .

TRELEVEN: Right, and older.

HALDEMAN: . . . and older. Well, you had the new freshman classes coming in I guess that were nonvets. But you had so many people on the GI Bill, and there were a lot of married veterans, and there was married veteran housing on the campus, and that group had a political impact, because it had a significant community political interest in terms of their housing problems. So there was something there. For some reason AMVETS [American Veterans of World War II] comes to mind

as being an active organization. I don't know why. I don't recall anything specific, but I have a feeling there was an AMVETS organization that was in some way active. I would say that generally, though, my recollection would be that the veterans pretty much just became part of the general campus community and obviously were a large part, just like the males and the females were each a large part of the campus community but not actively organized as such.

TRELEVEN: Okay, so they didn't make a particular run at student government or anything?

HALDEMAN: I don't think so. I don't recall anything like that.

TRELEVEN: Okay. You mentioned the Coro Foundation, and what I did not ask you is specifically what your role was.

HALDEMAN: I was a trustee.

TRELEVEN: Which . . . ?

HALDEMAN: I was a member of the board of trustees. I was asked to go on, and my role initially was I was invited to be a member of the screening committee that selected interns, and from that developed the interest in it, and that led me to going on

the board of trustees.

TRELEVEN: Okay, then once you get on the trustees, you're sort of out of the loop when it comes to selecting students?

HALDEMAN: I don't remember. I'm not sure whether I stayed in the selection process after that or not. I kind of don't think so, but maybe I did.

TRELEVEN: I wanted to ask you too whether during your experience with the Coro Foundation if the policy was, as we move into the sixties and on in the sixties, whether the policy was to pay particular attention to identifying nonwhite students because of the attention to . . . ?

HALDEMAN: No, I don't think there was. I recall that there were nonwhite interns, participants in the Coro thing, but I don't think there was any particular initiative consciously to activate that area.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Beta. You indicated last time that you had been involved with not only the chapter at UCLA but nationally with the national chapter. And along about the early sixties, the regents required fraternities and sororities to have nondiscrimination clauses in their charters, which sometimes if I understand correctly flew

in the face of the nationals. Did that happen in Beta or did you have to deal with that?

HALDEMAN: We never had a discrimination clause from the outset. Beta never had any discrimination clause in its charter.

TRELEVEN: No, but these are . . .

HALDEMAN: And I don't think we ever had any problem with the requirement. I don't recall any problem with the requirement for a nondiscrimination clause.

TRELEVEN: Not with your national office either?

HALDEMAN: I don't think so. I don't think so. We've had members of all races in the fraternity. No, I don't think there was. . . . I don't recall having any problem within the fraternity vis-à-vis the nondiscrimination clause, so I have to assume we either had one or put one in to satisfy that requirement. I suspect that it wasn't just the University of California that was requiring that.

TRELEVEN: That's right. Well, federal civil rights legislation,¹ and indeed California's Unruh Civil

1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 78 Stat. 243 (1964).

Rights Act,¹ which was 1960 if I remember correctly.

HALDEMAN: I don't have any feeling that that was ever a problem as far as our fraternity was concerned. I don't know why it wasn't, but I don't think Either we already had one or we didn't have any problem putting one in is what I have to assume.

TRELEVEN: Well, I thought I'd ask, because I know that there were problems with it.

HALDEMAN: There were some fraternities that did have discrimination clauses, and those that did had in some cases some real problems.

TRELEVEN: And in some cases the home, the breeding ground for the particular sorority or fraternity would be in a Deep South institution, and historically

HALDEMAN: We do still have a discrimination clause: we're limited to males.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And lots of fraternities I think if not all of them are. And seeing what's happening to the Boy

1. A.B. 594, 1959 Reg. Sess., Cal. Stat., ch. 1866.

Scouts I guess is a potential problem. And I guess one of the major fraternities in one of the Ivy League schools, one of the eastern schools, admitted females and I guess created a big stir with their national. It wasn't the Betas.

TRELEVEN: You spent a little time educating me a little about the Republican wings. We were talking about that. I guess it came up when I mentioned Salvatori. How would you say by the mid-sixties and maybe moving ahead, since you are a political analyst, how would you delineate the key differences in the factions or the wings of the Republican party at that time?

HALDEMAN: At that time?

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Well, the delineation is hard to do, whether you do it in terms of personality of individuals who were sort of the symbols of the wings. But if you go back to '62, the '62 campaign, you start with the ultraconservative, which was the John Birch [Society], what we could call the John Birch wing of the party. And there was a substantial and highly vocal. . . . Substantial to some degree at least in number. It wasn't

anything approaching a majority. It was a small minority, but it was a large enough minority to be heard. And it was a vocal minority, so it was heard, which were the people who actually were members of the John Birch Society and subscribed to the beliefs or credos of that society and took a super anticommunist--because that was their focus really--right-wing position. I think their thing was a very active and very extreme position on communism that led them to conclude that [United States Supreme Court Justice] Earl Warren was a communist and [President] Dwight [D.] Eisenhower was a communist. They actually. . . . I think Robert Welch said that Dwight Eisenhower was a dedicated active agent of the communist conspiracy or something. He made some charge of that sort. That may not be an exact quote.

TRELEVEN: That group kind of carries the mantle of [Joseph R.] McCarthyism forward into the sixties.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, yeah. Then coming off of the Birch Society there was a larger minority within the party. And the Birch Society was not all Republicans. There were Democrats that subscribed to the Birch Society concept also, but I think much more

Republican, and they were much more of a voice in the Republican party. I think they were much less significant as a factor in the Democratic side politically. Coming down a shade from their level of ultraconservatism, conservatism in the sense of anticommunism, not conservatism I don't believe in what we would now look at as economic conservatism or that sort of thing, except to be concerned about creeping socialism and what that was doing, which I think that was an economic concern on the part of some people and not necessarily a political or ideological one.

TRELEVEN: So it's sort of the "free world" here and the communist world there.

HALDEMAN: In a sense, yeah. Anyhow, you had a lot of people that were sympathetic to some of the Birch. . . . To the concerns of the Birch Society members, but did not subscribe to the "Eisenhower is a dedicated communist agent" kind of thing or Earl Warren and that the Warren court was a communist-dedicated group or something, but still felt that there was a valid concern about communism, the communist threat to America, internal and external, and that sort of thing.

Then you got down to the more sort of standard conservative who didn't get quite as concerned about those things but who was a economic and civil rights and welfare and those kinds of things conservative that believed in the sort of the basic mainline Republican position as the more conservative of the two parties.

TRELEVEN: Which is keep big government from getting bigger and supporting various types of . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah, supporting the free enterprise system in practice and concept and leaving more to the states and less to the federal government and more to the free working of the society rather than to government regulation. The general sort of I would say moderate to conservative credo, starting from the middle and going to the conservative side. And then it's very hard to paint this stuff, because one can be. . . . You say someone is a conservative, and it turns out that he isn't a conservative in anything except that he is conservative in one particular area. And the same with calling somebody a liberal. But you run through those gradations and then start swinging over to the thing of what became

in the sixties the Great Society concept, which I would say is sort of the epitome of liberalism at that time as contrasted to conservatism. It was more, we have a lot of problems, government's got to step in and solve them, where the conservative viewpoint was, we have a lot of problems and let's get busy and solve them within the community or the city or the state or on the volunteer side and that sort of thing. And Nixon was in the forefront in the anticommunist activity early on, but politically, generally, I would put him on the conservative side but in the moderate side of the conservative side, not in the extreme conservative side. He was not a Birch Society member. He was openly opposed to the Birch Society and said so and lost a substantial chunk, as I mentioned I think the other day, mentioned he lost a substantial chunk of political support from the Republican right because of his anti-Birch Society position. And that's what brought forth the Joe Shell wing of the party, which was backed by Salvatori and some of those people. Salvatori swung over afterwards and backed Nixon and had backed Nixon earlier.

The same with Holmes Tuttle and Justin Dart and some of the other people of that group.

TRELEVEN: So, let's see, somebody like George Christopher now who ran against Reagan in the primary of '66, Christopher on . . .

HALDEMAN: George Christopher also ran as a lieutenant governor with Nixon on the '62 ticket.

TRELEVEN: That's right. Well, anyway, Christopher was seen as. . . . I mean, the literature will describe him as a moderate, but what does that mean in terms of what you've just described?

HALDEMAN: Well, it means different things to different people, and that's why I'm not sure you can describe it. What it would mean is that in the gradations I was setting he would come more towards pure central rather than moderate to conservative in the conservative, in the Republican general spectrum, let's say. I would say that he was, if you want to put it in personalities, he was more a [Nelson A.] Rockefeller Republican than a Nixon Republican. And Nixon was more conservative than Rockefeller but less conservative than whoever the superconservative--well, Reagan or [Senator

Barry] Goldwater. Goldwater sort of personified the strong conservative wing, the superconservative wing in the realistic sense. He was not a Birch Society-type person either, but he was a more I guess. . . . It really is hard to. . . . In a way I'm reluctant, because when this gets typed up it's going to look like it's all a very simple stratification, and it really isn't, because individuals cross the lines depending on the subject area you're dealing with.

TRELEVEN: Which could be . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, you could have a strong conservative in terms of economic policy and social policy who was a very liberal in terms of international policy, and [United States Senator Arthur H.] Vandenberg comes to mind in that sense. Then you have Eisenhower who I would say is in the middle of the road of conservatism in the general spectrum. But, you know, those are generalizations, and I'm sure Eisenhower in some areas was superconservative, maybe more conservative than Nixon. I can't name the areas, but I think on the Eisenhower-Nixon [presidential]

ticket, you had Eisenhower as the more moderate and Nixon as the more conservative. On the Nixon-[Spiro I.] Agnew ticket, you had Nixon as the more conservative and Agnew, the vice presidential candidate, as the more moderate. Agnew would be more in the mold nationally as what Christopher was in the state of California, more in the Rockefeller mold nationally. And Agnew was a Rockefeller Republican. He backed Rockefeller. And his selection as vice president was a factor in bringing in the Rockefeller wing of the party to unify for the general election.

TRELEVEN: Well, where in '66 would you place Reagan? And again, we know this is going to be an overgeneralization, but for instance, the Democrats, or the Brown campaign, if I recall correctly, tried to paint Reagan with a John Birch brush, and he gingerly danced around that and never really. . . . Well, he avoided it.

HALDEMAN: By '66 when Reagan ran, the John Birch issue was a nonissue really. The Birch Society had pretty much. . . . Its flame was in the process of dying down. I think that Reagan probably and Reagan's adviser. . . . I don't know this because I

wasn't. . . . I was involved in some areas in the Reagan campaign in trying to soften the views on the university, but I was not involved in any general strategy sense or theoretical sense or anything else. So I don't know, but I would assume that Reagan and/or his advisers felt that one of the political errors Nixon had made was his frontal, open attack on the Birch Society, and that that hurt him. And there's no question that it did in '62. The Shell wing, a lot of them sat on their hands. They didn't campaign They are the activists. They are the activist people in the Republican party. They're the people that get out and work, that work, that hand out pamphlets and bumper stickers and set up rallies and do the activist-type things. And they, a lot of them, they probably voted for Nixon for governor, because they wouldn't vote for Pat Brown, but they didn't have any enthusiasm for him and therefore didn't get out and really work for him. That could have made the difference in that election, along with other things. Although, I think ultimately it was an external factor that made the difference.

Interesting to see in the paper today, and I don't know if you had the chance to see it, Pat Brown visited the Nixon [Presidential] Library yesterday and while there had a phone conversation with Nixon. It's reported in some detail in the L.A. Times today¹ with a big picture of Brown talking to Nixon on the phone, which is kind of interesting.

TRELEVEN: Wow!

HALDEMAN: Brown in his wonderful way said, "Well, yeah, it was a tough campaign." Then he kind of laughed and he said, "You know, it doesn't seem fair. Nixon's got this beautiful library, and I beat him. I don't have anything built like this for me." Which is great. [Laughter]

TRELEVEN: Pat's got his institute [Edmund G. Brown Institute of Public Affairs] over at Cal State L.A. [California State University, Los Angeles]

HALDEMAN: Yeah, yeah. He's got something, but he doesn't have the big building kind of thing that the Nixon Library constitutes. It picked up some

1. Leshner, Dave. "Speaking of History: Ex-Gov. Brown Chats About 1962 Campaign With Former Rival Nixon." Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1991.

things: he had noted apparently in the library there's a scorecard for one of the elections. Now see there again, Nixon did run for senator because he, Nixon, was elected senator, and I knew he was. He ran against Helen Gahagan Douglas. She ran for the Senate, and he ran against her in 1950.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Okay.

HALDEMAN: I'm sure of that, because here's my reason for validating that now is that Brown, it notes in this story, was interested in seeing in the museum on display an election tally card that Nixon had been marking on election night following the returns. Both Brown and Nixon were on the state ticket, Nixon running for senator and Brown running for attorney general.

TRELEVEN: I'm sure you're right. Inadequate research.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, there's something wrong in there. He may have been appointed by Downey to replace Downey or whatever as a way of. . . . I bet he was elected in the '50 election and then was appointed prior to January 1 in order to get seniority in the Senate, because that was often done.

TRELEVEN: Okay, well, I'll . . .

HALDEMAN: The original senator, the incumbent senator would resign prior to the end of his term so that the governor could appoint the new senator to give California seniority. And that I would think would be likely. Nixon ran for the Senate against Helen Douglas. I'm sure of that.

TRELEVEN: So am I, and I didn't look that up.

HALDEMAN: Anyhow, we were. . . . I'm way off the question which was something like what?

TRELEVEN: Well, we were . . .

HALDEMAN: What was happening in the city . . .

TRELEVEN: Well, we led into this because Pat had visited the Nixon Library, and that's good. That's how the mind works, by association, and I think we've got that Nixon-Gahagan thing straightened out.

HALDEMAN: Oh, I know what we. . . . The point we were working on was Reagan in the '66 campaign and skirting the Birch Society issue. My explanation of that by speculation and not knowledge is that Reagan either instinctively knew and/or was advised by his political advisers to avoid the Birch issue rather than take it on frontally, because, A) the anti-Birch feeling had died down,

so he didn't need to be anti-Birch in order to pacify that side of it to some extent; and, B) it wasn't politically wise to take on what was still a strong activist segment of the California Republican party, which had been the Birch people, but now they were ex-Birchers in a lot of cases, but still didn't like being told that that was a dumb thing to have been.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, yeah. If I recall correctly amongst the individuals quite active in anti-Birch was Thomas More Storke right up in the Santa Barbara News-Press here who really decked the Birch Society.

HALDEMAN: He did. Tom Storke was probably the most vocal opponent with a forum, because he had his paper to take on the Birch Society frontally, and he really did.

TRELEVEN: You said again you didn't do much for the '66 campaign, but as someone who had worked for JWT-- you've explained how you took leaves of absences to work on Nixon's campaigns--how did you size up the performance of Reagan's public relations firm, the name of which escapes me? It was not JWT, of course, it was another one.

HALDEMAN: Was it Spencer-Roberts?

TRELEVEN: I've probably got it here somewhere.

HALDEMAN: Or Deaver? It was [Michael] Deaver's firm I guess, maybe.

TRELEVEN: We can. . . . But in any case . . .

HALDEMAN: It doesn't make a difference. They did a good job. They won the election.

TRELEVEN: Yes, right.

HALDEMAN: The measure of all those things is really the results. You can come up with all the strategies and make all the mistakes you want, if you win the election everybody says you did a good job. If you lose the election everybody says you did a lousy job.

TRELEVEN: But you really have to shape an individual who is in a sense one of those "Hollywood types" and turn him into a meaningful . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, I don't agree with that. I don't think a public relations firm or an advertising agency shapes the candidate and turns him into anything at all. I think that they. . . . And that same thing is true in dealing with a product. An advertising agency can't make a successful business venture out of a lousy product. All they can do by advertising is make its lousiness

become more apparent. And the same is true, not totally, because it's a totally different process, that a campaign management. . . . In the first place, I'll use this opportunity to get it on record somewhere--because I'd like to have it in writing someplace--the point that gets totally lost by those who are nonprofessionals in the field and understandably so but needs to be reconsidered, which is there are three different entities involved here, all of which get lumped under the same umbrella but are vastly different. You have advertising agencies. An advertising agency has the function normally for a product, but election campaigns also hire advertising agencies to run that side of the campaign. But what does an advertising agency do? It prepares and places advertising. It has basically little if anything to do with the product itself, whether the product is a marketable product or is a candidate in the case of an election campaign. It gets or tries to discover the merits of the product or the candidate, and I've got to put a caveat in here. I don't like. . . . I'm falling into a trap here

of lumping products and candidates together, but it's because we've gotten into this vis-à-vis or via the candidate election route, but there's a real difference. I don't subscribe to the making of the candidate type, making. . . . What was the . . . ? Some guy wrote a book about one Nixon campaign that was The Selling of the Candidate or something.¹ His whole point was that these candidates are created by advertising and promotional people and all that. I don't buy that at all. The candidate creates himself and builds his career and his bio and everything else by what he is and what he believes. The advertising agency is one entity. It prepares and places paid advertising, paid promotional material. It buys time on radio and television, it buys space in newspapers and magazines and billboards.

TRELEVEN: So they're responsible for the marketing.

HALDEMAN: No, they're responsible for the paid advertising, that one factor of marketing.

1. McGinniss, Joe. The Selling of the President, 1968. New York: Trident Press, 1969.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Marketing is an overall thing.

TRELEVEN: Okay, okay.

HALDEMAN: Advertising agencies buy paid advertising, and they get paid a 15 percent commission on the advertising. That's how they're compensated. A public relations firm is a totally different thing than an advertising agency. A public relations firm deals with public relations in the nonpaid sense. That covers publicity, promotion, public relations advice, speech writing, those sorts of things for corporate public relations and for product public relations. They get the free space in the magazine. For a food product, you buy an ad. That's advertising. You submit recipes that use your product to the home ec editor of the magazine, and she whips up something that shows a picture with your product as part of the food dish that's being prepared or something, that's public relations in the food business. And in the garden supply business, it's you get the gardening editor to say that you need to use this kind of spray to get rid of your aphids in your roses. Or this shovel is much sturdier we

found. Or in the computer business, the computer columnist says this new software package is great. Why? The public relations firm works to get that kind of stuff done.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Then you have a specialty kind of an organization called a political campaign management firm, and they're somewhat of a new breed, although in California we've had them for a long time. They go way back. I'll think of it in a minute. I can't remember the name of the firm that was the classic, but they really started the business of political campaign management, and it was here in California. [Whitaker and Baxter] It went way back before my time in politics, back into the thirties, at least to the forties. They take on the role and they get paid a fee for it, as does a public relations firm. A public relations firm gets a fee like any consulting organization. A campaign management firm specializes in managing political campaigns and, depending on the candidate and the nature of the campaign, they can have a very broad or a very narrow assignment. That assignment can include, for a

candidate who has no experience and no organization, can include the entire development of a campaign organization, staffing it, handling the scheduling, the travel, everything else but the candidate. Nixon did not hire political campaign firms. We ran our own campaigns, because he had the experience that developed through time. And Spencer-Roberts is one of the big political campaign firms that has handled total candidates. And I think in the Reagan case in '66 they hired a political campaign management firm, and I think it was Spencer-Roberts or Deaver-somebody or something like that. That was probably a good idea, because they didn't have the background of having had earlier campaign experience. But my . . .

TRELEVEN: Spencer-Roberts.

HALDEMAN: It was Spencer-Roberts, okay.

TRELEVEN: According to an article by Totton [J.] Anderson and Eugene [C.] Lee.¹

HALDEMAN: Eugene Lee, I'll be darned. Yeah.

1. Anderson, Totton S., and Lee, Eugene C. "The 1966 Election in California." Western Political Quarterly 20:2, 535-54.

TRELEVEN: Another old UCLA man I think.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but I think that's a different Gene Lee.

TRELEVEN: Oh, okay.

HALDEMAN: Totton Anderson is a poli[tical] sci[ence] professor at 'SC.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Or was. Maybe he still is. Anyhow, I don't know what led me off on that diatribe, but really you've got to look. . . . Nixon always thought about PR and advertising as being the same thing, and I could never explain, never successfully explained to him what I'm trying to say here, is that they are totally different. And a person like me who has spent twenty years in the advertising agency business does not as a result of that qualify in any way, shape, or form as a PR person or as a political campaign management person. Now I had by my campaign experience acquired political campaign management expertise also, which was above, beyond, and in many ways totally unrelated to my advertising experience and knowledge and expertise. I don't claim to have any and I think I proved [Laughter] in the demise of my political experience that I don't

have any PR expertise at all. I don't. I'm not a PR man and I've never functioned as a political campaign management person professionally, except the one campaign in California where I was Nixon's campaign manager and we did run the campaign as an internal campaign.

