

California State Archives
State Government Oral History Program

Oral History Interview

with

LUCIEN C. HAAS

Press Secretary and Campaign Specialist, 1961 - 1984

January 19, 24 and February 2, 6, 23, 1989
Pacific Palisades, California

By Carlos Vásquez
Oral History Program
University of California, Los Angeles

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None.

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PREFACE

On September 25, 1985, Governor George Deukmejian signed into law A.B. 2104 (Chapter 965 of the Statutes of 1985). This legislation established, under the administration of the California State Archives, a State Government Oral History Program "to provide through the use of oral history a continuing documentation of state policy development as reflected in California's legislative and executive history."

The following interview is one of a series of oral histories undertaken for inclusion in the state program. These interviews offer insights into the actual workings of both the legislative and executive processes and policy mechanisms. They also offer an increased understanding of the men and women who create legislation and implement state policy. Further, they provide an overview of issue development in California state government and of how both the legislative and executive branches of government deal with issues and problems facing the state.

Interviewees are chosen primarily on the basis of their contributions to and influence on the policy process of the state of California. They include members of the legislative and executive branches of the state government as well as legislative staff, advocates, members of the media, and other people who played significant roles in specific issue areas of major and continuing importance to California.

By authorizing the California State Archives to work cooperatively with oral history units at California colleges and universities to conduct interviews, this program is structured to take advantage of the resources and expertise in oral history available through California's several institutionally based programs.

Participating as cooperating institutions in the State Government Oral History Program are:

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California State University, Fullerton

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Center for California Studies
California State University, Sacramento

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Claremont Graduate School

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The Bancroft Library
University of California, Berkeley

Oral History Program
University of California, Los Angeles

The establishment of the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program marks one of the most significant commitments made by any state toward the preservation and documentation of its governmental history. It supplements the often fragmentary historical written record by adding an organized primary source, enriching the historical information available on given topics and allowing for more thorough historical analysis. As such, the program, through the preservation and publication of interviews such as the one which follows, will be of lasting value to current and future generations of scholars, citizens and leaders.

John F. Burns
State Archivist

July 27, 1988

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

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Series,
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Science]
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Interview Time and Place:

January 19, 1989
Haas's home in Pacific Palisades, California
Session of two hours

January 24, 1989
Haas's home in Pacific Palisades, California
Session of one and one-quarter hours

February 2, 1989
Haas's home in Pacific Palisades, California
Session of one and one-quarter hours

February 16, 1989
Haas's home in Pacific Palisades, California
Session of one and one-half hours

February 23, 1989
Haas's home in Pacific Palisades, California
Session of two and one-half hours

Editing

Vásquez checked the verbatim manuscript of the interview against the original tape recordings, edited for punctuation, paragraphing, and spellings, and verified proper names. Insertions by the editor are bracketed. The interviewer also prepared the introductory materials.

Mr. Haas reviewed a copy of the edited transcript and returned it with minor corrections.

Papers

There exist no private papers which the interviewer was able to consult for this interview.

Tapes and Interview Records

The original tape recordings of the interview are in the university archives at UCLA along with the records relating to the interview. Master tapes are preserved at the California State Archives.

BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

Lucien C. Haas was born in Buffalo, New York, on July 15, 1918, where he attended Saint Margaret's Elementary School and Louis J. Bennett High School. He studied marine biology at the University of Florida from 1937 to 1938, and geology at Ohio State University from 1938 to 1939. In 1940 Haas began his military service in the United States Army Air Corps, and earned the rank of captain while serving with the Ninth Army in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands until 1945. While in the service, he married Claire Kehoe and had four children: Lucien Jr., Dirk, Vernon, and Jack. In 1955 he married Janet Vernon in Los Angeles, California.

As a young man, Haas aspired to become an explorer and world traveler, but he always harbored an interest in journalism. Upon his discharge from military service, Haas began his journalistic career with the Los Angeles Daily News. He worked with that newspaper until it suspended business in 1954. As shop steward at the Daily News, he was active in the Los Angeles chapter of the American Newspaper Guild and experienced the red-baiting and blacklisting commonplace in the McCarthy era. In 1955 he went to work for the Los Angeles Free Press, then moved to the City News Service and wrote publicity for radio at the Columbia Broadcasting System. In 1957 Haas became regional director of public relations for the Western Beet Sugar Producers in Denver.

Haas joined the staff of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., in 1961 as associate press secretary. He wrote speeches, handled press relations, and participated in policy development until Governor Brown's 1966 loss to Ronald Reagan. Haas also worked as communications director or press secretary in several critical statewide campaigns, among them: the 1962 gubernatorial race between Governor Brown and former Vice President Richard M. Nixon; the 1966 Brown campaign against Ronald Reagan; the 1968 senatorial race between Alan Cranston and Maxwell L. Rafferty, Jr.; the 1969 mayoral race between Thomas Bradley and Samuel W. Yorty; the 1970 gubernatorial contest between Governor Reagan and former Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh; the 1972 presidential campaign in California between Senator George S. McGovern and President Nixon; and the 1974 senatorial race between Alan Cranston and H. L. Richardson.

In 1967, Haas was named director of public information in the Office of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. He was also Secretary Wilbur J. Cohen's press secretary. Since 1969 Haas has worked for United States Senator Alan Cranston in California as policy analyst, press secretary, and speechwriter. Until 1984 he was on the board of directors of the Edmund G. Brown, Sr., Institute of Public Affairs at California State University, Los Angeles.

An amateur botanist and naturalist, Haas is active in various environmental organizations.

[Session 1, January 19, 1989]

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

HAAS: I was born in Buffalo, New York on July 15, 1917. My family: five kids, three sisters and one brother.

VASQUEZ: What are their names?

HAAS: The oldest sister was Virginia [Haas], the next one was Miriam [Haas], the next one was Betty [Haas]. My brother is [Donald] Don [Haas]. We come from German origin at least one generation removed, but neither of my parents lived in Germany. They were at least one generation removed. There was a little French influence on one side of the family. At least, my [paternal] grandmother claimed a little French. She named two of her children with French first names: Remi and Lucien. So that sort of carried down. But basically we were of German origin.

VASQUEZ: And you grew up, again, where?

HAAS: In Buffalo, New York, until I went to college. We were Catholics and pretty much a middle class

family. My father was an engineer--very successful, but he didn't make a lot of money.

VASQUEZ: What was your father's name?

HAAS: His name was Lucien Levant [Haas]. That's the French influence, so called.

VASQUEZ: And your mother's name?

HAAS: My mother's name was Gertrude. Gottschalk was her maiden name. We had a very solid family life. My mother was a traditional mother. This was really old-fashioned stuff where she did a lot of canning and baking, that sort of stuff. And, of course, a good part of our years were spent there in the Depression. But even in the Depression, my father was never out of work or anything like that. He worked for the same company practically all of his life. It was called the MacKenzie Muffler Company. He was an engineer. He invented automobile mufflers and had about twenty-six patents. He wrote a book, Jigs and Fixtures,¹ a mechanical engineering book which is still in use. We haven't received any

1. Haas, Lucien L. and Fred H. Calvin, Jigs and Fixtures, New York: McGraw, 1928.

dividends from it for a number of years, but he published the book the year I was born. So it was around for about sixty years. The book was updated a couple of times.

We had a very steady family and church life and neighborhood. I only lived in two houses. I was born in one, and then we moved to a bigger house. Both houses were in Catholic neighborhoods. The Catholic school we went to was next to the church. The one I went to was Saint Margaret's [Parochial School]. It was on Hertel Avenue in Buffalo, New York.

I was very much into athletics from the time I was a kid. I played all the sports and games and everything there was.

The rest of my family was quite creative. Two of my sisters were artistically inclined. My father had an artistic background. My brother tended to follow in my father's footsteps. He was the mechanical engineer in the house. He was the kid who could fix things. I could fix nothing. Of course, I was younger. On the scale of things, I was fourth down. My sister Betty was the youngest. We were all two or three years

apart, a typical family.

So life revolved around the neighborhood, friends, and a farm that my grandmother [Betty] owned out in a very, very small village called Holland, New York, which was sort of a weekend farm. We spent a lot of time in the spring or the summer out there on the farm. There was a mill down there that had been converted into a weekend house. All of the family would pile into this place. In fact, we'd sometimes have two families out there. My father had a brother [Remi] who also had five children. So we had that family relationship. The two families were almost equally matched for boys and girls, same ages and so on. We'd walk to Holland.

In other words, mine was a sort of idyllic life, sort of isolated. There was not much happening in my life except growing up and doing the usual things: traditional family, church, neighborhood, and friends-type of things, without very many problems.

VASQUEZ: Were there any minority groups?

HAAS: Not linguistic groups. This is important for me because I've been involved with minority issues

all my life. Towards the end of the time we were living in Buffalo, in the last neighborhood we lived in, there were. That's the house where I grew up, because I was just a very small child at the other house, the first house. I spent most of my years practically growing up in one house.

There were Jews who began to move in there, a small number of Jews. They must have been Orthodox because the old men all looked Orthodox. They acted Orthodox, they had their traditional hats and so on. My father was very anti-Semitic.

VASQUEZ: Where did that come from?

HAAS: You know, this sort of conflict between Catholics and Jews. There's always been some little sects of Jews here in the U.S. right from the beginning.

My father was a semicontrolled alcoholic. On weekends, he would drink a fair amount and would insult the Jews if they walked by the house, the old men who'd be speaking Yiddish or Hebrew. He would shout, "Why don't you speak English?" To my disgust and the embarrassment of the whole family. Nobody liked that, because the

rest of the family had no sense of that at all. None. It was just such a foreign idea that he should attack somebody. The family would say, "Dad, shut up. You're doing that again, you're embarrassing us." He would answer, "No. This was a white community." Now, Buffalo is a Polish city so there were some Poles living there. They called the Poles, "Polacks." We called them Polacks. It's like you'd say, "Mexican." There was open prejudice there--even amongst us kids, I think.

VASQUEZ: Did you have these problems at school?

HAAS: There weren't any minorities in the schools. Looking back at my schools, I didn't see anything but white faces. I played all kinds of sports.

VASQUEZ: Your Catholic schools?

HAAS: Yes. Well, I went to a public high school.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember the name?

HAAS: Louis J. Bennett High School. I don't remember any kind of a foreign face there.

VASQUEZ: There were no blacks in town at the time?

HAAS: There must have been.

VASQUEZ: But you were never cognizant of them?

HAAS: They were way off somewhere else. I mean, we

were living in a pure, all-white, Anglo-Saxon neighborhood--German or whatever it was--totally, totally removed from anything like that. The real treat for me was to go with my father down to Chinatown because he loved to dabble into certain kinds of foreign foods. I don't know why.

VASQUEZ: So he liked the food but not the people?

HAAS: Well, probably not. He probably thought the Chinese were crazy, because they were traditional Chinese with their herbal shops, their foods, and all that stuff. And they looked Chinese. Chinatown was just another world. I mean, a very small world, like one street, one block or something like that, not like Monterey Park [Laughter] or Los Angeles. Because wherever the minorities were, they were minorities. They were a tiny percentage, at least in this city.

Buffalo's a fairly good-sized city, but it was out of the mainstream as a target for minorities. I mean, New York was where the minorities were streaming into. And into Chicago, perhaps, and San Francisco. The coastal cities were where they started from. A few crept out into the

hinterlands. Buffalo is kind of far away, so maybe it just didn't have as many. New York was the melting pot. You can't ever compare it [Buffalo] with New York or any place like that.

VASQUEZ: Tell me about your school years. Were you a good student?

HAAS: No, I was my own teacher. Everything that I learned was basically self-taught, because I was an intense reader and didn't care about school. I was an indifferent student. I passed. I never flunked a course, but I didn't get A's. Maybe somewhere in the range of B's and C's. But there was no fooling around. You did your homework. You performed. Because I came from a Catholic elementary school. I don't know what you know about Catholic elementary schools, but in my days, Sister Joseph had a ruler like that [gestures] and she would rap you if you were horsing around or anything like that. And you learned.

I was an altar boy and learned Latin when I was five, six, or seven years old. I recited Latin to my mother. So learning was a discipline that you just accepted. It didn't make any

difference what I felt about school. I was not that interested in school because I was interested in teaching myself. I wanted to learn what I wanted to learn, which was primarily about the world.

From my earliest days, the only thing I wanted to think about was becoming an explorer. That's what I wanted to do, and I read everything about the world that I could find, including history. I became very interested in Russia. I read every single book in the library about Russia. I would read at least a book a day during the summer.

VASQUEZ: What was the interest in Russia for you?

HAAS: I don't know how the hell I got interested in Russia, except that I was a newspaper boy. I started delivering newspapers at age ten and would read the newspapers as I walked around delivering the papers. That's how I got interested in reading newspapers. I must have been reading about Russia in the newspapers. I said, "What the hell is Russia all about?" And when I started to grow up a little bit and spend a lot of time during the summer going down to the

library, I read every book on Russia that they had--which was a lot. I remember the shelves. There were probably six shelves of books on Russia. That's not very many, although for a kid, it's like fifty, sixty books. I read them all.

So that was my sense of being a student. Athletics were far more interesting to me than being a member of the chess club, a member of the literary club, or anything like that. Athletics were a big part of my life. I just went from one sport to the next. It was hockey in the winter. We didn't have much basketball in those days. That was a nothing sport. If you had winter sports, it was hockey. So I just went from playing one sport to another. In summers, if I could find some place, I'd swim. We lived right by Lake Erie. That was my approach to teaching myself, which I've done most of my life. If you look around, you'll see that I don't have a large collection of books, because I've given all of my books away. But I'm always reading, at least six books at one time. I'm now reading a bunch of books on "new physics." But I

was determined, like everybody else, that I was going to go to college. My family didn't have a lot of money.

VASQUEZ: Did the Depression affect you very much?

HAAS: Yes, it did. Everybody suffered through the Depression, as far as I know. My neighborhood would be called upper-middle class, but it was probably middle class. Even though my father was working and the country was manufacturing automobiles and selling mufflers, you didn't sell as many cars. Everybody was taking cuts in wages to keep the company alive. So it was a struggle.

And my mother was constantly struggling to make ends meet by canning and doing her own sewing. She even sewed pants for me. She didn't know how to do that. This is terrible to say, but I used to be so ashamed to wear those clothes. She was an expert seamstress, but she sewed better for women, for the three girls and herself. [Laughter] My father wasn't about to go around in any suit she made because he was very careful about what he wore. He was well-turned out. He wasn't a blue-collar worker. He wore a tie. He was an executive. He was an engineer.

He was the chief engineer of this company. It was a small company, but he was the master of the works. He knew all about the machines. He designed the machines and so on.

VASQUEZ: Was the Depression very important in your formative years?

HAAS: It was an influence, although we didn't suffer. You were just aware of it. We were very, very much aware of the fact. It was on the front page of the papers all the time, and I was delivering the papers.

VASQUEZ: Were you aware of the gradations of suffering that went on as a result of it?

HAAS: Yes, absolutely. The unemployment and all of the rest of it, yes. That was definitely a big influence.

VASQUEZ: But you were very much aware that you were in the middle class?

HAAS: Oh, yes. Yes. No question about that. I knew the difference between poor people and what we were, because they all lived on the other side of the railroad tracks. There actually was a railroad track about four or five blocks from where I lived, and there was a very fancy, private school

there. We used to go over there and play these guys in football and hockey. We were the scrub teams, and we would go over there and play. We actually went over the tracks to the rich man's school over there. So we were also aware of that, the rich people.

VASQUEZ: Who would you then say was most influential in your intellectual and social formation as a child?

HAAS: My social ideas came from books. I didn't get any social ideas from my family. If I got any, I probably would have rejected them. I wasn't socially oriented in the sense that I was going to make a career in politics or anything like that. It wasn't what I was going to do. My career was going to be as an explorer, so I had no real commitment to social ideas, politics, or anything like that. That was just nothing.

So the point that I became socially aware-- I'm taking a huge leap--was when I got drafted into the army. That was when my social transformation took place, because I suddenly realized that there was a force over my life. I had been a free spirit right up to that moment in 1940

when Uncle Sam said, "You are 1-A" and I was gone.

VASQUEZ: Tell me about your military experience.

HAAS: Well, like I said, I was a free spirit. Another friend of mine and I were living here in Los Angeles. We were living on a boat down in Santa Monica harbor.

VASQUEZ: Who was that friend?

HAAS: George Uman. We were living down in a boat in Santa Monica harbor when there actually was a harbor. Well, it wasn't a harbor. It was a breakwater. I don't know how long you've been around here, but the breakwater practically disappeared. If you look out there, you can see little rocks. Anyway, we were going to sail around the world in this crazy, little boat. Well, we would never make it in that boat, but that was our goal. We were going to sail around the world. That was in 1940. We knew what was happening.

All of a sudden, we were registering for the draft. We said, "We aren't going to sail around the world. Anyway, we're going into the army." So we took off. Not away from the draft--we were

registered, but we took off for one last fling to make a trip around California, Utah, Arizona, and Nevada for gold mining. In college, I had been studying geology with the idea of becoming a mining engineer so that I could use that as my tool to travel around the world.

VASQUEZ: Where did you go to college?

HAAS: Well, I went to five different colleges.

VASQUEZ: We'll come back to that. Let's finish the service.

HAAS: Anyway, we took off on this crazy mining trip. We figured that was the last thing we were going to be able to do, go exploring the world. I had caught this guy up in my fever. My fever was "We're going to see the world." So he just went along with me, although he wasn't really inclined that way, I don't think.

At the end of this disastrous mining trip I say "disastrous" because we practically starved to death. We almost froze to death. We almost died. Lots of things happened to us that I really don't want to get into, because I think it's just too much.

At the end of that, he went one way and I

went another, and within three or four months, Uncle Sam said, "It's time." We both wound up back in L.A., marched down to Fort MacArthur, and were drafted into the Signal Corps. We both got drafted into the same outfit, the Seventh Infantry Division, and wound up in northern Monterey.

We were buck privates in the Signal Corps, which was a good service at that time because that was a high-class outfit. The Signal Corps was for guys who were bright. They only took the high-level guys in there. Not that the work was very high-level, because it wasn't. The only thing that we really had to learn was the Morse code. [Laughter]

So that was the beginning of my military career. I spent four and one-half years in the service. I got married while I was in the service. My life was totally transformed.

VASQUEZ: What is your wife's name?

HAAS: Well, that was my first wife.

VASQUEZ: What was her name?

HAAS: Well, what was her name [Claire Kehoe]? Good question. [Laughter]

VASQUEZ: Why did that transform your life? First of all, before we get into the marriage, did you go overseas? Did you see action in the war?

HAAS: Yes, I went overseas right at the very end. I went to officer training school, so my first part of the service was in OCS [Officer Candidate School]. It pretty much consumed a lot of my time. Then, in 1945, I went over to England.

We were the Ninth Army at the time, and we headed for France, then up through Belgium to the Netherlands. We landed in the Netherlands and set up our headquarters. That's when the war ended with Germany. But I did not have enough points to get out of the service, and we got sent back immediately to Mississippi to be reoutfitted and retrained to head for the South Pacific. While we were down there, they dropped the atomic bomb, and we were busted out of the service. By that time, I was a captain. I was married and had a kid. My life was transformed in the process.

VASQUEZ: How so?

HAAS: Well, from a free spirit who was going to be a world explorer, I had now spent four and one-half

years in the service against my will--although I didn't disbelieve in what we were doing. But I very strongly felt the force of the government on my life. It transformed all my thinking. It probably didn't transform it, but it crystallized a lot of the things that I had spent my life reading about.

VASQUEZ: For example?

HAAS: For example, the relationship with the Soviet Union. I knew Russian history and was sympathetic to the revolutionary ideas of communism. I was sympathetic to the [Bolshevik] revolution.

VASQUEZ: Did that get you in trouble with any of your mates?

HAAS: Well, we never talked politics in the service. Life was just too much of a hassle. There was very little talk about politics.

VASQUEZ: What did you learn about yourself, your country, and Americans in the service?

HAAS: Well, from a personal point of view, it transformed my life. I realized there was a force out there that was greater than everything else. I was determined, when I got out, to influence events the best that I could. In other words, I

was no longer some wide-eyed kid who was going to travel around the world and become a world explorer.

I came out an energized, political activist on the strong, liberal side. Right over on the left as far over to the left as you could get without becoming a communist.

VASQUEZ: Why was that line not crossed? What did you see was wrong with communism?

HAAS: Well, I never could see the results as being very favorable. You can't look at Russia today and say, "It did work." It didn't work from the beginning.

VASQUEZ: You were already aware of that at that time?

HAAS: I couldn't see that communism was a workable solution. A socialist solution, yes.

VASQUEZ: What did you understand about socialism at that time?

HAAS: Socialism was less than communist. I was probably, without having the label at that time, a democratic socialist, as I am today. If I would call myself something, I would say I'm a democratic socialist. I've been a member of the Democratic Socialists of America for many, many

years, but I've never been active in it because I think it's just a waste of time.

It's not going to happen in the United States, not in the near future anyway. The left has been. . . . I don't know. From my point of view, I guess, I was more pragmatic about politics.

VASQUEZ: And all this came as a result of your own reading?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: Did you join organizations?

HAAS: When I got out of the service I went to work for a newspaper.

VASQUEZ: Which was?

HAAS: The Los Angeles Daily News. I came out and said, "I'm going to be a newspaper man." Now, that had some roots back in my mind. When you thought of careers and so on, you had these hidden careers. When I was in elementary school, another kid and I formed a newspaper called Santa Margarita. I went to Saint Margaret's School. It was called Santa Margarita. We had rubber type. You took out little tweezers and set the whole newspaper of just one page with little

rubber type. That was some job. Anyway, we published this little newspaper, not for very long because setting that type was just murder. [Laughter] If there were some other way to do it. . . . Let's just forget about that.

But there was something there which must have influenced my life. I didn't think of it consciously. I said to myself, "What are you going to do when you get out of the service? You've got nothing." I hadn't completed college. I had left college.

VASQUEZ: When was this?

HAAS: I was at Ohio State [University] at the time, and in fact, I left college in the midst of the Depression, which was still going on in 1939 or 1940. I practically starved my way through college.

VASQUEZ: Why did you leave college to go into the service?

HAAS: I left college to join something called the air corps. There was no air force. There was an air corps. I was having a very bad time keeping my life together in college because I had no money and . . .

VASQUEZ: Your parents didn't help you through college?

HAAS: No, they didn't. I was very independent, and they probably didn't know how bad things were for me, because I didn't complain. I had to find jobs. I had to find jobs to eat, and there were times when I did not eat.

There was a time when a girl who lived in the same place that I lived in worked in a cracker factory. She was a student and would bring home crackers that she stole. And I would eat crackers.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember her name?

HAAS: No. She kept me alive with her crackers for a while. My mouth got so sore, I could not even talk from eating crackers. Between trying to hustle jobs and so on, there was always the same problem: hanging on to a job and eating.

I remember I had a job at a fraternity for one meal, lunch. I would come in, and the minute I walked in the door, I would grab anything to find anything to eat. I'd start eating because I figured I would have to eat enough for three meals. One meal didn't keep me going.

Anyway, I lost that job, because they wanted me to join the fraternity, and I couldn't join.

I didn't have any money. They said, "Well, we're sorry, but we're going to have to give this job to one of our fraternity brothers." So I went off to work on another job.

I had one of those weird experiences while I was washing pots and pans. I was a tough, hard-working guy. I wasn't goofing off. These jobs were life and death for me. I had to eat. You were just looking at disaster if you couldn't keep working. That's where it was with me. Anyway, life was a hassle. But I had a funny experience.

I lost this job in a hospital. I didn't know what the hell the reason was. I just got laid off. There was no reason given or anything like that. I was washing those pots and pans till hell wouldn't have it. When I got laid off, two black people who worked in there called me aside on my way out. They said, "Here, take this." They had a couple of bags loaded with food that they had snatched from this big hospital cafeteria where they fed the patients. These guys gave me this food to take with me so I'd have something to eat for a few days. Now,

that was one of the profoundest experiences in my life, because I had so few contacts, even then, with black people or anything like that. And to be befriended by these two black people . . .

VASQUEZ: This was in Ohio?

HAAS: Yes, Ohio State, at Columbus, Ohio. That was a profound experience for me. I've thought about it a great deal. You know, I was just a young guy in college, a sophomore at that point, and a very impressionable person who didn't have any social consciousness, at least no perceptible, liberal roots except through my reading. But I was heading to this career of being an explorer. It didn't fit in with my being some kind of a social activist, because a couple of blacks befriended me or something like that. It had nothing to do with it.

VASQUEZ: But it did have some impact?

HAAS: Well, it's just one of those things that you remember. It burns into your consciousness. A lot of things you forget in life, but I can recall that scene as if it were a painting that I look at everyday--that scene of a black woman and a black man calling me aside. They knew I had

been laid off. I hardly knew these people when I came in and worked. I wasn't joshing and bantering and socializing with the other workers or anything like that. I was barely aware of their existence. They were just a couple of other workers there. I didn't know what the hell they were doing. All of a sudden to be . . .

VASQUEZ: Helped out liked that.

HAAS: To be helped out. To be given charity and welfare from these people was sort of a heart-warming experience. They grew on me over the years. You never forget that. Everybody has things you never forget. Some of them are tragic, some are uplifting.

VASQUEZ: We were talking about when you got out of the service.

HAAS: Yes. I went to work for a newspaper [Los Angeles Daily News]. I said, "I'm going to be a newspaper man." I felt I could write. For some reason or another, I said, "That's what I want to do." It was a liberal newspaper.

VASQUEZ: Did you know anybody there?

HAAS: Nobody. I just saw the editor. I was just fresh out of the service. I didn't have my uniform on,

obviously, but they knew that anyone who came in looking for a job was an ex-serviceman.

I went in to see the editor. His name was Lee Payne. I said, "Mr. Payne, I want a job." He said, "Well, we don't have anything right now." I said, "Well, I'll be back tomorrow." And he said, "I don't know whether we'll have anything tomorrow." I said, "That's okay. I'll be back. I'm going to check in because I want to work for the Daily News." I don't think I went back that day. I think he hired me at that point. I said, "I'm going to work here." I was determined. He was obviously impressed, although the job he gave me . . .

VASQUEZ: Was not impressive?

HAAS: No. I was a copyboy. A copyboy is nothing. A copyboy is what you do to grovel for the chance one day to sit in front of a typewriter and write anything. And that's the way it went. Anyway, here I was, a captain, and the word got around that I was an ex-captain. Everybody was an ex-serviceman--most of them, not everybody. There were some older guys there. There were some guys coming back from the service and becoming part of

it [the newspaper]. There were a number of women there then who obviously had not been in the service. They were filling the ranks and some of them were getting married.

Anyway, he gave me the job. I was there until they shut the place down in 1954. So I worked there for about nine years and moved quickly up the ranks. I was lucky. There was a lot of movement then, and I knew how to do the work. I knew how to write. I learned very quickly how to write a story.

VASQUEZ: Did you do any writing while you were in the service?