TRELEVEN: Well, I think we got into this because of my question about Reagan, and maybe I can come at it . . .

HALDEMAN: The age-old campaign--I've got to get it in here--the age-old campaign. . . . I've got one name--at least it will get it out of my mind and I won't sit here thinking of it--is Baxter. Whitaker and Baxter was the great old campaign, the granddaddy of all campaign management companies. And Clem [S.] Whitaker and his wife Leone Baxter [Whitaker] were the two people. And Leone Baxter did work with us in the '52--excuse me--'62 campaign in California for governor. She was the political professional who came to us with the proposal for the Democrats For Nixon thing, what became known as the dirty campaign in California. There was legal action on it and all that. But it was tying the CDC and Brown together.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And Brown on his visit to the library, he said, "In that campaign Nixon tried to imply that I was a communist, but I was never a communist." But he's forgiven that. We didn't try to imply that he was a communist. We said he was backed by an organization that had communist affiliations, which it did. What we said was true. We never said Brown was a communist, but I guess we let people come to that conclusion.

TRELEVEN: Well, perhaps what I'm trying to get at, and maybe I'll personalize it and say, what in the '66 campaign, what ideologically about Reagan or philosophically about Reagan was attractive to you?

HALDEMAN: To me personally?

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Basically, his economic conservatism and his electability. I guess those would be the two major factors. And he was the candidate. I believe not blindly but generally that we're better off with a Republican than we are with a Democrat, and he was the Republican.

TRELEVEN: And you would have preferred him over

Christopher?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I think he had more to him than Christopher did. Ideologically, I didn't have any problem with Christopher's ideological base.

TRELEVEN: Okay, drastic shift here.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: Another follow-up question. You were involved last time in the establishment of the UCLA Foundation. At UCLA as well as other UC campuses, increasingly that meant private-sector solicitation at a level that was unprecedented.

HALDEMAN: Right.

TRELEVEN: And the private sector schools were not very happy about this. They made their unhappiness known, and the name Lee [A.] DuBridge comes to mind. He was the head of the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities. But were you involved in any of that fallout?

HALDEMAN: To a degree. Going back sort of historically, it was my understanding (and I think it's valid) that there was at least a gentlemen's agreement if not an actual written agreement that the University of California, or at least UCLA, and this goes back to the forties and fifties I

guess, would confine their fund-raising, private fund-raising efforts, to their own alumni and would not try to raise funds in the general community and thereby become competitive to the private university that was totally dependent on private funds as contrast to the University of California campuses, which were only partially dependent on private funds.

TRELEVEN: Kind of a no-raid agreement.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I think it was. I think in order to avoid the community ill will that was threatened by our trying to solicit funds from USC alumni, let's say, or Caltech [California Institute of Technology]--in the case of DuBridge--alumni or whatever, that we would confine our fund-raising efforts to our own alumni. Thus I would. . . . I think that was a reason if not the reason that the only active fund-raising activity, overt fund-raising activity, conducted by UCLA up to the Pauley Pavilion time was conducted by and under the auspices of the Alumni Association. The Alumni Association was the fund-raising arm of the UCLA campus. We still were at the time of the Pauley drive basically. The Pauley drive was

an offshoot of the Alumni Association, although it formed itself as an independent drive, as a Memorial Activities Center campaign, which was the first time we had done that kind of a thing. And Franklin Murphy's intent, I believe, and I think my recollection is that I understood this at the time, was that one of the purposes of the Memorial Activities Center campaign was to broaden our fund-raising base both in terms of dollars. . . . Well, in terms of dollars, go out to raise more money, big money that we hadn't been trying to raise before. Secondly, to try to raise funds for capital improvement instead of just a low-level, student enrichment kind of thing, which our scholarship fund was. And to broaden it to a broader community than just the members of the Alumni Association.

TRELEVEN: Okay, excuse me just a minute. I've got to turn the tape over.

HALDEMAN: Sure.

[End Tape 5, Side A]

[Begin Tape 5, Side B]

TRELEVEN: Okay, we're back on.

HALDEMAN: We were talking about broadening the campaign or

the fund-raising activity. So I'm not sure, I think we probably did limit. . . . I'm sure we concentrated at least our efforts on the Memorial Activities Center campaign on alumni and alumni groups. But Franklin clearly had the strong motivation and intent of interesting the total Southern California community in the University of California at Los Angeles, not just trying to continue mobilizing our own alumni. I think he saw our own alumni as the core of that outreach into the community, because we were the best missionaries. We as alums were better missionaries for the university than anybody else in the community might be, at the outset at least. The results speak for themselves. I mean, we have an enormous community-wide non-alumni support now, and a lot of our major gifts have come from non-alumni, starting with Ed Pauley, who was a University of California alumnus, but not a UCLA alumnus. And I have the feeling, and it may not be valid, that there was not only some concern on the part of the independent universities, the private universities, but also on the part of the other

campuses of the University of California as they saw Franklin Murphy's star rising here in the south and the lure of an Ed Pauley to make a major contribution to UCLA and that sort of thing. Although Ed was making contributions to, if not all, a number of the campuses of the university. As a regent he was looking at the university-wide system, not just his own alma mater. But I was not aware and I didn't have any. . . . I know lots of people in Los Angeles and I was active with a lot of people in Los Angeles in those days who were not alumni of UCLA, and I did not sense any major opposition to our conducting the Memorial Activities Center drive. You still hear things--I do--from my Stanford and 'SC friends about why should people give money to UCLA, but we set out in the Memorial Activities Center campaign to make the case for the need for private support for a public university as well as private support for private universities: that while much of what is done at the public university can be and is funded by the state and federal government, which people didn't realize the federal part of it, but

a lot of it simply couldn't be and wasn't provided by either state or federal funding; and that there was a substantial need in moving the university into a period of greater greatness, if there is such a thing; that private support was badly needed to do the kinds of enrichment things that couldn't be done under the state or federal funding sources. So that led to the concept of the foundation, and my feeling at least and I think Franklin's and a lot of the other people's-- I don't think I was the sole holder or even the originator; I'm sure I wasn't the originator of it, but I agreed with it--that it would be wise to separate fund-raising activity at UCLA from the Alumni Association as an entity. Therefore, to set up the UCLA Foundation as clearly a foundation to which one could contribute without feeling that he was an outsider contributing to the Alumni Association. And that was one of the major impetuses for it, the other being the opportunity to get more professional assistance under the aegis of the foundation both from to some degree university funds and the chancellor's special funds as well as the private funds from

outside. We got some staffing and housing support and so on, which is clearly to the benefit of the university and was used for the benefit of the university, coming from university funding sources as well as the outside private funding sources.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, in particular I think on the medical campus there are individuals of substantial means.

HALDEMAN: Jules Stein.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, Jules Stein, the Jonsson family with the cancer center.

HALDEMAN: Right.

TRELEVEN: And others who . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, there have been a number, and they obviously are people who are not. . . . I think we have continued to carry the gentlemen's agreement forward in that I don't think. . . . I'm not aware and certainly during my activity there we did not actively solicit people who were known supporters of 'SC or Caltech or . . .

TRELEVEN: Claremont Colleges.

HALDEMAN: . . . Stanford, Claremont, whatever, for participation in our campaigns. But we did not refrain from soliciting people who did not have

any ongoing tie or active involvement in one of the private universities in giving them the opportunity to become involved, as Jules Stein did, for instance, in one of the exciting projects that was going on at UCLA in which he was interested.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: And those projects now and as time was developing in that period, there were so many things starting on campus that had interest to people, the cultural history museum and all sorts of art activities. Franklin did some fantastic things in getting collections donated and that kind of thing, and we were a good depository for that sort of stuff.

TRELEVEN: I look back at the date of your first meeting and I'm trying to figure out why there was some, as you put it, knock-down-drag-out meeting coming up because of some issue and . . .

HALDEMAN: Couldn't find it?

TRELEVEN: Well, the hottest thing that appeared was the resolution so-called of the UCLA Extension building downtown, which was . . .

HALDEMAN: I remember that as being a major issue, but I

don't think that was of the level of what I. . . .
I think what I was thinking about was something
more volatile, more publicly volatile.

TRELEVEN: So I don't think I've identified it. I thought
of the Extension, because Mrs. Chandler was very
adamant you might remember of Extension being
located near or in the cultural center nexus on
Temple Street, and a lot of dallying with the
county.

HALDEMAN: That's right, I'd forgotten about that.

TRELEVEN: And then there was the issue of money, where the
money would come from. And then there was the
issue of priorities. A lot of things were needed
at that time, even at UCLA. But that was not the
volatile issue?

HALDEMAN: I don't think so.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: I guess it's possible that it was and that it
seemed volatile at the time. In hindsight that
doesn't strike me as being of the level of
volatility that I think I remember was something
coming along.

TRELEVEN: Well, I couldn't find any more options.

HALDEMAN: I don't know what it was.

TRELEVEN: You were running down a list of regents last time in terms of their political affiliation and you got to Kerr . . .

HALDEMAN: And I was wrong.

TRELEVEN: Well, you got to Kerr and said you don't know, which I accept as an honest answer, but didn't you and other Republicans sort of assume that Kerr was a Democrat?

HALDEMAN: I never. . . . I didn't. I have no idea. I didn't. . . . I mean, to me he was apolitical. My opposition to him was not partisan political opposition.

TRELEVEN: I thought he'd made some small noises during the '66 gubernatorial campaign that . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, that may well be, but I think he was concerned about Reagan and Reagan's views of the university. I know he was concerned about it, because I talked with him about that, because I was too. So he made have made some noises, and that may be one of the seeds or the seed of Reagan's opposition to him. But Reagan, it wasn't Reagan's opposition to Kerr that I was concerned about and that Kerr was concerned about, it was his opposition to the university as

perceived. It wasn't so much opposition. . . . It was in a way opposition, but what it was was really a clear lack of understanding of the university and its role in the state and the misapprehension of, you know, the little red schoolhouse that they used to refer to UCLA as and that sort of thing. I think there was a feeling that the university was a hotbed of sedition and bad things in those days that, you know, is not surprising in a way. I mean, because universities are a hotbed of new thinking and unacceptable--at the moment unacceptable thinking or emerging thinking or whatever that discomforts the establishment. But I have. . . . I do not and I don't think I ever did think of Kerr in political partisan terms one way or the other, whether he was pro or anti.

TRELEVEN: Okay, and finally in terms of follow-ups, this getting near the end of where we left off last week, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but my interpretation of your argument in favor of tuition is that you're a believer in fee for service. Is that correct? Would that be an accurate interpretation?

HALDEMAN: I'm a believer in. . . . Not precisely, no. I'm a believer in the fact that there is no such thing as anything free, that it may be free to you, but if it's free to you it's because someone else paid for it. Everything has a price, and that whether it's education or lunch at the bar, somebody's going to pay for it. I believe that people ought to realize, A) that somebody is paying for it, and B) how much they're paying for it, what its value is. And I feel that tuition is a way of making that realization clear to the person who is receiving the education. And for that reason I have been all along and still am, although I received a free education myself, in favor of tuition. Now I also said, and I want to say it again in the same paragraph. . . . And please don't insert the paragraph, typist, until I get finished with this, because I want it in the same paragraph as the above, if not the same sentence.

TRELEVEN: Editor, no paragraphing at this point.

HALDEMAN: I was at the time--and I'm not sure where I stand now, because I haven't really studied it at this point--but I was at the time opposed to tuition

at the University of California. So I am separating my philosophical belief in tuition with a pragmatic belief that it was proper and good at that time that the University of California provided an education without charging tuition. And I would not be in favor of tuition if there were not major ways of providing assistance up to the point of total assistance in meeting the needed tuition for those students who were qualified but unable to provide the funds themselves. And that goes back to what I explained or what I talked about in the previous-- you can make a paragraph now, I've made the point--goes back to the previous discussion we had in an earlier session, which was my concept at Cal Arts of charging a tuition that reflected the full cost of each thing. If you were a dance major you'd pay one level of tuition. Translated into the University of California, if you were going to med school you'd pay \$10,000 a year tuition or \$20,000. It's probably \$30,000 now. I don't know what it is, but I remember it was some horrendous amount. But you should have to be charged that, and then after being charged it,

and concurrently with being charged it, it was incumbent upon the institution to see that the institution and/or society provided the means for your paying that tuition, whether it was by loans or grants or direct gifts or whatever, so that I believe in the tremendous value to the society of educating all of its people to the level that they are capable of being educated, and motivated to being educated, without placing before them the burden of meeting the financial cost of doing that unless or until they're able to either meet or participate in that cost. So I don't have. . . . I guess what I'm saying sounds What do you call it? One thing against the other

TRELEVEN: Contradictory.

HALDEMAN: Self-contradictory, but I really don't feel that it is. To me it's a very clear thing conceptually and ideologically. I think there are a lot of kids that go to the free universities as a way of avoiding going out and having to get a job. And it gives them an excuse to spend the time there instead of doing something else. And I think that we need to. . . . I was a great believer--

and I was a member of the Coordinating Council on Higher Education for a while--and I was a great believer in the Master Plan for Higher Education¹ in California. I thought the concept was outstanding, and I think its result at the time I saw it and was familiar with it in the sixties was proving that it was outstanding. The University of California had achieved great distinction and was continuing to enhance that distinction in the academic world and that the state colleges were outstanding in their milieu and that the city colleges or . . .

TRELEVEN: Community colleges.

HALDEMAN: . . . were there to provide a free education to everybody who didn't qualify for the higher levels of university education. I know it's unpopular to say, but I don't believe that all people are equally qualified. I believe that some people have more intellectual capacity than others and more physical capacity and stronger

1. Liaison Committee of the State Board of Education and the Regents of the University of California. A Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975. Sacramento: California State Department of Education, 1960.

motivation. And I think that it's foolish to provide a free education to someone who is not capable of using it, of absorbing it, or to try to, or to someone who is not sufficiently motivated to make the effort to acquire and use that education. But to the extent that they are able and motivated, I'm all for making sure that they have that opportunity, and I think the University of California system or the state system of higher education master plan was a wonderful blueprint for trying to accomplish that. I'm sure it had lots of flaws, but I think the idea, the desire was great, the motivation, and I think the implementation was.

TRELEVEN: Well, you look at the record of the construction that's going on in the sixties, not only UC but the state colleges and universities, and it's just mind-boggling to think that that could have taken place without a coordinative body.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: Even though I suppose in a way the coordinating body becomes a bureaucracy in and of itself.

HALDEMAN: Well, I think it did to some degree. But I don't know. I really appreciated the chance to serve

on the Coordinating Council, because it was a chance to see the operations. I had already been on the regents at that time. I had been on my alumni year on the regents.

TRELEVEN: Yes.

HALDEMAN: Or two years, so I was familiar with the University of California's governance. And then Reagan appointed me to the Coordinating Council after he became governor and after I went off the board of regents.

TRELEVEN: Oh.

HALDEMAN: So my time on the Coordinating Council was in the interim period between my regental periods.

TRELEVEN: Oh, I see. My god, you're reading my mind. I was going to ask you today, "Well, what did you do once you were no longer a regent up to the time . . . ?"

HALDEMAN: By that time I had established my bona fides with Reagan vis-à-vis the university and my interest in higher education and that sort of thing, so he had an interest in continuing my interest in that. Looking back I think it was fairly clear that he had an intent to appoint me to the board of regents, but he didn't have an appointment

until March of the following year or whenever the appointment time came.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: So in the interim he appointed me to the Coordinating Council on Higher Education. I think that was his or one of his staff people's idea, not mine. And I think it was a very good idea, because it did give me some time, not very long, but I went religiously to the Coordinating Council meetings and was as active as I could be, you know, with time constraints on the Coordinating Council and learned a lot and got to know Father [Charles S.] Casassa of Loyola [Marymount University] and Glenn [S.] Dumke of the state college system and the people that were the administrative leaders of that system plus the regental type people. There's the architect. [Charles] Chuck Luckman was the chairman of the trustees of the . . .

TRELEVEN: State colleges.

HALDEMAN: . . . college system and so on. I got an idea of their views and their concerns vis-à-vis themselves and the University of California and the problems between the two and the jealousies

and that sort of thing, which I think had I served my term as appointed regent would have made me a much better regent in a lot of ways, because I did have that quick but fairly intensive exposure to the rest of the system.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, just to nail this down, this would have been between July of '67 and December of '67 that you would have done that, because . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, I didn't go on the board until March of '68, did I?

TRELEVEN: Oh, that's right. Excuse me. So it would be July '67 up through early '68.

HALDEMAN: Early '68. I believe that's right.

TRELEVEN: Well, as long as we're talking about Reagan having appointed you to the CCHE, I was going to ask this question later, but I might as well ask it now. What were the circumstances under which Reagan did ask you to become a full-term regent?

HALDEMAN: Well, I'm not totally sure of all of them, because I think there were some things going on in the background that I didn't know about at the time and never found out about since. But I had taken the initiative in the '66 campaign of approaching the Reagan campaign and trying to be

helpful in whatever way I could in broadening their general understanding of the University of California and that sort of thing.

TRELEVEN: You explained about that.

HALDEMAN: And after Reagan was elected, Reagan and Finch were elected, I had the dinner to get them informally together with the regents, just so socially they had a talking relationship to start with when they started their business relationship on the board. Then I had a few months on the board as alumni regent while Reagan was governor, because he became governor in January and I was alumni regent until July, so I had six months of my alumni regent term. And I was the voting regent at that time where I was voting with them and participating with them and trying to work to continue that development of understanding. So I spent a fair amount of time with Reagan and a lot of time with some of his people as we went along there in that period. His people--I'm thinking of [Philip M.] Phil Battaglia, his chief of staff or whatever Phil was at the time, and a couple of other key people in the governor's office that didn't have

anything to do directly with the university--I think saw me as a pro-Reagan, pro-university person that was an asset to the administration and to the university, and I didn't do anything to discourage that. I tried to encourage it, because I. . . . By that point at least Bill Forbes and I think Ellie Heller. . . . Is she still living?

TRELEVEN: Ellie?

HALDEMAN: I think we talked about this before and. . . . Because I would love to confirm this with her, because I'm not sure what I'm saying is correct. But if it's confirmable, I'd like it to be confirmed before it became part of the official record. If it's not, I'll put it on as my opinion, unconfirmed. . . .

TRELEVEN: Okay, try me out.

HALDEMAN: . . . and that is that I had the feeling. . . . Ellie and I became good friends on the board, as Coblentz and I did. And I think Coblentz also It seems to me that both Ellie and Bill made the point. . . . They saw my relationship with Reagan and made the point to me that I should be appointed to a full term on the regents

when Reagan started having appointments. They felt my knowledge of the university and my interest in it and my political background was such that. . . . And I think they had confidence in me as a regent in terms of the interest of the university. They recognized that they might find Reagan's appointments not to be friendly to the university and that they wanted to have them friendly if possible.

TRELEVEN: Clearly Reagan was not going to appoint a Democrat.

HALDEMAN: Well . . .

TRELEVEN: I mean, Pat had a kind of a mixed record, you know. He appointed Forbes and . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and I think maybe. . . . I don't know whether. . . . Did Reagan not ever appoint a Democrat? I would suspect that Reagan would have appointed a Democrat at times just as Nixon as president tried to appoint Democrats to key posts, but not a lot of them. I would not expect that his first appointments, his first two appointments would be Democrats, and they clearly weren't.

TRELEVEN: Right. Leading up to your own appointment, just

to fill in the background a little, Larry Kennedy's term was going to be finished. Larry had been appointed by Brown to finish out I think four years, and . . .

HALDEMAN: I know there were two seats coming up in March of '67.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: Or '68.

TRELEVEN: And the other one that [W. Glenn] Campbell got the appointment to came up somewhat unexpectedly, because Mrs. Chandler decided to resign early from the board.

HALDEMAN: Oh, was that it? I didn't realize it. So she went off . . .

TRELEVEN: She went off . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, this shows her into '68. Well, I guess that's okay.

TRELEVEN: She went off roughly two years before her term ended.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: And the seat that Larry Kennedy held, which is the one you were named to, that was coming up first, so I think that was the first known seat.

HALDEMAN: Well, Kennedy went off before Chandler, but

wasn't there somebody expiring? Didn't somebody else, yeah? Did Campbell take the Chandler seat?

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: It doesn't look like it on this chart, because they overlap.

TRELEVEN: Well, it's probably the way my lines read.