HAAS: No. Never. Nothing. I had absolutely no inkling that I would spend the rest of my life in front of a typewriter, which is what I have done. There isn't a day in my life I'm not sitting in front of that typewriter pounding something out, letters or whatever. It became very quickly my life and I was a natural newspaperman. When you go to Catholic school, you learn how to read and write. And I knew how to read and write. I loved to read.

I never really thought about writing. I

never thought about myself as a writer. At some point there in the service, I knew I was coming to the end of the line, that things were going to happen. I don't know what happened to me; "You're going to go to a newspaper and you're going to become a newspaperman." But by that time, I had been into all kinds of readings. I had read about newspapermen and about a lot of the social history of the United States.

VASQUEZ: Was there a particular publication that you were fond of or that served as a role model for you?

HAAS: The great muckraker. . . . What's his name? I've forgotten his name right now. I read all of his books, and I read a hell of a lot of books about journalism, writers, and the writers who were influencing social history and political history. So my reading was so broad that it probably was making its way through there, and I was not aware of it. I just never had a sense of that because I've never gone back and tried to analyze it. I can never remember why I made that decision to do what I was going to do, to set on the newspaper path. And here you are interviewing me about it at the end of my career.

There was no interruption from the time I got out of the service in 1945 until this very moment. My life became immersed in politics, social activism, left-wing politics, and writing. I mean, that's what I've done.

VASQUEZ: Did you go directly to radio when you left the Daily News?

HAAS: The Daily News left me. They folded up the paper. I was an outlaw. I was blacklisted. I could not get a newspaper job because I was a red-hot in the American Newspaper Guild and was the president of our local.

VASQUEZ: What was a "red-hot?"

HAAS: Red-hot means I was tough. Also that I was pink, to the left.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

HAAS: It was the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] American Newspaper Guild. Locally, it was called LANG, Los Angeles Newspaper Guild. But it was an international union. It was infiltrated by communists and a lot of leftists, including me. We were a very, very activist, tough, left-wing union, and it just had a history of that.

In fact, we were the target of [Senator Joseph R.] McCarthy's purges. Our newspaper was in a turmoil for years as a result of the communist influence in the newspaper. These guys were my best friends.

VASQUEZ: Who were some of them?

HAAS: I was the shop steward, then I became the head of the union, then I became at one point the executive secretary of the union. So I was head of all the guilds here in town. We had one at the [Los Angeles] Herald [Examiner]; we had another one at the Hollywood Citizen News, and Long Beach [Long Beach Press-Telegram]. So the newspaper guild was a pretty strong union at that time. We weren't at the [Los Angeles] Times. We never got into the Times. The newspaper guild never got in there because they would not permit that.

VASQUEZ: Did you participate at all in the purges of the communists from the unions by leftist forces?

HAAS: Well, no. I fought them. Our guild, our newspaper guild, the union fought every single one of the cases, and we lost them all. Some of my best friends were booted out. Some of them

came back, but there weren't that many. Let's get it straight. You're not talking about a large number of people, but it became a dramatic thing because everybody was saying, "Communists writing newspaper stories? How could they be objective?"

VASQUEZ: Who are some of the people you can remember from the time you were blacklisted?

HAAS: Vernon Partlow, Darr Smith. Vern Partlow was the most flagrant example of it, because he was a very close friend of mine and was a guy who was sort of beloved. He was a folksinger, one of these classical, left-wing, liberal-type guys: a folksinger type. He composed a lot of very famous songs that he sang. There was a lot of socializing on the left where we would all get together and sing the labor songs of Joe Hill and all that sort of stuff. Anyway, he was the guy that stands out. A lot of people were sort of exposed but they never really got ran out of the papers and so on. Some of them recanted. They were exposed and then they recanted. They were okay.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember any of them?

HAAS: Our managing editor by the name of Charles

Judson. You probably heard from Roy [Ringer] about some of this stuff. Did you talk to Roy about some of this stuff?

VASQUEZ: Yes, but we had another perspective that we were getting at.

HAAS: I'm not trying to pry into anything about what you got from Roy, because he obviously shared a lot of stuff that I did, although Roy was not as much of an activist as I was.

VASQUEZ: What kinds of things would be activism at that time?

HAAS: You mean . . . ?

VASQUEZ: To be an activist in the union?

HAAS: The shop steward is the activist. I was the shop steward for years. For the editorial work, we had a shop steward on the next floor, and then one down on the bottom floor. Circulation department, they had the shop steward, and then the business department. This was a vertical union. That is to say, the whole plant was unionized except for the printers. They did not belong to the American Newspaper Guild. But the circulation guys belonged to the Newspaper Guild, too, and we had red-hots down there. [Andrew]

Andy Barrigan was another one.

VASQUEZ: You were blacklisted?

HAAS: Where does this take us? Where are we going now?

VASQUEZ: Well, I'm wondering, whether the union or any of the people you knew, your friends, were called before the California version of the House on Un-American Activities Committee?

HAAS: They didn't mess around with us much. The California committee [Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities] was very weak. I don't remember that happening to our guys. What happened was most of them were not exactly what you would call [Laughter] big-time communists or anything like that. They did not rate that kind of attention. What they rated was being mentioned, and then employers took action against them.

In other words, the employer didn't want to be tainted by having a communist or ex-communist on the staff. These weren't guys going around making bombs and [being] revolutionaries. They weren't big wheels in communist parties. They were mostly a social sort of thing. It was fashionable to be part of the left at that

time. You had the Hollywood left, and the newspaper guys would socialize with that part of the left end. These were the guys getting all the attention, obviously, the Hollywood Ten.

VASQUEZ: I was going to ask about the Hollywood Ten. Were you involved in that in any way?

HAAS: No, no. I was never involved in it, other than the fact that we were fighting that sort of thing along with our own fights, the House Un-American Activities Committee. Turmoil was around you all the time. If you were a member of the left, you were very, very much aware of it. I was being red-baited along with everybody else. I came home from the war and was thrown right into this thing. I never joined anything. I wouldn't have even if I've been asked. It was all coming apart anyway, that whole idea was disintegrating.

VASQUEZ: Why?

HAAS: I think people were disillusioned with the Soviet Union, with Russia. That was the mother source of communism and so on. People were related to that and were related to the idea of peace in the world and the joining together of the socialist world. So there was a hell of a lot of

disillusionment with the Soviet Union, with Stalin, and all the rest of it. It was hard to reconcile the human rights violations and what became, in a sense, the betrayal of the revolution, the revolutionary ideas that Lenin and Trotsky and others had. All those were lost and betrayed. I think one hell of a lot of people who had joined the Communist party were disillusioned. Then they dropped out. The left, itself, in those days was still fairly strong, especially in the labor movement. There was a constant struggle in the labor movement between the CIO and the AFL [American Federation of Labor]. There was Walter Reuther and a hell of a lot of other people, the auto workers. These were all radical unions in the CIO. Not revolutionary-radical in any way like that, but they were activist-radical unionists. That was the tradition of the CIO at that time. That was the base of it, the growth of it, the strength of it.

VASQUEZ: What were your feelings at that time when the CIO and the AFL merged?

HAAS: I don't remember whether I had any particular

feelings about it one way or another. We were always semicontemptuous of the AFL, because they were not interested in the broader aspects of unionism, which the CIO was. The CIO had this vision of spreading industrial unionism, and the AFL was interested in their crafts. We thought that was a very narrow, selfish point of view. They were protecting their ass and to hell with the rest of the workers. The CIO was going to organize the world. It was a great dream. It was a Walter Reuther dream, the sort of thing of which there are only a few, sad remnants. One of them was the East Los Angeles Community Union, TELACU, which was a Walter Reuther idea to organize a community union. Of course, now TELACU is not exactly a CIO union idea anymore. I don't know what the hell it is. I'm very disappointed in it.

VASQUEZ: So when you left the Daily News, where did you go?

HAAS: I went to work as the editor of the Free Press, which was called Claypool's Free Press at that time.

VASQUEZ: Claypool?

HAAS: Yes. Lester Claypool was the political editor of the Los Angeles Daily News. The Americans for Democratic Action said, "We've got to recreate a liberal voice in Los Angeles." So they decided to create a small, weekly newspaper that was going to be a liberal, political newspaper voice. I became the editor. Les Claypool was the nominal editor. He was listed on there, but I was running the newspaper. He didn't know anything except how to write a column.

So they called it Claypool's Free Press at first, then we changed the name to the Free Press. They took his name off because it soon became evident that he really wasn't that interested in trying to create a newspaper.

VASQUEZ: The Los Angeles Free Press, or just the Free Press?

HAAS: The Los Angeles Free Press, yes. Anyway, it was a nothing effort. We had no money. There was very little vision of how to do this. The guys who were trying to put it together and were trying to bankroll it were scrounging up money to make the thing go. Half the time, you couldn't even get paid. It was a struggle that was

misdirected and misguided. It was totally visionary that you could do this sort of thing and that there was some sort of market for the newspaper.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember what your circulation was?

HAAS: It could never have been more than one thousand or two thousand, something like that.

VASQUEZ: It was really limited then.

HAAS: Oh yeah. It was practically zero. And I suppose we gave half of it away, because even a simple, little newspaper, a weekly newspaper which is just a simple one, was way beyond their capability. I say "their" capability because, hell, I had nothing. I was starving to death. I had gotten a job, and they're not paying me a hell of a lot. I was doing work on the side whenever I could get outside jobs. I was working doing PR [public relations], writing jobs, anything I could do to make some additional income.

Then I went to work for City News Service on weekends trying to hold my life together. By this time, I was having a lot of personal problems. My first wife, Claire, had a serious

mental problem. She just broke down completely. I had two kids now living out in Baldwin Park in a garage that I was trying to rebuild into a house.

VASQUEZ: What are the kids' names before we go on? Your kids' names?

HAAS: These are two boys: Lu III--his name is Lucien--and the other one was Dirk. So in the middle of all of this turmoil of the newspaper falling apart, not having jobs, and not having enough income, I was breaking up with my wife because she was mentally incompetent, and I had to take care of the kids. She was in the mental hospital. I had no money for her or for the babysitters. So it was just a total uproar in my life which is almost like a fog in my memory. I can't even begin to put together what was going on in my life at that time.

VASQUEZ: How long did that period last?

HAAS: It was like a couple of years. It was long enough to be a scar in my life which is so bad that I just don't want to look back on it. You say to yourself, "With all this stuff happening to me. . . ." Anyway, so the Free Press didn't

work out. I had to work for the City News Service on the side to make some money. By this time, I had split up with my wife. That didn't work off and on. She was very marginal, and by now I had moved in with my present wife, Jan [Janet Vernon], and we were living together.

So then I went through a divorce and finally wound up taking the two kids. My ex-wife couldn't handle the situation. I married Jan, and all of a sudden she was the mother of two kids. Hey, they're not little babies. They're grown up kids. So she had a lot of responsibility. She was working. I was working two or three jobs, whatever I could do. Meanwhile, I had gotten a decent job because I did go to work for CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] Radio, which was an okay-paying job, but it was a dead end because it was on its last leg. CBS Radio, of course, at one time was a powerhouse, but by 1955 radio was fading fast. You were in the wrong business if you were in radio. You were supposed to be in television.

VASQUEZ: What did you do there? Were you a writer?

HAAS: I was doing publicity for them. My job was to

write publicity for all the radio shows that were still going on: "Jack Benny," "Peter Potter's Platter Parade," Bing Crosby ["The Bing Crosby Show"], the CBS "[Theatre] Radio Workshop," which was theater productions on radio, and two or three other shows that we were publicizing or trying to publicize. People were not listening to radio too much and the newspapers weren't doing much publicity or doing enough publicizing of radio programs. Everything was television. It became apparent that that was no place for a career, so I went to look around for jobs. At this point, a friend of mine who had been working at the Daily News said, "Hey, we're looking for somebody to run our office in Denver." This was the beet-sugar industry [Western Beet Sugar Producers]. So the next thing I know, I said, "Hey man, at last I've got some money and a real job." So I was in Denver, Colorado, working for the beet-sugar industry as a public relations writer, publicity-type person doing something which is totally outside my interests.

VASQUEZ: How did it square with your previous work?

HAAS: It didn't square at all.

VASQUEZ: How did you reconcile it?

HAAS: The beet-sugar industry, if you know anything about it, was totally, totally dependent on Chicanos: Mexican farm-labor workers.

VASQUEZ: Seasonal, migrant workers.

HAAS: This was a form of feudalism, slavery. It was a totally organized, governmental form of slavery.

VASQUEZ: How long did you work with the industry?

HAAS: Too long. It was about three years, I guess. I didn't like it. It didn't square with anything. At one point, I even had a problem with the head of the whole goddamn sugar-beet industry. He [Frank Kemp] was the president of the biggest company [Great Western Sugar Company]. I had been out somewhere and had had a few too many drinks. I was sounding off about the goddamned farm-labor problems, and it got back to him. He called me in, and I figured out that I almost had it at that point, but I talked my way out of it because I needed the job.

I was looking around, so I finally wound up in San Francisco, which is the opposite of Denver. The next thing I knew, Roy Ringer called me and said, "Gee, we're looking for somebody to

help us out in Sacramento with Governor [Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.]. Would you be interested in it?" Well, good-bye. So that was the start of my political career. That was in 1961.

VASQUEZ: Well, let's get into the years as associate press secretary. What was your assignment as associate press secretary?

HAAS: Well, it was to write anything that came along, basically, and there was a lot of writing that we did. A lot of it was self-inspired. By that I mean that we had [John F.] Jack Burby, we had Lu Haas, and we always had a third person there. That third person sort of varied. [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton was a lawyer. He was sort of the brains of the . . .

VASQUEZ: Campaign strategy?

HAAS: Yeah, campaign strategies and so on. He was never a writer. He didn't do that kind of stuff. Most of the stuff that we were doing was what you would call routine, government writing, governmental-political, because there was never any differentiation between government and politics. There wasn't even a gray line. It just flowed back and forth.

- VASQUEZ: Those who worked in the administration and those who were out there getting people reelected, it was the same?
- HAAS: It was all the same mishmash. You could probably find something and say, "Well, that is really government." But if it is really government, we in the governor's office didn't do it. Somebody else would. That's what is called public information. Let's say the head of the health administration put out a new rule about doctors' payments or something like that. Well, shit, we didn't bother with that kind of stuff. That was just something you would call straight public information.
- VASQUEZ: How about something like the governor deciding or not deciding on the [Caryl] Chessman case. Who handled that? The political or the governmental people?
- HAAS: The thing about it is there is no compartmentalizing. It is a total meld, a total lock of government and politics. It's indistinguishable.
- VASQUEZ: That's interesting.
- HAAS: It's indistinguishable. There wouldn't be any way of separating out a piece of it except for

technical pieces, when you appoint a judge. Technically, the judge becomes an independent person under the laws governing the judiciary and the separation of powers by the constitution. So there is some sort of separating, but the judges are appointed for political reasons.

VASQUEZ: It's interesting to hear you say that about the staff and this melding, because Jack Burby saw very much a distinct differentiation. He seems to feel that there was a very meticulous separating of the two, and they've taken that to involve political issues, campaign issues with, say, the functioning of government.

HAAS: Campaigning became something a little different. That was a little different. Once the governor announced he was a candidate and once you set up a political campaign structure, then it got a little. . . . The lines become a little fuzzier, fuzzier in the sense that you can't see that there is some fuzz. I don't know what Jack was talking about. The day-to-day basis? I can't imagine what he was talking about there being some separation.

This is not to say you weren't aware that

you were doing something political, it was just that it was part of the job. Being political was part of the job. Being political was talking to the Republicans. We talked to the Republicans all the time. We did business with the Republicans. We did business with [Assembly Speaker] Jesse [M.] Unruh everyday. We did business with special interest groups, you name it. It was all a mix of politics and government.

You made a decision to support a bill on the basis of whether it was a good bill because it would benefit the people. Let's say it was a bill on education or something like that. But it was also political, because at that level of government, you can never untangle the politics. It was totally comingled. There was a total, unified interest in it.

It's an absurdity to think about it in any other way. You would go crazy if you thought there was some kind of separation, where you shouldn't be doing this because it was political. You can't say what is political. I could never see the difference.

You knew when certain decisions came down

that it was totally political. By god, you were going to appoint a Democratic judge in that particular situation. There is no way you were going to appoint a Republican. Everybody's aware of that. You found the best Democrat you could get. You were only going to appoint as few Republicans as you could possibly get away with, but you had to have some token ones. And when Jesse Unruh came in and said, "I want this bill signed. . . ."

VASQUEZ: Is that government or politics?

HAAS: Politics. It's a government bill most of the time because there aren't that many special interest bills. Sometimes it was a special interest bill, savings and loan, you name it. That is 95 percent political, probably. You could sign a savings and loan bill that was a good bill. You were supporting the savings and loan industry because you felt that these guys were building the homes here in California. And they were. So they were an integral part of the whole mixture of government and business.

There were a lot of payoffs on that too. The savings and loan industry, for example, was

practically all Democratic. It was dominated by Democrats, and they for many years were the heart and soul of the funding for the Democratic party.

VASQUEZ: This was specifically the case for Governor Brown.

HAAS: When Pat Brown set up his campaign, he went down and said, "Okay, Mark, we're ready. Let's go."

VASQUEZ: Mark?

HAAS: Mark Boyer.

VASQUEZ: Who were some of the other people that would support this?

HAAS: Eugene Wyman. Gene was the lawyer from Beverly Hills, and Mark was a builder. He built Lakewood, thousands of homes down there. They were multi-multi-millionaires. These guys made millions as builders and savings and loan and all the rest of it. It was all a mishmash.

VASQUEZ: How about people like Howard [F.] Ahmanson. He was a source?

HAAS: A Republican.

VASQUEZ: But was he a source of support at any time for Brown?

HAAS: Howard? Yes, he probably was.

VASQUEZ: Of course, at that time, you had people that

supported both sides.

HAAS: Of course. The savings and loan industry, they were totally dependent on government because the banks didn't like them. They still don't like them. There was this constant conflict. The banking industry, of course, was outside, basically, state government. The S & L's were creatures of state government. They were created by the state government.

Banks had been around for so long that they were sort of untouchables, but the S & L's became basically an industry that was created by some bright people who got the state government to pass laws.

VASQUEZ: A charter for a savings and loan was a pretty hot commodity, wasn't it?

HAAS: Jesus Christ! This was a ticket to becoming an instant millionaire. We created dozens and dozens of them. I don't know how many S & L's got created and whatnot, but every time you looked around, there was a new one.

VASQUEZ: Was there a political payoff in supporting S & L's for Governor Brown?

HAAS: Of course. This is the hard-core money coming

into the Democratic party. As I was saying, Pat Brown calls Mark Boyer. Now, I'm recreating this. I don't know if he calls him up. First of all, I was just a flunkie over there at the press department. I was no big-shot politician. I was just an operative. My level is the lowest level, practically, in the governor's office, on the governor's staff. We were the least influential. We didn't have any influence. We were just the mouthpieces for everything that was going on. So when I recreate things, I only recreate them out of what I know to be the facts.

First of all, I was the political press secretary in both of his campaigns, so I got the political side of things. I knew what was happening politically and I was at Los Angeles where it was happening. We're away from government into a political campaign. We're going back and forth here a little bit.

Anyway, the image is this: He calls Mark Boyer and says, "We're ready to go, Mark. I want you to become my finance chairman." "Don't worry, Pat. I'll do it. I'll take care of it." So Mark Boyer is finance chairman. The

finance chairman in those days, he was the bag man. That is to say, he raised all the money himself.

VASQUEZ: For the entire campaign?

HAAS: Right. Pat Brown, all he had to do was to show up. I was there. You got to Perino's which was then the fanciest restaurant in Beverly Hills. If you named a fancy restaurant, this was ten times fancier than anything in those days. Perino's now is nothing. I don't even know if it exists. It burned down. In there, you had twenty-five guys around the table, you locked the doors, and Mark would say, "Okay." Pat was there. They'd have their breakfast or lunch, whatever it was. "We're going to go around the table now." Everybody knew what the scene was. He [Mark Boyer] would maybe call on one or two guys. He knew what he would get from these guys. A guy would jump, "I want to be first. Put me down for \$100,000." Whatever it was, some big number. You wouldn't always get that from the guy either. He was a phony. [Laughter]

VASQUEZ: Was it a plant?

HAAS: Yeah. Something like that. Anyway, they would

go around the table, and that's the first thing that you needed. You walked out of there with a million bucks or something like that. Then you had to collect it and go do that at a few other places.

Alan Cranston, I think, raised \$14 or \$15 million in his last campaign. He did it practically all by himself. He raises as much money by himself. . . . There is no Mark Boyer. I couldn't even think of his finance chairman. He did have some finance chairman, Alan Cranston. But for years, he's been his own finance chairman. All politicians now raise most of their money themselves. They are on the phone constantly. They do nothing but raise money in their spare time. That's all they do.

Alan Cranston would get off the plane and head for the phones. He was calling his people. He would have a list of ten people that he would call that night. The next night there'd be ten more, and the next morning there'd be breakfast, lunch, this and that, and in between would be phone calls to raise money constantly. So you had to fight to get a press conference to get

some publicity.

It was different in those [Pat Brown] days, the way you raised money. You had Eugene Wyman and Mark Boyer and they took care of it. Pat Brown, all he had to do was show up. He looked around, he knew who those people were, they knew that he was their friend, etc. Eugene Wyman would come in with a list of guys to appoint as judges and so on. So there was a total linkage between the fund-raising, the elections, and the appointments. Not 100 percent on judicial appointments, because you have only so many hundreds of judges. They weren't buying judges, but believe me, it helped a hell of a lot if you had given \$5,000 in the Pat Brown campaign and you wanted to be a judge. If you had anything on the ball at all, you had to be a total asshole not to have a chance at it. This doesn't mean that everybody got appointed.

VASQUEZ: But it helped?

HAAS: Of course.

VASQUEZ: Some argue that Pat Brown was especially scrupulous about the rating from the Bar Association.

HAAS: We did not appoint any bad people. That's not a

problem. Well, I wouldn't say he didn't appoint any bad people. Probably somebody turned out to be a real jerk. But . . .

VASQUEZ: Is there a case you can remember in which somebody had a sizeable contribution and wanted to be a judge but had to be turned down for some reason?

HAAS: I don't know. I was not in on that. That was a totally different department over there. The guy who was responsible for making all the appointments for Pat, who did all the personal checks, the bar checks and this and that and the political checks. . . . A lot of different kinds of checks.¹ Jesse Unruh would come in with his list, the president of the senate would come in with his list, Eugene Wyman would come in with his list, and the labor guys would come in with their list, and so on.

So you had a lot of different interests. Hey, we had Chicanos coming in, blacks coming in, and all the rest of it. A lot of these guys were

1. May Layne Bonnell Davis was the Appointments Secretary for Governor Brown.

out of the stream of fund-raising and all the rest of it. The guys that we appointed from the black community, the Chicano community, shit, they didn't have any money. They weren't contributing to his campaign and so on. So you were appointing those guys for different reasons.

VASQUEZ: What were those reasons?

HAAS: It was political. It wasn't money. Incidentally, I don't think you were going to come up with a judge who wasn't a committed, decent guy. We appointed good, liberal, intelligent, bright, highly-rated, Harvard [judges]. You name it, that's the kind of people he appointed. Now, if he had the good sense to have given \$5,000 in the campaign, that's great. It didn't hurt a bit.

VASQUEZ: Tell me a little about the . . .

HAAS: But most of the judges weren't appointed for financial reasons.

VASQUEZ: They all pretty much passed muster to be appointed?

HAAS: And he, Pat Brown, took great pains to get the best possible guys he could get. You just knew that once in a while Eugene Wyman would come in

and say, "Sorry, Pat, but we have got to appoint this guy."

VASQUEZ: Before we expand out, tell me a little bit about that process.

HAAS: I don't know about that. I don't know anything about that. Okay, that is to say, I was never in a single meeting where any of that took place, and that's all over here in the same office. I don't mean to say it wasn't happening around me.

VASQUEZ: It was not in your department.

HAAS: No, and I was out of the swim of that. That wasn't what I was doing. I mean, I was a specialist, I became a campaign specialist, a political campaign specialist. I was part of the political strategy. I didn't have time to be screwing around with judges and this and that, or even screwing around with the politics of things. I would get involved in some of that, obviously. You just couldn't be the press secretary without dealing with this whole world out there, what made up the Democratic party, which was all the minority groups, labor, and all the special interests, whatever the hell they were. We were all part of that big pot that was

boiling out there, and you were relating to them all the time. You made an effort. I always tried to have a staff that could write a goddamned sentence in Spanish so we could get something out to the Spanish-language paper and so on. So you were paying attention to everybody like that.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember how the press secretary's office or the press staff was organized? Who did what while you were there? Burby was already there.

HAAS: Jack was the press secretary and was in a separate office. The secretary's room was in between, and we were on this side.

VASQUEZ: Who is "we?" You or Ringer?

HAAS: No. Roy was down in Los Angeles.

VASQUEZ: He was the governor's representative in Los Angeles.

HAAS: And he wasn't really part of the press operation. At least that's my recollection.

VASQUEZ: Who else was?

HAAS: During a campaign, that was different. He [Ringer] was right there. He was part of the campaign.

VASQUEZ: But on a regular basis, who else was part of the

press operation?

HAAS: Myself, and then underneath me there was another writer.

VASQUEZ: Charles Guggenheim? Was he around already?

HAAS: He was a campaign television person. Charlie Guggenheim did all the original stuff. I don't know whether he was involved in the first campaign. You understand, I didn't come in until 1961, so I wasn't in on the first campaign, which was in 1958.

VASQUEZ: Nineteen sixty-two was your first campaign.

HAAS: That's right. I came in November of 1961, and in 1962, I was involved in the campaign. I was the press secretary.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

VASQUEZ: Who else was on the press staff?

HAAS: [Patricia G.] Pat Sikes was the speech writer. She was the official speech writer. In other words, she wrote most of the governmental-type speeches.

VASQUEZ: Who wrote the political-type speeches?

HAAS: Jack Burby and Lu Haas. Now, when I started out, I didn't write the political speech. That's

something I evolved into, because when I started out I was doing shit work. I was just grinding out press releases, statements, and so on. Jack Burby was the brains of the press operation. The press came in to see him, not to see Lu Haas. His office was over here, and I didn't even know half the time who was in there with him. He was doing his thing. He was the press secretary. He was the one who went in and saw Pat Brown five or four times a day. He'd say, "Hey, we've got to talk to so-and-so to do this, if you're at all interested."

VASQUEZ: So there was no need for you to have access to the governor.

HAAS: Not in the beginning.

VASQUEZ: But once you started writing speeches . . .

HAAS: Well, speech writing was never anything that the governor was much involved in. The speeches got written, period. He just delivered them. They were all strictly a creation of the staff and were pretty much written as the staff wrote them, without any consultation at all.

VASQUEZ: When he was no longer press secretary and had gone to another position, what was Hale

Champion's role in writing the speeches and dealing with press matters as you remember?

HAAS: Hale, of course, became head of the [State Department of] Finance, and that was a critical spot in Pat Brown's administration because it also embraced a lot of political assignments. In other words, the power relationship with Jesse Unruh and a lot of other people in the legislature and whatnot, this was part of Hale's basic assignment.

Running the finance department was only like the secretary of treasury being a policy person with respect to the policy issues in the budget and the constant struggle with the legislature in deciding how the money was going to be spent. So there were constant policy questions of which Hale was the formulator, the principal policies that are always guided by money.

VASQUEZ: What other policies?

HAAS: Nobody really gives a shit about other kinds of policies.

VASQUEZ: But Hale Champion was more than that, wasn't he? Wasn't he an adviser, too, a real close adviser to the governor? Didn't he delve into other areas?

HAAS: I don't think that there was anything that he wasn't involved in. It's just a question of how much time you have to do everything that you can possibly get involved in. You can't get down to minutiae when you get something as vast as the state of California's government. It's just too much to be informed on every single thing and to get involved in every single decision.

So the answer is he tried to keep himself up with the big policy levels. But, yes, he was the governor's chief adviser, I would say.

VASQUEZ: What role do you think he played, if any, in the conflicting relationship between Jesse Unruh and Governor Brown?

HAAS: You mean the. . . .

VASQUEZ: Well, there was a tension very early. Some attributed it to personality. Some attributed it to the different visions of government that the two had. Some attributed it to Unruh's hopes to be governor one day. Some attributed it to what they saw the legislature doing. Perhaps Pat Brown resented the initiatives coming out, and that the legislature respond to the executive. There are all kinds of different reasons that

people give to the public, and that's a well-known tension there. What was Hale Champion's role in that do you think?

HAAS: First of all, Hale always was, obviously, an arbitrator. He was not a confrontational type of person as I recall him. He was strictly an operator type of person who was going to be an arbitrator, a moderator, and a "worker-outer" of deals. Every single decision was part of a deal, a compromise in which you made a deal with Jesse, with the senate, Hugh [M.] Burns, whoever it may be. I've forgotten all the . . . But he [Hugh Burns] was the president [pro tempore] of the senate for a hell of a long time, so you were dealing with Hugh Burns. I just used him, because I don't remember the succession of people. Jesse looms large. Okay, we know that. You know that from your own study of this whole thing and so on. So it was always Jesse. We had no trouble with the senate. These were our guys. They were our kind of people. They were the nice guys that we could get along with and could do business with. But you couldn't do business with Jesse.

VASQUEZ: Why not?

HAAS: Well, I don't know why. I think it was a mixture of a lot of these different things you get. One thing about politics [is that] you [have] got to try and generalize a little bit about politics, but it's never going to work to look for a single answer. It will never work. I can tell you now. It's too much of a complex of a lot of things.

The last time that [Mayor Thomas] Bradley ran for governor, after he was beaten by [George] Deukmejian, as a little exercise, I started calling my political friends, the savvy guys with the visions of gurus. They should know something about politics. I said, "Well, what do you think? Why did he lose?" Then they'd give their reasons and I would record them.

I stopped collecting after ten, different, significant reasons as to why Tom Bradley lost the election. I did that one to confirm what I knew about politics by this time: it's extraordinarily complex, it's a lot of different forces, and you can never sort them out. You can put a value on [each of] them, but it won't be the

value that this guy puts on them.

We all have different lists. If I gave him the list of ten that I got, I'd say, "Okay, you guys, I got you all on the table. I want you all to sort this out the way you think this should be." If you had ten guys on the table, you would have ten different kinds of lists as to what they thought was the important element.

So when you talk about Jesse, I personally think it was a personality clash. Jesse very quickly thought of himself as a political power, and he thought that Pat Brown was a weak-kneed sister. He did not respect Pat Brown.

VASQUEZ: The tough guy approach?

HAAS: He thought that Pat Brown was probably. . . . The phrase that's been used about him so much is the "tower of jelly" thing, which is an unfair characterization of Pat Brown. Because ultimately you can talk of "tower of jelly" as much as you want to, but he made the decisions. You're stuck with him. Jelly becomes the wavering in making the decisions, in which there was plenty.

VASQUEZ: Tell me, if you were dealing with the assembly,

did you have to deal with Jesse Unruh?

HAAS: You mean me?

VASQUEZ: Not you, but the governor's office.

HAAS: That's right.

VASQUEZ: Were there any independents or renegades out there that you could count on?

HAAS: In the assembly?

VASQUEZ: In the assembly.

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: [Unruh] held a tight rein. In the senate, who were the governor's allies, as you remember?

HAAS: Oh, god. There were so many of them there.

VASQUEZ: Republicans and Democrats?

HAAS: Yes, Republicans and Democrats. We had some real nice Republican guys there, as you do now. The senate attracts different types of people.

VASQUEZ: What do you see as the difference between the senate and the assembly at the time that you were serving in the governor's office? In the quality of people?

HAAS: The senate was sort of a club, in the first place. A lot more so than the U.S. Senate is because it's a smaller group, for one thing. It has a hundred senators back in Washington, and

what do you have up here? Forty?

VASQUEZ: Yes.

HAAS: So it's just forty guys. Then they'll have their weekly, Derby Club meetings and so on. They were just a bunch of guys getting along, they were elected for four-year terms, and they had cinch jobs, most of them, with the gerrymandering and so on. The districts were pretty much set, so they had a nice, comfortable life.

At that time--I don't know whether it was an accident or not--the quality of the people was quite different. The senate was full of quality people. That was the impression one had: quality people, quality guys. I mean, real statesman-like guys who were interested in really becoming legislators and so on.

VASQUEZ: Despite all of the childishness.

HAAS: Yes, in trying to do senatorial work and so on. Over here on the assembly side, there were these rough, tough, sons of bitches from the barrios, this and that and so on, headed by this guy Unruh who is power, total power. Well, just like [Assembly Speaker] Willie [L. Brown Jr.], but Willie is just barely hanging on. [Laughter]

When Willie started out, he was doing a little better in terms of being a power.

VASQUEZ: Some people see the assembly as the initiator of ideas and legislation, and the senate is not so much that. [The senate] is a body that embodies special interests and [it] establishes interests. It's not so much initiating or coming up with new ideas. It's either squashing them or allowing them to get through. Is that a fair characterization?

HAAS: Yeah, I think so. I've never really understood that. I don't really understand whatever niceties there are about how that system works. But your characterization of it is my impression, and it's not a very good impression in the sense that I don't really understand why it's that way. I don't quite understand why it's that way at all.

Now, I think that Pat Brown would tell you that his recollection of the senate is that this is really where the good social legislation and the good educational legislation originated. There was none on the assembly side. I think that he would claim that that's where the good

stuff happened for him, especially in those early years.

VASQUEZ: The Unruh Civil Rights Act¹ and the Unruh Consumer Protection Act², those are things that Brown was close to and liked to take credit for.

HAAS: Yeah, but we weren't interested with that. Those were his [Jesse's] toys. The senate wasn't interested in that stuff. That's the hurly-burly of the assembly. The senate is interested in education, water, highways, freeways, construction projects, health care issues, and, perhaps, mental illnesses and so on.

VASQUEZ: How about something like a master plan for higher education?

HAAS: Exactly. I had the feeling that that's where the Master Plan for Higher Education came from, not from the assembly. Maybe I'm wrong. I could not sort those things out. That's sort of an impression if anything else. Because in the first place, once again, on a day-to-day basis, that's not what I did. I was not doing that.

1. A.B. 594, 1959 Reg. Sess., Cal. Stat., ch. 1866.

2. A.B. 2319, 1961 Reg. Sess., Cal. Stat., ch. 1214.

VASQUEZ: No.

HAAS: I was sort of exposed to it. In a general sort of way.

VASQUEZ: You see, what I'm trying to get here, I'm trying to get your perspective, your perception of what was going on from where you were located. I know you were not responsible for that, but we would like to get everybody's view to get a chance of what really . . .

HAAS: Sure, I understand that. But I'm also warning you, see, in some cases my opinion is pretty good and I can say, "This is my good opinion." This other one is fuzzy for me.

VASQUEZ: Let me ask you something that maybe is more specific but was obviously something you had to have noticed. And that was the people around Unruh--the young liberals, as a matter of fact. He brought people like [Assemblyman] Jerome [R.] Waldie, [Assemblyman] Thomas [M.] Rees, [Assemblyman] Bob [Robert W.] Crown. What was your impression at the time of what was later called the "Praetorian Guard."

HAAS: They were a terrific bunch of guys, absolutely terrific. These guys were activist types. So

many of the senators were what you would call "cow county" senators. Hey, what did we have in Los Angeles? We had one senator or something. Who the hell was he? [Senator Richard] Dick Richards. Sure, he was a fine liberal and all the rest of it, but he didn't represent the state, the senate up there did. All the ferment came from these assembly districts, and the guys that you mentioned there were all terrific guys--bright, eager, smart, liberal--believing in what they do.

VASQUEZ: Why were they often at loggerheads with the liberal, Democratic governor rather than more in tandem?

HAAS: I don't know. I don't think that's true. We saw the personality differences with Jesse which translated, obviously, into some sharing of dislike of Pat Brown, seeing him as a weak leader and all the rest of it. Plus the daily conflicts that you have, anyway, where some assemblyman wants to get a good friend of his appointed a judge.

Well, Pat Brown is the one who appoints the judges, not the assemblyman. You're not going to

appoint every goddamned judge when an assemblyman comes in constantly being pissed off and they've got their special bills. Pat Brown vetoed an X number of bills. I don't know how many he vetoed, but . . .

VASQUEZ: I'm trying to get a sense here of how much particular, individual personality conflicts got in between what should be a pretty smooth institutional relation between people in the legislative and executive branches. You're right, I have interviewed some of these people that you've mentioned, and even within the same interviews there are mixed emotions about Pat Brown. At one point, very positive, and then at another point, really quite harsh and critical. I'm wondering how much loyalty to the leader of the assembly mitigated so the judgment of the governor.

HAAS: Well, I suppose you can go over it case by case. I think it's very difficult to generalize about it, because when you look at the overall record of the Brown administration, it's pretty liberal. Basically, it was liberal, probably too liberal. That probably, ultimately did him in.

Because my theory was that by the time Pat Brown was being kicked out of office, the state had washed its hands, politically, of liberalism. It was dead. I think liberalism died in '64, if you want to pick out a date. If you want to pick a year, you can take '64 and '65 when we put nails into the coffin.

VASQUEZ: What do you attribute that '64 date to? I know you're being arbitrary, but there must be something . . .

HAAS: Yeah, it's one of those things that you have to watch out for, because you're looking at a single issue, see. All I'm looking at is an indicator issue.

VASQUEZ: What might one be?

HAAS: It was Proposition 14 [the initiative on the November 1964 ballot to repeal the Rumford Fair Housing Act].

VASQUEZ: Well, first the Rumford Act.

HAAS: Fair Housing Initiative. Now, I was the press secretary for that one, too. There was no election that year. That was an off year, see. So I was the press secretary for that.

VASQUEZ: Let me ask you a question, since you were in that

position. In interviewing members of the executive staff--I won't specify, but more than one--they share one commonality. That was that they were highly, highly surprised by the reaction to the Rumford Fair Housing Act that culminated in Proposition 14. In interviewing assemblymen that were at another level, [I was told that] they cannot understand why the administration should have been surprised. They felt that it was very clear, the damage the Rumford Fair Housing Act would bring about to Democrats. Was the Brown administration caught off guard by this?

HAAS: I think that's all total second-guessing after the fact. I can't believe that, because I'm immersed in this. I was the left-wing, liberal, social activist. I was an oddball in the sense that I was too far to the left to be in politics, in Democratic politics. The only thing I brought to that was an awareness of it myself of the dangers of being a liberal. What I'm saying is What happened in 1964 with the proposition was that this was the bomb that exploded to expose what we were up against, which was racism.

VASQUEZ: Let's back up a little bit. The governor's office was aware of Rumford's desire to get this bill through the floor. And I'm sure he negotiated some kind of support, some kind of backing on this. Was there a debate? Was there a discussion? Were there those in the administration who said, "No, it's going too far"?

HAAS: I don't know. I never heard of that.

VASQUEZ: At what point did you become the press secretary to fight for the . . .

HAAS: Right. I was unaware that the Rumford Fair Housing [Act] was controversial in the beginning.

VASQUEZ: Not until the reactions start to come in?

HAAS: Right. But then, that was only the real estate lobby. Fuck them. Nobody had any respect for those assholes.

VASQUEZ: Not then.

HAAS: Right. No.

VASQUEZ: They weren't perceived as having the power they have now?

HAAS: No. But for the guys in the assembly, they were aware of it because the realtors were coming into their offices and saying they didn't like the

Rumford Fair Housing Act.

But, shit man, I mean, this was what we were doing. We were passing the Rumford Fair Housing Act. This was our act. Liberalism was. . . . We were rolling, man. We were doing the Jesse Unruh stuff and all the rest of it. We were taking credit for it and were marching around and saying, "By god, we passed the fair housing act." And we passed this and that and so on. We were bragging about it.

Now, that isn't to say that something as controversial as that wouldn't have been. . . . You would have expected that there would be some opposition to it. What was surprising to see was when the initiative passed. It passed in fifty-seven of the fifty-eight counties. Only Modoc County. . . . Modoc County doesn't even belong to the state of California. It should be over in Nevada. The Modoc Indians said, "By god, we want fair housing." Well, I'm just exaggerating.

All I'm pointing out is that when you look at the sweep of that initiative, this was a shocking revelation that the people. . . . Never mind the real estate agents. Screw them. Who

cared about them? They were a bunch of idiots. They were going to be against everything that they wanted to be against. But to be shocked that we had a minority position in this moral, upright, right thing, constitutionally, you name it, everything that you could name that was good about fair housing for a liberal . . .

VASQUEZ: It was success for some of the areas?

HAAS: And then to see it rejected in such a decisive way. The people who have never even seen a black in this county for Christ's sake. Never. Those northern counties, there were no blacks up there. They didn't have any fair housing problems or anything of that kind. They voted just like the people did everywhere else all over the state.

VASQUEZ: Why?

HAAS: Well, you know, I have to say that it's been my reluctant conclusion since 1964 that this country--and it was obviously working for a long time before--has gone racist. Race is the driving force in politics today. It is the crux of everything that you're looking at, and it's the crux of the destruction of the Democratic

party. [Reverend] Jesse L. Jackson is the living symbol of what's happened to it, but it ain't just blacks. "We got the Mexicans hanging around our neck, too." You know how I'm saying that. I'm saying it with this emphasis talking to a Carlos Vásquez.

VASQUEZ: What do you see in the future? What do you see this is going to mean to California if these attitudes are still around given the diversity of the state, the demographic indicators and the projections all seem to tell us?

HAAS: Hey, this is going to be a Spanish state.

VASQUEZ: Not if people who have those attitudes are in power. Do you think that they're going to give up that power to a Spanish-speaking minority?

HAAS: It won't happen in my lifetime, obviously, but you mentioned demographics and you know . . .

VASQUEZ: South Africa has considerably more more blacks than whites and they [blacks] have very little power.

HAAS: Yes, well. I will tell you, this is not South Africa.

VASQUEZ: It's not that racist?

HAAS: Political power is going to shift, and we're

going to have a Mexican governor. We're going to have a Mexican governor. In my lifetime. . . . I'm sure I'm not going to make it, because I'm seventy-one. I'm not going to live that long. It's not that far off. You'll see it, and by that time politics will have been transformed. That is to say, if there's still a Democratic party, it will be a Democratic, Mexican governor-- Latino. We don't even say Chicano anymore. Right?

VASQUEZ: That's funny.

HAAS: Chicano. Very few people use Chicano.

VASQUEZ: Well, very few people ever did, but when we did, we happened to be in front of television cameras. That made it look a little more acceptable than it really was.

HAAS: That's right. I followed every single one of those variations. When you're in politics, you know what you say. I know "Chicano. . . ."

VASQUEZ: Why don't we break off here for the day?

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[Session 2, January 24, 1989]

[Begin Tape 3, Side A]

VASQUEZ: Today, I would like to cover two events and your role in those events. One is the 1962 campaign for governor between Governor Brown and Vice President Nixon, and the second is the 1966 campaign between Governor Brown and Ronald Reagan. Maybe we can contrast [them]. If we could, I'd like to address the climate that existed at the time of those campaigns, the issues, the candidates, the strategy and tactics, the mistakes that might have been made, and the lessons that you learned.

HAAS: We didn't make mistakes. [Laughter]

VASQUEZ: Good. The voters make the mistakes.

HAAS: That's right. Voters make mistakes.

VASQUEZ: Why do they make mistakes?

HAAS: Because they don't recognize the greatness of the incumbent. I'm just kidding.

VASQUEZ: Let's get to the 1962 race.

HAAS: My feeling about voters is they generally know what they're doing and they have only one interest. That is self-interest. That is what happens in elections. These people who know what

their self-interest is act on that. That's why they seem to be erratic.

VASQUEZ: Is this why they'll go Democratic for a certain number of offices and Republican in other offices?

HAAS: No, that's mostly the result of gerrymandering.

VASQUEZ: Let's talk about the 1962 race for governor. Give me the setting. What was the climate? You had a successful administration that had been moving programs on education, water, government reorganizations, and a number of [other] areas.

HAAS: You've stated pretty well that here you had a governor who had not only been in office for three years--this was the tail end of his fourth year--but there is just no question that the overall image of that administration was of a government that was doing a lot of things that the people were interested in and wanted: highways, water programs, schools, higher education, the Master Plan for Higher Education. First of all, there was a sense of a growing state of which everyone was proud.

VASQUEZ: It became the largest in the union.

HAAS: Yes. Right. Boy, we were number one, and we

were number one in a lot of things. If we weren't number one in a particular phase, then we always compared ourselves with New York, because the two states were the most progressive in terms of government programs that reached out to people. So it was easy to make these comparisons between these two states.

Now, we weren't doing this all the time. We were doing it mostly for our own enlightenment and also because we were copying. If we saw something good somewhere else, we copied it. We hired the guy who was running that program in New York, brought him out to California, paid him more money, and said to him, "Hey, we'll give you more responsibility," and so on. There was that sort of feeling going on.

You could go through all the documents and you probably wouldn't find anything really about the comparisons I'm talking about. It was mostly a subtle thing that was going on. But we were aware of the fact that these two states were number one and two in the various categories: aid to education, higher education, availability of higher education, growth of freeway and

highway systems, housing, job development, and so on. There was this constant sort of checking.

Whenever you had an opportunity, you'd be looking at their budgets, what they were doing, and what their proposals were. So it was sort of a subliminal competition. That was, of course, not the point I'm trying to make here. That was just a little side show to the whole thing. But we were aware that we were number one and wanted to be number one. If we were not number one, we were going to get there.

You got there by proposing new ideas and so on. "If there's something new in education, let's get it. Let's do it. Let's propose it. Let's teach foreign language by the sixth grade. Everybody has to have a foreign language by the sixth grade." A tragic idea that never worked out. Tragic because it was never established. We proposed it and we were pushing it, but that's one of the things. . . . That was a line in a speech. I think it was in that election. It must have been in the 1966 election. I can't separate that out.

Unfortunately, I don't have any records of

anything that we did. I walked away from those offices, all those press releases, the hundreds of speeches I wrote, the thousands of press releases I wrote. I assume they're in the archives somewhere over at [the University of California] Berkeley.

Anyway, to generalize, that was sort of the setting of a state that was going to be number one in important categories like high tech[nology]. Silicon Valley was not what it is today, but it was blooming. In our high-tech industry, defense was looked upon as high tech. These marvelous, wonderful bombs that we were building, these great weapons and all the rest of it, were based on our approach to government which was, "We must provide that kind of manpower--the scientists, the engineers, and the educated computer people--to do this kind of work and keep this flow of high-tech jobs coming into California." So that was the ball game.

VASQUEZ: I sense pronounced optimism in the approach to government and what government could do on the part of the Brown administration?

HAAS: There was just no end to it. There was never any

thought that there was any other way to go except through government and that it was the government engine that was driving things. There was never any sense, incidentally, [of the] socialization of this system. It was all being done through the private enterprise system.

No thoughts were being given to the socialization of this because of big government. But, yes, indeed, government was the engine, and we were proud of that engine, the way it was going, and we knew we were doing the right thing by investing in schools and higher education, especially in higher education. Elementary and secondary schools were a little secondary, because it's basically bullshit that state government can do much about elementary and higher education in my estimation.

VASQUEZ: Why is that?

HAAS: Outside of providing X number of money. But providing X number of money has been just a system of financing which has been in existence forever. That is to say, the schools got a certain percentage of money rather than their collecting the money at the local level and so on

to have some equalization of funds statewide. Of course, later on, as you know, we got the Serrano decision.¹ That equalized education? That's an important point. But, anyway, the governors have always stuck their noses in elementary and secondary education whether or not they can do anything or not. I spent some time in the Office of Education in Washington, and it was there where we kind of learned how much you could do in education and how much you couldn't do.

VASQUEZ: What were governors reacting to at the local level when they tried to inject themselves into elementary and secondary education?

HAAS: They didn't. They didn't. The governor was always very much aware about the separation between local and state government--and federal government. The federal government had to be aware of that too.

It starts out at the federal level, which is basically providing gross amounts of money and special funds. Which, of course, they did during

1. Serrano v. Priest 483 P. 2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).

the Elementary and Secondary Education Act when we had that. [President Lyndon B.] Johnson created this massive poverty program, and the massive education program providing billions of dollars for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act mostly to be directed at poor schools to get the poor schools involved. Of course, we still have that now. It's called Title I, I think. We used to call it ESEA.

Anyway, we were very much aware of the separation. In fact, the local school district ran the school. The local boards of education ran the schools. Nevertheless, we had the statewide curriculum and the statewide support system. And, certainly, as we can see in the papers right here now, there are certain elements [over which] the state could have a very, very powerful influence.

VASQUEZ: One of the criticisms that's made today--and, in fact, has been made by the Little Hoover Commission¹ for a number of years--is that part

1. Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy.

of the complexity and problems that exist in solving the needs of California's education is that there are too many local districts running their own shops. They can't get any form of uniform funding or uniform curriculum. What's your position on that?

HAAS: This is a very, very deeply embedded policy, the local control of schools.

VASQUEZ: Do you agree with it?

HAAS: Well, I don't know. I have a lot of mixed feelings about it. At certain levels, you've got to have state control. You might even have federal control. At the federal level, you've got to have civil rights. There has to be civil rights in schools. Desegregation, that's a federal issue, a blanket that covers the whole United States.

VASQUEZ: You see that as a federal mandate?

HAAS: Absolutely. It's constitutional. So there are these gradations of things. At the state level, there has to be a uniform agreement upon the basic goals of education. That has to be set at the state level through the state board of education, through the curriculum, and through X amount of

mandating for what is to be considered as basic, fundamental, and uniform. Everybody's got to have reading, writing, etc. You know, that type of thing.

There is, in fact, this kind of gradation that goes on. Less on the federal side now except for the civil rights part of it. But we haven't seen much activity, because in eight years of [President Ronald] Reagan, education has taken a back seat at the federal level. Now, whether you'll see a resurgence of that, I don't know. If you have some kind of a new administration.

VASQUEZ: Getting back to the state level, some educators are concerned that the problems will get worse in the education system in part because of the ethnic, racial, and linguistic diversity of the state. Do you think that state influence at all levels, rather than local, might be necessary to address those problems of diversity? Do you see diversity as being a problem, first of all?

HAAS: Oh, that is a horrible problem.

VASQUEZ: What was the attitude in 1960 when you had a thousand people a day coming into California?

Was it seen as a problem then?

HAAS: What do we have in Los Angeles? We have seventy languages or something like that within the school district.

VASQUEZ: What was the attitude in 1962?

HAAS: There was nothing.

VASQUEZ: There was hope. There was optimism. There wasn't any reaction or any fear of any kind of diversity problem?

HAAS: No, nothing. No sense of that at all. Nineteen sixty-two was just an unbelievably dark age in terms of the growing problems that erupted two or three years later when the civil rights movement shook our asses totally and Watts blew up in a situation where we said it couldn't happen. "It wouldn't happen here." And we believed that. But Watts didn't happen in 1964, it happened in '62, '61, '60, and so on. So these problems were growing.

Obviously, there was some awareness of the problem. I'm not saying that we were sitting there in '62 with a total ignorance of what was going on in the poor neighborhoods.

VASQUEZ: Was there a conscious plan, a conscious

awareness, or a conscious approach that the Brown administration had in the 1960s in addressing particular communities or particular low-income groups?

HAAS: No. We did that mostly through bringing in--or at least we thought we were bringing in--all of the interests, all of the people who belonged to what we thought was the framework of the Democratic party. In other words, the Mexican American Political Association, MAPA, had a voice in the party. Now, they were always screaming. It was a goddamned weak voice. It was.

VASQUEZ: Who were some of the people that you remember being prominent in MAPA at that time?

HAAS: Oh god, I've forgotten their names.

VASQUEZ: Edward Quevedo?

HAAS: Yeah, I'm sure Ed was there. Oh gee, you'd have to . . .

VASQUEZ: [Enrique] Hank Lopez, was he involved?

HAAS: I've got a phone book downstairs with a lot of these names. I've got a phone book right downstairs. I can pull it out and turn it to a page--not a page, but pages--called Mexican-Americans.

[Senator Alan] Cranston doesn't use a telephone book. He uses what he calls his "K cards." He has a card file going back--this phone book goes back--going back thirty years in politics. He has this incredible card system of keeping track of everybody. He's constantly updating it, putting little notations and codes on it and so on. Then he transfers it onto pieces of paper when he wants to call these people. He's constantly manipulating them.

If you went through my phone book, you'd get the sense of what we're talking about. My phone book is organized politically. Mexican-Americans. Okay. That's what we called them when I had this phone book. You won't find Chicano in here. You won't find Latino in here. I called them Mexican-Americans. When you go down this list, you're going to see a lot of names that you can recognize. Henry Lozano, [Philip] Phil Montez, David Ochoa, Rosalio Muñoz. You know Rosalio Muñoz?

VASQUEZ: Sure. [We were] classmates at UCLA when he was student body president [1968-69].

HAAS: Rosalio. I've been friends with him for many, many years. I haven't seen him in a long time.

That's too bad too. I used to see him out on the picket line once in a while when I'd go picketing. But all my friends and contacts and everything are on this side. They're all over there. I never see them.

VASQUEZ: At the time, was Edward Roybal seen pretty much as a power force in East Los Angeles?

HAAS: No, I never saw him as a power of anything.

VASQUEZ: Who did you consider a significant mover of 1962? When you went to the Mexican-American community, who did you go to? MAPA?

HAAS: MAPA was important then. Our problem in '62, as it was in '62, '76, and '86, was. . . . Now, I think, politically, the Mexican-American community is a hell of a lot better organized, only because you've got some real power there now. But at that time, you know, we only had one guy, Roybal. That was it. And then he was back in Washington. I've forgotten when he went back, but . . .

VASQUEZ: I think in '62.

HAAS: Yeah, because it was right around that time. When he left, we didn't have anybody. MAPA was never regarded as much of anything. It was somebody you related to because we didn't have

that much to relate to. So we would go over there, and it was a wasteland. Politically, it was a wasteland because you couldn't find [leadership]. You've got to have leadership in a community when you're dealing with the governor, for example, who has to deal with the whole mass of the community all over the state. It's impossible.