HALDEMAN: I would have thought there was somebody else on an appointed term that was expiring in '67, '68. What was Jesse Tapp? No, he was an appointed regent.

TRELEVEN: Anyway, that's a little of the background for '68. See, I can look through here on this other listing that I have and I'm sure I will find no other terminations. I should say terms expiring in '68. I'm sorry. I stand corrected. Einar Mohn's term expired. He was a labor guy, you might remember. So Campbell took his seat and William French Smith took Chandler's. Southerner to southerner.

HALDEMAN: That makes sense, because Chandler was on while I was still there as an appointed regent.

TRELEVEN: Yes, sorry. Now we got that straight.

HALDEMAN: Einar Mohn expired.

TRELEVEN: Yep.

HALDEMAN: That's it.

TRELEVEN: So it was you for Kennedy and Campbell for Mohn.

HALDEMAN: Campbell for Mohn. And both of those were expiring terms.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: And both of them were short-term appointments.

TRELEVEN: That's correct.

HALDEMAN: They had both been appointed as replacements.

TRELEVEN: That's correct.

HALDEMAN: Okay, that makes more sense.

TRELEVEN: Okay, anyway, that's part of the scenario. Could you I guess pick it up at that point?

HALDEMAN: Well, I think that what happened. . . . I made no secret of the fact that I was interested in serving on the board of regents. Battaglia knew that and I think the governor knew. I talked to the governor about it directly. I may not have talked directly with the governor, I may have left it to be filtered in. Bob Finch certainly knew it. So my interest in the thing was clear to the appointing authority.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: My backing was made clear. I understand that Ed Pauley, who became palsy with the governor in

some ways, and I think Ed told. . . . I think a number of the Democratic regents as well as Republican regents made it known to the governor that they felt I would be a good appointment. And I think that was what brought it on. And I think the governor's intent was to make that appointment, but he had to wait. He didn't have any seat to appoint.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: So he put me on the Coordinating Council as sort of a holding position pending the chance to make a regental appointment. And then when he made the regental appointment he put me on along with Glenn Campbell.

TRELEVEN: How'd he do that?

HALDEMAN: How did he do it?

TRELEVEN: Yeah, did he call you up, or do you remember?

HALDEMAN: I don't remember. I don't know. That's interesting, isn't it? I haven't any idea.

TRELEVEN: Anyway, were there any reservations in your mind at all about whether to accept?

HALDEMAN: No.

TRELEVEN: And at this point it's not in any way certain that Nixon has any further political ambitions?

HALDEMAN: Well, it must have been. We're talking about the spring of '68.

TRELEVEN: Well, you were named on March 4. That's when the announcement was made.

HALDEMAN: Nixon at that point was gearing up for running I think. I'm sure he was. I had been in some meetings aiming toward Nixon running. I had said that I was not going to be in the [presidential] campaign, that I was through with the political stuff, that I would help in any way I could, but that I was doing other things, including. . . . Then I accepted the regental appointment and did not at the time I accepted it intend to get into the campaign on anything other than an external advisory capacity. And as the campaign organization was being put together in April, which was right after I was appointed to the board, it became clearer and clearer that there was a real problem in the campaign structure in setting up how it was to be run. And the upshot of that was that I was strongly put upon by Nixon and the people that were putting the campaign together that I was badly needed and that I ought to work out the. . . . And by then I was in a

point with the family and everything else where I really didn't want to get into the campaign. And I went in. And some of the campaign historians have said that I was dragging my feet because I wasn't sure Nixon was going to get nominated, and I was waiting to be sure it was a sure thing before I hooked onto the thing. That wasn't the case at all. My concern was personal. I didn't want to get into it and for a lot of reasons didn't want to get into it. But I changed my mind and went into the campaign. I think I went in in May. In effect, what I did is for a while I said, "I'll put in a week a month. I'll come back here for one week a month and work with you." That's exactly how I started. I made a deal with them to come back to Washington or New York, where they were setting up the campaign organization. I said, "I'll spend one week a month in New York doing what I can, you know, help you get the thing set up and all." I felt I could do that and maintain my business tie with Thompson and maintain my new regental thing. I think I did that for maybe April and May or something. Then it became increasingly clear,

and I get more and more caught up in it, that I've got to do it.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, that seems to square with your record of attendance at the regents' meetings.

HALDEMAN: Does it?

TRELEVEN: Yeah, because you made the meetings March through July. There probably was not one in August.

HALDEMAN: Okay, that makes sense.

TRELEVEN: You made one in October of '68.

HALDEMAN: That was probably to say good-bye.

TRELEVEN: It looks like that might be true, although your resignation was not formally accepted until January of '69.

HALDEMAN: Well, I didn't resign until after the election.

TRELEVEN: Right, so that would have been . . .

HALDEMAN: Nobody believes this either, but I intended to finish the campaign and then come back here and be a member of the kitchen cabinet and have access to the White House and all that, but I had no thought of going into the government after the campaign. So I stayed on the regents, although I missed obviously some meetings during the campaign, because it got to the point where I just couldn't get away to get out here.

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: Then after the election, and right after the election, Nixon. . . . We went down to Key Biscayne [Florida] to do some planning with a key group on how we were going to set up the transition period, and he said, "You've got to stay through the transition period, because there's nobody here to run the thing and set up a successor." And then as soon as we started into that he then came up with wanting me to go to the White House as chief of staff. I had figured that he would probably ask me to come and that I would probably be his appointment secretary or something like that, and that I didn't want to do that and that I wouldn't. So I didn't intend to go back. And then when the chief of staff thing evolved and we set that up, it was an offer I couldn't refuse. As soon as that became clear that I was going to do that, I did make it known that I was going to resign. I don't know how and when I formally submitted my resignation, but I felt that there was no way I could serve--I think I mentioned this before--on both the regents and the White House staff, so I left . . .

TRELEVEN: Right.

HALDEMAN: . . . very reluctantly, because I realized within either four or eight years I would be out of the White House and I'd still have eight or twelve years of regental time coming, because my regental appointment carried through to 1984.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And I would clearly be out of the White House by, what, well, either '73 or '77. So I could have stayed on. I really did that reluctantly, because I had really looked forward to coming onto the regents and being on as a full-time regent instead of the one-year appointment thing.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. Tell me though. . . . And I won't get into the White House. We can remind the reader of the transcript that The Ends of Power was published in 1978, and it's really not the purpose of this interview to sort of rehash some of that. But I would be interested in knowing what you consider to be the chief inducement to, if I can put it this way, becoming roped into the Nixon campaign that year.

HALDEMAN: Well, the reason I got into the campaign is because the candidate said he felt it was

essential that I do so, that I was badly needed. The more I got involved in working with them in trying to set something up without me, the more I became convinced that I was badly needed. Maybe that's egotistical, but I think I was. There was a gap that needed to be filled, and we couldn't find a way to fill it, and I tried to with someone else. The net was that I felt that he had a chance to win the presidency with a good campaign and that he had a good chance of losing it without a good campaign and that if there was some way I could help make a difference in making it a good campaign instead of not a good campaign, I had an obligation to do it. And, you know, that stuff gets in your blood. You get like a firehorse; when the bell starts ringing, you're sort of ready to trot again. The more you get into the campaign, the more you get caught up in the context of the campaign. There's no doubt in hindsight looking back that that was a factor too, that as I was going back there on that one-week-a-month basis, I was getting more interested in the campaign and less interested in running the J. Walter Thompson

Company office out here.

The regent thing was. . . . Well, the biggest negative to coming into the campaign was family and personal situation. I really didn't want to do it and I didn't want to for the family's sake for a lot of reasons. The second was the regental appointment. The business thing was no drawback at all. I was ready to make a change or let whatever happened happen there, because as I said before, I'd gone as far as I could get basically, and the challenge wasn't really there, where the challenge was in the campaign. And I saw a real challenge in the regental thing. At that point I had to work for a living, so I couldn't just, you know, pull out and become a full-time regent the way Bill Forbes, for instance, had at that point and Phil Boyd and a few other people. But I was going to work out some way to either stay at Thompson for a while until I moved onto some other business thing that would provide an income while I did the regent thing. But the campaign became sort of a compelling draw, and I agreed to do it, thinking that I was going to be doing it for,

what, say, only--I went in May full time or June-- maybe five or six months, and I'd be back on the scene here. And a good chunk of those months would be the summer months when regental activity isn't going on anyway, so I wasn't going to miss much in terms of regental time I didn't think.

TRELEVEN: Well, was part of the backdrop about the increasing excitement the fact that the Democrats were so badly split and then came the famous Chicago [Democratic National] Convention and . . . ?

HALDEMAN: Well, I was in it by the time of the Chicago convention.

TRELEVEN: Oh. Pardon?

HALDEMAN: I was in the campaign.

TRELEVEN: Oh, you were in it.

HALDEMAN: That wasn't a factor.

TRELEVEN: What I'm leading up to though is, did part of the excitement build because it looked increasingly like Nixon really had a good shot because of what was going on on the Democratic side?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but it looked like that not because of the convention but because of the [President Lyndon B.] Johnson pullout and the concern within the

Democratic party. It definitely looked like Nixon had a good shot at it. I don't think it ever looked, and it wasn't, a shoo-in at all. And having been burned in '60 when we thought we had won an election and turned out not to have . . .

TRELEVEN: In Illinois, right?

HALDEMAN: Illinois and Texas. I didn't feel it was a sure thing by any means, which is why I didn't resign from the Thompson Company. I took a leave of absence in '68, because I intended to come back to Thompson. I took the regental appointment, because I intended to come back to California and serve as a regent. I did not think through to the likelihood of my serving in the White House.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Well, our follow-up questions are taking quite a while.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: It's good, because we covered some stuff that I was going to get into sooner or later. Last week, if I can keep my mike on, I think when we ended we were talking about some aspects of the student rebellion, especially at Berkeley. And the context which I probably don't have to remind you of: the Free Speech Movement (September 19-

December 9, 1964) of '64 and just read through '65, '66, '67, '68, Obscenity Rally (March 4, 1965), VDC [Vietnam Day Committee] Rally (February 2, 1966), PROC [Peace/Rights Organizing Committee] Protest (March 24, 1966), Navy Table and Strike (November 30-December 6, 1966), Stop the Draft Week (October 16-18, 1967), Dow-CIA Protest (November 6, 1967), Sproul Hall Mill-Ins (November 29-December 1, 1967), Sproul Hall Sit-In (October 22, 1968) and so on. That's the milieu in which you found yourself as a regent. What I guess I'd like to ask you is what exactly were you and other regents subjected to when you would go to meetings?

HALDEMAN: Well, I don't think we were subjected to. . . . Well, we were, actually, at times. What happened, I wouldn't characterize all this under an umbrella of being subjected to, because subjected to has an adverse connotation, that it was a hardship that we had to endure that we shouldn't have had to endure, and I don't put all of this under that kind of category. But I found that I think right at the start, although I don't remember it in the context of the first regents'

meeting that I went to, but that regents' meetings had become a focal point or one of the focal points of the student unrest activity and student demonstration activity. Therefore, we had to go through student demonstrations in order to get into the regents' meetings and that sort of thing. And I'm not sure whether that was right at the outset or whether that built over the time, but it certainly built.

TRELEVEN: Okay, let me interrupt here. I'm going to have to change the tape.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Okay.

[End Tape 5, Side B]

[Begin Tape 6, Side A]

TRELEVEN: Okay, we're back on, and you were . . .

HALDEMAN: Okay, what were the regents you said subjected to, and I said, what did they have to do?

[Laughter] We were faced with the demonstrations and the expressions in various forms of student dissatisfaction with various things that the regents were purported to be doing or were about to consider or whatever. That was in the form of gatherings of students who would chant slogans or shout their views to us as we'd come and go from

meetings, holding up signs, expressing their views. As I recall, the meetings were not. . . . Most of the meetings were not open to student attendance. When you get to the formal meeting, the meeting, that's a public meeting.

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: But the other meetings were committee meetings and that sort of thing. Am I right that they were not open?

TRELEVEN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Students couldn't willy-nilly come in and sit in on a meeting. We would bring students in. In those days the regents did what I felt was a very good practice, which was to meet once each year on each campus. We had monthly meetings on Thursday and Friday and with often some preliminaries on Wednesday that were conducted by rotating from one campus to the next. And there was a very concerted effort on the part of the administration and the regents to expose the regents to the campuses in various ways. A little hard to do, because you have a board of twenty-four people plus the retinue of staff and facilities types that go along with it. It's a

fairly large group and it's hard to develop personal exposure. But there was I thought a very worthwhile effort. We, for instance, would have breakfast, luncheons, and dinners that would be attended by faculty members in one case, students in another case, maybe outside people that were brought in as resource for one reason or another in other cases, but related to the campus. We would have usually some campus tour kind of a thing, some exposure in depth to some particular activity on the campus or facility that the campus was involved in at that moment or something like that so that we were getting a flavor of each campus physically and through the students and the faculty and the administration of that campus in some depth as well as the overall university activity that would take place in the general regents' meetings. And I thought that was good. We used those. . . . They did a good job of mixing us up. If it were a lunch with students, they'd have three regents and six students at each table or something of that sort so that there was direct conversational exposure. It wasn't that the regents all sat

over at their table and the students sat over here and someone made a welcoming speech and all that. They tried to deformatize it as much as they could. And the regents, most of them, most of the time, I think made a conscious effort to do that too, although it would get in the way of the business of the meeting, let's say, at times, but nobody seemed to mind that. I thought that was great. I understand they don't do that anymore, and I think that's too bad, because I think it was very valuable for us to do that.

TRELEVEN: Well, they swung away from it for a while.

HALDEMAN: Are they back to doing it?

TRELEVEN: Yeah, they do meet at various campuses again.

HALDEMAN: All of them though?

TRELEVEN: I think so.

HALDEMAN: I thought that they had three or four meetings at Berkeley and three or four at UCLA and scattered one or two meetings somewhere else.

TRELEVEN: No, they went that way. For quite a long time they were held at just Berkeley and Los Angeles. That was later.

HALDEMAN: Well, clearly that's easier. That's easier for the regents. It's easier for the campus, because

we were a terrible pain in the neck to the host campus when we appeared, because they had to turn themselves upside down. And some of the campuses didn't have the best facilities for the various types of meetings, because we had the small committee meetings and then the big board meetings and then the public meeting and the caucuses and then these luncheons and dinners and that sort of thing that were difficult for the campuses to handle, but they all did it in their own way and I thought did it very well. It was a good thing to do. I think it's worth the effort and expense. It was harder. . . . There weren't good places to stay at some of the campuses and that kind of thing, but they always found ways to work that out. But in each of those we were exposed to the student movements and we realized, and I think to varying degrees maybe--I certainly did--that what we were seeing was not an expression of the total student body, it was an expression of a segment of the student body on the campuses. So, you know, I was interested in what they were saying and I was concerned about the way they were going about it in some cases.

But I wasn't overly upset about most of it.

You said, what were we subjected to, or something, what did we have to undergo? I forget how you worded it. But there were a few things that we did, the most notable of them being the one occasion that I won't ever forget at Santa Cruz when we were. . . . That was one of the campuses incidentally that we posed a difficult problem for the campus, because it was just in the development process. They didn't have the facilities to accommodate us well for our meetings or for our living accommodations. And it was worked out, but it was difficult for them. We moved around the campus by bus, because it's a fairly extended campus in the residential colleges. You'd move from one, and we'd go out to look at things at the other end where they were going to build the new college and what was going on. And it's quite a hilly campus and little, winding roads, and we were going by bus. Reagan was in the bus that I was in, and it was like an old school bus as I recall. We were being moved from one place to another for something, and a group of students, demonstrating

students, blocked the road and then started rocking the bus and spitting on it and shouting obscenities. It was a mean occasion. It was not what I would call a proper or a justifiable kind of demonstration. It went beyond the acceptable limits. And there was a real concern that they might tip the bus over off the road and down the hill, because we were on one of those winding, hilly roads, and that was a scary moment. I had another one like that in the presidential campaign in San Jose when a group of demonstrators started throwing rocks at the presidential motorcade, which was also scary, because they had stopped it. There we did have secret service protection and police and all that and were able to work our way out. At the regents' meeting we didn't. There were campus police, but it wasn't adequate to deal with this for the moment. We got through it, and it was okay.

That became. . . . That kind of thing tended to become intense at times, and there were unpleasant sort of facings off at times. The one that upset Reagan so much when they shouted,

"Fuck you!" to the governor at I think a meeting at UCLA. That was in a formal meeting, and a student just stood up in the audience and shouted it out as a reaction to something Reagan had said as a regent in the meeting. So there were problems and there were concerns. The concern from my viewpoint was one that continued when I went into the administration, which was just the sheer question of governance of the university and letting this kind of thing get in the way of the ongoing business of the university. That did concern me as a regent.

TRELEVEN: In a sense that when you should have been. . . . When the regents should have been spending a lot of time on policy . . .

HALDEMAN: No, we could have solved that. That wasn't the problem particularly. It was the problem of letting this happen and get in the way of really not the regents' business, but the university's business, the education of students.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: And the continuing ongoing research. You know, the normal campus activities. And the normal student activities, the nonacademic activities,

because this was disrupting all of those, including the football games and all of that kind of stuff, you know, things that everybody saw as part of the overall campus life. It was being distorted. I could see why they were demonstrating, but I was not sympathetic to the route they were taking to express their views when it got past a reasonable level.

TRELEVEN: How about what I might call the changing content of student newspapers at that time? Especially the four-letter words, etc. Did that . . . ?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, that bothered me. I remember there was an issue of some play that was being put on.

TRELEVEN: I think it could have been Ergo, if I remember.

HALDEMAN: I don't remember what it was, but I remember there was something that was going to be staged as a thing that had nudity and obscenity . . .

TRELEVEN: Sounds like Ergo.

HALDEMAN: . . . and stuff in it that didn't seem like it was appropriate for the university stage. That kind of thing I was opposed to. And I was opposed to the [male-female] cohabitation in student dormitories and university living facilities and that sort of thing. In today's

age that sounds incredibly mid-Victorian, but at the time I was very much in the main line of society, maybe not the main line of the university, or at least some of the university society, but certainly of the general society. I felt it was harmful to the kids, harmful to the university, and unnecessary, you know, and I was not in favor of it. And it did involve regental time. I wasn't so concerned of the fact that we had to spend time on it; I thought we did have to spend time on it. It was a factor in the university's administration that needed to be dealt with. And if the administration wasn't dealing with it or wasn't satisfactorily dealing with it, that made it a regental concern.

TRELEVEN: I take it as an old ROTC person you did not have any sympathy with those who wanted to see ROTC completely off the campus.

HALDEMAN: No, you're right, I did not. I don't know that Well, obviously my ROTC background was a factor in that, but I suspect that had I had no ROTC experience I would have still had the same view. I felt that ROTC was an established and valid part of campus, a valid ongoing campus

program.

TRELEVEN: Where did you feel the university should draw the line, because you mentioned theatrical performances? It may have been Ergo, it may have been something relating to the Vietnam commencement, and the content of student newspapers--these are functions in a way of student government. Shouldn't students, those who are interested in those aspects of student government, have the ability to have a pretty wide license . . . ?

HALDEMAN: Well, there's no question that they have the ability. They proved they had the ability. The question is whether they should have been permitted to exercise that ability. And again sounding mid-Victorian, I felt that there were limits to that as I feel that there are limits to the right of the free press and free speech in society. It goes back to the old saw that the right to free speech doesn't entitle a man to stand up in a crowded theater and shout fire. I think that we had a lot of people standing up in a crowded theater shouting fire on our campuses. And I think a person as an individual

has a right to do anything that is not unlawful in order to express his views or to go to the bathroom or whatever else he needs to do. But I don't think that a student on a campus, and this goes back to my tuition view also, who is being subsidized by the general public who is paying for his education and paying a lot of money to give him the privilege of coming to a campus, I don't think he has the right to take the time and use the facilities of the campus or of the system in order to carry out some of his lawful activities which are offensive or obstructive to the campus world, first of all. And secondly, I don't think he has the right as a citizen to do them if they're unlawful. And I think that the students in these cases were engaged in both obstructive and disruptive things to the campus, and in some cases things that were clearly on the face of them also unlawful. The unlawfulness is just another degree of it, though. I think that there is a higher burden on the student in the university than there is on the homeless citizen on the street.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: But I still don't think the homeless citizen has the right to urinate on a building or defecate in somebody's front lawn any more than I think the student does at the university.

TRELEVEN: Okay. And vis-à-vis student newspapers, that it's unlawful to use the kind of language that had not been used before?