VASQUEZ: How about the black community? Who in the black community in 1962 did you consider being of significance or someone you wanted to influence?

HAAS: These are tough questions. I guess I'll have to turn my pages back to N. Do you know what that stands for?

VASQUEZ: "Negro," I would imagine.

HAAS: Negro. This is not a very tidy way of doing this, but my recollection of names will be bad, but the minute I look over the list, I'll say, "Sure, so-and-so and so-and-so."

For one thing, in 1962 there was no change as there is right here today. The Baptist churches were then the key place to go to. Some of the Baptist ministers are probably on this list of the key people that we related to.

Blacks. See, I've crossed it out, "Negroes," and replaced it with "blacks." This part of this was. . . . Well, you know there's [Bishop H. H.] Brookins.

VASQUEZ: Was it H. H. Brookins?

HAAS: H. H. Brookins. Ted Watkins of the Watts Labor Action Committee. John [W.] Mack was probably still well-known. Yes, he was at the [National] Urban League at that time. The head of the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], whoever he was I've forgotten his exact name [Christopher Taylor]. His name may be down here.

VASQUEZ: These are the people that you would approach for support?

HAAS: Mostly for forums and so on. The black community has always been a lot different than the Mexican-American community.

VASQUEZ: In what way?

HAAS: In the sense that they have an underground. There's an underground communication system that says, "Hey, we're voting for Pat Brown." Not that they're not voting Democratic, because they're always voting Democratic. So you didn't

really have to do a hell of a lot except find some forums to get down there and make a showing, have the hands laid on, then the word goes out. That was sort of a subtle network. But in my estimation, I don't think that it's any question that that was a fact. The word went out that this is an okay person.

And, of course, the word could go out in a primary election. For incumbents and so on, you didn't have much of a problem. It was mostly just going down and doing the token things. I use that word advisedly, because I think it was tokenism then as it is more so now, for god's sake. I mean, you know, who goes down into the black community--does anybody at the state or national level?--except, maybe, drive hastily through?

VASQUEZ: Meet with the elected officials.

HAAS: And meet with the elected officials or meet with the bishops and all that sort of thing.

VASQUEZ: How about elected officials like [Congressman] Augustus [F.] Hawkins? What was the governor's office's estimation of his importance in the black community for what you say?

- HAAS: We had no relations with Gus at all. Once he went back to Washington and he did the same thing that everybody else does. They disappear. They go out of sight. They go back to Washington and that's it. They've got a cinch district, a gerrymandered cinch district. Nobody's going to challenge them. They do the routine stuff to keep in touch with their constituency, come back once in a while and so on, but they sure aren't around to be exercising any leadership--the required leadership, from my point of view.
- VASQUEZ: Who was the most effective black leader in California in 1962? Who comes to your mind?
- HAAS: I can't think of anybody, whether he's in my book or not, I don't know.
- VASQUEZ: Would [Assemblyman] William [B.] Rumford be of any significance to you?
- HAAS: No.
- VASQUEZ: He was still in the state legislature.
- HAAS: He was just another local guy up there who cut his name on that Rumford Fair Housing Act. He was a pharmacist or something like that who was ploddingly decent. [He was] a good guy.
- VASQUEZ: But not dynamic, not a mover, a shaker?

HAAS: No. We didn't have that in '62 that I could recall. It was always a puzzle and conundrum. We didn't understand the black community. We didn't understand the Mexican community. We wanted to find people that we could work with, because you just can't relate to what's going on out there.

You can't wander around the community and shake hands. You can't do that when you're running for governor. You can barely do that when you're running for the assembly, walk and shake hands. You have to do that for a minor office like the assembly, but that's about as far down as you can get with the handshaking routine.

VASQUEZ: Were there any appointments that Governor Brown made in his first term from the black and brown communities that he felt he could then use as conduits into those communities?

HAAS: Well, we always had black people on the staff, on the governor's staff. We had Sherrill Luke. And what was our lawyer guy? Cecil Poole. Now, let's see. Were there any others? I don't know.

VASQUEZ: By that time, I think, Cecil Poole had been replaced by Arthur [L]. Alarcón.

- HAAS: Yes. Art. He was gone, and we just had tokenism, tokenism all the way through. It wasn't deliberate tokenism, it was sort of accidental tokenism.
- VASQUEZ: There wasn't even an aggressive effort to get a token.
- HAAS: No. I mean, not to expand it. We had our tokens, but we didn't go out there and expand it. There was no affirmative action program, believe me. There were very few black guys doing a Mau Mau number on us. Mexicans were talking more about appointments even than black people were. They were more concerned about it as a sort of keeping track of what was going on.
- But they sure as hell weren't very effective. They didn't make a dent in us. If you look through our administration. . . . We did have Art, but he probably was . . .
- VASQUEZ: Daniel [M.] Luevano, was he a deputy director of Finance?
- HAAS: Right, but Art. . . . Everybody says, "Art who?" He didn't have any standing anywhere. He wasn't a political figure. He was a smart lawyer, as Dan Luevano was. They didn't come

from the ranks, they didn't come from the grass roots, they didn't come from a political background, so it was easy to make those kinds of appointments. You can reach out and grab a smart lawyer, appoint judges, and so on. There were some black judges.

There was that process that was going on. I'm not trying to say that it didn't go on. From my point of view, in retrospect. Only in retrospect. Hey, none of us were raving liberals on that side at that time only because you hardly gave it any thought. You thought you were doing the liberal thing. Tokenism, hell, that didn't happen until Jesse Jackson came around and started screaming at us.

Jesse Jackson. When I was in Washington, he came in and threw this Poor People's March. I was [Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] Wilbur [J.] Cohen's press secretary at that time, the head of information and so on. Jesse Jackson came in with the Poor People's March in 1968. He couldn't get through to Wilbur, but he got to my desk. I got the Jesse Jackson treatment, which was a treatment that you

will never forgot once you've gotten it.

[Laughter]

VASQUEZ: And that would encourage you to do a little tokenism, is that it?

HAAS: Well, you bet.

VASQUEZ: As you remember, what were the issues? What did you plan to do for that campaign?

HAAS: We ran on our record. That was all there was to it. But, as you know, there was a lot of defensive campaigning, because you've got to go back and rethink it again. And I haven't gone back and rethought it through, incidentally. I haven't even reread some of those books that I probably should have to refresh my memory for it, because my memory is not that great at all. The one thing that stands out was that we ran against [Richard Nixon], the classic McCarthyite in the state of California, the guy who invented it in California. I can tell you a little story about that, because I was the precinct captain in 1947. He ran [for Congress] in '48, didn't he?

VASQUEZ: Right.

HAAS: He got elected in '48. I was a precinct captain out in Baldwin Hills for the Democratic party. I

was working at the Los Angeles Daily News and I got a call at home saying, "Did you know that [Horace Jeremiah] Jerry Voorhis was a communist?" That was the guy Nixon was running against for Congress. And then they hung up the phone. That was the work of Murray Chotiner who invented McCarthyism at the grass-roots level in the congressional district for Nixon.

In other words, that was the thrust of their campaign, that this nice little guy who was the incumbent Democrat--mild, liberal, slightly socialist and so on--was a communist. They came right out and charged him. So we had that. This guy Nixon thought he could pull it off in this campaign too. And, of course, you're probably aware of that classic piece of literature that they put out.

VASQUEZ: Is this the one where Governor Brown is bending down to a little girl?

HAAS: He's bowing down like this. They took that [picture], cut it out, and made him bowing down to some communist.

VASQUEZ: [Nikita] Khrushchev.

HAAS: Right. So there was that kind of stuff, and I'm

sure that there's a lot of negative stuff that is going on. There's nothing new about negative politics, even though we don't like to see that at the presidential level. Negative politics, as far as I know, there isn't any other kind of politics in history or anywhere else, as far as I can see. We had a hell of a lot of negative politics.

VASQUEZ: So your battle plan was strictly to run on the record, run on what you'd done the first four years.

HAAS: Absolutely. We went out and made speech after speech about the Master Plan for Higher Education, the water program, the freeway program, the new plans that were on the books for this, that, and so on.

VASQUEZ: How about your fiscal policy and budgetary record? Did you feel that was . . .

HAAS: It was impeccable.

VASQUEZ: They took some hard shots at that, or tried to: "The water plan is costing too much; California's taxes are the highest in the country."

HAAS: They were high.

VASQUEZ: That the people were being taxed to death here in

California? Did you respond to that? Did that make a dent?

HAAS: I don't recall that it ever made a dent. It was such routine Republican stuff. One of these, you have to remember, is that the Republicans have been campaigning from time immemorial against high taxes.

VASQUEZ: And big government.

HAAS: Big government, government spending, taxes, etc. It was such a routine part of the campaign that one intended to just shrug it off.

VASQUEZ: Do you think the electorate saw through that and saw that? At the same time there was big government and a lot of taxes, there was also a lot of . . .

HAAS: They were getting something for their money. Maybe now with the tax revolt that's been going on, maybe there is a sense that we're not getting enough for our money or it's going to poor people and black people for welfare, all that kind of shit. People have pulled in their horns. You can't deny what has happened in recent years, in the last fifteen years or so. We opened the door for it by the Democratic party's failure to deal

with the tax revolt.

Now I'm going to move up just a little bit to talk about the different campaigns to illustrate a little comparison of what was going on. In 1972, when I was press secretary for Jesse Unruh's campaign, we stood out there on opening day in front of a home over in West Hollywood and laid out this guy's property taxes. We were talking about property taxes. In 1972, okay. Proposition 13 was six years later, '78 I think it was. In 1972, our campaign was, "Property taxes are killing the middle class and the homeowners in the state of California." That was our campaign.

We went from this middle-class homeowner in Hollywood, had the big placard showing what he was paying in taxes, and so on. Then we got in the buses and drove out to Bel-Air, stood in front of Henry Salvatori's house, got out our placards and said, "And Henry Salvatori, an oil man, is living in this castle. This is what he's paying!" I don't want to go into what happened then. Maybe you read or heard about it.

VASQUEZ: We're going to come back to that. I want to talk

about that campaign.

HAAS: I only brought that up to show the difference between ten years, say, and, incidentally, the difference between the Democratic party. Because in 1972 we recognized the tax revolt. We created the tax revolt by going out there and campaigning on this issue. Then we didn't do anything about it.

We got Proposition 13 rammed down our throats when we were the ones who were talking about property taxes, that they were unfair, that there was too much of a burden on property taxes. At least, property owners perceived it to be [a burden]. I don't know whether it was unfair or not. I've never figured that out. As we all know, except for those of us who already live in a Proposition 13 house. . . . And you probably live in a Proposition 13 house. What do you think I pay for this mansion, a house that's worth \$600,000? I think my property taxes are \$600. Ridiculous! Absolutely, goddamned ridiculous.

Anyway, we didn't pay any attention to that kind of an issue. If you say that was an issue, I'm sure it was simply because that was such a

standard issue. You didn't pay any attention to [it] and you certainly didn't respond to it except in a very offhand way. I don't even remember what the responses would have been.

VASQUEZ: Did you feel a need to respond to the "soft on communism" charges?

HAAS: When they made that, they made that outrageous distortion. We sure as hell did respond to it. But, again, it was a kind of ridiculous statement, because Pat Brown was not the image of some left-wing commie. It just didn't ring true, and his whole Catholic background . . .

VASQUEZ: Being attorney general.

HAAS: Attorney general and all the rest of it. You just didn't see that. There were probably some associations that they might have pointed some fingers at, because in those days it was filled with remnants of whatever left there was left around, including Lu Haas.

When I went to work for Pat Brown, I met Jack Burby. The first thing I did with Jack Burby was to sit down and go over my record. I said, "Jack, I've got a record as a leftie." I never belonged to anything. I never belonged to

the Socialist party, the Communist party, or anything like that, but I had associated with a hell of a lot of red-hots in the American Newspaper Guild and so on, and I know the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] got it all down because my name appeared regularly in the People's Daily World.

When I finally, years later, went to the FBI to get my record under the Freedom of Information Act, they didn't have it right. For years the People's Daily World had referred to me as Lewis Haas. So, "Lewis Haas" probably had a record.

VASQUEZ: But you were clean.

HAAS: It wasn't me. They were calling me "Lewis Haas" because they thought that was my name.

[End Tape 3, Side A]

[Begin Tape 3, Side B]

VASQUEZ: Why did your campaign feel it necessary to put up signs in Chinese asking Nixon to respond to [questions about] a \$200,000 [Hughes] loan to his brother? Do you think that would have made him vulnerable?

HAAS: It was part of the dirty campaigning. We didn't have anything on him. It was innuendo.

VASQUEZ: It worked, didn't it? You got a press conference to respond to it.

HAAS: Right, absolutely. That was a [Richard] Dick Tuck stunt, as you probably know. Dick Tuck created that stunt. Nobody asked too many questions about Dick Tuck. You put him on the payroll and you gave him how many assistants he needed. But, generally speaking, he didn't need any assistants and he didn't ask.

VASQUEZ: And you didn't want to know?

HAAS: And we didn't want to know.

VASQUEZ: What kinds of things would he do? He's been said to have shown up with more floor tickets to conventions than were supposedly available and any number of other things.

HAAS: I don't know the history of Dick Tuck. You remember him for these epic sort of things. And that one there I certainly remember, because I was in the press room the day that it happened. He came back with all of his signs, and I had them right there in the office. He left them there, so people took them as souvenirs, I guess. I wasn't a souvenir collector, so I didn't. It would be nice to have a little

memorabilia, because that was a beauty, those signs that he had printed in Chinese.

VASQUEZ: So there wasn't any real concern that Nixon would somehow dethrone the governor in that election? Was there ever an issue or a moment when you felt a threat of any kind?

HAAS: I don't know what the polling was in those days, whether we had much polling and so on. In a campaign, you assemble people who are naturally combative and competitive. Combative and competitive. So there's no question about it.

When you got into a campaign, especially with a guy like Nixon whose guts we hated, it was easy to get combative. You're not running against a nice guy. You're running against a first-class son of a bitch that we all hated. We had no respect for him.

VASQUEZ: Not even as vice president, a good debater, the man who had defeated Kennedy in 1960 in the state of California? None of those things fazed you at all?

HAAS: Well, it didn't faze us in the sense that we thought that we were going to lose the election. Because I don't think that the San

Francisco Forty-niners ever felt that they were going to lose a football game. We had a team like the Forty-niners. They were so imbued with victory and so charged up.

It's a point of view of a political campaign that you're going to win and, by god, it's war and we've got the guns, we've got right on our side, we've got the voters. It was a Democratic state. This wasn't the days when there's a lot of these shifting of votes.

VASQUEZ: There had been some shifting in 1960.

HAAS: Yes, I understand. There was always some shifting back and forth. California has never been without that. We had no sense of the fear of it that one might have now. Let's say you're the incumbent. I've been associated with a couple of incumbents in recent years where you forget about the Democratic registration, Democratic strength and all the rest. This is not a Democratic state and hasn't been for a hell of a long time.

We never thought about it in '62 as being that type of a situation where we really had to worry that there was going to be a swing vote out

there. We didn't have that feeling about it at all.

I guess the point is that that was sort of irrelevant. One didn't think along those lines. You were in a war and you were conducting battles every single day, pro and con. That is to say, [battles] against the guy you're running against, and puffing up your guy, making sure he has all the right things politically. The right thing politically, was locking up our special interests, first of all. In those days, they weren't called special interests. They were called the Democratic party.

VASQUEZ: Who were those special interests?

HAAS: They were the usual gangs of people: liberals, the Jewish community, blacks, Mexican-Americans, to a lesser extent Asians--although, in those days, Asians were not much of anything--and labor.

I don't know why I put labor down at the end, because in those days labor was really important, or at least we thought it was important. I don't know whether they were really important or not, but they thought they were important, and we thought they were important.

[John F.] Jack Henning, by god. . . . He was somebody. You don't forget his name. I may have a hard time remembering who was the black Jack Henning--which we didn't have, of course--but we sure as hell knew who the labor leaders were.

VASQUEZ: How about the CDC [California Democratic Council]?

HAAS: By and large, though, they did represent a group of people who were really Democratic. So you put all those people together, and then you just have a lot of people in the middle that probably were aware of what you were doing. They were interested in schools, they were interested in highways, higher education, opportunity for jobs, and so on. The economy was good, I guess, in '62. I don't know. I have no idea.

VASQUEZ: It was expanding.

HAAS: People were working. "Hey, go out and find a job."

VASQUEZ: Unemployment in California was lower than it was nationwide. It was relatively low. The CDC, what role did they play in this election?

HAAS: Nineteen sixty-two?

VASQUEZ: Or were they pretty much out of the picture by then as an effective force?

- HAAS: Well, I should have thrown their name in there, at least in that list of people.
- VASQUEZ: Were the Democratic clubs what they had been eight years before, six years before, or even four years before?
- HAAS: CDC was always sort of an intellectual, moral force, a left-wing force, but it was part of that liberal wing of the party. It probably was the voice of that liberal wing in the party, and to that extent, it was important. You went to the CDC conventions. I mean, you were there and you had big presence. All of your staff people showed up at these things. So the answer is yes, we paid attention to it in '62.
- VASQUEZ: What importance do you think Governor Brown gave the CDC in his election in '58 and his reelection in '62?
- HAAS: When you're governor and go over that list that I just gave you of people that you're paying attention to. . . . I didn't give you any kind of list of the other special interests, business interests, for example. Let's say the wine industry and a lot of agricultural interests and so on. We never got in the state of California

. . . . You never got any Democratic vote out of the farmers. They never voted for Pat Brown or anybody else, no matter what you did for them, no matter how well off they were. These guys were hard-core Republicans.

But they were part of the groups that you paid attention to. Even during campaigns you paid attention to them. You went up and down the state. You visited the "cow counties" and so on. So what I'm saying is that the range of interests in a state like California is so enormous that just paying attention to it, even in just a minimal way, is totally time-consuming. That is to say, you can't touch all those bases, but you do touch them.

Alan Cranston, to this day, marches up and down, up into Eureka, Redding, Chico, and the cow counties. Some of these guys even make these extravagant claims that "We're going to visit every county in the state of California." They never do because they never get up to Modoc [County]. That's a myth that is perpetuated, and it's a myth that probably isn't followed now. In the 1980s, it's pretty well abandoned, simply

because the politicians now are spending all their time raising money to get on television. They don't give a shit about the cow counties or anything like that. They'll make one run up and down the state, and then that's the ball game.

There'll be damn little tokenism because there's no time for it. Obviously, you'll go down and meet the Baptist ministers and, over on the Eastside, you'll meet with the new groups over there, primarily the guys who are stirring things up on drugs and education.

VASQUEZ: UNO [United Neighborhood Organizations].

HAAS: Yeah, the UNO group. So you do all that kind of stuff, but not a hell of a lot, because you don't have time.

VASQUEZ: As a candidate, how was Pat Brown in 1962? Was he one [who was] easy to work with? Was he difficult?

HAAS: He was a performer. He always took the view that he was the horse and we were the jockeys. I don't know whether he ever used that [phrase], but I'm sure he probably used that phrase. It sticks in my mind as a phrase out of the Pat Brown years. If he didn't say that, he acted

it. Which was to say he was an executive somewhat like Ronald Reagan. He got people that he believed in, had confidence in, and he let them do their job. He said, "Hey, you guys tell me what to do. I'm not going to sit here and tell you. I'm going to be in Los Angeles tomorrow. Where am I going to be and who am I going to talk to? Where's my speech?" He took the speech, the press release, and he never changed a word. I say never, but never say "never." He performed and was totally a product of the people that surrounded him.

VASQUEZ: Did you have to worry about the image that he would project as opposed to someone like Nixon, say, in a debate?

HAAS: There was never any thought about that. We were aware of some of the weaknesses that he had, which was basically an intellectual weakness.

VASQUEZ: For example?

HAAS: Well, the notion that he could stand up to Nixon in a debate, that was a little bit of a problem for us, and it turned out to be a real problem because he wasn't up to debating Richard Nixon.

VASQUEZ: Even though your campaign argued that Richard

Nixon knew very little about California at all and this man had been in California building, constructing, and passing all these terrific programs? You were still worried that he might not be able just on the mechanics of the debate? Is that it?

HAAS: No, I think probably on the psychological grounds that he did not have that much confidence in his own abilities. I really think that he probably did not have that much confidence in his own basic abilities. It was a bit of a shock to find out that about it, incidentally, to see that manifested in this confrontation with Nixon. So by the time Reagan came along, it didn't make any difference. We didn't have that sort of situation.

VASQUEZ: Before we move on to the '62 campaign, who was the architect of the '62 campaign?

HAAS: It must have been the same trio. It was [Frederick G.] Dutton, [Donald L.] Bradley, and Hale Champion. Those were the guys. Now, to the extent that other people participated, I was not aware of anybody else.

VASQUEZ: What was your role?

- HAAS: My role was primarily as the person who created the words.
- VASQUEZ: Phraseology?
- HAAS: And to some extent, the images that flowed out of the campaign.
- VASQUEZ: What images did you try to project that year? Do you remember?
- HAAS: Well, the image of a governor who was one hell of a governor, basically. Here was a guy who was doing it. He was a doer, a goer, a believer, an optimist, and nothing was going to stop California. We were number one, and this was a great state. Everybody was doing well and so on. But we didn't sit around and really do the image number. In those days, you really didn't think in those kinds of terms. It was just sort of coming on then. The [Marshall] McLuhan concepts of manipulating images and all that sort of stuff, it wasn't a big, big thing, and there wasn't much of a belief in it.
- VASQUEZ: What was your recollection on the role of television?
- HAAS: Well, at that time, [it was] emerging. It was emerging, but it wasn't a big thing except that

political TV news was big stuff. It was big stuff because we had, at that time, political TV reporters who were tough.

VASQUEZ: Like who?

HAAS: Like who? I can't be too sure who was here. Tom Brokaw. We have to check the dates on these. We had a group of guys. There's another guy, Bob [Abernathy] from NBC, Tom Brokaw, then a third guy whose name is gone. Whether I can dredge these names up, I don't know, [of those] who stand out as the epitome of the emergence of TV political news.

VASQUEZ: Why were they tough?

HAAS: They were probably more tough on Nixon than us. There wasn't much to be tough about with us. But Nixon was on the attack constantly, and these guys were saying, "Prove it!" and all the rest of it. They were hammering at the Hughes loan. I mean, it was out there. They were hammering at it, so they were cutting him up. And they probably cut us up, too. I don't mean that they were one-sided, because they'd come to us with charges and all the rest of it. They weren't trying to deliberately get at Nixon, although, as

you know, from hearing the tapes and everything else about his last press conference . . .

VASQUEZ: When he took the stage away from Herbert [G.] Klein and said, "Yes, you won't have Dick Nixon to kick around anymore."

HAAS: So he obviously came out of that campaign thinking that he had shit kicked out of him by the press. At that time, you had a very combative set of not only TV reporters but also a lot of tough political reporters. All the newspapers had first-class political reporters who were out there every single day covering it. Now, you see, they don't have any of that.

VASQUEZ: Who sticks on your mind? Remember any of them?

HAAS: We had Carl Greenberg who was a classic guy.

VASQUEZ: How about Herbert [L.] Phillips?

HAAS: Well, he didn't travel. He was pretty much of a columnist at that time.

VASQUEZ: He was very positive to your campaign.

HAAS: I don't doubt it.

VASQUEZ: In his editorials?

HAAS: The Sacramento Bee was a blatantly Democratic newspaper as the Los Angeles Times was a blatantly Republican newspaper. In those days,

there probably was a turning point somewhere along in there. It was probably in those years that newspapers became a lot more professional in covering politics and so on. They hid their biases a lot better. They were much more careful to make sure they didn't let that slop over into actual reporting of the news. There was a separation. It was one thing to have the editorial op-ed pages.

VASQUEZ: How do you think you were treated by the media in the '62 campaign?

HAAS: Well, my impression in all the years that I've been in politics is that Democrats sort of go with the flow a lot more in terms of the press. You sort of expect an amount of kicking around by the press. That's their job. I always went through a campaign saying, "Hey, look, they're going to cut us up, they're going to scream at you. You can't do anything about it. You roll with the punches. They're doing their job. Don't scream at them. Don't complain to the publishers and so forth." So you were constantly on the alert.

VASQUEZ: Do you think in those times it worked, that it

turned out to be a good strategy over this?

HAAS: I don't think there's any question about that. The press was grateful for it, because they hated whiners, people whining about their story and their coverage. So if you got a bad story, you kept your mouth shut, unless it was wrong. Then you'd say, "Hey, you've got that one wrong."

VASQUEZ: Were there any [such] cases that you remember in that campaign?

HAAS: I have no recollection of any kind of bad relationship with any of the press. Not a single one. The point that I was making is that you got the impression that the Republicans were always whining about the press, that they were getting a bad rap. The press was basically a liberal establishment. The reporters were Democrats. The people who own the press knew they were Republicans because they were screaming at the publishers and going to Republican party meetings with them. So that was sort of a common complaint. There's probably some justification for it.

First of all, I don't think there's any question. I was out with those guys all the

time. I knew them well. I knew that they were liberal Democrats, most of them. Not all of them, but a lot of them. A lot of them were very careful to disguise it. We wouldn't really go along with it, but it crept out, especially when you had candidates like Nixon whom they didn't like.

So I don't doubt for a minute that it was reflective in their writing. But I never sat down with the stories and found two columns and said, "Yeah, they treated us nicely and kicked Nixon in the ass." There was no scorekeeping going on in my point of view, because we felt that was part of the hurly-burly of politics--dealing with the press and so on--although a lot of our people had the same problems. That is to say, they would come to me and say, "Boy, we've got a lousy story." I'd say, "Ah, don't worry about it. It wasn't that lousy. It was true. We'll get a good one tomorrow, whatever."

So whenever there were those kinds of complaints, I always pushed them off and said, "Look, we've got a good relationship with these guys, and the reason we do is because we're

open. They can walk in here and they can ask me a question. If I don't know the answer, they can see Pat Brown or Don Bradley to get the answer to it instead of bullshit around."

You didn't get that feeling about the Republican press guy and so on. There was no sense of that going on with the [Franklyn] Lyn Nofzigers and so on who were running the press operations on the other side. Although Nofziger himself was the guy who had a pretty good relationship with the press. He was sort of one of them. The operation of the Nixon campaign was not one that inspired much confidence or pleasure on the part of the press corps, because I don't think they liked Dick Nixon.

VASQUEZ: Jack Burby, in an interview that I did with him, said he always followed the dictum of not trying to hide things from the press, because they would eventually find it out if [there were] any negative things to be found out.¹ Did he

1. John F. Burby, Oral History Interview, Conducted 1987 by Carlos Vásquez, UCLA Oral History Program, for the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program.

articulate that to his staff working on the campaign or working around the governor?