HALDEMAN: I don't know that it's unlawful. When I say unlawful I'm talking about the statutes of the state and the nation. When I'm saying improper or impermissible, that's within the rules of the university. I think that when you become a student of the university you accept the responsibility of living by the regulations of that university, not just the laws of the state and nation. That if the regulations of the university say that students living in campus dormitories must be in their dormitory by ten o'clock on weeknights, then I think you by moving into the dormitory accept that regulation and that you're subject to disciplinary action if you violate that. I think that if the university has a regulation that says that obscenities, and they can define whatever they want as obscenity, are

not to be used in student or university sanctioned or financed or endorsed or affiliated publications, if that's the regulation, I think that when you become editor or contributor to the Daily Bruin or the Daily Cal [Daily Californian] or whatever it is up there, that you are required to live by those regulations. I think that as a student on the university campus you have a right by the established procedures to seek to change regulations that you feel are oppressive or improper or undesirable, but that you have to do that through the established routes. And if you don't like that you have the obligation to leave the university and not to tear it apart. And that I realize is an unpopular view in many forums, but it is my view, and I feel it applies to all sorts of levels of society, not just the university. But it definitely applies to the university. Attending the University of California is a right, it is not a privilege. I mean, it's a privilege and not a right, excuse me.

TRELEVEN: Okay, we have a situation where we encourage students to join student government, participate

in student government, and in the context of various demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, Associated Students funds were used in one case for bail money, in another to hire attorneys. Now this is Associated Students money. The students vote democratically that this is where the money should go, and yet the regents are not happy with that. I guess what I'm after here is what your sense is of the connection between Associated Students UC money and the regents.

HALDEMAN: All right, maybe I can make an analogy that will do it a little bit, which would be the relationship between state and national government. We encourage the states to elect their own governments and to govern themselves, but they must do it within the constitution and they must do it within the overriding federal laws. A state cannot pass a law that conflicts with the federal constitution or with the federal law. I would say that the ASUCLA cannot take upon itself, or the student council cannot take upon itself, an action that is prohibited by the rules and regulations of the regents or of the individual university campus as promulgated by

the chancellor or the appropriate ruling, governing authority of the campus. I think that, sure, we encourage students to come into student government. We don't encourage them to tear down the university. We encourage them to come into the student government to learn how to govern themselves and to learn by practice the process of self-government. And the process of self-government requires responsibility. When you say the students vote to use those funds, I suspect that those funds were not voted by the students, they were voted by the student councils.

TRELEVEN: No, I thought that's what I said--student government.

HALDEMAN: Okay, I thought you said the students. And if it were the . . .

TRELEVEN: No, it's . . .

HALDEMAN: Then you can argue and I'll agree with you that the student government is representative, a representative government of the students. It's elected by the students. Having served on election boards and having been involved in the election process at all levels of this country, I know that our elected representatives do not

necessarily represent the views of their constituents. They represent their own views and what they believe to be the best for the thing that they're doing, and that's the way our system works. And I agree with that and I agree with it in the university context. But I still think that the student government does not have the right and should not have the right to violate state law or to violate university regulations. And the regents have the right and the responsibility to determine the university regulations. They are appointed by the elected representative of the people of the state to represent the state in the governance of the university. They expect the regents to govern the university in the way that the people of the state want it governed, when you get down to it, because they are the ones that are paying for it. And the people of the state, I can guarantee you, if you take any kind of majority viewpoint of the people of the state, they were not in favor of what was going on on the campuses.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. Tell me, at [University of] Wisconsin, which was another hotbed during that period, the

legislature acted swiftly in raising--probably doubling, something like that--out-of-state tuition, partly because the perceived demonstrators were often "Jewish kids from the east."

HALDEMAN: Really?

TRELEVEN: Was there anti-Semitism in California also, because there was Art and Jackie Goldberg and there was Marc Eisen and people like that? Did you sense any . . . ?

HALDEMAN: I don't sense that it was anti-Semitism at all. I think that . . .

TRELEVEN: You know what I mean, the old Jewish-communist connection that can be raised in some people's minds.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but that is I don't think you're anticommunist because the communists are Jews. I think you may be upset with the Jews that become communist if you're anticommunist. But I don't think the concerns about Angela Davis were because she was black. I think she got away with a lot of what she got away with simply because she was black. I think she used that and I think maybe some of the Jewish people use anti-Semitism

as a way to justify another cause that has no relationship to Semitism or anti-Semitism at all. And I don't know that. . . . Mario Savio wasn't Jewish I don't think. It's not a very Jewish name anyway. And no, I guess maybe Abbie Hoffman was.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, I mentioned several other names: Art Goldberg, Jackie Goldberg.

HALDEMAN: I don't even know who they are.

TRELEVEN: Marc Eisen.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, Marc Eisen rings a bell. My feeling again is that anti-Semitism was not a factor in . . .

TRELEVEN: Well, I thought I'd ask, because I've . . .

HALDEMAN: I don't. . . . I mean, on the board of regents, I don't know who were Jewish, but I'm sure there were Jewish regents on there. I don't recall any division of the regents on. . . . I don't know, Coblentz I guess is Jewish. Ellie Heller I think was Jewish. Norton Simon is Jewish. Bill Roth is Jewish, I guess. Aren't they? I was going through the people who I said were Democrats and I was wrong, so maybe I'm wrong about the people who are Jewish. But I don't think that. . . . I didn't sense any anti-Semitic context in there at

all.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Another thing that came up while you were a regent in these hurly-burly times had to do with student records. In fact, Eisen sued the regents because the regents were going to release registration information which would include the history of one's participation in student organizations and the purposes of the organizations and the officers of the organization. These are organizations that are officially sanctioned by the university in the mechanism that it has. After some debate, after Roger Heyns's objections--this was September '66--you made a motion to make available the records. It was seconded, and the regents passed it. Now, can you recall why you felt the way you did about that issue?

HALDEMAN: No, I can only surmise why I felt the way I did, which would be that there was no reason not to release the records, and the people. . . . I don't understand why there would have been any. . . . If they were organizations sanctioned by the university, why the university would be under any obligation to keep them confidential.

TRELEVEN: Okay. How did you feel about the faculty senate at Berkeley in that it seemed to often support student dissenters?

HALDEMAN: Well, I have a concern about faculty not exercising its responsibility as leader of the students to some degree. I think in a lot of cases you had instances of faculty weakness in terms of faculty succumbing to student demands or appearing to when it wasn't necessarily their own feelings. I think the faculty, each individual in the faculty has a right to his own views. I think he's got an obligation to his employer to again support and enforce the regulations of the institution by whom he's employed. And I think as an individual he's entitled to express his views. As a faculty member he's obligated to conduct himself as a faculty member. Talking about the senate en masse is very difficult, because I think there were a few very vocal people in the senate activity, as there were within the student body, who were heard out of all proportion to their numbers or their academic weight or their intellectual weight for that matter. Those things tend to get distorted, and

I think it's unfortunate that they do. The impression in the country at that time was that all students on all college campuses were antiwar and antiadministration and anti-American, and that was not the fact. The fact was that about 80 percent of the students on the university campuses across the nation were pro-American and about 60 percent or 70 percent were prowar, which astonished me. But they felt the United States was doing the right thing in Vietnam. Now that changed as time went on and it changed as far as the president was concerned. I mean, he felt we were doing the wrong thing. He was trying to get out, but nobody understood. That's a whole other issue.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, right.

HALDEMAN: But I had a range of concerns about the senate. I have a range of concerns about the practice of tenure and the abuses of it and about the ability of again a vocal minority to manipulate a silent majority in many cases. And I think that was then--I have no idea what happens now--I think that was then a factor in some of the actions within the senate.

TRELEVEN: Okay, I want to come back to faculty in a minute, but just . . .

HALDEMAN: You've got to break for a second.

[Interruption]

TRELEVEN: Okay, we're back on. One of the areas involving students that evolved in the sixties involved equal opportunity and affirmative action programs, where the institutions such as the University of California would find ways to provide a better opportunity for nonwhite students, and in the case of professional schools, women students, than it had in the past. Where did you stand on that particular issue or area?

HALDEMAN: I'm not sure whether we got into that area and anything that required a stand. I think I can tell you how I would. . . . If I did, how I think now I would have stood and probably did if I did get into something and where I would stand today, which is consistent, which is that I am and I'm sure was then strongly in favor of equal opportunity. I am strongly opposed to affirmative action as it's come to be practiced, which is affirmative action that is

retrospectively designed to redress grievances of the past, because I think the past is the past and I think you can't redress those. I think we must recognize that we were wrong and we must stop being wrong, but I don't think we have to start being wrong in the wrong direction, in another direction, in order to undo the fact that we were wrong in one direction. And I don't think it solves the problem of the past by doing that. I firmly believe that a student should be admitted to the university on his own merits, academically or by whatever standards are established for admitting students. If by providing financial help or pre-tutorial help or any of that sort of thing to an individual who has the promise but not the immediate capability and does have the motivation or something like that, I'm all for it. But when it comes down to where I feel we have tended to go in some cases and may still be of saying that we didn't admit enough black students or enough Chinese students over the last thirty years, therefore we must admit three times more now for the next hundred years in order to make up for what we did wrong,

I think that's absurd. I think it leads to admitting people to the university and has led to admitting people to the university that were not qualified to attend. I understand and cannot back up and I may very well be wrong that the records show that we have admitted people to the university that should not have been admitted; that admission to the university did not by itself create a great student; that the person who was not an adequate student prior to admission proved not to be an adequate in many cases, not adequate student post admission, and was not a successful product of the university. And if I'm wrong on that, I apologize. That's my impression though.

TRELEVEN: I don't know what's right or wrong. I'm just asking questions. [Laughter]

HALDEMAN: Well, you may know on that, because I'm sure there are records on it. I know there's been and I have the feeling that I've seen information in the press that tends to make that point, which is the reason I'm saying it. It's not anything that I have no personal knowledge. But as a matter of principle, I don't think it's right to tell the

highly qualified, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant to our law school that he cannot be admitted because there is a Chinese female who is not nearly as qualified, but because we have been short of Chinese females for the last three years, she's going to get in instead of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male. And vice versa, I don't think we should keep the Chinese female out if we're short of our quota of WASPs at the moment either.

TRELEVEN: An example that runs pretty close to Allan Bakke in the medical school at UC Davis.

HALDEMAN: Was that while I was on the board?

TRELEVEN: No, that was in '74.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I thought it was after.

TRELEVEN: Bakke v. the Regents, U.S. Supreme Court Case.¹

HALDEMAN: And what was decided? That we have to admit him?

TRELEVEN: That decision helped to establish what became the guidelines for affirmative action, which affirmative action in its positive sense means if you have two individuals and they're equally qualified, equally well qualified in every

1. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978).

respect, we'll take the minority, we'll take the nonwhite.

HALDEMAN: I'd even have a problem with that, but I have much less of a problem with that than I do with what I understand is often the application, or at least was, of going the other way, taking a less qualified. I know affirmative action in hiring policies has gone the other way, has been forced to go the other way. And I know it is from the development business and the construction business and minority business. . . . I mean, [United States] Small Business Administration stuff, and it's grossly abused. I suspect and I think that I've understood that that was also the case with university admissions and retention system, but I may be wrong. I don't know about it in the faculty hiring system. I don't know how it fits there.

TRELEVEN: Well, I think back in the sixties . . .

HALDEMAN: If I were a regent today. . . . If I were a regent. . . . If I thought then the way I think now--and I think I did think then the way I think now--if I were a regent then, I would oppose on principle, and maybe it would be mitigated by

circumstances, but on principle I would oppose the concept of admitting a less qualified person simply because he or she had some minority identification.

TRELEVEN: Okay, including athletes?

HALDEMAN: Including athletes.

TRELEVEN: At UCLA?

HALDEMAN: At UCLA.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Enough of that.

HALDEMAN: I totally mean that. Now, I said there . . .

TRELEVEN: Because you know there have been some problems.

HALDEMAN: I know there have. I also would say that there also are mitigating circumstances. I think in anything you need to recognize that principles You can have a principle that is sound and solid, but it doesn't necessarily encompass every possible human condition that might arise. For instance, I know in the old days, and I don't know whether it's still true, but there used to be I think it was a 2 percent chancellor's leeway in admissions or something. The chancellor has some degree, some discretionary thing where the chancellor is permitted to admit a certain number of people who

are not otherwise qualified for the university.

TRELEVEN: Right, opportunity funds which come out of I believe one of the endowments . . .

HALDEMAN: It's opportunity funds, but that's funding, but isn't that also on admission . . . ?

TRELEVEN: It's funding to support the chancellor's discretionary ability.

HALDEMAN: Okay, see, I'm in favor of that. I understand for instance at Stanford, where both my daughters went to Stanford, and my son, his life ambition was to go to Stanford, and he didn't get in. So . . .

TRELEVEN: It paid to be a female, I guess.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, it did. And Stanford has I know a very arbitrary admission policy and doesn't make any bones about it. They admit in order to achieve balances of all kinds. And the balances are not simply minority related, they are related to seeking to achieve a balanced community on the campus. I don't think it's by quota, but I don't know. I think it's by a judgmental factor of, you know, this kind of thing.

TRELEVEN: So cutting across socioeconomic lines as well.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and I'm not telling tales out of school,

but one of my daughters had a boyfriend in high school. Both of them applied to Stanford and both of them had a burning desire to go to Stanford. The boy was outstanding, an outstanding student. He went to Harvard School, private school here in Los Angeles, and my daughter went to a private girl's school in Los Angeles that was a comparable school. He was near the top of his class and was an athlete, had done all kinds of extracurricular activity things, and, you know, superqualified, was Jewish, so he had a minority qualification in a sense I guess, had really everything going for him. My daughter is a very charming, likable, good student, but not outstanding; interested in activities, but no leadership roles in high school. Her record was not the record that dazzles you when you're on the Coro Foundation board or a UCLA Alumni Association scholarship committee or something like that, where her boyfriend's was. She was admitted and he was not to Stanford. And looking at that she felt that that was really unfair, and it was unfair, and life is unfair. I totally support Stanford's

right to decide who they want to put in there and who they didn't, and apparently they had enough of what he was to meet what they felt was needed in that, and they didn't have enough of what she was, so they put her in. She loved Stanford, she was a good student, did well, and I'm sure will uphold the honor of the university in the years ahead. But that was kind of unfortunate from the two of their viewpoints. He ended up going to Berkeley where he was admitted to the University of California, went to Berkeley and distinguished himself, and went to some other school and has done extremely well and has done extremely well in the outside world. Anyhow, I guess I've said enough, haven't I? I've probably covered the subject to death, but I just don't think there's any justification to actual quotas or to a quota system, and I think we're in real danger in society of being forced into that area.

TRELEVEN: Well, you and President [George H. W.] Bush agree.

HALDEMAN: Yep, we do. We agree on a lot of things.

TRELEVEN: I want to talk about students a little bit, because, like it or not, it was something that

was very visible. I'm talking about the 20 percent students and the dissent in the sixties, dissent against the war, rebellion against cultural, social mores, etc. But I don't want this to obscure the fact that you were on committees when you joined the regents. I guess this turns us into more sort of nitty-gritty things. I think what I'd probably like you to do is just to tell me what you remember that is significant, that has stuck in your mind about the two years you were on the Audit Committee. And somewhere I think I sent you a sheet . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I have the sheet with the committee assignments. I hate to admit it, I don't have any--unless you can trigger me--I don't have any committee-related recollections in any specific sense at all.

TRELEVEN: Okay, whether it's Audit or Educational Policy [Committee]?

HALDEMAN: I remember that there were lots of interesting Audit I remember as being a fairly routine kind of a committee thing. It was interesting because you did spend some time going through the financial structure, but that it did

not require any particular decision-making kinds of things. It was a review rather than a policy-making committee. I think we got into policy-making things in terms of reporting stuff and that sort of thing, but I don't think it was anything that was . . .

TRELEVEN: . . . relative. I suppose one of the chief policies is who you're going to hire as an external auditor, which for years and years was Haskins and Sells if I remember right.

HALDEMAN: Did we change while I was there? I don't think so.

TRELEVEN: No.

HALDEMAN: My recollection is that Audit was. . . That I didn't consider Audit a very important committee. And looking at the makeup of it, it doesn't look like the chairman did.

TRELEVEN: Educational Policy I think you mentioned last week you found to be quite interesting and somewhat fascinating and . . .

HALDEMAN: I did. And I remember thinking that there were lots of things. . . That that was the committee I wanted to be on. I don't know if I asked to be on any committees or I can't remember how the

process worked on that, but Educational Policy was--of the regental committees other than Finance--was the committee that interested me. But I've got to tell you that I can't come up with a specific on it. I have the general recollection that that was an area where there were always things of interest to be reviewed, discussed, voted on, and that it was a productive committee to be on. I liked being on things that do something and accomplish something. And there were controversial things which made them interesting. And also, looking at the makeup of the committee there is a fascinating collection of people [Philip Boyd, Elinor Heller, Edwin Pauley, Edward Carter, Dorothy Chandler, John Canaday, William Roth, Max Rafferty]. Many of them are the same as were on in '68-'69 with Rafferty replacing Glenn Campbell, I guess--I mean, Campbell replacing Rafferty. No, Rafferty is still there. Campbell replaced Canaday I guess.

TRELEVEN: Well, one thing that would have passed through Educational Policy is that it's a little hard to tell if you were there or not . . .

[End Tape 6, Side A]

[Begin Tape 6, Side B]

TRELEVEN: Oh, back on. It was the issue over the overage appointment of Herbert Marcuse at San Diego, philosophy. I don't know if that rings a bell with you or not.

HALDEMAN: It rings a dim bell. Try a little more as to what the issue was and maybe. . . . I think I probably was. . . . I was certainly aware of that, because the name I'm aware of. I don't recall the total specifics. I know he was controversial beyond being over age.

TRELEVEN: Controversial, considered a Marxist.

HALDEMAN: Is that it? Okay, he was a Marxist. . . .
Supposedly a Marxist.

TRELEVEN: Considered a bit of a guru of the New Left. And he had an overage appointment and he was recommended for reappointment by the then chancellor, which was. . . . Who was John Galbraith's successor? I'm not coming up with it, but I will, the guy who wrote the book The Year of the Monkey¹ about his San Diego

1. McGill, William J. The Year of the Monkey: Revolt on Campus, 1968-69. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982.

experience, [William J.] McGill.

HALDEMAN: Oh.

TRELEVEN: Who went to Columbia.

HALDEMAN: That's interesting. McGill recommended the reappointment or the continuation?

TRELEVEN: McGill recommended the reappointment, and it became an issue.

HALDEMAN: It was a big issue in the community too, wasn't it?

TRELEVEN: It was an issue in the community. Do you remember [Assemblyman] John Stull, who was an assemblyman?

HALDEMAN: No.

TRELEVEN: He was very outspoken. Higgs was fairly new on the board and even Higgs really wanted to support McGill and did and marshalled a campaign to collect signatures of prominent San Diego citizens, lots of Republicans included, to take to the regents' meetings. The thought was that Reagan really wanted to make an issue of this and to get rid of Marcuse because of his political philosophy. And at the same time, Higgs, while a self-described conservative Democrat, felt that he's the San Diego regent and he's going to

support his chancellor. Does any of this . . . ?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, it all has a very familiar ring to it. I don't know whether I can add to what you are saying. And I don't know which way. . . . Did I vote on it?

TRELEVEN: But committee wise, that would have gone through Educational Policy.

HALDEMAN: It would have. . . . Well, I don't know. I could have gone either way on something like that.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I can comment on the general thing a little bit, if that's useful, which would be that first of all, I would disagree. . . . And I think Higgs and I had this conversation. I have great respect for Higgs. I liked Higgs and thought he was very solid.

TRELEVEN: Higgs is a very likable guy.

HALDEMAN: But I disagreed with the parochial approach. I strongly felt then, and this is a general comment on the board of regents, I felt that regents were not like congressmen, elected to represent a constituency. And I'm not even sure congressmen are elected to represent a constituency in terms of voting on policy matters. I think a

congressman basically or a senator should vote on the basis of his knowledge as congressman or senator and try to bring his constituency with him rather than voting the way he thinks. . . . Polling his constituency and then casting the vote. I realize there are two schools of thought in that. But I felt even more strongly in that direction in terms of a regent of the university, because I felt regents were not appointed as representatives of any constituency; they were appointed as able citizens who would bring their best judgment to the business of the university. And it was incumbent upon me not to espouse a cause because it was a UCLA cause or a Republican cause or a basketball cause, to take the things that I was concerned with, but rather to look at the thing in my best judgment what represented the maximum benefit for the university. And I would say the same. . . . Higgs and I had this argument, because I disagreed with his thought that he was the San Diego regent and therefore should do something. Some of the regents are. There's a guy on there who used to be the agriculture guy [P. Allan

Grant, president, California State Board of Agriculture], that represented agriculture, and the guy who represented some library in San Francisco, which was ridiculous.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, Mechanics Institute.

HALDEMAN: Mechanics Institute. That's changed now, hasn't it?

TRELEVEN: That was changed in the 1974 proposition.¹

HALDEMAN: That seat is gone now?

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That's what I thought. And I think the ex officio regents do have some responsibility. . . . They're on by virtue of their office, they should represent the view of that office and the expertise of that office, the Superintendent of Public Instruction from his viewpoint and so on. But I don't think. . . . I think the governor should try to get some balance of representation on the regents, but I think since it was set up just as the president appoints the members of the Supreme Court, the governor appoints the members of the regents, it was set

1. Proposition 4 (November 1974).

up that the governor is elected by the people, and the assumption is that his appointments should reflect his views to some extent. And I wouldn't expect a governor to put a representative on that was radically opposed to his views. I don't think Higgs should have felt that because he was the San Diego regent he should support the San Diego chancellor.

TRELEVEN: I'm not sure about that.

HALDEMAN: No, he did.

TRELEVEN: Oh, he told you that?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and I understand why he did, because it was a new chancellor and he wanted the man to. . . . He didn't want him to come in with a major regental, public regental defeat and rebuff from the community, and I understand that. And forgetting that he's representing San Diego and instead he's representing the university, that's sound university-wide reasoning, in a sense. I mean, you don't want to shoot a chancellor out of the water in his own territory on his first round in his position in the university or whatever. Anyhow, as far as Marcuse is concerned, I don't know where I would have come out. I have a

natural aversion to a Marxist teacher, but I think I probably would have defended that, but I would have put some strong pressure on to find a radical anti-Marxist to countervail his views and permit his students. . . . We have a guy [Walter H. Capps] up here at Santa Barbara that is so anti-Vietnam War that you've probably heard of him, because he's become the great teacher of all time at the campus here. But he conducts these things where he brings people like [United States Senator J. Robert] Bob Kerry in.

TRELEVEN: Brings the veterans in?

HALDEMAN: Brings the veterans in.

TRELEVEN: He's a minister?

HALDEMAN: He may be a minister, a lay minister or something. I don't think he's an actual. . . . I don't think he's ordained. Maybe he is. But I don't agree with that. I think it's fine if he would do that and then if he would bring in [Melvin R.] Mel Laird or something, who was the Secretary of Defense at the time, or General or Admiral [Thomas H.] Moorer, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and let him talk about the other side of the coin, but he doesn't. I don't

think that's in the university tradition of exchange of ideas. But that's what happened. And I think we tend to get unbalanced, and academic senates tend to get unbalanced, and I don't think that's good. I don't know how you achieve true balance and I don't think that's necessary, but I do think you need some at least counterbalancing voices.

TRELEVEN: Well, the . . .

HALDEMAN: I was opposed to Angela Davis's appointment because I didn't think she was qualified. Marcuse as I understand it, as I recall, was a very qualified academician as well as being either an actual or a neo-Marxist.

TRELEVEN: Well, the larger issue became . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . who decides.

TRELEVEN: Well, yes. Who decides, and the regents had delegated the power of promotion and tenure to the president and the chancellors in concert with the Academic Senate.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

TRELEVEN: I must tell you my observation from looking through a lot of regents' minutes is that increasingly as the Reagan appointees had more

power on the board, increasingly the screening, if I could call it that, seemed to take place. And indeed, in the context of the Angela Davis case at UCLA, the regents revoked the power and did not give it back until Dave Saxon I think was the president '76-'77 or thereabouts. But also the other thing that strikes me is that questions were always raised about left-wingers. I don't recall seeing any challenge ever to, you know, a promotion recommendation or tenure recommendation to somebody who was ultraright. Now, maybe it was . . .

HALDEMAN: Have you ever found an ultraright-winger in the University of California faculty?

TRELEVEN: There are a few economics professors who are pretty damn far right.

HALDEMAN: At UCLA. They're pretty well counterbalanced in the rest of the system though. It's the only economics faculty in America other than [University of] Chicago that is right.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: So I think we're entitled to a little bit of American academic economic thinking somewhere. They aren't that far right either.

TRELEVEN: So I think that was--well, I don't know--so I think that was the larger issue of what's going on there. And of course, that was all exacerbated by the Angela Davis summer appointment [at UCLA]. And I think. . . . Where are we? I'm losing my time frame here. The summer appointment was made, oh, while you were a member of the board.

HALDEMAN: Angela Davis?

TRELEVEN: That appointment would have occurred, but you would have only attended. . . . No, that was '69. That's right, you'd left the board.

HALDEMAN: That's what I thought. Let's look at it in terms of principle. The regents had. . . . The fact that the regents had delegated this authority to the chancellor and the Academic Senate, whatever the process was, is de facto confirmation that the authority is the regents' authority. If it were not the regents' authority they wouldn't have the power to delegate it.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: So it is the regents' authority.

TRELEVEN: But you understand that there's this gray area because of the way IX:9 [Article IX, Section 9 of

the California State Constitution] is written, which does among other things mention the Academic Senate.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but it doesn't give the Academic Senate the power to appoint and dismiss faculty.

TRELEVEN: Well, through this mechanism that you're familiar with . . .

HALDEMAN: The Academic Senate must be consulted and their views heard, and that's fine. They should be. But . . .

TRELEVEN: But you're talking about who has the ultimate authority.

HALDEMAN: Right. And what I'm saying is the regents have the ultimate authority for the governance of the university under the constitution of the state of California. And on that basis, it's up to them to decide what's best for the governance of the university. And in their wisdom, in quotation marks if you like, they decided that that particular area should be delegated as they delegated it. They have the obligation to review or to observe the results of that delegation as any delegator always does. You can delegate authority. You can never delegate

responsibility. The regents delegated the authority to do those things, but the responsibility is nonetheless the regents'. Therefore, if the authority is being carried out in a way that the regents feel is not proper for the benefit of the institution, they have the responsibility to revise, overrule, or eliminate the delegation. And that's precisely apparently what they did on the Angela Davis issue. And I would say that the regents have a perfect right to review a delegated authority at any time. Now whether you do it on the basis of one individual case, as they did apparently in Angela Davis's case and apparently they were discussing in the Marcuse case, it gets into a tough, you know, decision area that you've got to decide on your best judgment at the time you're there and what you're doing. But you can't let the zoo be run by the inmates or the asylum be run by the inmates. The asylum has got to be run by some constituted authority, or you have anarchy. You can have input for the exercise of that authority. And I don't think it's unnatural that the issue of challenging this thing becomes more

intense, if in fact what you say is true, that as the board is more reflective of Reagan appointees than previous appointees, which is obviously going to happen when a governor is elected for eight years. That's what the Constitution of the state intends will happen. And if you don't like that you should have elected a new non-Reagan-like governor. Instead you elected--you meaning the people of California--elected another Reagan-like governor and another Reagan-like governor. I mean Pete [Wilson] is more liberal than Deukmejian, and Deukmejian is more liberal than Reagan, so we've moved away from it, but we've not reversed it. So the people of the state want a Republican governor for whatever reason. And one of the governor's jobs is to appoint regents, and he's going to appoint regents that tend to reflect his general approach to that particular assignment. And I think that's. . . . If you don't like the constitution, then you've got to change the constitution. You shouldn't change the system that it establishes.

I also think that my response to your point they always get upset about liberal appointees or

left-wingers and never get upset about right-wingers, I think my response is perfectly justified. I think you've got to look very hard and wide to find a certified right-winger on the University of California faculty. You don't have to look very hard to find certified left-wingers on any one of the branch's faculties. By anybody's definition of certified right-winger and left-winger. And that's not solely true of the University of California. That's true of the universities of the United States and probably of the world. And that's probably a sad reflection on the willingness of conservative people to devote their time to academics and education. They tend more to get into the outside world type of things.

TRELEVEN: Either that or left academics don't spend their time trying to figure out who the right-wingers are, bringing them to public attention.

HALDEMAN: Oh, yes they do. You knew right away where they were. [Laughter] And you're right. There are some conservatives in the economics department at UCLA, and that to me is a bright shining star in the University of California's crown.

TRELEVEN: That was Educational Policy, and we don't want to sell that area short though, because coming before that committee were, especially in this period of new campus building, curriculum plans, etc. . . .

HALDEMAN: Those were the kinds of exciting things that. . . . Dean McHenry's program at Santa Cruz, which, you know, was very exciting to think about and see if it would work. I don't know whether it has or not at this point. The jury was certainly still out when I was there.

TRELEVEN: It gets conflicting views from various people.

HALDEMAN: Well, I know there have been some successes and some failures, and that was probably inevitable. And without Dean really hammering to keep it going on that track, it probably isn't going to stay that way. But all of the areas of interest that the new campus and emerging campuses were going to aim themselves at, Irvine and Santa Barbara and so on, those kinds of issues to me were fascinating. The fact that they don't leap to mind now is not a result of lack of interest so much as it's a result of lack of notoriety I think. The other things became so inten. . . .

And also, there was lack of, less. . . . It wasn't emotional controversy. Where there was disagreement it was intellectual disagreement, and it was questions of emphasis and that sort of thing rather than questions of principle and deep feeling, and so it was intellectually interesting. It wasn't as emotionally stimulating I guess, and apparently at least in my case, and I am not so sure I'm unusual, the emotional things tend to live with us longer than the intellectual things do. We deal with them and move on with satisfaction that they've been solved and are properly proceeding.

TRELEVEN: I suppose one other thing does come to mind. I think that you were on. . . . It's this committee that would have been involved with [Eldridge] Cleaver's Social Problems 139X on the Berkeley campus. I don't know if you recall . . .

HALDEMAN: That was a course?

TRELEVEN: That was a . . .

HALDEMAN: Or a non-course?

TRELEVEN: That was a course taught by Cleaver.

HALDEMAN: As a faculty member? Was it a catalogued course?

TRELEVEN: As a guest lecturer.

HALDEMAN: So it was a catalogued course.

TRELEVEN: It was an experimental course.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: And that's part of the reason why it was controversial, part of the reason why, had this gone through the bureaucracy, you know, cleared the mechanisms that it should, did the Berkeley Academic Senate act properly in approving it in the first place? And then Cleaver spoke at various campuses around the state. It was quite controversial at that time.

HALDEMAN: Well, see, if they had brought Robert Welch in to conduct a similar course, probably everybody would have said, "Well, okay, we've got both sides, let them go."

TRELEVEN: Welch in later years must have had some influence on Cleaver because Cleaver was quite. . .

HALDEMAN: Cleaver shifted, yeah, I know that. [Laughter]
A lot of those guys did.

TRELEVEN: You were on Grounds and Buildings [Committee], and I suppose we were sort of nibbling at that when you were talking about the new campuses, Santa Cruz and . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, that was about. . . . Not really, because

our most immediate, recent discussion of the new campuses I was talking really about Educational Policy excitement and ferment . . .

TRELEVEN: No, I understand that, but . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . but also, the thing of the Grounds and Buildings thing was also fascinating to me. A great eye-opener in my first regents' meetings when I went in as the observer regent, the regent designate, I was just astonished at the amount of time, detail, and attention that the board of regents gave to the specific designs of building by building, even to the furniture layout of dormitory rooms. Things like that I thought was just amazing, that there was that much concern. And I was a little discon. . . . I thought that was good, although I felt it maybe went into more detail than we really had the expertise or the need to get into, you know. But we raised questions that were considered and judged to be valid, and things changed. And I must say that a lot of the things that got through. . . . We made some ghastly architectural and structural errors on our campuses. That either proves that the regents got into it too much and screwed it up or

didn't get into it enough to keep it straightened out and out of the hands of the architects and planners, I'm not sure which. But we did get into amazing detail. What bothered me was individual regents tended frequently to get into matters of architectural taste and judgment. I didn't feel that this was a group of people that were really qualified to say this is architecturally good or not. In the first place I don't know how anybody is, because two equally qualified architects will give you two exactly opposite views on the merits of a particular structure, so I'm not sure where you are. But anyway, it was clear that regents felt certainly the right if not the obligation to expound on those kinds of areas as well as the functional areas and policy areas.

TRELEVEN: Is this in general or anyone in particular?

HALDEMAN: Oh, it's in general really, because a lot of them did. But I know both Ed Carter and Buff Chandler, as I recall, very strongly would get into the architectural things and, you know, intensive discussions with [William L.] Bill Pereira or Welton Becket or, you know, the

various very eminent architects that would come and make very elaborate presentations with huge models and pages and pages of charts and flow diagrams and all that. At that point I had never been exposed to the development business. Now, looking back, it's not as surprising, because having gone through developing several major projects, I know what you do have to do to get your approvals through and all that. And I realize that a lot of what I never realized went on behind the scenes in developing something is really standard procedure.

TRELEVEN: Did you get a sense of how, if I can call it political, the selection of architects was?

HALDEMAN: Not really. It was clear that there were. . . . That people had their pets, and I don't know whether it was. . . . Political in what sense? I don't think political in terms of partisan politics.

TRELEVEN: No, no.

HALDEMAN: But political in terms of favorites . . .

TRELEVEN: Favorites.

HALDEMAN: And backing, I think there was. But I think it was, as far as I could see, it was an honest belief that one architect had a better concept of

what needed to be done on this campus than another might have and that therefore was the guy we should stick with to get this next thing done or whatever it might be. I didn't have any feeling that it was being done. . . . That there were preferences for anything other than the benefit of the project or the campus.

TRELEVEN: Were you in a position in the short time you were a regent to be exposed to the Irvine controversy?

HALDEMAN: Define it.

TRELEVEN: The Irvine controversy is essentially conflict of interest by several regents . . .

HALDEMAN: No.

TRELEVEN: . . . with the chief allegator, allegationist being Norton Simon.

HALDEMAN: Doesn't ring a bell.

TRELEVEN: It might have been a calm period when you were on the board, but both . . .

HALDEMAN: My recollections of everything with Irvine was that everybody was delighted that it was rocketing along in great shape. I know land acquisition things, we'd get into that question of conflicts and all, but I don't remember it in connection with Irvine.

TRELEVEN: Well, briefly, this involved the so-called inclusion area, an inclusion area that would be protected from commercial development around the campus, which the Irvine [Land] Company was willing to sell, but the price kept going up, and they each had appraisers and this, that, and the other thing. Simon--and this is all public record, it made the newspapers--came back with it in the seventies, in 1970, that there were individuals on the board like Carter and Smith, who being on the Irvine Land Company board . . .

HALDEMAN: Were they on the Irvine board?

TRELEVEN: Yeah. That there was a conflict of interest.

HALDEMAN: See, Smith was on the board after I was. He wasn't on when I was there, so it wouldn't have arisen with Smith when I was there.

TRELEVEN: And Smith and Carter never voted on any issue relating to Irvine.

HALDEMAN: Oh really?

TRELEVEN: So I just wondered if . . .

HALDEMAN: I think, you know, from time to time some of that is sort of fun and games, too, a little needling here, getting a zing at somebody for some reason.

TRELEVEN: You mean regents did that once in a while?

HALDEMAN: Maybe, yeah. I suspect so. I think all groups of people do that.

TRELEVEN: Finance, as you pointed out last week, you finally got onto the powerful committee, and here you are not being able . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . to even show up. I'm not sure I ever even went to a Finance meeting.

TRELEVEN: Is that right?

HALDEMAN: I don't know when I got on Finance. I suspect I didn't get on until July. I don't think they changed committees until fall.

TRELEVEN: You're right, because there is one meeting in the summer that is not held. . . . Excuse me, there is one month in the summer in which a meeting is not held. It begins in September. The meeting that is not held is in August.

HALDEMAN: But see, I don't think I went on to Finance when I first came on the board appointed in March.

TRELEVEN: Oh, I see what you're saying.

HALDEMAN: I think I didn't get on the committee until fall for some reason. I have a feeling I never got into Finance. If I did I sure didn't get into it much.

TRELEVEN: No, I think your memory is good, because the nominating committee usually comes in in June.

HALDEMAN: That's what I think, and then you start in the September meetings.

TRELEVEN: That's right, so I may be missing a little data here. The thing that comes to mind in terms of Finance Committee that I wonder if you were part of at all and that is Simon's complaints about the investments.

HALDEMAN: Yes, but I think I was aware of that from the board rather than the committee, because I think Simon raised it at the board level.

TRELEVEN: Yes, he raised it rather constantly, rather consistently. The issue there is, I guess, any kind of investment is how much risk you take and in this case how much risk the trustees of the public's money take. And Simon's attitude was with a better portfolio, a more diversified portfolio, the university could be bringing in a lot more money on its investments. This came up in the context of that first Reagan budget.

HALDEMAN: I remember there was a lot of that sort of thing, and that was sort of what interested me about the Finance Committee is. . . . And I don't think I

had a view on it. It was something I wanted to learn about and see where I came out.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, at that point a subcommittee of Finance was Investments, Subcommittee on Investments.

HALDEMAN: And that was just Pauley, Carter, and Simon, wasn't it?

TRELEVEN: Simon when he wanted to participate.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: Simon sometimes resigned from all committees, refused to be named to committees and so on. But as a conservative and as a capitalist I suppose, although I'm not sure of that, how do you look at yourself in that kind of a position as a trustee of public monies, of endowments, of pension funds? What kind of a portfolio do you feel you should have?

HALDEMAN: I think you've got to. . . . You can't. . . . Well, let's see if I can generalize in a way. I think really the obvious answer is the answer I would agree with, which is that you have a dual responsibility. You've got to invest the funds entrusted to you in a way that they will be as productive as they can be within the limits of reasonable prudence or safety or risk or however

you want to define it. And that's really a nonanswer. It's the obvious generalized statement, and it leaves right where you started, which is, well, how much risk can you take in order to make how much? How much is a reasonable return? And the greatest minds in the world will disagree on that constantly.

TRELEVEN: Economists.

HALDEMAN: Every economist disagrees with every other. Every financial adviser disagrees with every other. You know, even the guys that Louis [R.] Rukeyser gets on "Wall Street Week" don't agree week to week, so it's. . . . I don't know how you answer that question. I think what you. . . . My inclination is to push more for. . . . Is to accept probably a little higher degree of risk than the normal superconservative trustee would take. I'd be on the side of the taking a little chance in order to make more money if you could, because the actual. . . . You've got two missions. One is you've got to make as much money as you can, and the other is you've got to preserve the trust, the basic corpus. And I don't know. In personal investing I think you

follow a life plan where in your early days you take risk and as you get to my age and want to live off what you have you become more conservative. And in institutional investing we're going through this. . . . I'm on the finance committee of our church, and we're going through it right now, because we've just received two very substantial endowments, and there's a division in the church. Do we, you know, buy new carpets and repave the parking lot and plant some trees and do all this, or should we put this in a fund and only live off the income of it? And if we put it in a fund, should we put it in a high roller that will get 12 to 15 percent or a reasonable 8 to 10 or a conservative 4 to 6? You know, that's a tough decision to make, and you've got to make it in light of all the factors at the time. I would just say that's a reason to have a finance committee rather than just one person doing it. And I would think if you can have a finance committee with the ability that this university Finance Committee has in terms of experience and exposure to information and that sort of thing, that you ought to be in pretty

good shape. But they can certainly make mistakes too. I mean, everybody thought Executive Life [Insurance] Company was the greatest thing around, and Fred Carr really had it figured out.

TRELEVEN: I don't know whether to get into any more areas relating to finance. I suppose just maybe a couple questions. One, because in '66 there was a bonding initiative¹ that passed for the construction of university and college buildings. It was the same election where Reagan was elected governor. Would you as a regent . . . ? Well, would you do anything to urge people to vote for it, as an individual?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

TRELEVEN: What would you do? Or how would you . . . ?

HALDEMAN: Well, it would depend on what was needed. Certainly in personal conversation and in whatever opportunity I had speaking to groups or anything like that. As the alumni regent I pushed, and that was where I was at that point. The Alumni Association was strongly backing the bond issue as I think we always have. And we had

1. Proposition 2 (November 1966).

committees working to charge the Bruin Clubs up and send out mailings and did the standard things that you do to try and urge a favorable vote.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, that was Prop. 2, '66. Prop. 3, '68,¹ I guess you were pretty far, a bit removed from that.

HALDEMAN: I was involved in another election that year.
[Laughter]

TRELEVEN: It was the same kind of an initiative, which lost.

HALDEMAN: Oh, did it?