HAAS: We never had to. It was sort of a way of operating, a mode of thinking, that you never sat down and discussed it. I never once remember doing that. We knew that we tried to conduct open things. We knew that that was good press relationship, and we probably even had some do-good ideas because we had been newspaper people. I spent nine years in the newspaper business. I don't know how long Jack was in it, but he certainly felt that he was a newspaper person. He was a journalist, and this is what journalists did. This is how they behaved, and you were one of them. You were not going to change your thoughts because you were coming to work for us.

So the idea of open government, the idea of being honest and answering whatever the question was. If you couldn't produce the guy himself, you at least got a response to whatever it was. And there was never any question about any of the governor's appointees who were running any of those departments, of those guys out there trying

to hide anything. To hell with that. That didn't work. There, it was different.

There was probably some expression in use saying, "Don't tell us. Don't come in here and say we're going to try to manage the news." You're not going to do that. You're going to have an open relationship. I don't remember anything in government that reflected anything where there were these kinds of cover-ups or where we were ever accused of that. The public information officers were just civil service employees. As a general rule, you have a Department of Transportation. You didn't have a paid political hack running the Public Information Office.

VASQUEZ: Let me ask you one more question before we break for the day. Several people that have served in government who were professional journalists have said that when you cross over to the political side of the street, it's very hard to come back. [They say] that journalists don't have the same confidence in you, there's a distance. How do you react to that?

HAAS: It's probably true for a lot of the guys,

although I never looked at it statistically. I'll tell you one thing: There aren't a lot of guys who want to go back. So I'm not too sure that it's any big issue about going back. In some ways, a newspaper editor might think, "Hey, here's a valuable guy. He's got a hell of a lot of contacts." For example, if you wanted a political reporter. He knows politics, right? You'd have to have some confidence in the guy being a journalist at heart. He doesn't give a shit about Republicans or Democrats. He's just going to go out there and do his job. He's not going to shade the thing. You're not hiring some political hack, although I think the Los Angeles Times would never hire somebody that had that kind of experience. I don't think they want to expose themselves to having hired somebody who is tainted, no matter how much integrity he might have.

VASQUEZ: Tainted by what?

HAAS: By being a party, political person.

VASQUEZ: They hired Jack Burby.

HAAS: Right, but he was not hired to do a reporting job, and he had cleansed himself in the

meanwhile.

VASQUEZ: By going to Washington?

HAAS: And being editor of that paper there, the [National] Journal. So he had cleansed himself. I don't think it's impossible. I don't think that would be any problem. The assumption has to be on the part of an editor, if he's a smart son of a bitch, "Hey, you're getting somebody with very valuable experience, so that's what you're hiring." That's what most of us are hired for, for our experience and, I assume, the ability to do certain things. You've got to have something on the ball.

[End Tape 3, Side B]

[Session 3, February 2, 1989]

[Begin Tape 4, Side A]

HAAS: Do you want to hear a funny story about Pat Brown?

VASQUEZ: Sure, maybe that might be a good place to start.

HAAS: It gives you a little inside picture of real life in the governor's office. It's one of these amusing political stories.

VASQUEZ: By all means, go ahead.

HAAS: I tell it all the time to various people. The setting is the governor's office. A group of Armenian farmers from Fresno had come in to see Pat Brown. I was the staff person assigned to sit in on the discussion. They rotated the [staff] people around [and] said, "Hey, Lu, go and sit down." There always had to be somebody to listen to what he was saying and if he made any decisions. You've got to write them down and see what the agreement was--or nonagreement--to make sure these guys don't screw you up. Anyway, these guys were raisin growers. The key figure was a fellow named "Sox" Satrakian. Anyway, he was a Democrat. A lot of these guys were Democrats, Republicans. They were big-shot

raisin growers. Fresno is the raisin capital of the world, and raisins are a very, very big business.

The raisin industry, like a lot of others, has a marketing order, a framework of government-allowed controls over product marketing and so on, not prices. It's not a cartel or anything like that. It's sort of like a union, a cooperative of growers. Well, a marketing order is not really cooperative. Everyone is an individual, but each one has to follow the standards set to make sure you've got a good product, that you don't have people out there selling inferior products or running down the raisin industry.

VASQUEZ: Quality control?

HAAS: Or by not following some of the other rules which have to do with total production and so on. This year they had this fantastic raisin crop. God, they had raisins. We're talking about thousands of tons of raisins in excess. They couldn't market them under the marketing order. They could only market so much. So they came in and they wanted dispensation from the governor or, at least, let him get behind changing the marketing

order for this one particular crisis of too many raisins. What they wanted to do was dump the excess raisins into the wine industry, make wine out of the raisins.

So we had this meeting, and they're talking about wine and the raisins. You could almost tell that Pat Brown, whose attention span is very short. . . . You have probably picked up on this before, that his attention span is not long enough, when the phone rings and so on. This conversation was going on and on for maybe twenty minutes or so. It was going on for quite some time. It was pretty clear what these guys wanted.

The governor suddenly turned to Sox and says, "Sox, I didn't know you could make wine out of raisins." Sox just got this pained look on his face and says, "Governor, you could make wine out of horseshit if you put sugar on it." Anyway, that is the end of the story.

VASQUEZ: This is life in the governor's office?

HAAS: Right. Pat not paying too much attention to what the meeting was like.

VASQUEZ: Did they get the dispensation, do you remember?

HAAS: Oh, I don't know. Probably. That was sort of a little detail.

VASQUEZ: I wanted to ask you one more time to summarize the differences, that you saw or were cognizant of and have had time to think about, between the 1962 and 1966 gubernatorial campaigns. You were involved in both campaigns. One was a sweet victory. The other one was a bitter defeat, to paraphrase a sportscaster there. How would you summarize the differences? How would you categorize the two?

HAAS: One of the things that you always have a problem with is dealing with something in retrospect. When you look back on it, there always tends to be a political analysis which people do which is mostly bullshit. Political analysis is like having a strange disease and going around to a bunch of doctors trying to get a diagnosis. You'll go to ten doctors and you'll get, say, ten diagnoses. That's what political analysis is. No one ever knows why something was the way it was in 1962 and then, four years later, why it was the way it turned out in 1966.

Now, everything being never equal, obviously,

but the man himself doesn't change. He's pretty much the same. Pat Brown in 1966 was pretty much the same guy in 1962. The only difference was that those four years between '62 and '66 were remarkable four years. In retrospect, it showed that dramatic changes were taking place in the political climate, if you want to use that word, in California.

VASQUEZ: What were the consequences of that?

HAAS: Nineteen sixty-four, which we already talked about, was somewhat of a watershed year, with 1965 following right on it. Nineteen sixty-four, being the year for Proposition 14, the anti-Rumford Fair Housing Act initiative for which I was the press secretary. I was on loan from the governor's office, so I was representing the governor's position, as most of us were, in the campaign supporting the Rumford Act and opposing this initiative.

Well, losing fifty-seven of the fifty-eight counties on this kind of issue that on the face of it was sort of a moralistic, straightforward, equal rights, civil rights [issue], to lose this fight in fifty-seven out of the fifty-eight

counties was an enormous shock to those of us who, first of all, believed in the goodness of the civil rights movement, the rightness of it.

To be confronted with a decision by the voters was a total rejection of a rather mild approach to civil rights. Which was not really civil rights but human rights, the right to go out into the market and buy a house and not be judged on the color of your skin and so on. The rejection of that, you couldn't read it any other way except to say, "My god, we're facing racism in the state of California," something that [existed] throughout these years of tremendous growth and the hurly-burly of the way this country was developing. We had Mexicans, we had blacks, everything like that, and we were all mixing it up and getting along fine. Everybody was working and happy and so on.

That myth was shattered at that moment. It was shattered for me. We didn't all go around moaning, "The world has come to an end." I don't recall people sitting around in the political, smoke-filled rooms discussing the enormity of this, and it probably didn't grow on me until

later, too. You get caught up in day-to-day things and you don't think about it.

VASQUEZ: What did you attribute the loss to? Did you attribute it to being outflanked in your publicity by a perhaps less-than-ethical campaign on the other side?

HAAS: No, I did not see any of that. First of all, we conducted a very solid campaign based pretty much on organizing the liberal and the moral base of the state of California. We went out and got the endorsement of one thousand pastors, ministers, and so on--that type of thing--and the endorsement of all the various people organizations that you couldn't even think of, The League of Women Voters, etc. We had everybody on our side. Everybody but the voters.

VASQUEZ: It sort of sounds like the initiative on "English only."¹ Even the governor was against it, and it still came out winning 2 to 1. Is there something in the California electorate that foreshadows what politicians are going to do, do you think?

1. Proposition 63, on the November 1986 general election ballot, was a non-binding referendum on English as the state's official language. It passed by a 3 to 2 margin.

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: Was this the case in 1964? Was this a harbinger of 1966?

HAAS: Oh, absolutely. I think you've seen the state pattern of it right down through recent things. Now, there's no way to get at or to measure or to poll on the race issue. You can't go around and ask people how they feel on race issues. You're not going to get many people to bare their souls. So you've got to pick up the fragments of it from your political guts, from common sense, and from listening, sort of subliminally, to the radio talk shows and that sort of thing. Occasionally, you have some kind of a test of this. You don't have too many really straight-out political tests. That is to say, you don't have someone running on a racist platform getting elected in the state of California. We had this guy Metzger down there in San Diego.

VASQUEZ: Tom Metzger.

HAAS: Yeah. He tried to do this, but it didn't work. The Klu Klux Klan, that's going a little too far, buddy.

VASQUEZ: But you have had state senators like [Senator

John G.] Schmitz who have come out to say something at times you didn't expect in public. Whether it was threatening to disrupt the session when Martin Luther King's memorial was read in the senate or whether it was calling a famous lawyer protecting women's rights [Gloria Allred], at what some would consider the peak of the women's movement, a "butch lawyeress." So you do have those kinds of weather vanes, don't you?

HAAS: Well, I think that Schmitz is not a very good example of it, only because he's on the fringe area of the far right. He probably isn't representative of the common person's thinking which is more concerned about his neighborhood, schools, busing, and some of the more practical things that people object to.

VASQUEZ: This is the chord, you think, that the anti-Rumford Housing forces was able to tap into?

HAAS: Right. They sensed that civil rights was okay in somebody else's backyard, but not mine. So there's a little bit of the "not my backyard" thing. "It's okay to bus kids, but not my kid." Or, "It's even okay to bus black kids into a white kids' [neighborhood], but you're not going

to bus my kid down to Watts."

So there are those limitations that people began to build up in all of this sort of thing. I guess you have to apply sort of commonsense tests, because we don't have any political tests on this. In other words, I can't prove that race was a significant part of the '66 campaign. There's just no way to do that. Instincts alone were telling you that it was an important thing. Incidentally, I don't buy the notion that you can single out one thing and say that that was the cause for a defeat. I'm not suggesting that this would be the case in the Pat Brown race or in the [Senator] Pierre Salinger race. You probably got this or you should have gotten this. You can get this from Roy Ringer. Roy was Pierre's press secretary, speech writer, and so on. He buys the same thing. It was the same year, '64. He says that Proposition 14 destroyed Salinger's campaign.

VASQUEZ: Some assemblymen say the same thing.

HAAS: Let me just finish my story. This is an interesting little thing. Because I was sort of a political expert, I was called upon to move

around, respond to invitations, and to talk to people about politics and so on. Right after the '64 campaign, I was invited to talk down at USC [University of Southern California] to political science students, and the first thing I got was "What about this race that just happened?" Salinger and so-and-so [George Murphy]. And I said, "What about it? What is your reaction?" This guy said, "I saw this guy Salinger on TV and he looked like a gangster to me chewing that cigar, that dark beard and so on. He looked like a gangster."

VASQUEZ: Because he didn't have [George Murphy's] twinkling eyes?

HAAS: I went to another place. Now I was beginning to be alert. I would say, "What do you think was the reason for Salinger's loss?" Everybody thought, "Gee, he's Kennedy and this and that," that he should have won. I got the same remark from a different group: "He looked like a gangster." Now, I didn't suggest anything. I was asking them what their reaction was.

All I'm saying is, if you ask the public the reason why [Mayor Thomas] Bradley lost to

[Governor George] Deukmejian, the reason why Pat Brown [lost] and so on, you're going to come up with ten different reasons. I suppose if you could ask one million voters, then you'll have some kind of sample. But the fact is [you can't]. I'm using this only to negate the notions that there are always these single things that are the controlling factor. People like to look for a simple answer, and there are no simple answers, not provable ones. Even the after-the-fact pollings they do. First of all, they don't poll things like race. Talk to some pollsters. Did you ever talk to them about polling for race?

VASQUEZ: Yes. It's very difficult.

HAAS: Anyway, the difference between '62 and '66 is those four years. If you want to go over the rest of those four years.

VASQUEZ: Well, let's do it.

HAAS: There was the Watts riots. There were the campus [riots].

VASQUEZ: How did you try to handle the campus uprisings at the time?

HAAS: You know what the governor did. My son was a member of the FSM, the Free Speech Movement, at

[University of California] Berkeley at this time. So I was in touch with him and Mario Savio and all the rest of it. I am a card-carrying member of the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union]. I support free speech and think that's the reason kids go to college and that's the reason why you're trying to teach kids. You'd better work it out, because that's what the university is supposed to be all about. These kids were doing their thing. Well, the way Pat Brown handled that obviously had been how the liberals on his staff thought he should handle it. And maybe in his heart he felt the same way. I don't know.

VASQUEZ: How would you represent that?

HAAS: Well, you'd represent that by his wavering around, his not being decisive. That's how it comes out in retrospect and even right at the time. People wanted to crack down on those kids: "Who the hell are they? They're getting a free education and they're up there messing around and tearing up papers."

VASQUEZ: Give me an example of who might have argued that in the administration?

HAAS: In our administration?

VASQUEZ: Close to the governor in his office.

HAAS: Who would have been on that side?

VASQUEZ: Right.

HAAS: I wouldn't know of anybody out there. There might have been some people. I don't know anybody.

VASQUEZ: Who were his main advisers on this?

HAAS: I was not the main adviser.

VASQUEZ: Were you ever asked to comment?

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: Was Hale Champion, do you know?

HAAS: Hale Champion was so close to the governor that he was in on everything. He was the first one in the door on practically any issue that you're going to hit. From the standpoint of who's reading the wires and reading all the newspapers, getting the calls from the press, and hearing blasts from the press about "What's the governor going to do about this" and so on, Jack Burby was going to be flooding Pat Brown with information. Jack, however, deferred to Hale. The next thing, Pat Brown was going to listen to the [University of California President] Clark Kerrs and so on.

He respected this man. So he was getting a composite of ideas going back and forth.

VASQUEZ: Do you think he got good information from Clark Kerr? Good advice?

HAAS: I don't know what the advice was, so I can't make that judgment.

VASQUEZ: But he was obviously going back and forth about calling in the authorities at a particular point, and I'm sure . . .

HAAS: There was no question about it, but all you can do is sort of read it, read the superficial aspects. That's all I can say. The superficial aspect was this was another example of Pat Brown appearing to be indecisive when probably popular opinion, in retrospect, was on the side of cracking down, law and order, and all of the rest of that stuff. People were outraged at what was happening.

That's pretty much of a common phenomenon that you see whenever there's a sign of disorder in our society. The common approach is to crack down on them.

That is the thing that is a test for politicians, whether they want to crack down or

not. It does become a test. The popular thing is that we have no room for that kind of disorder in our society. I think it's pretty much of a widespread, expected reaction from the populace. So I suppose you should be ready for that sort of thing and you should take that into consideration. Still, your heart, conscience, and so on, dictates that you're going to try and handle it without doing something that is mean and hurtful and that goes against your grain, because you do believe in free speech. Obviously, you can't carry it too far. Those kids probably were carrying it too far. Ultimately, they did crack down.

VASQUEZ: So, was it a case of giving Pat [Brown] bad advice, or did he just make the wrong choice?

HAAS: I don't think so. I think he did what he wanted to do. In other words, he wanted to try to solve the issue amicably without cracking down, beating up any kids, roughing them up, or without creating disturbances by cracking down. That's a calculated risk, too, to create an even worse situation. So it's not a clear-cut decision, except for those people who think in a certain

way. Which is that if you have some disturbance here, you crack down on it, you wipe out that disturbance.

VASQUEZ: Some observers have suggested that perhaps the university authorities should have handled the matter themselves before the governor had stepped in. He was sort of lobbed a political time bomb. Do you give that any credence?

HAAS: Well, the buck stops with him, and it's a natural thing to move in that direction very quickly. First of all, you're sitting there in Sacramento with that whole legislature there, and they're jumping up and down calling Pat and saying, "By god, do this," or, "Don't do that." Back and forth, back and forth. So, willy-nilly, you're pulled right into it.

The ones who are demanding that you do something are calling press conferences and saying, "I'm going to see the governor" and blah, blah, blah, and so on. So he's put on the spot whether it should be that way or not. It is a state institution and he sits on the board of regents. He appoints these guys.

VASQUEZ: At that time, Berkeley was the premiere

institution in the country.

HAAS: Yeah, right. So his inclination would be to go along with Clark Kerr, and my guess is he probably did there for a while.

VASQUEZ: Were there any negative repercussions in the relationship between Clark Kerr and the governor that resulted from the actions?

HAAS: I don't know of any. I doubt it. I haven't heard of anything like that.

VASQUEZ: How about Watts? Tell me about how you think Watts hurt him. I think we've talked a little about it.

HAAS: It's not a surprise that when something like this happens, it is television in its finest hour, massive television coverage right in your back yard: Flames, rock-throwing, shooting, troops, everything. This was a show with helicopters circling around with cameras and all the rest of it. It was an all-out, massive show of force by television.

I say that only because you better believe that television is what politics is all about. Once the television camera became a force in politics, it took over politics.

VASQUEZ: When did this happen?

HAAS: Well, it was gradual. When I first went to Sacramento, for example, television had a separate press conference with Pat Brown. I think I've told you about this. You didn't even have two press conferences. It was, to a certain extent. . . . It wasn't allowed. Of course, the fact is that there was no stopping television, obviously. It shouldn't have been. How could you do it? Under the First Amendment and everything else. Not only that, everybody was embracing this thing. It wasn't like we're trying to reject it or fire it off or anything like that.

Everybody was saying, "Hey, we got television. We don't have to rely totally on the press." Which was and I still believe is the dominate media for politics, only because the television guys have to read the press reports, otherwise they wouldn't have anything.

If they didn't have AP [Associated Press] or UPI [United Press International], the Los Angeles Times and all the other sources, the information flooding into them through the printed word, they wouldn't exist. So they just simply convert this

information into pictures. That's all.

They obviously do it in a different way than the print media, but I can't look back in this period. . . . Certainly, in the fifties right up until the sixties and so on, you would say that people didn't regard television as the force that it obviously was. I don't think people began to make the connection between what was going on in the world of television and the political results. That didn't happen for a long time.

I'm looking at a book right over there which is sort of my Bible. I just happened to be reading it, which I do once in a while. That's Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media.¹ I don't know if you're aware of that book. Here's the guy who was the predictor of what was going to happen and what was happening to the media which goes far beyond just television. It's not a book about television. The thing about media applies to everything in life, the electrical light and the rest of it.

1. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

I don't see any point where you could say, "Well, now we know about television." I'm giving you an illustration that at that point in 1965, and maybe even before then--I don't mean that that was just the point--the drama, the power of television to project this explosion of information. . . . You knew that several million people were watching this stuff on television every night, day after day after day. Never mind the Los Angeles Times. Who the hell reads the Los Angeles Times?

The masses of people are watching. Some of them are reading the Los Angeles Times, but they're all watching television because, first of all, it was a compelling thing to see. And there it was: "Blacks: How to control them." You don't have to be a genius to recognize the effect of that over the long haul on people.

VASQUEZ: And this came close on the heels of Proposition 14.

HAAS: Right. The linkage, and even the campus things are somewhat related, because it shows a world which is sort of disordered, and people don't like disorder. They're fearful of that and

expect government to provide order.

VASQUEZ: Does the governor then become a natural target here since he is the highest constitutional officer in the state?

HAAS: He sure as hell was the target in this particular case. Once again, he became the central figure. Of course, he was in Greece. I don't know whether that had any effect. Actually, there was nothing wrong with him being there. So the target became the lieutenant governor [Glenn M. Anderson], you might say. He was just a substitute governor for the moment.

VASQUEZ: Some people say that the administration was genuinely surprised. Others say they shouldn't have been, and, in fact, they indicated that the administration was out of touch with southern California, that too many of the appointees Governor Brown made were from northern California, that he didn't have a sense of what was going on here. Is that a fair criticism?

HAAS: Well, the only thing we had to go on at that time was that there were riots elsewhere that had preceded the Watts riots. Not too many, but there were some. So a lot of people were

predicting that the big cities were all going to blow up. I can tell you what I said at that time in jest, but it was sort of giving the feeling that at least one person. . . . or maybe it was a reflection of what was going on everywhere else. I said, "It's not going to happen in Los Angeles, because in order to have a riot in Los Angeles you'd have to drive to it, and you couldn't find a parking space." Now, that was sort of a flip remark, but it illustrated the notion that it wasn't going to happen in Los Angeles. We didn't have that kind of a society out here, we're in touch with the black community. Which we were. We were in touch with the black community, we were not out of touch.

The business of Pat Brown being from northern California is another question, because the locus of political power was shifting from northern California to southern California. That has become a fact of life.

VASQUEZ: But it wasn't as evident.

HAAS: No, it was not. That was an end of an era. And even Pat Brown had some recognition of that, because he always took up residence down at

Hancock Park during the summer and made at least a token show of being a southern Californian. But he was at an obvious disadvantage because he was not a southern Californian. You can't just come down occasionally to some mansion over there--which he used mainly for raising money--and become a southern Californian. But this administration was not out of touch with the black community. They had access to us and they were outspoken.

VASQUEZ: What were the elements that you had touch with?

HAAS: Let me finish first. If there were any real signs that something was going to happen, [Laughter] too bad. We would have heard about it.

The hearings on the commissions and all the rest of it were clearly. . . . This was an unexpected thing. It was an event. Things exploded, and all of a sudden we recognized, "My god, it's here, too." But I don't know of anybody who has never heard of anything like that. Maybe you're out of touch. I don't know. If we go back to interview the police officials and so on, maybe some of them are saying, "Well, I was predicting this" and so

on. Have you ever talked to [Samuel] Yorty, by the way?

VASQUEZ: No, not Yorty, but I have talked with someone that had crossed swords with him, the congressman from that area who had held hearings out here in southern California.

HAAS: Who, Gus?

VASQUEZ: Gus Hawkins, a couple of weeks before the riots, had urged Mayor Yorty to free some of the federal monies that had been allocated to Los Angeles, especially in the field of health care, employment, and that sort of thing, [claiming] that it was causing a very tense situation in the black community that was expressing itself in many different ways. Police-community relations was only one area. There were other areas where there was a lot of frustration and resentment.

HAAS: I think that the police-community relations thing was the key to it.

VASQUEZ: Someone else has mentioned that.

HAAS: That's really where they come to grips, right out there on the streets. It's those cops, and they were all white.

VASQUEZ: That's the flash point. That's the contact,

regardless what programs are coming down, what people see on face-to-face.

HAAS: One hell of a lot of those people were rowdies. They were rowdy types, unemployed. You have to say to yourself that a riot like that can take place any day and at any time of the year from 1964 up to now, because no one can be a black in American society without a daily sense of outrage.

There's just no way you can be black, especially black and live down there in that community. . . . Even if you're living in Baldwin Hills, there's going to be a sense of outrage, because you step a little bit and you're going to be draped over your car no matter who the hell you are. It happens all the time.

They knew they were stopped for being black. This latest thing from this guy from Hawthorne, a policeman and so on,¹ is just

1. Donald C. Jackson, a former police officer with the Hawthorne police department, carried out his own "sting" operation to expose police brutality against blacks in Long Beach. On January 14, 1989, with a camera crew from NBC-TV filming the incident, he was arrested and physically assaulted. Later, the videotape of the incident was aired on national television.

another example of it. [City Councilman Robert] Bob Farrell, [City Councilman] Nate Holden, all of them have been through this. So they're constantly living in rage. There's a rage burning within. I think today its just as feasible as it was then. My guess is that conditions are probably a little worse down there than they were then.

VASQUEZ: Many of the local residents say they are.

HAAS: Yes. A couple of years ago was the twentieth anniversary of the Watts [riots]. Pat Brown has this institute [Edmund G. Brown, Sr., Institute of Public Affairs at California State University, Long Beach], and I was on his board and said, "Pat, this thing is coming up. Let's do a review of all of this. We'll hold a little conference and so on." He says, "Great idea. Let's do it." It was a very poorly done thing. His institute was not capable of doing anything. I was really pissed by the way it came out. I was going to write his remarks. I'm his speech writer in retirement, because I've been writing speeches for Pat forever.

VASQUEZ: You still do it?

HAAS: Yes. He just called me about two weeks ago and wanted me to do an op-ed piece on Ronald Reagan. I said, "Well, you know, Pat, I don't think you want to do that." Anyway, he calls and wants a speech, and I write it for him because he likes my style and he pretty much buys everything I have to say.

So I wrote the speech for him, and in writing the speech I was doing research and was calling the Urban League, the NAACP, and a lot of the leadership people down there, the people who are functional. That is, the health clinic people, this, that, and so on. Besides that, over the years I've kept in touch, anyway, with that community because I've always felt that this whole nexus of issues down in the central city, whether it's the Eastside or South Central. . . . Now, the Asians are just an incredible admission of the failure of our system.

[End Tape 4, Side A]

[Begin Tape 4, Side B]

HAAS: The bottom line of my little survey was that twenty years later, things were no better and, maybe, they were slightly worse. I think in the

area of crime, drugs, growth of gangs, etc., we're probably worse off than we were twenty years previously. But, certainly, in the general areas of employment, housing, and schools. . . . The [school] dropout rate never changed.

Take one little indicator. Twenty years later, schools were just about the same [with a] 30 or 40 percent dropout rate. So you couldn't measure much in a way of improvements. All I'm saying is that in my estimation, given the fact that twenty years later they still haven't improved, why don't they have another riot and blow up the goddamned town?

VASQUEZ: There's a generation in some of these communities that believes that that's the way you eventually get attention. You take off on the axiom in America, "The squeaky wheel gets the grease." Some of the discourse coming out of Miami in the last month is very similar to it.

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: That blacks have been forgotten.

HAAS: Yes. It's just incredible.

VASQUEZ: Why do we do that as a society?

HAAS: Boy, I'll tell you. I have spent a good part of

my political life puzzling over that and experiencing my own daily sense of rage. Because I identify, I personally identify. I live over here, but I don't live over here mentally. Mentally, I know what's going on in the world, and I know that what's happening in our central cities all over the United States is not tenable. It is not acceptable in a society which says when you turn on the television set. . . . The television set tells you what you as a citizen should expect from your society. What you should expect is a decent home, personal respect, health, schools, freedom from fear of crime and all the rest of it.

These are the simple things that you expect. This is what television tells you our world is all about. I'm talking now mostly about the ads and most of the programs. I'm not talking about the news programs. I'm talking about what people watch on television. This is pure McLuhan, see.