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I'll be darned. That's interesting.

TRELEVEN: I don't know how much it lost by. I don't see the statistics, I just have a listing here.

HALDEMAN: That I would have not been involved in at all even if I had had the opportunity, because working the presidential campaign, there's no way I would get into a local issue.

TRELEVEN: Right. Has California gone far enough in terms of bonded indebtedness through initiatives?

HALDEMAN: I don't know. I really don't. I don't know

1. Proposition 3 (November 1968).

enough to have a useful opinion on that. That always concerns me, because. . . . But I am not like some Republican conservatives. I am not opposed to indebtedness. I believe that proper debt is a good way to provide for growth. So I'm not per se opposed to bonded indebtedness, but I'm concerned about the ability to service. And if in fact we're doing the proper research on the bonds and we know that we can handle them, like the bonds for parking structures at UCLA I never worry about because you can get whatever income you need out of those.

TRELEVEN: You keep raising the rates. Five dollars as of July 1.

HALDEMAN: Really? That's nothing. I went downtown--I couldn't believe it--I went downtown to a dinner at ARCO the other night. I drove down from here and swung in just in time for the dinner, so I was going to park in the ARCO garage. And I swung into the entrance of the ARCO garage, and there's the sign: Parking \$25. To go in and eat dinner. And even though it was a free dinner I didn't figure the dinner was worth \$25, and I said the hell with it and I found another place

to park. But parking in downtown L.A., I hadn't been down there for a long time so I didn't realize what it was, and I don't think I'll ever go down again. But anyway, yeah, the parking is a problem. But I have no reading on the level of bonded indebtedness, the state's level or the university's at this point, so I don't know. And I don't understand the financial crisis we're in in this state. I haven't studied that at all and I'm aware that Wilson's got a bit of a problem on his hands. [Laughter]

TRELEVEN: I had here nuclear science fund, you became aware of that.

HALDEMAN: Yes.

TRELEVEN: It was kind of the upside of contracts with the national government I guess. Huge overhead. Did you have much to do with that?

HALDEMAN: No. That was. . . . I remember a visit to the Lawrence Livermore Lab and a visit to Los Alamos [Scientific Laboratory] and those were two-- especially Los Alamos--that was a real regent perk if you were around at the time of the Los Alamos visit. It was fascinating, and I was very much interested in what we were doing. We talked

about this a little in one of the earlier sessions. I am not opposed to the university's involvement per se. I can understand the reasons for concern about parts of it, but as long as it's furthering the national interest and advancing science and so forth, I see no reason that we shouldn't be participating. And it makes money for us.

TRELEVEN: Well, that overhead money has gone a long way.

HALDEMAN: Sure has.

TRELEVEN: And maybe here's the place to interject that, I think . . .

HALDEMAN: I trust that our overhead things are a little more in balance than Stanford's.¹

TRELEVEN: I can't speak for . . .

HALDEMAN: You really wonder about that. And the Stanford thing didn't really surprise me that much. I think, you know, I hope we haven't been getting away with the kind of murder that they have. But you wonder, because the temptation is certainly there. It's too easy.

1. Allegations arose in 1991 that Stanford University misused federal research funds and overbilled the federal government.

TRELEVEN: Right, the temptation in any project where there's that kind of money involved, because in the past I think grants related to medical education/health sciences, there would be a lot of loose change laying around.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: But I get the sense that the Stanford situation has put everyone on alert. The federal auditors may be walking in our direction.

HALDEMAN: Yes, I'm sure it has. I was just going to say I'm sure that whatever abuses there were are being carefully looked at at this point.

TRELEVEN: I thought I'd mention that I think I recall it was that fund that was also drawn upon in part to provide a loan to help get Pauley Pavilion built, but the regents ultimately had to come up with a little money.

HALDEMAN: The regents came up with substantial money, but they were committed to it. I don't know what fund it came out of.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, I think it was loaned out of that fund.

HALDEMAN: Oh really?

TRELEVEN: It's really been a tremendously important source, usually not outright, just like loans paid back

over a period to keep the corpus intact.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Well, I'm sure Pauley's paid back its loans.

TRELEVEN: Okay, what else do we have here? I have something called on-campus speakers from off campus. Again, it seems to me the lefties are picked on, whether it's . . .

HALDEMAN: And again, I'll ask when was there an off-campus speaker that was a rightie?

TRELEVEN: Good question. Young conservatives are not inviting righties to speak anymore?

HALDEMAN: Aren't they? I don't know. Not superrighties probably. The smart young conservatives would be inviting rational righties instead of superrighties. That was an issue. I know there was concern about that. It really is the same issue as the other things we were talking about in that context. There again, I think there should be a substantial effort--a determination, not just an effort, a substantial doing of providing balance. That if one side is presented, the other side ought also to be presented in equal opportunity. If nobody wants to come that's up to them.

TRELEVEN: Okay, honorary degrees, want to say anything about that? Why was there so much controversy over honorary degrees? That's not a political issue, is it?

HALDEMAN: I don't know. Was there? What was the controversy? Academic versus regents?

TRELEVEN: Well, sometimes they wanted to award honorary degrees to . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . donors.

TRELEVEN: . . . politicians.

HALDEMAN: Oh, and they objected to that?

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: The regents did?

TRELEVEN: Yeah. There was controversy amongst the regents over that.

HALDEMAN: Well, that I would think would be inevitable, because those on the side of the politician to be honored would be in favor and those opposed would be against.

TRELEVEN: Right. I'm trying to think of an instance during your period. I don't know if there was one.

HALDEMAN: I don't remember any. I remember discussions about honorary degrees and the concerns about some, but it seems to me it was less a concern

within the regents as it was a faculty concern that we shouldn't give degrees to people for reasons other than academic distinction. And obviously, honorary degrees are used substantially for other reasons than academic distinction by everyone.

TRELEVEN: Right. We're just about at the end of this.

[End Tape 6, Side B]

[Session 4, June 25, 1991]

[Begin Tape 7, Side A]

TRELEVEN: Back on, this is our second session of June 25. And maybe one more area I'd ask you about your impressions of, and that is medical education and health sciences, a tremendous area of growth at UC both on the old campuses as well as several of the new campuses. Again, relating to an expansion plan that was a piece of the Master Plan for Higher Education, which you've mentioned. If my memory serves me right, by the late sixties, early seventies, I think medical education and health sciences was taking about twenty-five cents on the dollar in terms of UC budget. Now, some of that is made up from revenues, abundant federal money for building medical facilities in the sixties as you might remember, and National Institutes of Health grants for various types of research, but nonetheless still a pretty substantial figure.

How do you assess the value of medical education and health sciences in the modern University of California?

HALDEMAN: I'm so totally inexpert in that field and really unknowledgable about it that I don't have a valid basis on which to make an assessment. I have the feeling that the university has made and is continuing to make an enormous contribution to the advancement of health sciences both in theory and practice. This it seems to me is a proper and fitting thing for a university to be doing in the advancement of science in its theoretical, you know, far-out development stages and then bringing it down to practical application, and that we're doing a great job of it. I don't have any real knowledge of the field in order to give you a more specific assessment.

TRELEVEN: As far as you can remember, by the time you became a regent, had the politics been taken care of? That is politics involving many legislators desiring more physicians--which is part of the function of medical education, produce practicing physicians--and some sometimes veiled and not so veiled threats that if, "Well, if you don't want

it, University of California, we'll set these places up at the California state colleges." Was that pretty well out of the way by then?

HALDEMAN: I guess so. It doesn't ring any bells.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, if you don't remember it from CCHE, that issue was probably pretty well taken care of.

HALDEMAN: I don't, I don't remember it. It's an issue in which again I had then and have now so little expertise that even if it had come up, I probably wouldn't have focused much on it, because I wouldn't have had anything to contribute or even to think about.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. I suppose here's one place I will interject something about your White House years, because medical- and health-related things are always pretty big issues. They still are. With calls yet for national health insurance and that sort of thing, were you in a position in the national government to be aware of what we might call medical/health sciences politics?

HALDEMAN: I don't really remember anything in that area in that context either. There are always ongoing issues in the field obviously, but I don't remember anything of any particular overriding

significance that came up. The president got into his program on a cure for cancer somewhere in the middle of the first term, and that was something that he was personally quite caught up with. I'm not quite sure where his interest in it came from or, you know, where he had developed that. But I know he did have people over at HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] working on that and then announced the major program and was quite excited about it. But I don't remember it in terms of any really political issues, controversial issues that we were dealing with. The focus over at HEW during that time was so much more in education than it was in health--well, education and welfare both. Health really wasn't a cutting issue that I recall; and education, the education issue really being desegregation, the whole thing in the public schools; and then an enormous concentration on the whole welfare activity that we got into with the really welfare reform approach to part of the dismantling of Great Society overblown projects and trying to shore up the ones that seemed to be worthy of shoring

up. I was just trying to think whether there was anything. . . . I really don't . . .

TRELEVEN: Somehow HMOs [health maintenance organizations] stick in my mind, that President Nixon was a supporter of health maintenance organizations.

HALDEMAN: Bob Finch sure was and became very much involved in HMOs. I think he was before he went to Washington, to HEW, and then again when he came back in later years he and [Maurice H.] Maury Stans were. But I don't remember the president getting into the HMO thing at all, but it's perfectly possible. Basically, my position in Washington was not issue involved, it was operational. So there were. . . . But I was obviously aware of the issues as they came by, but I didn't get into the dealing with any of them. So if it had been a major issue of any concentrated focus I would be very much aware of it, and I don't remember any in the health science field or the politics of health science.

TRELEVEN: Well, one thing about the university medical and health facilities, they're ever changing with the technology.

HALDEMAN: Well, the field is ever changing.

TRELEVEN: Stick something in place and bingo.

HALDEMAN: Everything is outdated every year. The average half-life is getting down to about an hour.

TRELEVEN: Well, moving towards I guess summing up your tenure on the board of regents, what do you consider the most satisfying--I have here satisfying accomplishments--during the period you served? You can perhaps answer that either in terms of accomplishments or what you feel personally, what was most satisfying about that experience as part of your life.

HALDEMAN: Well, I have a problem with the most satisfying I have a problem with any of those "most" kind of things or the standard approaches, because usually there's so many things, and one is very satisfying or whatever in one way and another in another, and they're hard to categorize that way. But as far as the accomplishments of the board, I was on there for such a relatively short time that I really felt I kind of came and went during a passing parade and that we never got to where we were going. I guess you never do in something that's as alive as the university is and constantly changing.

You're always moving onto the next thing. There's nothing that stands out as a super monument that was the thing that we really got done while I was there. I think we made a lot of progress in a lot of directions, primarily probably on the positive side. The campus expansion or the addition and development of new campuses I think was really the biggest forward thrust that was under way at the time I was there, and the fact that that progress did move forward was our major accomplishment. It's fascinating to see where Irvine and San Diego and Santa Barbara, Riverside are now compared to where they were in those days. And you realize how much. . . . Well, and even to go back to UCLA, which was supposedly a mature campus when I was a regent. The campus today bears no resemblance to the campus then or certainly not to the campus that I went to school on. So I would say the growth and the continuing development of the academic excellence and the eminence of the university is our greatest accomplishment and probably the best and greatest accomplishment of each board each year, because

it keeps on happening.

As far as my own personal satisfaction, it would be pretty much in the same area. I think that I had a chance to participate for a couple of years in a really fascinating, productive enterprise, and that's exciting. I got an enormous amount of challenge and interest and education and enjoyment out of it.

TRELEVEN: How do you as a conservative look at such a highly bureaucratized institution where things often seem to move very slowly? If change is to come about, it seems that change takes a long time. Sometimes it seems things do not even happen very efficiently.

HALDEMAN: Well, I think more than sometimes. Often things don't happen efficiently at all. I think that a certain amount of bureaucracy is desirable, and a somewhat greater amount of bureaucracy in any institution is inevitable. And I think that you need to be aware of the dangers of overwhelming bureaucracies while still recognizing that you have to have some. There's a need for bureaucracy. There's a need for systems and procedures that keep things on an orderly path.

But when that becomes the end-all and the bureaucracy then becomes overwhelming, then I think you're in trouble. And as a business management professional and to some degree student, my natural approach in a business environment is to get rid of bureaucracy, because bureaucracy tends to impede change rather than facilitate it. And I believe that the importance of any organism or institution or anything else in life is for it to facilitate change. It's for it to change positively and progressively, because I don't think you can stand still. If you stand still I think you immediately start to regress, and I think the objective of most things is to progress rather than regress. So the bureaucracy of the university bothered me some when I was involved on the regents, because it did impede progress I felt in some ways. Yet. . . . And when I got into government it was worse, and I saw more examples of bad effects of overbureaucratization. And in recent years since I've been working on a project in the Soviet Union, I've seen the ultimate example of it and I realized that the university's in pretty good

shape. [Laughter] But I think that the university is a pretty good. . . . There's a--I think I mentioned him the other day--there's a professor at UCLA, Ichak Adizes, in the Anderson [Graduate] School of Management, an adjunct professor who has a fascinating theory of management and management advising that is based on the necessity for proper management of change--the desirability of change and the point that the key to good management is managing change. And to do that requires what he defines as the four basic elements of good management, which are production, human relations, entrepreneurship or creativity, and administration. You need a balance of all of them. And the bureaucracy at its ultimate bad is the total dominance of administration suffocating the other three elements. And I think that the university, for a large and public institution, is remarkably--looking at it in hindsight now--is remarkably unbureaucratic in the sense that it is not dominated by the administration element of its managerial functions to the degree that it could very easily be, because there is the creative

ferment there all the time that keeps pushing the thing forward and producing change and producing desirable change. And to the degree that bureaucracy in its classic role of resisting change is unsuccessful and that I think it is at the university unsuccessful, I think that's great. And so I don't. . . . It bothered me at the time in the university, because I'd come right out of the business world where we eliminated bureaucracy almost too much, got maybe at times at least away from even the needed bureaucracy to a university which seemed to me to have too much bureaucracy. But then I went from there into the government where I saw a lot more. I think it's a problem and I think it's something the university needs to keep watching. I think an example of it is tenure of faculty, which I think is essential. I understand. . . . I somewhat understand the validity and the reasons for tenure, but I am inclined to think that it's not a good thing. I don't think life appointments of judges are a good thing either. I think everybody needs to be subject to change, and it's too easy for someone

to become so solidly entrenched that he can't be budged. And the threat of change is a positive threat often, I mean a good threat, a beneficial threat, because it causes us all to change, and I think we need to. That's a long lecture. I didn't intend to do that. [Laughter]

TRELEVEN: No, but, you know, it raises several things in my mind. First, and you're aware of the issue, that good teaching is often not rewarded in the tenure system.

HALDEMAN: Right.

TRELEVEN: A heavy emphasis is placed on research and publication, which gets into problems with undergraduate instruction and so on. The other thing that popped into my mind, and somebody has made the observation, I think somebody rather important, that faculty as a whole tend to be liberal, but when it comes to their own interests they're conservative, which I think is rather interesting.

HALDEMAN: You know, you don't need to confine that to faculty. Everybody is always in favor of something as long as it doesn't cost them anything.

TRELEVEN: "Not in my backyard."

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

TRELEVEN: Is there a greatest . . . ? "Most," you don't like that word.

HALDEMAN: It's all right. It's a good trigger.

TRELEVEN: Were you disappointed in anything in particular during your regency?

HALDEMAN: Well, my biggest disappointment was that I didn't get to serve my sixteen years. It really is. And that I wasn't. . . . It really is: that I didn't have the opportunity to stay on the board long enough to really have an effect. I felt I was somewhat of an activist or starting to become one in my appointed term, but I was a back bench man pretty solidly all the way through my first voting term, because I just felt I had so much more to learn that I wasn't really in a position to take a strong view on some issue contrary to what others were saying. I pretty much had to figure out who to follow on any particular thing and then follow them rather than come up with my own view on it. I was starting to develop my own views and I would I think over the sixteen years have gone a long ways in that. And that really

is the real disappointment.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. Well, you had some pretty imposing front
pew people there, too.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, we really did, and that was one of the
highlights. That really was. . . . It was the
first time I had dealt on a peer basis with as
distinguished and accomplished a group of people
as I did. I mean, I had worked with specific
individual businesses and some pretty outstanding
people in business, including some of the leaders
of our own company, J. Walter Thompson Company,
plus some outstanding clients that I dealt with,
most notably Walt Disney. But I found the
association with the group that were the members
of the regents plus the chancellors and a lot of
the faculty of the university to be a very
stimulating experience in terms of the caliber of
the people that I was working with. I think
that. . . . I hadn't really thought about that,
but that really was a real highlight of the time
there.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, let's see, it would be eight years before
you graduated from UCLA that Pauley had become a
regent.

HALDEMAN: Isn't that amazing? Which means shortly before I started high school or just about the time I was starting high school, because I had four years of high school and four years of college.

TRELEVEN: That's right. You've mentioned several regents a number of times, perhaps mostly in connection with the Finance Committee, and I take it these are real powerhouses: Pauley, Carter. I'm not sure, maybe I'll let you define powerhouse, but what I'm after here is in your experience, who would you name as really being the sensible or imposing figures? In other words, those who I don't want to say dominated the board, but whose voices seemed to be a little louder perhaps than others.

HALDEMAN: Well, maybe without looking at the list, because that's probably a better way to do it, then I'll look at the list and see if I missed somebody I would put on. But it would be the ones we've talked about already, which would be Carter, Chandler, Pauley, Heller, Coblentz, Simon in his own way, Forbes, and Boyd. Those are the ones that come to mind. Canaday in some ways, yes. Dutton in some ways. Catherine Hearst not

particularly. Higgs, but he wasn't there very long while I was there.

TRELEVEN: No, short time.

HALDEMAN: So I never really. . . . I didn't get to know him well, although I was very much impressed with him. Ted Meyer I didn't really. . . . He was chairman, wasn't he?

TRELEVEN: Yes.

HALDEMAN: But he was. . . . Ted was not, in my opinion. . . . He was a very quiet man and sort of a manager of the process without injecting himself or his views very strongly. I wouldn't see him as a mover and shaker on the board. That pretty well sums them up, I think.

TRELEVEN: I've been told by others that in that first Reagan budget that we've talked about previously that a real important player in working out a compromise was Phil Boyd.

HALDEMAN: Quite possible. Phil had some credentials as a Republican political leader. He had been an assemblyman I think and he'd had state elective office and had run for higher office, I forget what. And he was a very careful, low-key, reasoning kind of guy. And I think he did have a

substantial influence probably. He was a senior man. He had long experience on the board of regents. He had status as a political and business leader, and he was a very thoughtful guy.

TRELEVEN: By mid-'69, and this is after you have left the board. . . . I don't think we discussed this before. Well, let me try it. If I have, forgive me. William Trombley, who covered the regents for the L.A. Times . . .

HALDEMAN: We haven't discussed, but I know I remember Trombley.

TRELEVEN: By June of '69 he would indicate that the balance politically on the board had definitely shifted and that the Reagan regents were now in control.¹ Is that a simplistic way of looking at it, or were partisan politics that important in your experience on the board? I'm somewhat asking that because of the names that you mentioned, which seemed to be pretty well balanced politically between conservatives and

1. Trombley, William. "Conservatives Now Control Regents Board." Los Angeles Times, 23 June 1969.

liberals as you just went through the list. And the second reason I'm asking is because I get mixed opinions on this. I've been told by some others that the press liked to get on this thing partly because of Reagan and they liked to emphasize the partisanship and that we shouldn't listen to that, because if there was partisanship that tended to dissipate over time as one became acquainted with the regents.

HALDEMAN: I think the latter is true. In the first place I think most of the people were not partisan political people. They had views that would reflect a degree of conservatism or liberalism or Republicanism or Democraticism in some ways. But most of those people are--well, the ones we went through other than the ex officio regents, who are ex officio by view of their political posts--but the people like. . . . Well, Boyd had been in politics, but Canaday, Carter, Chandler, Coblentz had not. Dutton had. Finch had. Well, Finch was ex officio. Forbes had not. Hearst had not. Heller had. Higgs hadn't. I'm skipping the university people. Pauley of course had but long ago. Roth I guess was. . . . Well,

obviously he was in government. I guess he was in politics. I never really knew Roth. Simon had not been in politics up to that point. He got in politics later.

TRELEVEN: 'Seventy.

HALDEMAN: So the people that I was on the board with, they weren't really political people. Some were Brown appointees and some were Knight and maybe Warren and maybe back to [Governor Frank F.] Merriam or something. Appointees

TRELEVEN: In Pauley's case.

HALDEMAN: Was it Merriam?