It is pure McLuhan that the expectations we hold are products of what we see on one night on television, what normal people see. What they

view in the ads can be the most devastating of them all. That is to say, it is the ad, the automobile, the beautiful little home, the products, and all the rest of it, this is what our consumer society is all about and that's where our values are created. They're consumer values.

To be able to get consumer goods, you've got to have a job. And to enjoy even the fruits of your job, you've got to be able to buy a house or rent a decent house. You've got to be able to get your kids in a decent school, if that's the kind of value you're getting from TV. So on the basis of expectations, this is where it starts and on the basis of political results, that's where it also starts.

That is to say, politicians are held accountable by what people see on television. Not necessarily all the news, but all the rest of it that they see. That's the message, that's the McLuhan message which I think drives our society. And it drives politics, too.

VASQUEZ: Given that, is it within that context that the role of the politician is to give leadership to

or cater to that? Or, to put it another way, is his job to get elected so he can do something, or to try and go out in a flame if he's out of touch with a public that may be wrong?

HAAS: See, I think politicians are expendable, and they should be expendable. In other words, they should get their best shot, and if it wipes them out, well, you made your best shot. That's good. Somebody else is going to take a crack at it now, and if he doesn't cut it, he's going to go.

That's an oversimplification. Most people who have gone ahead in politics do not share my point of view. Twenty or thirty years in politics, I've known the good and the bad. I'm not trying to give a blank check to a politician to write it out for me, because I am one independent son of a bitch, especially right now. I'm looking back on my political life and saying, "Hey, did you devote yourself to some corrupt enterprise of being in politics so your life is a waste?" You have some sense of defending your life, so I have to be careful, therefore, when I say that my experience in politics. . . .

Most people who go into politics are dedicated. Now, X amount of ego goes into it. Politicians, by and large, like the sound of their own voice. There's no question about that. They are those kinds of persons. Somewhere they were president of their high school class, they were president of their senior class in college, and so on. They've been out doing things that are in the area of being a leader, being in the forefront of it.

Most politicians, when you study their careers, that is the way they've gone. They started out at a low level and kept on going up. I was just talking to Mas Fukai, [Los Angeles County Supervisor] Kenneth Hahn's assistant, yesterday. I called him about another issue about the Santa Monica Mountains and he called me back. "What's up, Lu?" I said, "Mas, how long have you been working for Kenny Hahn?" He said, "Fifteen years." I said, "Mas, you're not even beginning to get into politics. You have twenty-five years under your belt, Mas, before you are anything in this fucking business." Anyway, he was just laughing.

When you take a look at the Kenny Hahns. . . . He was one of the youngest elected officials in Los Angeles. I think he was nineteen or twenty years old when he first got elected. These guys generally start out in the Boy Scout troop, in the local chamber of commerce, this and that, and they work their way up. Because, first of all, they do have a sense of wanting to be leaders. That may be partly ego, totally idealistic, or it's a combination of several other things.

I wouldn't think that very many of them go into it with the idea that they're going to be grafters. That's what they're going to get out of politics. They're going to get money out of politics and so on because most of the procurement of money out of politics is illegal, and you're liable to go to jail. Now, we don't have too many politicians in jail here not because they don't get caught but because they don't do it.

VASQUEZ: There are other ways to do it. Governor Brown, for example, is a rather wealthy man now. I'm sure that contacts and associations while he was governor didn't hurt him.

HAAS: Absolutely no question about it. He came out of

being governor and went right into a very good law firm. Although in all fairness, that law firm was a liberal, Democratic law firm. The guy who was the head of it was one of the finest constitutional lawyers in California, [Joseph] Joe Ball. So Pat Brown wasn't going into some law firm that was going to be just representing corporate interests, and he was going to be making millions.

He was doing pretty much what anybody would have done who was in his position. He was a lawyer. He was aware of getting into a law firm and, sure, making some money. He wasn't that naive that he was not going to try to make money.

VASQUEZ: In the recent campaign, [there was an effort] to stop oil drilling here in Pacific Palisades.¹ It has disconcerted some people. They feel that he had gone to the other side.

HAAS: Well, you're looking at the most disconcerted son of a bitch.

VASQUEZ: What happened?

¹. On the November 1988 general election ballot, Proposition P would have stopped offshore oil drilling near Pacific Palisades.

- HAAS: Right here. Well, I think that first of all, he's an oilman. He's made millions in the oil business. Hey, he's become an oilman.
- VASQUEZ: Personal interest?
- HAAS: That's the first thing: He's an oilman. [The] second thing is, he wanted to get some money from Armand Hammer for his institute. Now, did he get it? I don't know.
- VASQUEZ: The [Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., Institute of Public Affairs] office space at Cal State [Los Angeles] has grown and they have new staff.
- HAAS: No kidding. That's terrific.
- VASQUEZ: I don't know where it comes from. I'm only saying objectively as one who does research over there. . . . I use resources they have occasionally. But there has been a considerable growth.
- HAAS: That's great. That's great. It is an academic enterprise.
- VASQUEZ: With great value.
- HAAS: So from that standpoint, it's a very good thing. And to any extent that they wring any money out of Pat Brown, he wrings it out of somebody else. This is going to be a good thing for that

school. There's just no question about it. To have any kind of an academic enterprise, yours is being supported, that's great.

VASQUEZ: What were some of the other reasons. You were saying he'd become an old man. The interests? The institute?

HAAS: I am sure that [Michael] Mickey Kantor leaned on him, Mickey Kantor and [Charles] Chuck Manatt, and certainly Pat was pretty much aware that. . . . He was probably leaned on by [William] Bill Robertson of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations in Los Angeles County], the secretary. He must have been leaned on by some of his oil-industry friends. He just had to be.

He was being leaned on by other people, including me, who was saying, "Gee, Pat, you can't do this." We had breakfast with him, and I was lobbying to support opposition on this thing because he's a symbol of the Democratic party and important. We sure as hell would have liked to have had him on our side.

Now, I don't sit down and say to Pat Brown, "Give me the inside story. Why did you do it?"

I'm not going to do that. I like him. We're friends. I don't go to his house, and he doesn't invite me, those things, but we had a long relationship, and I enjoy his company. I've written a lot of speeches for him which I'm proud of. He was my voice.

VASQUEZ: As his speech writer.

HAAS: Oh yes. He never changed a line of anything I ever wrote, and I wrote right from my guts. They were my speeches. They weren't his. He just gave them. He has done a lot of things for the causes that I believe in, too. To that extent, there's a mutual admiration and a mutual beneficial society in a relationship like that.

VASQUEZ: Let's wrap up the discussion we started out on on '62 versus '66 and then the next time we'll get into the seventies, the Unruh versus Reagan campaign.

What more would you like to add on the record? What happened in '66? You indicated that there was no single issue. Some of the people I've interviewed have developed a theory about a political pendulum that swings in California-- really, I guess anywhere--and two terms are what

people would take from a governor in California. If you start to make too much change, people want to slow it down. So you're liable to go from a liberal, activist government to a conservative, retrenchment kind of approach.

HAAS: There hasn't been much of a pendulum since 1966, if you wanted to take that as a watershed year. I'm not necessarily suggesting that because I'm not much for political analysis. I don't think too much about it.

That is to say, there is no such thing as political science. There's nothing scientific about it. Economics is called the dismal science. It's dismal not because it pretends to be a science; it's called a dismal science for a different reason. But it's the same sort of thing. Even the economist can't figure out what's going on. So how can you deal in a scientific way with politics? Political science?

VASQUEZ: Some have argued that it's only by dealing with political economy that . . .

HAAS: It's an oxymoron. Political economists, they should never change the words, but the economists wanted to change the word. They wanted to be

called economists, not political economists. They thought that politics was dirty business, so dissociate yourself. So they became scientific. Now, who the hell thought of the term political science I don't know.

All I know is that from my experience and from my reading, a lot of political science. . . . I was a fan of politics. I took it seriously, government and all the rest of it.

VASQUEZ: And a participant as well.

HAAS: That's right. But I was not just an idle performer there grinding out my speeches without thinking and knowing what the hell was going on in the world, especially the debate about how science works and about how people work and all the rest.

VASQUEZ: Do you understand politics more as a vocation rather than a science?

HAAS: No, it's an art form to that extent that. . . . You want to call it something other than calling it political science. All I'm saying is that the difference between '62 and '66 was a melange of many different things and a part of change which is inevitable in a society which is growing and

where the world itself around you is changing technology. Almost every aspect of our life has been undergoing this constant change.

VASQUEZ: Perhaps in the areas that you mentioned, nowhere more rapidly than California. Is that what made California the bellwether for the country?

HAAS: Well, I think California sort of becomes a symbol of it, because here you had a huge mass of people to begin with.

I don't think it's any different from, let's say, New York. Now, when you look at, say, Nebraska, you could say, "Well, there's been very little change except for the agricultural revolution that started back there somewhere." But Nebraska over the years has probably had a pretty stable society built around agriculture. Omaha became a fairly good sized, big city with a certain amount of industry and whatnot. But, by and large, if you look at the state as a whole, you'd say, "That hasn't changed much."

But people don't live that way. They live existentially through the mass media. We all are part of the global village, so the people in Nebraska are watching the Watts riots and have

the same sense that people here have. They are outraged that this is happening in our country. They identify.

VASQUEZ: What identifies the causes for them? They could be just as outraged at government or at the public officials who aren't taking care of the root causes that are prompting the people that are performing.

HAAS: Exactly.

VASQUEZ: How does that happen?

HAAS: My outrage at Watts is not with the blacks. My outrage is with a society that didn't anticipate this and didn't do something about it when we knew deep down that these people were getting a bad rap. Just like in our society right now, you have not just tens of thousands of blacks but tens of thousands of refugees that are here because of the horror of where they came from, whether in El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Mexico.

They're getting a bad rap because they have the sense of wanting what everybody else wants in this society, which is just an opportunity to work, for Christ's sake. Here these guys are wandering the fucking streets wherever you go

looking for that job. They don't have a gun in their back pocket. They're not going to hold people up. They just want to work. We have a society where they can't work. It doesn't matter to me whether they came from Mexico, El Salvador, Vietnam, or wherever the hell they came from.

The fact is they can't participate in society and they're here. A hell of a lot of them are here legally now. They're here under the amnesty program and all the rest of it. They're out there in the streets, too, looking for a job.

VASQUEZ: Knowing what you know and seeing what you've seen, might there be a possibility that the kinds of anger and rage that caused Watts might be brewing as well in some of these communities?

HAAS: You have to be surprised that it's not. The marvel is that there is as much stability in our society as there is, given the disparity. And the disparity has never been greater.

You go around this place that I live in right now, and it's unbelievable. My wife just got a call from her friend who sold her house down here for \$550,000, and she walked by the

house yesterday and it's gone. They ripped out the house. The guy paid \$550,000 for a lot. Now, he just didn't get the lot; he has to pay to rip out the house. Now he's going to build a mansion in there, I suppose. If somebody's got \$550,000 to buy a lot, he's got another \$550,000 to build a house.

VASQUEZ: There are some impressive houses being built along Sunset Boulevard from here going to UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles].

HAAS: This is the disparity in our society which is . . .

VASQUEZ: And this is a pretty upscale area compared to the rest of the city.

HAAS: Well, obviously. Obviously, it's a lot more upscale than other places, because it is true. They come in here. So people want to live here because they're fleeing from the Hancock Parks and other places. They are moving as far west as they can get to get the hell away from an environment they want no part of. Just to drive down to work and back and forth.

VASQUEZ: Are these what some of the local politicians and representatives refer to as "limousine liberals?"

HAAS: I'll say they are.

VASQUEZ: I remember one assemblyman's wife, and she said, "The reason those guys could never get it straight--they all have good hearts, they all really want the right thing--but they don't have to live with it. They don't know how it functions down here. They get surprised by these things. It's all in the abstract for them. They want busing as long as it doesn't happen to them." Much of the things you were saying earlier. Is there a validity to that? Is there a gap between limousine liberals and people whom they hope to make their lives better?

HAAS: I don't think there's any question about it at all, although I'm not going to dispute somebody's motives. Nobody's pure around here. We don't have any blacks in Pacific Palisades or Vietnamese or anything else. This is a protected community not because we can keep those people out but because they can't afford to move anywhere near it. Economics keeps them out.

Let's not be waving a flag here. It's probably a phony flag. That is, when the crunch comes, when your kid gets on that bus and heads for Watts, mama and papa are saying a little

prayer, and they're not liking it. I don't think I would like it either. If I could roll back the years to my kids, and that's on my back, I would have been alarmed about it, too, although I wouldn't have actively objected to it. I would have just been praying.

[End Tape 4, Side B]

[Session 4, February 16, 1989]

[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

VASQUEZ: Mr. Haas, the last time we met we were talking about some of the problems that Governor Brown had in his second term which affected the outcome of the '66 election. We were going over some of his relationships with ethnic minority communities in California at the time. What are the criticisms that you received from the Mexican-American community? [Tell me about] his refusal or failure to be present at or in some way actively support the [United] Farm Workers' march to Sacramento on Easter Sunday, 1966? What was your role in that and what was your opinion of that [decision]?

HAAS: Well, first of all, I was shocked that it happened, because I had never seen any indication from the administration that we weren't in support of the farmworkers. It was almost a given. He had apparently made some plans ahead of time to be absent [from Sacramento], perhaps without knowing about it. I don't know the ins and outs, whether he knew the march was coming off or not. But the fact is he was

heading for Palms Springs for an Easter weekend having a good time playing golf, swimming around, and so on, when these farmworkers were making this epic march up from the [San Joaquin] Valley. It was a tremendous thing.

At that time, César [Chávez] was on the march. He was on the move and he was thrilling people with what he was doing. He was a symbol of Carey McWilliams, John Steinbeck, and all the rest of it. Finally, the lowest people on the rung were cutting out and he was the leader of this group. It was really a fantastic thing that was happening.

I personally was just flabbergasted when I found out that Pat Brown was not going to change his plans to meet with César and the marchers. I was not in a position to find out what the hell was going on, whether there were any political ramifications or whether it was just sort of a childish expression of, "By god, I have plans to go to Palm Springs and I'm going."

Every politician comes to that point every once in a while. They feel they're being pressed, pressed, pressed all the time. At some

point, they say "To hell with it. This is my weekend and I'm going." Maybe it was something as simple, petty, and selfish as that. But it doesn't wash. In politics you're stuck. You're stuck with having to make tough decisions, and, occasionally, it is going to interfere with your personal life. Sorry, buddy, but that's what it's all about. You're in it and you're going to have to do it.

If he thought that was political survival, I'm sure he would have done it. I don't think there would have been any question about that. But whatever the judgment was. . . . And I don't know, I never did find out. I really didn't make any attempt to find out. I was just angry and pissed, and everybody knew it around the office, except the governor. He didn't find out until later, because I told him.

VASQUEZ: Did he have representatives attend? Did you attend?

HAAS: No, but what I did was I contacted César and said, "Hey, I want you to know that there's a lot of people in the Brown administration supporting you, including Lu Haas, and I'm having a big

party at my house for you guys, for your people." So I invited him and his leadership.

We didn't have all the farmworkers there, but we had all of his leadership there, and I had a lot of my friends [there] from the Brown administration. We all just had a party, a get-together [with] guitar, singing. We had a dance and we raged all night drinking whiskey and dancing until hell wouldn't have it, including César.

He was dancing up a storm. There was this little gal, one of his gals. She couldn't have weighed more than ninety pounds. She was a dancing fiend. I'm a dancer, I just love to dance. I always claimed that nobody could dance me down, but this woman danced me down and she danced César down. She danced everybody down in the room. So we were just having a good time. That's all.

Boy, it was almost a crisis for me. I felt so intense about the wrongness of that decision. It was just crazy. This is just sort of a follow-up and has nothing to do with this, but, once again, I couldn't believe a decision by

Tom Bradley when he first started out on the campaign trail against Deukmejian for governor. He went to Fresno, he met with the growers, and he didn't see César Chávez. That's an absolutely intolerable political mistake on his part, but it's deliberate. Nobody can be so stupid that you meet the growers and you don't go down and see César just a few miles down the road.

The same thing happened with [Senator] John [V.] Tunney. It's the same. He made the same mistake. I call it a mistake, but it's worse than a mistake because it's a principled act. You don't support César because it's the political thing to do, you support him because it's the right thing to do.

Incidentally, Alan Cranston. . . . We're going all over the lot here. We're talking about César. But, putting it into perspective, wherever you go in politics in the last twenty years or so, César's been there. He's been a force, a moral force. Hell, there are no votes there.

VASQUEZ: Might that be the case that led to the three or four instances that you've now mentioned, that

politicians look at votes and only votes and not at something else?

HAAS: By and large, the guys that I have cited here I was going to mention Cranston because Cranston, on the other hand, was there before everybody else was. This was up in San José. Did I talk to you about this? Did I mention this on the tape once before? This is now years ago when César was with the Catholic organization up there.

VASQUEZ: The CSO [Community Service Organization].

HAAS: Up in San José trying to get started organizing the barrio up there. Cranston, I don't know how he got involved, because César's the one who tells the story. When he introduces Alan at meetings he says, "This guy has been with me forever." He got him office furniture, office space, and all the rest of it.

In other words, he helped César get started in San José. Alan, in all the years that I've known him, has never faltered as these other guys have faltered on the farmworkers. There was never any question whether there were any votes or anything. Of course, from a practical,

political point of view, that's really not the issue, whether there were any votes. The issue in this case was that there was a liberal constituency that represented votes. Boy, I mean, they represented votes because these are the hard-core, liberal Democrats supporting César. Who didn't support César in those days? We were out there marching for him, boycotting, and doing all the rest of the stuff as the hard-core believers and activists. From a practical, political point of view, César was symbolic. He was a powerful symbol of what the Democrats stood for. So you couldn't turn your back on him without turning your back on that whole thing symbolically. So it was a powerful statement for somebody to ignore--for a Democrat or a so-called liberal Democrat like Tunney--to reject César Chávez.

VASQUEZ: Do you think that perhaps some of these people you mentioned, Governor Brown or Senator Tunney, might have seen César Chávez's movement as a little bit too much to the left? At the expense of what you might get [in return]?

HAAS: I'd rather doubt that it was too much to the

left. Let's look at the case of Tunney, for example--for all I know, Tom Bradley, too.

Here you have a situation of Tunney coming from Riverside where his acquaintanceship out there would be very, very antifarmworker. He identified with the growers out there. He has to identify with growers. That's what he represented when he was a congressman out there. So there was a hell of an attempt by the Democratic party over all the years that I've been around it to, to my disgust, deal with and kowtow to agriculture. Agriculture was perceived as that great, powerful force pumping billions of dollars into the economy. Which it was.

Economically, it was a huge force; politically, it was nothing. If anything, it was a negative as far as Democrats were concerned. They were all Republicans, anyway. You couldn't move them. Underneath that was an infrastructure of a lot of other people, because those 60,000 farmers were supporting thousands of farmworkers, packers, and truck drivers in an economy that permeated that whole valley up there. We're talking about the valley all the way to the

Imperial County.

So it was a widespread thing. Politicians were fearful of the power of the farm vote. Not farmers, per se, because there are only about 60,000 or 70,000 votes. I think it's down to 60,000 actual farmers now. Then, with all the associated issues that went with the farm--the pesticides, the environmental things and so on--you were constantly rubbing up against that. There was a constant effort on the part of the Democratic party to deal with that agricultural segment. César came into that as one of the problems. You can see what happened. It finally came to a head there in the [Governor Edmund G.] Jerry Brown [Jr.] years when he. . . . At the last end of this whole movement, the last Democrat to deal with this did deal with it as effectively as he did. The first bill he signed was the farm-worker bill. [Assemblyman] Richard [J.] Alatorre carried it, and I'll never forget that about Richard. I was so delighted. That was his first bill, and I hugged him for it. I worked precincts for Richard. But I wouldn't work a precinct for him right now, I'll tell you that.

VASQUEZ: Why is that?

HAAS: Well, I think he has gone the route like the rest of those guys. I just don't like his direction. I'm really upset with him because he was really one of my close friends. I worked precincts for him when he just got started.

VASQUEZ: Getting back to this Brown incident, what do you attribute it to? Was it a mistake that his handlers made? Was it a mistake he made? Was it fear of being identified with too many liberal issues in a year he was planning to run for governor? Was it that calculated?

HAAS: I don't know. In those days, I don't have any recollection, any sense of liberals being afraid that they were liberals. We didn't really encounter that. We were doing the Democratic thing. In the first place, there wasn't so much polarization around what you'd call liberal issues. It is possible that this was there and I didn't notice it, because most of us in politics took the César Chávezes for granted. Whether you agreed with him or not, he was such a force, such a symbol for the party.

VASQUEZ: It was a forgone conclusion to support him?

HAAS: Yeah, simply because you certainly didn't want to appear not to be a standard, liberal Democrat, only because of your supporters, the hard-core CDCers and all the rest of it who were supporting César.

So the liberal issues, whatever they were-- of course, they were civil rights, the Rumford Fair Housing Act, all of those things--were never brought up in a context that said, "Hey, we're going too far to the left." We didn't know that there was "too far to the left" until 1964. And even that lesson probably didn't hit home until 1966. We didn't know that we were too far to the left. There was never any real discussion about "Should we do this because. . . ."

One could say our total support of the labor movement was to the left. Well, there was never any question of supporting the labor movement. There was never any question of our support of the civil rights movement, of the Rumford Fair Housing movement, of the Unruh antidiscrimination bills and all of that. Every single one of those things, you'd have to look at the record on that and you wouldn't find any visible lack of support

of those things. It was enthusiastic as far as I could see in retrospect, because I don't have any sense of anybody retreating on those things.

So it was always a bit of a shock to have something like that happen when Tunney refused to have an approach to César, Bradley only a couple of years later doing such idiotic things like that. Now the political situation is totally changed. Democrats are scared shitless of the so-called liberal issues. I can tell you now that we're going to be talking about Cranston that my guiding principle with Alan is "Alan, don't get caught being a liberal."

VASQUEZ: What does that mean?

HAAS: Exactly, what does it mean? Basically, it means nothing. It means this: It means trying to present yourself, without polarizing it, not as a liberal but as a moderate within the framework of an American sense of justice, fair play, and all the rest of it. For a United States senator, it means being strong on defense. It means being in support of the capitalist system. You support the strength of the business system which provides the jobs and all the rest of it.

So when you take a look at a politician like Alan Cranston, you'll see that attempt to balance those forces so that he has never been perceived as, "That raving liberal." Probably, his opponents might be making a mistake in not making it more of an issue, because of the fact of his survival in this climate in the last few years from the time he ran in 1968, the climate by this time having shifted markedly to a more conservative stance. But some of the issues were so overriding. In 1968, for example, when he ran against [Maxwell L.] Rafferty [Jr.], the issue was Vietnam.

VASQUEZ: We'll get more into that in a couple of minutes. I want to ask you a series of questions on the Brown administration. We've talked about it, and I wonder if you would summarize your views of what went wrong in 1966? Why is it that Pat Brown lost the governorship to Ronald Reagan? I know you've thought about it for quite a while now.

HAAS: Right. I did quickly jot down my recollections of the election and everything that happened afterwards when you try to analyze what went

wrong. And that's the usual thing in politics. You get together and people are talking about it all the time. "What went wrong, Lu?" And you ask this guy and this guy and this guy and so on. So it becomes a game. With me, it's been a game, because in all the elections that I've been in, and I've been in a lot of them, there's always that notion that one single thing did you in. And everybody sees it on their thing so that you can go around and collect these single ideas. Pretty soon, you've got a list of ten or twelve specific items collected from people who said, "Yeah, well, it was the Rumford Fair Housing Act." "It was the Watts riots." "It was this, it was that," and so on. When, of course, good sense would tell you that collectively . . .

VASQUEZ: It's a composite.

HAAS: All those things might have done him in.

VASQUEZ: How would you . . .

HAAS: Let me just make one further point. Anytime you come up with a list like this, you never look at the other side of the coin. In other words, how many votes did this get you? Nobody ever says that it got you votes. They only say that it has

lost you votes, see. Nobody talks about putting it down on the other side. You're always looking for the fact that it lost you votes, and we never know.

We never know whether it lost votes on a particular issue. There is no system in our "political science". . . . I'm laughing now. Make sure you get those quotes around "political science." There is no science to tell us where we went wrong. Probably, that's a blessing, but it's a fact. You cannot isolate a single issue and say it lost us the election or it won us the election.

Alan Cranston, in this last election. . . . He loves to say, "Our get-out-the-vote program won the election." I say that's bullshit, because you can't single out one little thing to get the vote. Besides, if you got out the vote, who knows whether they voted for you. You haven't the slightest notion, especially in a close election.

Nevertheless, it's kind of interesting to look back on, only because you can probably lump some of these things together and say,

"Collectively, he was too liberal." Of course, there are also the personality problems that you run into. A Reagan versus a Pat Brown. Well, Reagan versus anybody, as it turned out. Just on the personality alone, it's no contest. The guy is a winner. He's likable. He's somebody that makes people say, "Ah, that's a nice guy. I really like him. I'm going to vote for him." You have that kind of adjustment.

Now, as to whether or not you can say, "Well, the Democratic party has gone too far to the left," that is the current thinking in the Democratic party. Which, probably, if you go back to the last Pat Brown election, you could maybe make a case for, the fact that he was caught up in being perceived as part of the Democratic party going too far to the left in a state that exhibited a hell of a lot of conservative tendencies, even beginning then.

My judgment would be, and I think it's correct, that that is a major problem beginning with the Pat Brown election in 1966 and [going] right on through today, because the presidential votes have indicated this kind of a problem. If

it hadn't been for gerrymandering, we would have a Republican state. Anyway, did you want to go into some of these details here?

VASQUEZ: I really wanted to get those ideas that you've sketched out for me in writing, on tape, and with whatever detail you think is useful.

HAAS: My list of ideas which I put down are in no order at all. There's no rank order here. I just put them down as I thought about them, as a result of our conversations I taped previously, and so on. Okay, after two terms, the voters were tired of Pat Brown. They were bored. They wanted something fresh and so on. Once again, you were up against a Ronald Reagan who was fresh and was not boring. Pat Brown wasn't exactly a stunning, charismatic figure. He simply wasn't. I don't know whether you would call him boring. He wasn't a boring person, but he didn't come across on television with any great strength, wasn't characterized as a stem-winding speech maker and all the rest of it. People weren't at all enthused about Pat Brown. They just weren't there.

We previously discussed the whole business

about the first emergence of racism in California voting and the Proposition 14 vote in 1964. It was there for anybody who wanted to make any interpretation you wanted to, but I interpret it as the first emergence of racism. To the extent that that's a negative--and I think it is in California as it is all over the country, he was stuck with that. The Watts riots were just a continuation from that, and his absence from being on the scene, unfair as it may be, you're stuck with it. It happened on your watch, and "Sorry, buddy." Nothing he could do afterwards made any difference. The Watts riots were not remembered by the McCone Commission. They were remembered because they were put on television.

The school situation at UCLA and at state colleges and so on, especially at Berkeley. . . . Wow. I don't think the voters were very happy to see these students at a state university raising all kinds of hell, invading the chancellor's office, breaking the law, shouting, and appearing to be radicals, which some of them surely were.