TRELEVEN: Hell, no, it had to be [Governor] Culbert [L.] Olson.

HALDEMAN: Oh, Pauley, yeah, that's right.

TRELEVEN: Going back to. . . . And Pauley was the dean of the regents at the time you served. He went back the farthest.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. He went back to 1950.

TRELEVEN: Pauley?

HALDEMAN: Well, wait. He must have gone earlier than that. This says '50.

TRELEVEN: 'Forty. Sorry, after I sent that to you I found the table.

HALDEMAN: It is, yeah, because he had to be in it before '50. Well, anyhow, at that time I don't think the regents were politicized in terms of partisan political affiliation. And I don't think they saw themselves as representatives of political elements. I think that's changed some. I think that from what I have observed from outside, I have the feeling that under the second Brown [Governor Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr.] the regents became very politicized, and much more so than under Reagan. Now Reagan did bring in. . . . There's no question Glenn Campbell, I'm sure, has been a controversial regent, because he's a controversial kind of. . . . I mean, he's the kind of guy who'll be controversial in whatever he does. And . . .

TRELEVEN: Strong willed.

HALDEMAN: Strong willed and very opinionated.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And I think had in a sense a political agenda. Maybe that's what I'm trying to get to. I don't think most of these people had a political agenda. They had a university agenda that was colored by their personal convictions of various

kinds on various issues. They weren't always classifiable as Republican, Democrat, conservative, liberal, or something like that. Some of them were. Catherine Hearst, you always knew about where she'd come out. John Canaday, you always knew about where he'd come out. But Boyd could surprise you, Carter could surprise you, Chandler could surprise you, Coblenz could surprise you. Dutton, you knew exactly where he was going to come out. Forbes, very much you never knew. Forbes was about as apolitical as anybody could be, I think.

TRELEVEN: Swing vote.

HALDEMAN: Well, he was a swing vote I think literally, but he was also a swing thinker. I mean, I think Bill took each issue on its own merits without a preconceived posture and no. . . . I mean. . . .

TRELEVEN: Let's pause for a minute.

[Interruption]

Okay, we're back on. I think . . .

HALDEMAN: I don't think any of us thought we were on the board to represent a particular constituency or ethnic group or political piece of the spectrum or anything else. We were there to try and do what

was for the good of the university. I think that some of the Reagan appointees may have come in with a more politicalization coloration, but from what I understand--and of course all of them except Glenn and me came in after I was off the board, so I don't really know--but I heard because I go to those. . . . They have those regents' dinners from time to time for former. . . . The president gives a dinner usually once a year for the former regents, and I've gone to a number of those and talked to present regents. And some of them, the current regents that were on the board back in my time that were worried about what would happen with Reagan, and they said that some of the Reagan regents have turned out to be very good university regents. Some of them I know bothered people and some of them I think have done very well by the board. But I have had the feeling looking at it from the outside, and I may be wrong, that there has been a tendency to appoint regents with a political agenda on the part of Jerry Brown and that they've come in arguing that. That would go to the [Stanley K.] Sheinbaums and the ethnic group people that were

representing particular interest groups.

TRELEVEN: [Vilma S.] Martinez, Sheldon [L.] Andelson, I suppose.

HALDEMAN: Andelson, I guess that's the one I'm talking about more than Sheinbaum. I don't know. These are all people that I don't even know, so you know I'm in no position to really come up with anything about them anyway.

TRELEVEN: So is it simpleminded, say, to look at this list of people and say, "Well, these people all think alike because they're Reagan appointees"? And I'll read the names beginning with you: Campbell, William Smith, [Robert O.] Bob Reynolds, Dean [A.] Watkins, and John [H.] Lawrence.

HALDEMAN: I don't know who John Lawrence is.

TRELEVEN: Well, he's Ernest [O.] Lawrence's brother.

HALDEMAN: Oh really?

TRELEVEN: He was a Reagan appointee in '70 after Phil Boyd resigned. But you know some of those people I take it?

HALDEMAN: Well, I know, yeah. Who were they again?

TRELEVEN: Watkins, Reynolds . . .

HALDEMAN: I've met Watkins, but I don't know him. I know

Bob Reynolds.

TRELEVEN: William French Smith.

HALDEMAN: Bill Smith I know, or knew.

TRELEVEN: Campbell.

HALDEMAN: Glenn Campbell I got to know through the regents. I've gotten to know him since better.

TRELEVEN: You. And then why don't we add [P.] Allan Grant for the heck of it, because Grant was ex officio as agriculture.

HALDEMAN: I got to know him a little bit just in those few months we were on the board together. I had never met him before and have never seen him since.

TRELEVEN: So were I a journalist--and here's what I want to get back to--were I a journalist like Trombley, I'd look at this and maybe I'd sort of analyze some voting patterns, if one could at regents' meetings, and say, "Well, these are all people that Reagan has in his pocket."

HALDEMAN: So that's a bloc vote? I would suspect that's not true, that it might be on some issues and wouldn't be on others. But I have no statistics to back that up. When I was on the board we did not. I mean, there wasn't a Reagan caucus.

There weren't that many Reagan regents on when I was on either. Well, there were actually, and there was a caucus on the Kerr thing. We did, but it wasn't just the Reagan regents. There were a number of existing regents that were . . .

TRELEVEN: There was a caucus on that?

HALDEMAN: There was. . . . In a sense there was. Not. . . . No official or formal thing, but there was a lot of. . . . A group mobilized itself in the interest of the dismissal of Kerr, although it had been long before the meeting. It had been mobilizing long before the election.

TRELEVEN: Well, it wasn't at your dinner, because you said it was purely social.

HALDEMAN: No, no. It was not at the dinner at all.

TRELEVEN: But it's something that obviously must have followed.

HALDEMAN: Preceded the dinner, preceded the election.

TRELEVEN: Oh.

HALDEMAN: Because it was a caucus forming of the existing regents prior to the Reagan regents coming in at all.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: And then the Reagan regents that came in at that

time were only the ex officios, because he had no appointments.

TRELEVEN: Right, except you as a voting regent.

HALDEMAN: But I wasn't a Reagan regent.

TRELEVEN: You weren't?

HALDEMAN: No, I was an alumni regent.

TRELEVEN: I know that, but were you a regent Reagan could count on?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

TRELEVEN: Well?

HALDEMAN: Well, not count on. No. On that vote, yes. But I think I was a part of forming Reagan's view on that vote more than Reagan was a part of forming my view. I know I was.

TRELEVEN: Explain that to me. I'm missing something.

HALDEMAN: I'm not voting against Kerr because Reagan wanted me to vote against Kerr. Reagan's voting against Kerr because I wanted Reagan to vote against Kerr. I came up with the feeling of the need to remove Kerr prior to Reagan's coming up with it, I believe.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: So I didn't get that idea from Reagan, I got it from people on the board and my own observations.

TRELEVEN: That's really kind of an important point.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

TRELEVEN: Because you know there's the school of thought, as you know I think, that Reagan set out to get Kerr as one of his . . .

HALDEMAN: There's no question that Reagan was in favor of the removal of Kerr, as was Finch, as was. . . . Who else came on? Allan Grant? Did he come on then?

TRELEVEN: Yes, he was the agriculture ex officio. Reagan's first appointee, gubernatorial appointee.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, it was a gubernatorial appointee, not regent appointee.

TRELEVEN: That's correct.

HALDEMAN: So he was there. Allan Grant was the other vote. So you had Finch and Grant and Reagan and, let's see, we didn't change Unruh then, so he was still on and went the other way. So that would be it. And Finch was. . . . Really, the only Reagan votes on the board were Reagan and Grant, because Finch was not a Reagan vote. Finch voted differently from Reagan I would guess substantially. He took views different from Reagan's. He didn't create any public divisions

with the governor, but he didn't always agree with the governor's positions internally. But I think Allan Grant pretty much did. And so that's what we were talking about before, that that was the addition of three anti-Kerr votes in effect.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, I think the record will show that.

HALDEMAN: But as the record will show there were substantially more than three anti-Kerr votes available that day. So the pre-Reagan people And I was in no way a Reagan regent. I was on the regents. . . . I became involved with Reagan because of my concern for the university, not because. . . . I didn't become involved with the university because of my service to Reagan.

TRELEVEN: Okay.

HALDEMAN: I'd had contact, university contact with Reagan prior to that, however, because I had been the chairman of the judging committee for the Spring Sing one year while I was a student at UCLA, and the judge that we got as the chief judge was a two-bit movie star called Ronald Reagan.

[Laughter]

TRELEVEN: I wanted to ask you, I guess it has to do with the dynamic between the regents and the

legislature at the time of the removal of Kerr. There were various bills being introduced in the legislature to investigate the university. I think the Burns Subcommittee [on Educational Environment] had reincarnated itself to look into communist activity on campus and bills that related to discipline of students on the campus.¹ In your recollection is that any part of the real dynamic that's going on, that we the regents had better make a change or we're going to get undue outside interference from the legislature or even perhaps from the governor's office?

HALDEMAN: Not in that strong a sense I don't think. I think there was clearly a recognition, as the regents were looking at some decisions, that you had to factor in the effect that this decision might have on the university's relationship with the legislature, with the governor's office, with the voters, with the public in the communities. I mean, it was part of what we looked at as the

1. A.B. 534, 1969 Reg. Sess., Cal Stat., ch. 1424; A.B. 1286, 1969 Reg. Sess., Cal Stat., ch. 1427.

worlds that we had to deal with, and the legislature was certainly one of them, because we knew we had to go there and we had to get the budget. And the president was certainly concerned with that and properly so. I think individual regents took it upon themselves at various times while I was there to function as liaison with the legislature, individuals or leadership within the legislature, and within the governor or the governor's office, as well as with constituent elements in the public where they had had an ability to do it in the community for the good of the university; to try and help things go through; help an understanding of the need to condemn a piece of property or add an item to the budget or whatever it might be.

TRELEVEN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And I think that the Washington-oriented regents when I was there, Dutton and Roth, I think took it upon themselves to do the same in terms of relations with the Congress and the federal government.

TRELEVEN: Okay, I think you talked a little earlier this morning about the pros and cons involved in

leaving the board after accepting a call to the White House, not to the White House initially, but I guess to the campaign. You had not officially left the board, but it severely limited your time.

HALDEMAN: Well, it limited my time during the fall campaign, but at that time I was not considering leaving the board, because I thought in November I'd be through and I'd be back for the November and December meetings and then from then on. I didn't contemplate leaving the board until I accepted the post at the White House during the transition period. And I didn't immediately decide to leave, but it became inevitable. Once I did reason the thing through, I was deciding a lot of other things, because we were trying to put our whole government together in seventy-five days, so I didn't have a lot of time to sit around and ponder the pros and cons of the board of regents position that I held. But when I did get to the point of thinking about it and going through the thinking, there was no question in my mind but that there was no way I could continue on the board of regents for the two reasons that

I said. The one, the time demand, and the other, the conflict. I don't feel I would have had an actual problem with conflict, but I did feel it would be an important appearance problem.

TRELEVEN: After you went to the White House, were you contacted by, you know, any regents or UC officials for any reason in connection with particular Washington policy that might affect higher education at the university? Was there any tie like that that you can remember?

HALDEMAN: I don't think of any. I obviously was contacted by people from time to time on various things, and I'm just trying to think if any of those was university related. And I'm sure there must have been. I can't imagine that there wouldn't have been.

TRELEVEN: No, I mean . . .

HALDEMAN: But I can't think of any, and the reason for that primarily is that I operated on a very, very fast . . .

[End Tape 7, Side A]

[Begin Tape 7, Side B]

TRELEVEN: You were on a fast track you were saying.

HALDEMAN: Well, at the White House I had a very efficient

and a very effective staff system. Had any inquiry come in, and as I say I can't imagine that somewhere along the line some didn't, I had a methodology that enabled me to move it immediately out of my orbit and into where it belonged. And that was always somewhere else, because I didn't. . . . My position was such that I did not myself have any authority or any direct line of responsibility relating to any outside matter. All of them went somewhere else. And my staff's function was to move anything that came up to the proper place. And I would have done that as I would whether it was University of California or the University of Texas or anyplace else. I mean, any such inquiry or any issue that arose . . .

TRELEVEN: Even if a letter comes that says, "H. R. Haldeman--PERSONAL," it still got routed?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, oh yeah, by me. If it said "Haldeman, PERSONAL," I got the letter. But I instantly moved that paper very rapidly, and I had a staff system that enabled me to do it with confidence. And it worked 90 percent, 99 percent of the time. The 1 percent was a little more

important than the other 99 as it turned out.

TRELEVEN: Well, you've written a book about that.

HALDEMAN: But basically it did, and the stuff went fast. And I very. . . . Well, I never--I can't say never, because I must have somewhere--but I didn't weigh the merits of the thing, I simply moved it where it should be handled without a recommendation. It would simply be, "Please take care of this," and off it went and whatever area of the university relationship it was. Now I know, for instance, the president appointed Franklin Murphy to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on my recommendation. And Franklin loved being on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

TRELEVEN: I'll bet.

HALDEMAN: And he came back every. . . . They met for two days every month, and he came back religiously for those meetings. Nelson Rockefeller was chairman and John [B.] Connally was on it, and it was a pretty potent group of guys. They sat and got briefed by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and all the superspy stuff, you know, for a day or day and a half, and then they'd spend

half an hour with the president giving him the benefit of their infinite wisdom on all these important matters. And Franklin always made a habit of stopping by and chatting for a while while he was there, so I would keep up with things from that contact. And I can't recall specifically, but I'm sure others of the regents were in touch with me in one way or another or in Washington and dropped by while I was at the White House. But people tell me now. . . . It's amazing. I run into people and they say, "Well, you know, you did this and you did that," and I get all this credit. Most of them are good things that they say, so it's not bad. But I don't have any recollection of it at all, because it was something that went through the system, and I couldn't afford to take the time to think about those things. And it wasn't my position. Someone else was much better able to handle any of those things than I was.

TRELEVEN: Yeah. Well, tell me, I guess moving into the conclusion here, how have you continued to keep in touch with UC generally and UCLA in particular?

HALDEMAN: Well, I have to confess that I haven't very much. I am a person of the present and intensely the present and somewhat the future and very little the past. [Laughter]

TRELEVEN: Now you tell me after all of this tape.
[Laughter]

HALDEMAN: That's why I have a problem recalling some of this stuff.

TRELEVEN: Well, you've done very well considering that . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, you've done a good job. You've done a lot of good research that's been helpful in stimulating me. I really do have a hard time with a lot of the past stuff. I don't tend to think in the past and I never have. I start from where I'm at and move from there. And that doesn't mean I've totally forgotten the past, but it does mean I don't try to actively maintain all my past ties. I don't go to class reunions and, you know, all the stuff that a lot of people find very rewarding.

TRELEVEN: But you go to past presidents' meetings.

HALDEMAN: I generally go to the past presidents' meeting every year, because it's a chance to see people that I enjoy seeing and to spend an evening with

Chuck [Charles E. Young] and get caught up on what's going at UCLA, and I find that very interesting. Since the White House time I have not reinvolved myself in any direct activity at UCLA or with the university at all actually, simply because for quite a while it wasn't appropriate while I was going through the whole trials and investigations and all that stuff. Then I got very intensely into a new business relationship. Now there I did get involved with UCLA a bit, because the Murdock Company [Pacific Holding Corporation], with which I was associated, I persuaded [David H.] Murdock, who lived right up in Bel Air, I was trying to persuade him to take a major interest in UCLA, because I felt he could become a very potent benefactor to the university. He had no He had never finished high school, or he did finish high school, but he had no college education at all, so I felt that this could become his de facto alma mater. Since he lived right up next door practically and his office was right down the street, it would make a lot of sense, and he'd get a lot of satisfaction out of

an association with the university. And we started developing some, and he did get some. He is I think still on the board of visitors or whatever it is of the graduate school of management.

TRELEVEN: I believe that's right.

HALDEMAN: And we got him involved in the museum of cultural history project, and he ultimately took on the development of the new building and then pulled out of it when he got frustrated with the bureaucracy, the lack of free enterprise in the university system. Then he got quite excited with the Brain [Research] Institute people . . .

TRELEVEN: The BRI.

HALDEMAN: . . . because he is fascinated with the human brain and had a great idea that I guess he's never brought to fruition, which was to form a master Library of Congress of brain research that would be a computer-centered and communication-centered thing that UCLA would be the focal point of, that would amass all of. . . . Like what [J. Paul] Getty [Trust] is going to try to do in art he was going to try to do with the brain: amass all of the world's knowledge and information

about the human brain in one place, one master computer file and communication center that then. . . . I got very much intrigued with that and was involved very much in trying to get him involved in the university from that viewpoint. But that was, other than going to the basketball games, that was about the only--and the football games with my son sometimes--about the only tie I had over there, except I did and do try to get to the "annual"--it used to be twice a year and I think it's only annual now--former regents' dinner that the president gives, and then to the former presidents' dinner that the current president of the Alumni Association gives once a year to keep caught up that way. And that really is about my only currently active tie.

TRELEVEN: Do you support the UCLA Foundation since you helped build it?

HALDEMAN: I have not. I have not been and intentionally not been a contributor. I told you I only did fund-raising once in my life and that was the Pauley Pavilion drive. That was the only time I made a major contribution to a fund-raising drive. In politics, and I've extended it to

other activity, I've gone on the basis that I contribute my time and my thought and whatever I can contribute there, and I don't contribute money. And I've held true to that position pretty much. I intend to do some substantial gift-giving if I end up with any funds to give in the long haul or in bequest. But in my current lifetime I've had to. . . . Well, after the Watergate thing I ended up with a very substantial negative net worth and I had to concentrate on trying to get it back above water again financially, so I have not been a contributor and I am not a member of any of the support organizations anymore. It's not because of a disaffection of any kind of even lack of interest. I read the periodical. I get the. . . . Well, it used to be the Clip Sheet, and then we get various things that come out of the university stuff and stuff from the president's office that I read just to. . . . I don't read intensely, but I go through just to see what's going on in the alumni magazine and that sort of thing. But I haven't been personally involved in any of it.

TRELEVEN: Well, a little of your answer kind of leads into maybe almost my last question, and that is I wanted you to give me kind of an overview of your career since you left the White House. Again, the researcher of the future may not be happy with me for skipping the White House by and large, but you have written your book The Ends of Power and . . .

HALDEMAN: That doesn't cover it very well. Someday I hope to write the right book, which I said I was going to do, and I still feel that I should do. But as I think I've told you, the thought of doing it doesn't appeal to me, so I always find something else to do. I've got everything. . . . I keep getting ready to do it, amassing things and collecting and reorganizing and all that, but I never actually sit down to page one.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, well, that answers a question I was going to ask also: do you plan someday to try and do a sequel to The Ends of Power? And you've answered that.

HALDEMAN: I really do, but it wouldn't be a sequel, because The Ends of Power, let me put that into the proper context here. The Ends of Power I wrote

under incredibly difficult circumstances. My motivation was primarily to make money. I mentioned that I ended up with a substantial negative net worth. The reason for it being negative is that I owed my lawyers far more money than I had. And so I needed money.

TRELEVEN: So the book really ties into your career since you left the White House in the sense that, what are you going to do now? You're explaining the book as a way to make some money.

HALDEMAN: That book.

TRELEVEN: That book.

HALDEMAN: That book was a way to make money, The Ends of Power, and it was the only interest. . . . I set out. . . . I had a lot of time, because I was pretty effectively foreclosed from working for a living at anything in the area of what I was trained and capable of doing because of the cloud that I was under and because of the demands on my time. I left the White House in April of '73 and spent from then until June of '77 in a constant round of the Senate investigations, a number of other congressional investigations that weren't as publicized as the Watergate hearings. But I

was hauled in as a witness on all kinds of things on the interrelated stuff to Watergate and some stuff that wasn't even remotely related. And a [federal] grand jury, the criminal investigation, working with my lawyers on my own (how I was to handle my defense and all that sort of stuff), and we moved back here to California. And I didn't have the opportunity really to set out and do anything outside, so I was. . . . I decided the thing I could do and fill my time in between these things and do it as time was available was to write a book. And I laid out a number of different approaches to writing books about inside the Nixon White House and all that sort of stuff. Well, going through agents and that kind of thing it became abundantly clear that there was nobody who had even a remote interest in a positive book about the Nixon presidency, which is the only book I was prepared to write or willing to write or able to write really. So all these outlines and approaches came to nought, and finally, I'm not sure exactly how it evolved into it, but the New York Times Book Company finally did say they would commission a book that would

be the inside story of Watergate. And I said, "I don't know the inside story of Watergate." And they said, "Well, you know enough, you know more than a lot of people, because you know the inside story to the extent that there is one." So they provided the coauthor [Joseph DiMona] that worked with me on it, and the president of New York Times Books became my editor and publisher. The three of us sat down, and they ground. . . . They did this to me, which you've been doing, except we did it week after week and put it onto tape. And they transcribed the tapes, and the coauthor worked with that to grind it, put it into shape as a book, because at about the time we were getting the tapes done was about the time that my legal process came to an end and I got sent to prison. I went to prison in June of '77, yeah, and was there for a year and a half. And when I first left the coauthor started working on the book. And after he got a first draft he and the editor/publisher came out and visited me in prison, and we did all of the reworking. I was horrified with the first draft. It was awful. And their whole thing was to sell books. All

they wanted, and they kept pumping me, and you could hear them in the tape that they did, they kept pumping me for more negatives. They just wanted scandal and anything bad that they could get. In the first place I didn't know. . . . There wasn't any that I was aware of, so I could never satisfy them. Plus they always wanted, you know, what was the scene and what happened and tell anecdotes and be human about it, and I couldn't remember any of that stuff, because my job was getting the work done, and they never quite understood that. But anyway, what happened is he took the material on the tapes and he jazzed it all up, and it came through in this awful form. I was really upset about it, so I said, "You know, we're not going to write this, we're not going to publish this book." They said, "Well, you're under contract, you've got to." And I said, "Well, if you publish it I will disavow it completely, and that probably will cause it to sell more books, but it certainly won't enhance the Times Book Company's reputation. It may help their coffers." Anyway, they agreed to substantial reworking and they did

a lot of. . . . We went through it all, but I had to do it from prison. So we'd go out in the prison visiting area, and you're sitting in the middle of an area with a half a dozen, or two or three dozen other prisoners talking to their visitors, and it wasn't a very good basis for trying to write a book.

TRELEVEN: Not a good creative environment.

HALDEMAN: No. Fortunately, I worked in the sewage plant in prison and I worked on a night shift in the lab doing chemical analysis, and there was nobody else there. And the sewage plant was out removed from the main part of the prison camp and out by the hard-line prison, actually, so I was alone out there. A guard came by every hour to make sure I was still there, but just cruised by, you know, roving patrol type. And I had this little shack out there by the sewage plant to myself and I had a typewriter. . . . I mean, the guy that ran the plant--he was an employee, not a prisoner--had a typewriter in an office there. And then we had a little chemistry lab where I did my work. But I could use the typewriter in the evenings, so I could work on reworking the book and all, and I

did. And then that was. . . . They published the book while I was in prison. I never really got to get it reworked the way I wanted. I made so many changes that I thought I had gotten it done okay, but the book is not. . . . Doesn't say either what I want to say or how I want to say it. And a lot of it is just speculation, and it's identified as that. And some of that speculation is sound and some of it isn't, as it turns out. Anyhow, that book became a Watergate book, and Watergate occupied about one one-thousandth of my total White House interest and time and effort and everything else. The other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths is what I would write a book about now if I ever get around to writing one. And I would simply skip Watergate and say I've covered that to the extent that I could, and while nobody believes that I don't know any more about it than that, others will have to enlighten the world on the true story of Watergate. But there's a lot that I know in all the other areas that nobody else knows, and I feel I should get that down on paper someday. And I guess I will, but I'm not making

any promises as to when.

TRELEVEN: Okay. Meantime though, after that, can you just give me a little overview of what you've been involved with since that time? I know you've mentioned business management and working with students, but I'm sure that's not all of it.

HALDEMAN: First of all, after I got out of prison, which was the end of 1979, I had to go back to work. I had no. . . . The book paid my legal fees to a pretty good extent and I came through. . . . I ended up back more or less even financially, but I was in no position not to earn a living. So I decided I wanted to go into business for myself rather than working for someone else. I came up with a number of business ideas. I spent six months. . . . I set six months. I said, "I'm not going to start a job, because I'm not going to come right out of prison and try to find a job. I'm going to come out and talk to everybody that I feel like talking to and take six months to do it and not make a decision until the end of the six months. Then by the end I want to come up with a decision as to what I'm going to do." And I thought I wanted to go into business for

myself. I worked up a number of ideas for businesses, one of them being. . . . Actually, four of them being four distinct business opportunities that I felt there were in China that I was uniquely qualified to put together if I could get financial backing to do it. But it would require financial backing which I didn't have in my own resources. And Fortune magazine had an article on doing business in China at about that time, and this is the spring of '79. I bought the issue to read the article about China, and in the same issue was an article about David Murdock, whom I had never heard of at that point. I didn't know who he was.

TRELEVEN: Oh, I see.

HALDEMAN: I read the article and I was fascinated with him and what he was doing and how he did it and all that. And it sounded. . . . Well, I wrote him a letter as a result of the article, just a blind letter saying that I'd read the article, found it fascinating that he and I were so completely different in so many ways that I had the feeling maybe there would be a validity of our trying to get together. And I said, "At least I'd like to

talk with you." And he wrote back and said, "Fine, give me a call, and we'll get together." So I called him, and we set up a date and had lunch, and I went through. . . . He said, "What are you doing?" And I said I was trying to figure out a business for myself. He said, "Well, maybe I could help you get started in a business then." And I said, "That's what I hoped maybe you could do." I went through the China stuff, and he said, "That sounds interesting." Then we went through some other things, and he knew about my Sizzler [Restaurants International] involvement, because I was involved as a Sizzler franchisee before that. Have we put that into the record?

TRELEVEN: With Jim?

HALDEMAN: With [James A.] Jim Collins.

TRELEVEN: No, I don't think that's in there.

HALDEMAN: Okay, going way back, [Richard A.] Dick Miller, who's a UCLA activist and was a fraternity brother of mine, Jim Collins, and I and a couple of other Betas tried and failed at several small businesses when we first. . . . I think I did cover this, didn't I?

TRELEVEN: I don't think so.

HALDEMAN: Okay. When we first got out of school, Jim was in his own family business, Dick was in his family business, his father's investment business, and I was with the J. Walter Thompson Company. We were four or five years out of school and we tried to decide we'd see if we could get together and start some little business that we could ultimately devote ourselves to. And we tried a couple of them, and they failed, and we dropped that and went back to our own thing and stayed with it. But in later years after Jim finished, got through his hamburger business and got into the Kentucky Fried [Chicken] business, then bought Sizzler and started developing the Sizzler steakhouse thing, Dick and I made the point to him that he owed us one, because we'd gone into these businesses with him that had failed. And now that he had a booming business of his own he ought to let us get in on it somewhere, and how about a Sizzler franchise. And we talked about it, and he said, "Sure, if you want we can work out a franchise." But he said, "Wait till the right

one comes along." And we wanted to get something in California, and he said, "We'll never be able to work that out, because the company is pretty well established and locked in in California, but let's keep looking for a good opportunity." And he finally came up with one, which was Miami. It was good, because the company had seven stores in Fort Lauderdale and no stores in Miami, and it was supporting the Lauderdale stores with television advertising which came out of the Miami television stations. So they were putting a lot of advertising into the Miami market with no stores. So he said, "We need stores in Miami. The company's not in a position to start opening stores there now, so there's your chance, and you'll be backed by television advertising, which is normally not the case until you get five or six or seven stores going." Also, their southeastern regional manager, a young guy who'd been with the company all his life, wanted to become a franchisee, because he found that you could make a lot more money as a franchisee than as a company employee. So Jim said, "I'm going to lose him anyway. He needs someone to back him

to set himself up in business. If you and Dick want to do that, we can work something out where you can acquire the Miami franchise, bring Tom in as the manager to run the business." So that's what we did, and it's been enormously successful.

So that was going along. We did that back before I went to prison. So where was I leading to? Murdock knew I was involved in the Sizzler business so he got intrigued with that, and we went into some possibilities of developing. . . . I had some ideas on that, too, on expanding the fast food franchise business in a creative way, and Murdock got intrigued with that. And he finally said, "You know, rather than my trying to set you up in a business and my trying to figure out what it is and work out an arrangement and all," he said, "come to work for me in the development business which is my ongoing business. It's a good field for you to learn something about. You don't know anything about development." And interestingly, when I talked to Ed Carter, he said, "Go into the development business." When I talked to, I don't know, half a dozen other people during this period when I

was talking to everybody, they said, "You ought to go into the development business. It's where you can make a substantial amount of money fast and all that sort of thing." So when Murdock said that it sort of rang a bell. And then he got intrigued with the China thing too and said, "Let's see if we can put the China thing together, but come on in and learn the development business while we're doing it. Then you've got a job, you're settled, and all that." Well, ultimately, that's what I did. And we explored the China thing, concluded that didn't make any sense, and the fast food thing didn't make any sense. So I stayed there and ran three or four major development projects for him. We did a community redevelopment thing in Omaha, downtown Omaha, Central Park Plaza, which was a twin office tower, high-rise office tower complex. One tower is the headquarters of ConAgra [Inc.] and the other of Peter Kiewit [Construction Company]. So we did that project. We did one in downtown Baltimore and one in Lincoln, Nebraska. And then in the process Murdock got intrigued with the hotel

business. We bought a couple hotels out here and I oversaw the operation of those, and we then set up a hotel company. We were going to go into developing hotels, and I was president of the hotel company and executive vice president of the real estate development company that was doing these development projects. And we bought the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington and did a renovation on that. Built a big hotel as part of our development in Baltimore, and another one was part of our development in Lincoln, and had the two hotels out here. We were fooling around with that sort of stuff, and it became obvious that Murdock shouldn't be in the business of managing hotels, that it was too management intensive. He's a developer/entrepreneurial guy, not a management type. So I recommended he get out of the hotel business. He didn't want to, but he agreed that we shouldn't try to build it, and we stopped. About that time, I'd been with him six years, say, a little over six years, six and a half years, I guess. And I decided I wanted to get back to working for myself instead of for someone else, because I had ended up being really

an employee of David Murdock's, although I was running a couple of companies.

TRELEVEN: Yeah, this brings us up to roughly 1985.

HALDEMAN: It brings us up to '85. As of the end of '85 I resigned from the Murdock companies. I had spent some time before I resigned thinking to myself, "What is it that I've really enjoyed? Because if I'm going to go into business for myself, I want to do something I want to do, that I like doing, that I can make money at, that I'll have fun at, and that will not demand all of my time on an all-absorbing basis, because I want to have some time with the family doing other things." And I also decided to move to Santa Barbara at the same time, get out of L.A. So I concluded that what I had most enjoyed in my alumni work, in working in general around the university, at J. Walter Thompson, in the government, and at Murdock was finding and developing young talent in business. I had done a lot of college recruiting at Thompson. We did regular college recruiting, and I did a lot of that and I set up a trainee program within the company where we brought college recruits in. Instead of starting them as

office boys, which was traditional in the advertising business, we started them in meaningful positions in effect with mentors. And we made them assistants to senior account executives or account supervisors or the manager of the media department or high-level people, vice presidential type people, so that they could learn the agency from something of an overview instead of starting in the bowels and trying to work their way out. And it worked well. I really enjoyed that and I enjoyed finding the talent and then seeing it develop and helping it develop. We set up seminars for these guys. They'd meet a couple times a week to compare their experiences as they were going through this program and all. And we shot them out of it. They got to spend a year at that job and then they had to find their way out of that into a meaningful routine, regular position and start working their way up the ladder. But it worked well. Then in the government, following that, I followed the practice in staffing the White House of--and I've been criticized a lot for this, and it was part of my downfall, but it was also a

very good move--I hired a lot of young guys, some of them right out of school, to work in fairly meaningful positions. They were operational, not policy positions, but they were significant. Most of them did just fantastically well, and we got a lot of good help for a reasonable price. And I had a problem in the White House, because you have staffing levels. You can only hire so many people at various levels. But there was no problem hiring people at low clerical levels, and these people were hireable. And I felt I was not doing any harm to them, because spending a year or two, three, four, or even eight years at the White House in the places that they were, would shoot them, and it's proved to be true, into spectacular positions in business later. And so we did that, and I really enjoyed that. So I decided. . . . And then at Murdock especially when I took over the hotel company and I had my own company, because Murdock was a very small staff basically. We worked with all external people and no internal overhead. We hired architects. We didn't hire them, we retained them as outside people. So when I took over the

hotel part of it I did bring in a guy as an administrative assistant. We had a couple of other younger guys in the office that we were training, and I realized that's what I really enjoy doing. So I said, "There's got to be a way I can do this and make money at it." And I didn't go through the Jim Collins story, his father's story with you last time?

TRELEVEN: No, no.

HALDEMAN: I've done this recently with somebody and I was thinking it was with you. I've gone through it with someone else I guess.

TRELEVEN: We didn't talk about Jim at all.

HALDEMAN: In talking about a business thing or something. Well, Jim's father-in-law set him up in business and he also set his own son Bob Leonard up in business. I didn't go through this last tape?

TRELEVEN: No.

HALDEMAN: Okay. I wonder where I did it in the last, not too long ago. I've talked about it. But anyhow, it's a good UCLA story, because it's all UCLA, a university story. Jim's father-in-law and Bob Leonard, who was also at UCLA, his father-- because Jim married Bob Leonard's sister--said to

the two, his son and his son-in-law, "You guys figure out what business you want to go into, I'll provide the basic financing for it and I'll own half the business. You do all the work and you'll own the other half." And that's what started Jim out. He originally started with a nineteen-cent hamburger stand on property that his father-in-law owned down by the airport, Jefferson [Boulevard] and Sepulveda [Boulevard]. And so he was in the fast food hamburger business with one hamburger stand. And he got it from there into the Awful Fresh McFarland candy business, and from there into the Kentucky Fried thing and became the Kentucky Fried western rep[resentative]. Well, anyway, I saw what a smart move that was on Jim Collins's father-in-law and Bob Leonard's father, because Bob Leonard set up Leonard's discount appliance stores, also set up a big appliance store on the same property, and he made a lot of money and was very successful in the discount appliance business. And he was one of the early on big, deep discounters in the appliance field. So I decided what I'm going to do is find guys that

have some real ability like the guys I found at Thompson and at the White House and at Murdock and figure out a way to set them up in business.

I had already, as I realized, started that with the Sizzler business, because we had brought this young guy out of Sizzler, set him up in his own business, he was running it, we were having a great success out of it and making a substantial amount of money. And I was making enough money out of Sizzler by that point by '85 that I could live on the money, on my return out of the Sizzler business and therefore didn't have to work for somebody else anymore and could do this exploring of others. So while I was still at Murdock I took the young guy that I had started as an administrative assistant at Murdock's who I got out of the graduate school [of management] at UCLA, who was an outstanding guy in terms of overall capability, but not a good administrative assistant, because he was an entrepreneurial-type guy, not a detail-type guy. So I said to him, "You know, I'll make the same deal with you that Jim Collins's father-in-law made with him. You figure out what you can do"--because I knew he

had super talent--"you figure out what you can do, and I'll work out the way to set you up in doing it, and we'll get it started. I'll take half the business and you take half, and we'll start out as a partnership right now, fifty-fifty partner, and you start figuring it out." Well, he figured out some things and did a few side deal things while he was still at Murdock, convinced him it was doable. He quit Murdock before I did, eight months before I did, and went in to set up his own business, started working out of his bedroom in his little apartment, little house down in Manhattan Beach. And he's built that into a big multibusiness now, and that was, what, early '85, so it was six years ago.

TRELEVEN: What kind of a business?

HALDEMAN: Well, what it ultimately evolved into after some trial and error is a business where he buys low-priced, single-family residences at auction, foreclosed properties. He buys at auction. He does a very fast fix-up of the property and then sells it. So it's a fast turnover, and really what it is is he's a wholesaler, or a retailer actually. He buys houses at wholesale and

prepares them and sells them at retail. And he's a discounter. He buys at substantially below market at wholesale and he sells at a little below market retail so he can sell fast. And he takes the small margin and works on a volume basis and makes good money. But that led him to seeing the opportunities, and he proved his entrepreneurial. . . . He proved my judgment of him as an entrepreneur, because he kept seeing opportunities. As a result of that he set up a development company that buys raw land and develops houses, small, still small scale. He stays within his niche. He set up his own construction company to do his rehab[ilitation] work, not his building of new houses. The development company hires outside, because that's big construction, but he has his construction crew kind of thing that does the rehab. And he set up his own real estate brokerage, because he didn't want to have to pay commissions to somebody else when he was selling all these houses, and set up an escrow company to handle the escrows of them. And now he's set up a securities company and licensed all of these,

gotten the proper licenses for them, so that he can sell limited partnership syndications to provide the funding to buy the houses that he buys. And these are two-year things. You buy into a pool, and that pool buys and sells houses for two years and then stops buying. Then when it ultimately sells them all off it distributes the money made: 75 percent of the money that it made distributes to the partners and 25 percent his company keeps. And he charges a fee up front not to the When they set up the syndicate partnership, but as they buy houses he charges an acquisition fee. So it's a very creative business. He's got, I don't know, twenty-five employees now, and most of them I guess or virtually all of them are UCLA people, most of them that he hires as interns for nothing to learn a little bit about the business while they're still in school. Then if they pan out, he puts them on staff afterwards and he builds the business with these people, and they're building it. Still okay?

TRELEVEN: Yeah, we've got a little more tape on here.

HALDEMAN: All of his principle people are UCLA people and

most of the others are.

TRELEVEN: Well, what's this done for you?

HALDEMAN: Well, what it's done for me is I own half the business. It's done nothing for me up to now, because we were putting all the money back into the business, but the business is becoming increasingly valuable as we go along. And because these guys and girls are building the business, I've told Greg that I want, and I've done it, that I want to change my ownership, that I want to end up that he and I together own half the business rather than each of us owning half the business, and that will give him the other half of the business to give to his other employees or to make available in some way to his key people. And that's what he's in the process of doing now. So I now own a quarter of the business. Greg owns a quarter of it. Well, he owns more than a quarter of it. I own a quarter. But he's unloading part of what he owns to the other people as we go along. All these businesses are incorporated. I think he's got five or six corporations now. They're all the sub-businesses. He's doing well, and I. . . .

What it does for me is I've spent a lot of time with him on a fairly concentrated basis. He'll come up here, like he's coming up this week for a couple days, and we'll spend two days just going over all the stuff and all his problems. Then he calls me probably an average of once a week and we're on the phone for an hour or two just going over anything he needs to go over. And I function as a mentor basically. I have a lot of fun and we're doing well.

I've done the same thing now with another business that is a young guy who came up with a great idea, which was to establish a business center in Moscow for American businesspeople to provide executive suite-type capabilities, a pooled central resource plus individual office space for American people wanting to do business in Moscow. He and I went over to Moscow, we set up a joint venture with the Ministry of Tourism there who owned a hotel. We converted part of the hotel to a business center and we're still trying to get it. . . . Well, actually, it's semi-open now, but we're going through all the bureaucratic red tape in Moscow that one has to

go through. But I've been at that for two years, a little over two years now. And it should open actually any time, it could open any time. When we get the hurdles all done, it will. That is a publicly-held corporation, because it was the only way he could get financing. My route there was I made an agreement with him that I would take a percentage of his interest in the business. And I function the same way with him as I do with Greg on the real estate business. I'm available when he needs me. I've gone over to Moscow a couple times with him and I set up a joint venture with the hotel company (because I've been in the hotel business) with a hotel company, with Radisson here in the U.S. to be the hotel partner for this. And we set up COMSAT [Communication Satellite Corporation] as our high tech communications partner. I worked with him on that, and that's been very productive.

Then there's a group of us that did a buyout of a small business here in Santa Barbara to enable the young guy who was running it to take over the business from the founder. The entrepreneur who had founded it wanted to get out

and retire. So I worked with him on that basis. The business has since moved to Seattle because of the labor problems here. But it's a little high tech manufacturing business. So I'm involved in that. So I've got Sizzler and Americom International, the Russian project, Wedgewood Investment Corporation, the real estate stuff in L.A., and CRT [Conductive Rubber Technology], which is the business up in Seattle. And then I'm currently talking to two other potentials of the same sort. So that's what I'm doing.

TRELEVEN: Well, I think that brings us up to date. The tape's about to end. You've spent innumerable hours with me putting up with my questions.

HALDEMAN: Well, I've enjoyed it. It's been interesting.

TRELEVEN: It's been a privilege for me to conduct this interview, and it all adds good information to the historical record. So on behalf of the California State Archives and UCLA, thank you very much, Mr. Haldeman.

HALDEMAN: Well, I appreciate your going to all the work that you've gone to in preparing for this. It's made it an interesting experience for me.

[End Tape 7, Side B]