That's sort of in the same bag as the Watts riots and all the rest of it where you had this

disorder going on. So you've got a cumulative buildup of these things. To that extent, you can sort of lump some of these things together.

The attack on [Mayor] George Christopher, I think that's kind of a minor point. But everybody says that it didn't make any sense because, first of all, you had to try to get some Republican votes. Certainly, a lot of the Republicans were pissed off with Pat Brown attacking one of his former political opponents, but a decent man, in San Francisco, the very city where he grew up politically. The other thing, of course, is that everybody said it was stupid, because we wound up with Reagan. We didn't think it was stupid. I didn't know anything . . .

VASQUEZ: All the intelligent, political money was on Christopher emerging as the serious candidate in that primary.

HAAS: Right. So the fact that we were getting to Reagan, having him as our opponent, everybody thought that was great strategy. It didn't make a hell of a lot of difference. The fact that Pat Brown was from northern California has to be a fact that we didn't think about in those days,

because there wasn't any sense that the power had shifted to the south. The power had been in the north all the time. It was just that there was a culture of politics emerging from the north, and it hadn't developed from the south at all.

But, there again, you have a situation from a practical, political point of view that was very, very important in retrospect. At the time, you didn't think about it. He obviously made some effort to be a presence down here because he took a home down here in Hancock Park and spent part of his summers down here. But the TV image thing. . . . I've sort of hinted a little there as to whether he was boring and so on.

Looking back at the Marshall McLuhan concepts, it goes even deeper, because the Ronald Reagans are clearly the TV and film-image types. That's the reason why they're successful. They have a persona. The McLuhan concept is that of sculptured looks. People with sculptured faces and appearances do a lot better than smooth-faced people on television. You had that in Reagan versus Brown. Again, this may be a marginal thing, because there's a lot of things on the

other side of the fence. When we talk about Cranston, I can tell you some stuff on that because he doesn't have a sculptured face.

VASQUEZ: Well, he has developed a sculptured look.

HAAS: Maybe. It's a little more sculptured now than it was. Within the Democratic party, we had this struggle going on.

VASQUEZ: Which was?

HAAS: Yorty, Unruh, Carmen Warschaw. . . . I don't know. You can probably go on naming a lot more. There was this constant struggle in the Democratic party which you don't see today. We haven't seen that in recent years, so you have to remind yourself that things have changed politically. In those days, in the sixties, Democratic politics were in a turmoil. It was rough-and-ready and by god, people were popping off. They were for Pat Brown and against him, the CDC, Carmen Warschaw, and everybody who was a power.

The press was looking at it as a cat-and-dog fight and was constantly covering everything that was going on. So Carmen Warschaw today wouldn't even be noticed, simply because politics is no

longer covered by the press. They just totally ignore it.

Only this year, because of Jerry Brown's reemergence into Democratic party politics, [the press] has now suddenly said, "Oh there is such a thing as a chairman of the Democratic party." Back in those days, they were all out in the papers every single day.

Sam Yorty was a popular mayor. So when this guy pops off constantly against Pat Brown, and when Jesse Unruh as the political leader of the assembly and so on is doing this sort of thing, and when hotshots like Carmen Warschaw, who didn't represent anybody but herself, her loud mouth. . . . Nevertheless, she added to the din. So, yes, that has to have had a long-term effect on Pat Brown, because Jesse felt he should have been the candidate and not Pat Brown. Pat Brown was worn out, and two terms were enough for anybody, etc.

VASQUEZ: How about things like the Vietnam War?

HAAS: That's next on the list. In 1966, it seemed like a minor issue. For me, it wasn't a minor issue, because war was never a minor issue with me. I

was so consumed by the Cold War, the total politics of the Cold War and the Democratic party's involvement in the Cold War, that I was sensitive to it. But I was outside of the mainstream of the Democratic party.

Looking back at it, I don't see it as a big thing, although it was one more mark where a political leader comes into conflict with [Simon] Sy Casady, who was the head of the CDC [California Democratic Council] with a substantial following, not to mention having a following as far as television is concerned. Because when Sy Casady popped off, he had television guys and reporters following him around. I don't know at that time whether it was a political issue of that much significance, but it was just another one of these little things that you add up, and it also represented the struggle within the Democratic party.

VASQUEZ: Which was to break open in 1968?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: At the national level.

HAAS: Sure. I wrote down the fiscal finagling. It seems like a minor point.

VASQUEZ: What comes to mind when you use that term?

HAAS: Well, the fact that he [Brown] was using budgetary devices to hide revenue losses and to avoid taxes. We should have been thinking about taxes or cutting back on that and so on. So there were always the Republican charges about fiscal finagling.

I never paid much attention to it. I thought it was kind of a minor point. I think, politically, it probably was. I don't think that people perceived that there was a fiscal crisis like the kind of thing we've been going through in recent years with state government where we have had some serious deficiencies.

High taxes. Well, Republicans have been campaigning on that forever. It never had any effect politically as far as we could see, on the Democratic side, that people really thought that taxes were too high or that the Democrats alone were responsible for that particular thing.

Clearly, there was something brewing there, because only a few years later people were getting the sense that taxes were too high or that they were unfair and so on. As we well

know, we come along finally with Proposition 13. Maybe it was happening and we were just sort of pushing it aside as a nonissue. I don't know.

The attacks on Reagan for his so-called [John] Birch Society connections and the fact that he came from the radical right, they apparently didn't take. So, therefore, you have to assume that there might have been some backlash or backfiring in these attacks that were, to use the common phrase, McCarthyite. They were. They certainly had that tone to them that this was obviously going too far in his case, because he wasn't a member of the John Birch Society. There wasn't any real evidence that he was well-connected with some extreme right wing of the Republican party. But this was all part of what has been constant in politics, which is that there's only one kind of politics, it's dirty politics. In this year, it was operative on both sides. It's always been operative on both sides.

VASQUEZ: But, perhaps, a little more damaging for Brown, because he was an incumbent. He was a professional politician and had always been a

politician. Mr. Reagan was billing himself as the citizen.

HAAS: Well, I don't describe what you just said as part of dirty politics. Dirty politics is when you make an accusation or pretend to make a presentation which is totally false, like the one we discussed previously where Nixon attacked . . .

VASQUEZ: [Congressman] Jerry Voorhis or somebody?

HAAS: Right. Nixon versus Jerry Voorhis, Nixon against Helen Gahagan Douglas, and the Nixon campaign showing Pat Brown with his fingers clasped as though he were praying towards Nikita Khrushchev.

VASQUEZ: I guess my point is that when there is that kind of a campaign and there's mudslinging, sometimes it just hurts more the person that is perceived as the long-range career politician, especially when you have a fresh figure like Reagan who is making a big theme of not being the politician. He is only a citizen that wants to step in and "clean up the mess in Sacramento."

HAAS: I do not believe that. My sense is that dirty politics is so much a part of politics that it is now, going through all these years that I've been involved in it right up until this year. . . .

Which appears to be a classic case of almost total preoccupation with dirty politics. We're talking about [George] Bush versus [Michael S.] Dukakis, where the whole political campaign was dominated by what you would call dirty politics. Bush's [dirty politics] clearly were superior to Dukakis's.

I don't mean that that's the only reason that George Bush won. But I'm now talking about it being superior in that his television commercials were so much more hard-hitting, effective, and damaging per se, just looking at them. And subtly damaging by use of that black guy. What's his name?

VASQUEZ: Willie Horton.¹

HAAS: Willie Horton as a subliminal figure that represented the Democratic soft-on-crime position. So you see a continuum of that as television more and more dominated politics. Now, back then, we were not unaware of

1. Willie Horton was a convicted felon who escaped from a furlough prison program in Massachusetts and committed another violent crime. He was used by the Bush campaign as an example of Dukakis's supposedly soft-on-crime record.

television. It was not the dark ages.

Television was emerging as a big thing. But if you could draw a line on a graph about how dirty politics has increased, I think it would probably show, if there were some way to quantify it, that it has now reached a peak in 1988.

VASQUEZ: Why? Because it makes better television?

HAAS: I think because it's perceived that it works.

[End Tape 5, Side A]

[Begin Tape 5, Side B]

HAAS: I am somewhat skeptical about this whole thing, when you look at it philosophically and over a long period of time, as to whether it "works" or not. The fact is, in all the campaigns that I've been involved in, we have used it. I'm not trying to say that I didn't get involved in using it, because I was a dirty politician too. Let's not try to set up something here where, I'm trying to give you some kind of a con job that I was above it all. Forget it.

Looking at it philosophically and looking at it from a practical point of view, the thing about professional politicians. . . . And I'm talking about political consultants you hire to

do this kind of work. On the one hand, you have operatives like myself and other people who are doing a sort of technical job within the framework of a campaign. Which would certainly have an effect on the campaigns and so on, because you're doing the speeches, you're writing the words, and you're putting out the press releases. All of that has an impact. But how much impact it has compared to ten million dollars' worth of television spots is another question.

Nowadays, nobody thinks but that ten million dollars' worth of television is going to make an impact. That's where the ball game is. Once again, you come to the question as to how you measure these things. In other words, my contention has been over the years that you can't measure these things. So how do you want to deal with politics? I have been arguing in recent years with Cranston to no avail that instead of spending all your time. . . . You're spending 90 percent of your time raising money.

Suppose you just reversed it and spent only 10 percent of your time raising money and 90

percent of your time doing old-fashioned politics? Which means getting out, making speeches, going on radio and television, getting free media. Which, to my point of view, is far more credible than these phony ads. Who believes these ads? What kind of credibility do they have? Everybody knows they're false.

VASQUEZ: Do they?

HAAS: I think so.

VASQUEZ: They seem to work.

HAAS: You don't know that they work. You don't know that. You don't have a test on the other side, there's no way to review with everybody as to why they voted.

VASQUEZ: Something that you just said does fly in the face of the observation you made earlier in another session, and that is that voters get tired of a politician being out there who is always speaking on issues. They just get tired of seeing him. Wouldn't that seem to contradict what you're advocating for Senator Cranston?

HAAS: Well, I don't know the context in which I made that statement, but it certainly doesn't jibe with anything that I believe. That is to say, I

don't think there's any question that some politicians get worn out with the voters. But it may be an accumulation of not just getting tired and all that, because there's really no evidence that people just get tired of their politicians.

If you look around and see the longevity of most politicians, they just go on and on and on. They don't get bounced out of the office. I don't have the figures, but you can dig them up, and you know them without my really telling you that 80 percent, let's say--that's probably a low number--80 or 90 percent of the incumbents every year get reelected. They don't get thrown out. So people apparently aren't getting bored with them. They don't care.

Now, in statewide elections and in presidential elections, you're a little more vulnerable, because you have that whole mass of voters and you're more visible. So, to that extent, there may be an element of that where you're out in front all the time. A congressman, for example, people don't see him. He's not on television, certainly. You very rarely see a congressman on television. Most people wouldn't

recognize even their own congressman from television, because they don't get any exposure. So they do have a much lower visibility except for a few of them who stand out a little bit. Like a Tom Hayden, who has visibility through Jane Fonda more than anything else, or Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, Jr. because he's Speaker. I don't buy off on that.

When you look at the politicians over the years that I've dealt with and the present crop, they are pretty run of the mill, boring types. A Deukmejian. If there's anybody more boring than Deukmejian, I don't know who it is. A Tom Bradley, he is basically a boring politician. John Van de Kamp, nice guy, but he belongs with the rest of them. He's boring, too. Gray Davis, Leo McCarthy, you just keep naming them. They're all a bunch of nice guys, but there's no glamour there.

The test of a successful politician. . . . You'd have to look at something else. You'll really have to look a little deeper. In other words, the cliches are you'd have to be glamorous, charismatic, and all the rest of it,

[but it] doesn't work in practice.

VASQUEZ: Let's take Pat Brown. What was it about him that made him successful?

HAAS: It was just the same element that you can account for success in politics, generally.

VASQUEZ: Which is?

HAAS: Ambition, the desire to be elected and to win, X amount of money, luck, a decent background, and so on. A lot of other things add up to it. Clearly, a lot of people are qualified to be governor, but they never quite get there. Leo McCarthy is a good example of that.

VASQUEZ: How much does luck have to do with it?

HAAS: A lot. I did mention luck. I just went through it rather quickly. I think luck has a tremendous amount [to do with it]. Alan Cranston was perceived to be a lucky politician. He had nothing to do with all the nefarious people that he ran against. He was not always lucky, because he was unlucky when Pierre Salinger came along.

VASQUEZ: Even though "lucky Pierre" turned out to be less than lucky. [Laughter]

HAAS: Right. So you can say he was lucky because Max Rafferty was his opponent and anybody could have

beaten Max Rafferty. I don't know whether it was true or not, because I'll tell you that Max Rafferty was flashy.

VASQUEZ: It was a tough race?

HAAS: He was an impressive guy. He was dynamite out there. He was absolute dynamite.

VASQUEZ: Before we look . . .

HAAS: When I would see him in action, I'd say, "Gee, that poor Cranston. How are we going to beat this guy?"

VASQUEZ: He came out of Needles, California, as the supervisor of education out there, didn't he? Before we get into Rafferty, I'd like to ask you a couple of judgment questions about the Brown administration. What do you think were the contributions of the Brown years, 1958 through 1966, to California politics?

HAAS: If you single out one thing, it would be education. If you singled out a second thing, it would be water.

VASQUEZ: To the form and substance of politics, what did it do for California politics, that experience?

HAAS: That's a difficult question. I've never thought about it in those kinds of terms as to what it

did. You'd have to get back to the issues. I can't see how you can escape it. You cannot link the two, because when I look back on the Brown years as I look back on all my career in politics, it's liberal politics versus all other kinds of politics. That's what it turns out to be. Whatever the label is. In this case, it's Democratic versus Republican.

To the extent that I could answer your question, it would be a test of Democratic ideals, liberal Democratic ideals, versus what was seen on the other side. Our side apparently had more voters who were interested in what we were trying to get across as a message in the generality of the other side. . . . I want to hedge out a little bit, because a lot of the things we were talking about were not liberal, per se. Jobs, for example. Democrats were always talking about jobs. We were always driving home the notion, and it was true. What we were doing was creating jobs. It is true that we were, because we were spending. We were spending money on building schools, constructing dams, constructing highways. Everything that we

were doing, the whole idea of growth, was generating jobs, and people had the sense that it was doing that.

We were positive on the economy and that these were good times because this is a growing state and all the rest of it. So that's a political bag there which has nothing to do with liberalism, per se. Because a hell of a lot of those people were certainly not on our side on Proposition 14 in 1964.

VASQUEZ: What do you think the Brown administration contributed to national politics?

HAAS: That California was a sort of a symbol of the new West, sort of an unusual place, and that it was getting to be the first state in the nation in terms of population.

It was certainly the first state in the nation as far as Los Angeles was concerned in the entertainment industry and so on.

We had an image out here that was being broadcast around the world and over the United States through television. I would say that it must have had some influence, just as New York, a premier Democratic state on the East Coast, was

doing the same thing. But there was a big difference. We had no national politicians of any stature. A Pat Brown never established himself as having a national figure. Whatever he did on the national scene was a complete flop.

Twenty years later, his son is adding to the confusion by running for president and messing things up. Nationally, I don't think our influence politically except. . . . Okay, here's a Democratic party that is doing things in California. California, I think, had a positive image over the rest of the country, because we were doing a lot of the things that other politicians in the country were talking about.

VASQUEZ: Which brings me to the question, how much do you think the administration in Washington helped the Brown administration at the state level?

HAAS: I think it helped a lot, because our state was dependent, especially through defense contracting. [California was] heavily dependent upon a hell of a lot of federal money flowing into the state. We always have, as you know, a positive balance of federal money coming into the state of California whether it's water projects,

highways, education. All the money that was falling into the state of California. . . . It doesn't mean that the state, itself, wasn't spending a lot of money, because it was spending its money. It wasn't dependent on the federal government.

I don't know whether that jells much with the voter one way or another. I don't know if they think that through. The local congressional district, you can sort of make a point. You got some form of a federal project, and it becomes a big thing. Let's say it's a huge postal center or something like that, five thousand jobs and money being spent on rents in the community and all the rest of it. So there are some obvious cases of localized things.

At the state level, you never made that as an argument to get a lecture or anything like that, that you were bringing in federal money. That didn't mean anything.

VASQUEZ: Perhaps an even more difficult question is what do you think was the greatest shortcoming of the Brown administration? What was disappointing to you about it at the time or with hindsight?

HAAS: I guess the greatest shortcoming of the Brown administration was Brown's failure to get reelected. There just isn't anything that comes close to that. What he was trying to do in the state, what he did was of such a positive nature, especially in education. In retrospect, some of the environmental stuff was very destructive, but at the time we didn't look upon it that way. The water projects were looked upon as a plus.

Nowadays, we would be out there blocking some of those dam projects. And the whole business of transferring water from the [Sacramento River] delta and the San Francisco Bay down here to southern California, that was all positive to them. But now, of course, it's a dead issue. Getting any more water from the north is probably an impossibility.

I'm not trying to be nonobjective about it. I don't see any shortcomings other than the shortcomings that Pat Brown himself, as a political leader who was not capable of getting reelected a third time for all. . . . Plus a few other reasons that were listed that we haven't even gone into. That's the only test in

politics, in our kind of system. There's only one test as to whether you were a success or not, and that is to be elected.

An election of Pat Brown for a third term might or might not have had some kind of a future effect on the state. By that time, we were running into a lot of problems which we didn't have up to that point, [problems] which were mostly fiscal. It was beginning to show, and the resistance of voters to spending more was beginning to appear. Ultimately, we floundered on that. Which gets us into the Unruh campaign.

VASQUEZ: Before we get into the campaign of 1968, in the Cranston versus Rafferty [campaigns], tell me a little bit of what you did in 1966 through 1968, just to fill in the chronology.

HAAS: Right. Almost immediately, the first thing I did after the election was to call whatever friends I had in Washington and say, "Hey, I'm coming."

VASQUEZ: Why Washington?

HAAS: Well, there was nothing in Sacramento. Coming from state politics, what was I going to do? Go back down to Los Angeles politics or something like that? No. I said, "That's the center of

the universe. That's where everything is happening. And that's where I'm going." So there was never any question about that. Fortunately, I had a good friend back there who was director of public information in the Department of Education. His name is Lee Goodman. He and I worked on the Los Angeles Daily News. He was the guy I called as my principal contact back there.

We also contacted the Johnson administration, the White House. Hey, we were hotshot Democrats from California, and he had Californians on his staff and so on. So there was the White House. There was clearly the possibility that these guys could hire some hotshots from California. Well, nothing happened on the Johnson side from my reaching out. They had an office there that you sent your resume to and so on. So I never did get a job with the administration through the administration. That's kind of a crucial point, because in my personal life, it had an effect on what I did.

Anyway, I very, very quickly lined up a job at the Department of Education through my friend

and became director of public information for the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education. This was right at the time when Johnson was cranking up his War on Poverty and his multi-billion-dollar Elementary and Secondary Education Act,¹ probably the single most important federal law about education that we've had since the land-grant colleges were set up in terms of pumping billions of dollars into our ghetto, barrio, and poverty schools in the rural areas of this country.

Anyway, that was a very exciting little thing that was going on in connection with my job. So I went back there and became director of the office of public information. From there, when Wilbur [J.] Cohen became secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, he asked me to be director of public information for the whole [Department of] Health, Education and Welfare. I got that job. I've forgotten the exact dates. I don't know if you have it. You probably have it, don't you?

1. H.R. 10586, Public Law 89-199, 79 Stat. 181.

VASQUEZ: Yes.

HAAS: When I came to [the Department of] Health, Education, and Welfare, anyway, that was with Wilbur Cohen. I was there until July of 1968, when I came back to Los Angeles to become the western press secretary for [Senator] Hubert [H.] Humphrey.

VASQUEZ: How did that happen?

HAAS: Humphrey's campaign chief here was Gene Wyman. I had worked with Gene over the years in the Brown administration. As you know, Gene was Brown's guy. So he just called me up and said, "Hey, Lu, come on. We want a press secretary." I was the press secretary for the Democratic party with the most experience, ability, and all the rest of it. I was the best.

If somebody rings the bell for a big political campaign, a presidential campaign, I'm gone. So I came out to California to do that, and I only lasted there for a week or ten days. It was a very short period of time when Cranston called me and said, "Lu, I need you more than Humphrey needs you." I said, "Well, there's only going to be one test. It's going to be an easy one,

because all you have to do is tell me what your position on the [Vietnam] War is going to be. Because that's the overriding issue as far as I'm concerned. If you're going to get me, I have to know what your position on the war issue is." He says, "Lu, we're going to run against the war." I said, "Okay, you've got a guy." So I jumped ship. Gene Wyman was pretty unhappy, but I'm a free spirit and do what I think is the right thing to do.

VASQUEZ: Let's get into that campaign. In your memory of the events at the time, what was the context? What was the historical setting? What was different about California that you've been watching when you came back and were getting ready to take care of this campaign?

HAAS: Well, in 1968, there was only one issue, and that, obviously, was the Vietnam War. That is what was consuming everybody. There was nothing else. Whatever else was so marginal. On a scale of 100, there was the Vietnam War at a 100 on the political scale and everything else in the range of 5, 15, 20, or something like that. You could make some kind of a scale. Where they were, I

don't know, I don't have the foggiest notion. I had no recollection of anything but the war being the issue.

VASQUEZ: What was your perception of the candidates? What were you going to work with in the case of Alan Cranston? What were you going to work against in the case of Max Rafferty?

HAAS: Well, Alan Cranston was, first of all, totally dedicated. He is the classic "peacenik." He is a guy who is so consumed with "peacenikism." Excuse the word. That has basically been his life. It's been sort of my life, too, in the sense that it is deep within me. The principal reason I got into politics was my experience in World War II and my determination that somehow or other we've got to put a stop to this nonsense. You just can't go on blowing up the world. We've got to have peace. So it's been my subliminal, underlying philosophy that has kept me in politics over the years. Although, unfortunately, in my case, most of the time, I was in conflict with the very party with which I was working, because we were in the Cold War.

VASQUEZ: In those days it was Johnson's war?

HAAS: Yeah, it was Johnson's war. But previous to that, it was John F. Kennedy's Cold War. Before that, it was [Harry S] Truman's Cold War. When it was Truman's Cold War, I voted for Henry [A.] Wallace. I was by no means, at that point, any standard Democrat who was going to put up with any kind of nonsense. I was voting my conscience even though I wasn't in politics at that time. I was a Democratic precinct worker, but not then. I became a member of the Independent Progressive Party, IPP, as a one-shot affair. Anyway, there wasn't anything in 1968.

VASQUEZ: What was your impression of Maxwell Rafferty at the time, and what was your strategy for beating this guy?

HAAS: Our strategy was the same as previous strategies, to attempt to isolate this guy as a weirdo--as a radical rightist, an ultraconservative, and as a warmonger. So we utilized everything we could to diminish him as a person.

VASQUEZ: An example?

HAAS: The thing that probably stands out--to get back to dirty politics, again--is him walking around with a cane and pretending he couldn't make the

war because he was not able to do it--he was disabled and so on. Of course, David Shaw, who is now with the Los Angeles Times as the media reporter, at that time was working for the Long Beach Press Telegram. He, in a series of articles--two or three anyway--reporting of what this guy Rafferty was all about, which was basically pretty unsavory when you get right down to it. . . . The guy was not a very savory character. So I think we did the country a service in getting rid of him, however we did it. We played until hell wouldn't have it the fact that this guy was a liar. One of the first really big documents we got together through a group of lawyers who worked in this. . . . Allan Kreps. . . . I don't know if you've come across his name or not.

VASQUEZ: Not Kreps.

HAAS: Allan Kreps was a very hotshot lawyer with O'Melveny and Myers law firm. He is a very smart, able guy. He put together a team of lawyers who went to work on coming up with a document called "Rafferty's Nine Big Lies." I think that's what it's called. I've forgotten

the headline on the thing. I probably have it downstairs. I don't know if you've come across that or not. I anticipated that we were going to be talking about this.

VASQUEZ: I remember it back then.

HAAS: "Rafferty's Nine Big Lies"-- whatever it was. These are a bunch of lawyers who are doing this. They do it like a brief. They were not going to put it down unless it was true. So we had nine big lies that this guy had committed over the years. I don't know what the nine were, but really, his war service was the dominant big lie.

We used that, first of all, as a way to avoid a debate with him. Our point was every time he asked for a debate, we said, "We can't debate a liar." And we would wave this document around. Everybody would say, "What's that?" Well, here's the proof that the guy is a liar. So you went to Fresno and someone would say, "Why aren't you debating Rafferty?" We'll say, "Here's the reason we're not debating Rafferty. He's a liar."

VASQUEZ: Did that work?

HAAS: The press kept asking the same questions over and over again. That's what they did. Because if you go to Fresno, they ask that question. If you go to Bakersfield, they ask it. In those days, that's the way you campaigned. You were going everywhere. You were getting the same thing.

VASQUEZ: Why were you trying to avoid a debate?

HAAS: Because we thought he would kill us. He was so superior in his debating skills, and he was so astonishing in his glibness and he did have the sculptured look.

He had something else that went against that. The McLuhan concept is you can't be "too hot" in television. You must be "cool" on television, not hot. He was hot, very hot.

VASQUEZ: Too aggressive?

HAAS: That's one of the problems that [Jesse] Jackson has. It's not that he's black. But he is a hot black according to McLuhan concepts. That is too much for this nice, cool living room here.

VASQUEZ: You see the excitement right through the TV set?

HAAS: Yeah. He's going to come out right at you. Tom Bradley doesn't do that. He's cool. He's low-keyed. He doesn't threaten you through that

television camera. So the television thing has its sides to it.

Another sculptured politician who definitely was too hot in television was [Edward M.] Ted Kennedy. The greatest speechmaker that the white community had until Jesse Jackson came along was Ted Kennedy. He was a superb speechmaker. Humphrey, incidentally, was in the same tradition, and they were too hot. Humphrey was too hot. We knew that even then. We tried to say, "Hubert, we've got to cool you down." Hey, come on, you were not going to cool Hubert Humphrey down. He's Hubert Humphrey.

VASQUEZ: How about the connection with the [John] Birch Society? The right wing of the Republican party was really . . .

HAAS: Well, we had that dossier on him and the right wing of the Republican party and so on. It was the same story with him, too. It was part of the nine big lies and all the rest of it. It was connections with this radical wing of the . . .

VASQUEZ: Why did it work against him and not against Reagan? Because he was too hot?

HAAS: No, because it was probably truer with him. With

Reagan it was not true. We just didn't have the goods on Reagan. He wasn't out there really identified with those people. We had no record of it.

He represented their views a little bit, because certainly, when you look back at what he was saying in those days, it was a pretty conservative point of view, but it certainly wasn't Birchist. We didn't have any kind of a Birch line on him. None at all.

I don't know. Day in and day out, the war issue became the most dominant, from our point of view. So we continued to campaign against the war versus Rafferty who was preaching on the war. He was taking the opposite point of view. I don't think there was any question about that. We didn't have to paint him as a warmonger or somebody who supported the war. He did, and we were opposed to it.

VASQUEZ: So he helped to polarize the election?

HAAS: Absolutely. Well, everybody helped us polarize it. That is to say. . . . We took a calculated position on this, and I was partly responsible for this, because the issue arose within the

Democratic party how we were going to handle it within the Democratic party. Here we got Johnson, and he got out. Then we got Humphrey, and Humphrey seems to be. . . . Although everybody was saying. . . . I wouldn't even hesitate about going to work for Humphrey, because I felt that this guy was not going to go on with the war. At some point, he was going to step away from it and start campaigning against the war. It was just unbelievable that he would do anything but that.

But as you know, it took him a lot of time to get away from that war and he never really managed successfully--I don't think. We'll never know whether this was the problem or not. Wow, looking at the election in '68, it's just hard to believe anything but the war issue was being the dominant thing all over the country.

VASQUEZ: Who were the sources of support that you drew on most for that campaign for Cranston?

HAAS: In those days, you went down the special interests in the Democratic party. To this day, it is still the strength of the party, so there was never any attempt to come up with a new

coalition as far as the Democratic party was concerned. We just did the laundry list. We had had someone on our staff that could write a Spanish-language news release.

VASQUEZ: Remember now who they were?

HAAS: No. Gee, I don't know whether I could come up with that guy's name or not, because he was a pretty well-known guy. I don't have any records now. Maybe somewhere. It was a part-time thing. It wasn't a full-time thing, because in those days we put out a lot more press releases than people do nowadays. Now, the press release is sort of an old idea. We ground out our press releases by three, or four, or five, or six a day, whatever it took. We were putting out black press releases, Mexican press releases, Chinese, whatnot.

What I am saying. . . . Okay, what was our stance? We had a standard Democratic party thing, which was in those days standard. It no longer is today. I don't know what politics it is today, because the Democratic party has gotten so far away from keeping together its coalition of interests, which was the minority groups:

labor, Jews, blacks, Mexicans, now women. In those days, women were not really a big issue.

VASQUEZ: How important to your campaign was the antiwar movement?

HAAS: All it did was set up the background. We didn't set out to identify ourselves with an antiwar movement. We were part of it. But by no means is anybody running for the Senate going to start identifying with groups that may get you into trouble. Certainly it was a possibility of getting into trouble with the antiwar movement at any moment, because they were marching all over the place.

I was in Washington and I marched in that great demonstration against the Pentagon, even though I was a member of the Johnson administration and so on. It was very intense. And of course, a lot of the stuff that was going on--as to whether or not it was creating any backlash, I don't know. There's no record. There's no indication that it did. So one assumes that the antiwar movement was setting up a general background of people saying, "That has to stop. We have to get out of that war."

Now, the reverse side of it is what happened in Chicago in 1968. There was Humphrey caught in that horrible situation, and it couldn't have helped him. There was just no way that it could have helped him. Incidentally, this is part of the discussion. It came time to decide what Alan Cranston was going to do, and I said--and my view prevailed, although I don't think it's any big deal--"We're not going to Chicago. We're going to stay out of that mess."

I didn't say that I knew what was going to happen, although everybody knew what was going to happen in the sense that the Democratic convention was a target for the antiwar movement, and we were aware of this buildup that was going to take place there and the possibility that everybody who is involved in the convention was going to get caught up in some kind of maelstrom or some identification as part of the struggle with the Johnson administration in this war issue.

Keep in mind, now, that it's one thing to be against the war. It's another thing to be taking on the Johnson administration and the president, which we didn't do.

VASQUEZ: You just stayed out of it.

HAAS: That's right. We just stayed clear of it. We weren't about to be taking on Lyndon Johnson, no matter how unpopular he had become. We certainly weren't going to take on Hubert Humphrey. So, to the extent that the antiwar movement was doing that, we were not going to identify with that. That was totally outside of us, and our position was to look like an independent voice, still Democratic in all respects, but on this particular issue we were not going to be participating in defending the Johnson administration, in supporting Humphrey, or anything like that.

We had a hands-off attitude towards the whole Humphrey campaign. At the very last, when Humphrey came out here, Cranston was up on the dais at a big rally out at the airport, Humphrey headed back to his home state. But there wasn't any real show on our side that we were going to in any way associate with a Humphrey effort, because it appeared that he was just too soft on this war issue for us.

[End Tape 5, Side B]

[Session 5, February 23, 1989]

[Begin Tape 6, Side A]

VASQUEZ: We were talking about the Cranston senatorial campaign of 1968. But before we get into that, I would like to get two concepts that you were developing off tape, on tape, before we go on. That is, your perception, one, of what the Democratic party is for a nuts-and-bolts political type like yourself. And, secondly, what that tells you about what politics is.

HAAS: Well, the Democratic party is a legal structure which is used primarily by the incumbent political officeholders to perpetuate their incumbency. It is designed to eliminate, modify, or to keep at a very low level, public participation--or more precisely, public power. The Democratic party as structured has no power.

Recently, I think they just amended the law to allow some endorsements. Whether that's going to have some real long-range effect or not, we don't know. That remains to be seen. Actually, in the past the CDC [California Democratic Council] had the endorsing function, and they were very activist and they were very important

because they had that endorsing function, maybe. But they were also very heavily involved ideologically. It could be said that as many people were on the CDC through the ideology as they were for this whole idea of endorsing and electing officials.

VASQUEZ: It reflected the rather narrow ideological strain of the Democratic party didn't it?

HAAS: Right. It was the extreme left, extreme liberal grouping, which is like 10 percent of the party, probably.

VASQUEZ: Yet, their endorsements became important for any Democrat?

HAAS: Right. Because first of all, there always was the possibility with the CDC that they could kick out an incumbent. Now, I don't know what their record is. I'm not an expert on CDC. Incidentally, if you ever want to talk about CDC, the guy who is our city treasurer [controller] now [Frederick B.] Tuttle and is part of the [Howard L.] Berman-[Henry A.] Waxman group. . . . He was in UCLA. He was on the UCLA faculty. He was the dean of student affairs or something like that, and he wrote a history of the CDC. He

knows the inside [story].¹ I don't know whether there's any record of how many guys that the CDC elected or that they kicked out any incumbents. I'm not aware that they made any big thing. The point is that the law is designed by the incumbent officeholders for the primary purpose of perpetuating themselves in office and also to protect themselves on something as crucial that you've brought up as reapportionment.

Now, for god's sake, they don't want any "Democratic party on the outside" dictating or having anything to do with anything as critically important as reapportionment, which is the source of Democratic power in this state and all over the United States. The Republicans right now are aiming at 1990, because when the census comes in, we have a new reapportionment. They are determined to break that lock, and I have some doubts right up to this very moment whether we would even be a Democratic state if it wasn't for reapportionment.

1. Frederick B. Tuttle, "California Democrats, 1953-1966." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, UCLA, 1975.

The conservative nature of the state suggests that if we had what you would call a "fair apportionment," if there wasn't gerrymandering, there's a good possibility, it seems to me, that we would have a Republican state, a Republican legislature. We may not have any, or very few, Democratic officeholders.

VASQUEZ: Why don't more people identify with the Republican party now?

HAAS: I think a lot of it is inertia. They know they can always vote for a Democrat. They were born Democrats and they still feel some identification with the party. The officeholders they have are good guys or good women, and they go along with them because, you see, they're not really bumping out the local officeholders. They don't look upon the local officeholders that ideologically, perhaps. They look at the governor and the president as the symbol of what they believe in and what they want.

VASQUEZ: The party label isn't that important?

HAAS: Right. Apparently, at that [state and national] level a Republican can say the things or promise the things that a general mass of people agree

with, and at the local level you've got an assemblyman who's doing favors for people and getting potholes filled--doing local kinds of work. They don't look upon them, perhaps, as being that ideological. Perhaps some of these local politicians, if they got too ideological, they might get bumped out. I don't know.

But the fact is, at the core of Democratic power in the state of California is gerrymandering. At least to begin with, you've got a core of Democrats. Now, if you talk to other people about this issue, you'll get the same message that I'm giving you. If you have a district that is so-called Democratic, if it's not 55 percent Democrat, it is not a Democratic district.

VASQUEZ: In some cases, it's got to be 65 percent.

HAAS: Right. Yes. In other words, you need a very high number of Democrats to account for the loss, the continuing loss that you get in elections . . .

VASQUEZ: Temporary switch-overs?

HAAS: Right. Yes. They may not even be temporary. They may keep on registering Democrats. They just haven't gotten around to [Republican] registration.

VASQUEZ: They vote Republican?

HAAS: And they've been voting Republican right along.

VASQUEZ: How many Democrats do you think do that today?

HAAS: I have no idea.

VASQUEZ: 2 percent? 5 percent? Closet Republicans or what have you? I ask you because you've been a longtime observer.

HAAS: Switch-over?

VASQUEZ: Yes. People who do that on a regular basis.

HAAS: There may be some academics around the state who have been working on this issue who might be able to give you some kind of an answer. But getting back to previous conversations, I have been insisting here a long time that this is not a political science. We don't have these kinds of measurements, because basically, it's based on the secret ballot. Even measurements after the fact may be useless, because people are going to lie about how they voted. They're not necessarily going to tell you the truth. So even when you interview them after the fact, they may cover that up and not even tell you.

I think that these exit polls have turned out to be very accurate as to how the voting

went. But you see, they don't ask you whether-- well, I guess they do--whether you're a Democrat or Republican. I don't know how deep they go into it, but they don't go into much in-depth stuff. To really get an answer to this question you have to ask these people who are doing these exit polls, which are basically the [television] networks. Now, the Los Angeles Times is probably analyzing network polls too.

VASQUEZ: And they would have another answer.

HAAS: I just don't. . . . The subject is way beyond me. I'll tell you. As long as I was in politics, there wasn't anybody that I know of who spoke with any degree of certainty about what voters are doing and why they're doing it and whether there was any way of really measuring it.

VASQUEZ: So it is as much political instinct as it is science?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: What does that tell you about politics as a practice? As a craft? As a hobby? As a life's commitment?

HAAS: Basically, it's something that people do because they have things that they believe in and they're

trying to press their point of view through the political system. So you have that hard core of people who are interested in the political process for that reason.

At the local level you can identify certain characters--your congressman, your assemblyman, your supervisor, and so on--and do some analysis. Then you can decide politically how you want to behave based on very simple political analysis of the people that you represent.

You could conceivably vote for a Republican because you think the congressman has been doing a hell of a job. And we've got a lot of Republican congressmen who are getting these big votes from people, which means that they are getting a lot of Democratic votes. You get, obviously, a lot of these kinds of Democrats who are switching and who are voting for an Alan Cranston. We're here talking about Alan Cranston and his fabulous success--fabulous because it's almost unbelievable that this guy has been elected so often. He has given his liberal credentials and matched up against a Republican president. People are voting for the Republican

president and a Democratic senator. There has to be an explanation for that.

VASQUEZ: What does this tell you?

HAAS: The switch-overs are switching both ways, you see. So you get a two-way switch.

VASQUEZ: Are the parties irrelevant?

HAAS: No, the party is not irrelevant. Because as long as we have apportionment, then there's a chance that gerrymandering is going to continue to produce Democratic majorities in this state and in a lot of other states, simply because of the process.

VASQUEZ: Are these people Democrats in name only? What is the Democratic creed?

HAAS: Well, they are, first of all, Democrats in name only. I think everybody probably is a Republican in name only or a Democrat in name only, except that there's enough hard-core Republicans and Democrats to make up your core group, and then you go from there. A politician knows he can start out with, let's say, 40 percent of sure votes in his district. Even an Alan Cranston would feel pretty comfortable saying, "I probably got at least 40 percent, because look at how many

people voted for me over the years. So I can start out with 40 percent of people who are going to vote for me." That would be a modest claim on his part. He's probably closer to maybe 50 percent. He probably has a sort of 50-percent rating of people who vote for him. Some of them may be Republicans.

VASQUEZ: Just on longevity and name identification?

HAAS: Well, a lot of other factors. . . . I don't think people vote for name identification and so on. You have to analyze. You have to do some guesswork in talking about a politician like Cranston who defies the conventional wisdom.

Like last time we talked about politicians are all dull. Most of them are dull. Reagan is the exception. He wasn't dull, but everybody else is dull. Deukmejian is dull. Bradley is dull. Leo T. McCarthy is dull. Pete Wilson is dull. Alan Cranston is dull. They're all boring and dull. I just named all the top people in our government. Then you get down to the other levels and they get even more boring. My state senator, a wonderful guy. . . . I love him. He and I get along.

VASQUEZ: Who is he?

HAAS: Herschel Rosenthal. He and I go dancing with his wife and everything. We're just great friends. I love the guy. He's marvelous, and he votes a straight liberal ticket, believe me. He votes the way I want him to vote and so on.

The guy is just another plodding politician, but they're all that way. So the point is this: The voters are looking for something else. In the case of Alan Cranston, what they're getting. . . . I assume this is what they're looking at. They're getting, first of all, an intelligent man. Okay?

VASQUEZ: Is that one of the things voters see?

HAAS: One assumes that maybe intelligence is important. Two, they're getting an honest man. They're getting a basically a no-bullshit man. The guy isn't really going to bullshit you. You know pretty much where he stands on the issues. So you've got some characteristics there that override the fact that he's got a lousy TV image. He looks like "death warmed over." You've expressed that to me and all the rest of these negatives.

Now, for all these people with this kind of longevity. . . . Right here in this town, we've got Tom Bradley. He is a black Alan Cranston. He's a black Alan Cranston. We look at the latest Times poll on the guy. There it is. They know he's honest. They know he's decent. They know he's trying to do the right thing. They know he's intelligent. They know he's fair minded in trying to deal with the blacks, Mexicans, and all the rest of the groups--and the white people, and so on. They know he's really interested and that he's not trying to feather his nest. So I have to conclude that these characteristics come through and that's what the voter measures.

VASQUEZ: So in [Marshall] McLuhan terms, he's "cool."

HAAS: McLuhan is wrong on the whole score, you see. He is. . . . This is one place in the book where he is dead wrong, on the "cool" plus the sculptured looks, and all the rest of it. . . . The McLuhan image of a politician was based on Jack Kennedy, basically, and everybody else is out of the ball game. Well, obviously, when you look around the world of politics, there are damn few Jack

Kennedys around. Our particular world, which is the only one we can analyze, there are none of them. We don't have a single one in the whole state of California, as far as I know. If he's out there, get his ass out there. We need him.

I don't diminish the voter. I think we make a mistake in politics, and people who analyze politics on the outside and are trying to make judgments about politics lose sight of the fact that, first of all, we are only talking about the voters. The voters are a small fraction of the mass of people. The masses of people may be stupid about politics, they may be cynical and this and that, but [there are] a lot of things you can throw at the people about politics and government and their refusal to participate and so on.

In other words, you can downplay the general masses of people, but in my estimation, you cannot say that about the voter. The voter is sophisticated. Just the fact that he goes through the trouble of registering and keeps registering year after year and keeps on voting We're talking now about voters, not

registered people. They are sophisticated. They know what their self-interests are, and they look at the politician and they can decide whether that guy is an asshole or whether he's okay.

They make these judgments, and it's a rather sophisticated judgment if you believe, for example, that the tube tells the truth. Television, in my estimation, tells the truth. That is to say, it can't lie. You can't fool the people.

The reason you can't is that the average person is a television expert. They watch a lot of television, and they've been sorting all of this stuff out in a very expert sort of way, because they don't just absorb it. They analyze it. They're processing this thing, so they've become very sophisticated people.

I am an idiot about television because I don't watch television. All I know is what I read about television and what McLuhan told me and what my guts tell me in my experience. My experience tells me that a lot of conventional wisdom that you get about television "dominating us, they're the ones that are controlling our minds," that is bullshit. I don't buy any of

that. I don't buy any of it.

I buy this: It is mass media. And if you need to advertise your wares--your ware is your candidate--you've got to get him on television. Because that's your ware, that's your product. Now, I just don't believe that you can manipulate the product to. . . . In other words, the classic conventional wisdom is Ronald Reagan. He is the media candidate. He is a manufactured candidate. All the bad things that we and everybody else said about this guy have been proven wrong.

It certainly has been proven wrong as far as the people are concerned and what they wanted, because, first of all, he isn't an idiot. He knew what he was doing. He knows what he believes in. You know what he believes in, and you get back from him what you would expect. We have gotten a conservative. He never told me he was a liberal. I never heard that on his television airing or anything like that. I knew what he was just from watching him, listening to him, and seeing his actions. You can't fool the people. Let's look at the black people.

VASQUEZ: It doesn't bother the voters . . .

HAAS: The black people never voted for him.

VASQUEZ: Not in great numbers, but enough did in some periods.

HAAS: Oh no.

VASQUEZ: Is there no problem in the voter's mind in the great discrepancy of what you are told and what is done. Let's say in the case of Reagan, who was going to cut the state budget and ended up-- of course there's inflation and other factors-- but his last budget was, I think, twice the size of any of the Brown budgets.

HAAS: And look what he did . . .

VASQUEZ: With the federal budget?

HAAS: Incredible.

VASQUEZ: How does the voter discern whether that's good or bad?

HAAS: It's not good or bad, you see. They decide whether it's important or not. I happen to think that the federal deficit is not important. You can't get me excited about it. You can't get the population excited about it. They don't think it's important. They think it's bullshit. And it is bullshit, because in the last forty-four or forty-five years we've only had a balanced budget

I think about twice. The rest of the time, we've had a deficit.

We didn't talk about deficits for forty-five years. The Republicans talked about the deficit, then when the Republicans run up deficits the Democrats talk about deficits. In the [Gerald R.] Ford election the big thing was to try and lay the deficit on the Republicans, because Ford had a \$60 billion deficit. It was monumental back then. It was just as big as it is now.

VASQUEZ: In relative terms.

HAAS: Right. It's roughly about the same. As part of the gross national product, it's about the same. Not much has changed. Slightly larger now, but only slightly larger. I'm an amateur economist and I've been studying this deficit thing a long, long time, so I never bought off on that.

All I'm saying, to get back to the point here. . . . I don't want to get too diverse, because we're not talking about the economy at all, although it's important political talk. It's not really what we're trying to do here. To get back to the point of this, I don't buy the fact that the voters didn't like what they got

from Ronald Reagan. He's out of office.

They didn't repudiate him. His popularity has gone up. They've looked at his eight years and they liked it. They don't care about the deficit, apparently. It's maybe a minor thing with them. They were a little worried about it, or something like that, but they don't blame him for it. They don't think it's that important. In other words, they didn't want to throw him out because of the deficit.

[Senator Walter] Mondale tried that and he lost, what? forty-seven states or forty-nine states. Hey, come on. What more do you want? That's what he ran on. "I'm going to straighten up this mess. I'm going to increase your taxes, and we're going to stop this nonsense--this deficit." I almost died. I was up there at the convention when he made his great speech, his acceptance speech. I just sat there, because I'm a guy who says, "For Christ's sake, forget about the deficit. That's not it, baby. You're not going to cut it with people, because they're not concerned." They are all using their credit cards until hell won't have it. You talk about

their debts as a percentage of their gross product, hah! Everybody is in deep shit.

VASQUEZ: Let's finish up a discussion we had started last time, if we can. That had to do with the Alan Cranston [senatorial] campaign in 1968 against Max Rafferty. At the time, the press called it the most bitter political campaign in California history. It was pretty intense, and it was pretty close. Cranston won by only 40,000 votes.

Let me recap. As I understand, the strategy that you had was the exposure and defeat of demagoguery--just to go after Rafferty. When he asked you to debate, you would say, "Sure, we'll debate him after he stops lying."

HAAS: We didn't even say that. We said, "No, you can't debate a liar." We didn't say, "If he stops lying." We just put it flatly, because that cut it off. "You can't debate a liar." In other words, we refused to debate him.

VASQUEZ: Now at one point, Lyn Nofziger, Governor Reagan's press secretary, became Rafferty's communications director. Do you remember what impact or what changes came as a result of this? Was it too late?

HAAS: I don't have the foggiest notion.

VASQUEZ: He would have been your counterpart, wouldn't he?

HAAS: He was my counterpart. He was also a counterpart for the 1966 Reagan-Brown election. I mean, Lyn Nofziger was then as he is now. He was a topflight pro with an ultraconservative position and a gut fighter. He was a fighter. This [shows pamphlet] didn't come out of that campaign. Are you familiar with this?

VASQUEZ: No.

HAAS: You can take that along, and if you want to send it back, it's okay. But you can keep it. I don't care.

VASQUEZ: It's from American Opinion¹, on Alan Cranston.

HAAS: This is the kind of stuff that was circulated and has been circulated against Alan forever. This is the ultra right-wing stuff that Cranston is a secret communist, that he dealt with communists in the Office of War Information, that he hired a communist commentator, which he did.

1. Refers to a pamphlet entitled, "Alan Cranston: The Shadow in the Senate," by Gary Allen, which first appeared in an article in the 1974 issue of American Opinion magazine.

VASQUEZ: This is the kind of thing that Lyn Nofziger would do or resort to.

HAAS: Right. Now, whether any of this stuff happened or not, I don't recall. Most of that stuff just sort of. . . . We just sort of brushed it off.

VASQUEZ: I understand . . .

HAAS: Because it was so extreme, it didn't mean anything.

VASQUEZ: I understand he was able to get some mileage or some steam out of shifting the opponent; instead of having Alan Cranston, have Eldridge Cleaver, who was an ally of Alan Cranston. There were all these press statements against Eldridge Cleaver. Did that cut into you at all?

HAAS: We knocked that down so fast.

VASQUEZ: How?

HAAS: I can remember the night that we knocked it down, when this thing first surfaced. We got ten lawyers on the phone. Allan Kreps and I organized this, and we called every television station in the state of California and we said, "You will not put that on the air. That is an absolute, direct lie." This was a TV commercial and so on.

That kind of stuff that Dukakis could get smeared the way he did is incredible to old pro politicians like myself who went by the first rule of politics. That the moment anything like that surfaces, you knock it down and you knock it down hard, so that no one would touch it, basically. And that's what we did to that issue and we just totally knocked it down.

VASQUEZ: They had spent nearly \$3 million on that push.

HAAS: Really? I didn't know that.

VASQUEZ: A last push.

HAAS: We did not brush that off lightly. We went after it. No doubt, we played it as a positive. Looking back at the Dukakis campaign, Dukakis gets the same treatment and what does he do? Nothing. It took him three days or something to even come alive, to even recognize that these guys were killing him.

If I had been his press secretary and running his communications and so on, we would have put up such a scream all over the country that that would have been dropped. We would have had bishops and everybody else getting up, church people making statements what a disgraceful thing

this is for [Vice President] George Bush.

George Bush would be picketed all over the place for being a monster to bring out these racist statements like these, etc. So that was our approach to that. Whether that Eldridge Cleaver thing. . . . Don't get me wrong. Max Rafferty was a formidable candidate, and he was doing exactly what we were doing. You call it dirty politics. That's the generality that you use. We were smearing him, and he was smearing us. There's just no question that was going on.

VASQUEZ: He went further than you did?

HAAS: He did.

VASQUEZ: He crossed the line?

HAAS: Probably, because as far as I know, our "Max Rafferty's Nine Big Lies" were all documented by a team of lawyers, who wrote that document and who had every single source documented. That's what it was. It was a legal brief, this document. These lawyers were not rinky-dink lawyers. We're talking about guys from O'Melveny and Myers who were topflight lawyers. They went at it with that kind of an approach.

So when I say "smear," I don't mean in that

sense that we were trying to create lies about the guy. We were only trying to create an impression about the guy which may have been a little extreme, although his record was pretty bad. What he said, the crazy things that he said. Having [General] Curtis E. LeMay and all the rest of it, we're more or less corroborating. What we were saying was that this guy was a madman. For all I know, he was a madman.

VASQUEZ: Was it that in this case the John Bircher charge stuck where it didn't against Reagan? Was the right tool in their support . . . ?

HAAS: I don't know. I really don't know. We threw a lot of those kinds of charges at him. What stuck him, I don't know. It's hard to, again, go back and analyze. From my point of view, and I'm not saying that we did not have a gut-fighting campaign. . . .

VASQUEZ: But you see what I'm trying to get at? You had Reagan saying things like, "If we have to take care of the college campus situation with a blood bath, so be it." But he's a nice fellow when he says it. He's a nice fellow. Then you had radio statements coming out of Mr. Rafferty's mouth

about turning over the war-making power to the military and let them escalate as they see fit. "Let's put people away if they are dissidents, and this sort of thing. Yet, that hurt him.

HAAS: Let me tell you to go back and modify my statement about McLuhan a little bit. If you were going to take the McLuhan concept of the "hot" and the "cold" personality. . . . Basically, he was applying those ideas to, first of all, the generality of a certain type of media. Radio is hot. Television is cool. But we apply it to personalities, making it very clear what he meant. Rafferty was the hottest thing that I had ever seen in television.

VASQUEZ: Too hot?

HAAS: Right. People were frightened by him just as I think people are frightened by Jesse Jackson. They're not frightened by Tom Bradley. They're frightened by Jesse Jackson.

VASQUEZ: It's not the blackness? It's the. . .

HAAS: He's too hot. He's just simply too much. Well, the combination of being black and hot . . .

VASQUEZ: And young and aggressive . . .

HAAS: His whole persona is that this guy is a very

threatening person. God knows what he would do if he were president or anything like that. So, Rafferty did present that, because, I'll tell you, when you saw him on television he was really. . . . He was a believer and he was really getting across. He is the old-time religion. He was red-hot stuff. If you could go back there and look at his appearances. . . . We're talking now about his public appearances.

In those days, we were getting a lot more free media. Television covered us maybe by a factor of a 100 percent more than they presently cover a race for the United States Senate. The television coverage, political coverage, has deteriorated so badly that people are not really getting a sense of what these campaigns are all about.

VASQUEZ: Unless the campaign pays for it?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: Is it the media understanding that there is more money in it if they don't give it free coverage.

HAAS: Well, it's not that. No. Television says that politics is boring. They've got news that is not as boring that they're going to put on the air.

They're bored with politics. They think that politics is boring. I'm not talking about presidential elections. They cover presidential elections.

VASQUEZ: State and local politicians.

HAAS: Anything below the presidential race, it's all over. We used to have five or six television stations from San Francisco and Los Angeles and San Diego stationed in Sacramento with political reporters. There isn't a single one today. You can't even name a political reporter on television. You know who the political reporters on television were?

VASQUEZ: How about someone like Bill Press?

HAAS: He's just a commentator. I'm talking about a political reporter for Channel 2, Channel 4, or Channel 7. You can't name who the political editor is. Well, you could in one of them, but boy I'll tell you, I don't think she gets that much coverage either. I'm talking about Linda Douglas.

VASQUEZ: Bill Stout.

HAAS: He's a commentator. That's different. In the days back there--and I'm talking about coverage--

Tom Brokaw was a political reporter. This is how he became a star. He was a dynamite political reporter. We had a guy by the name of Bob Abernathy on the other side who was doing the same thing.

They were out there and they were the political reporters for those stations. We're talking about the big stations: ABC [American Broadcasting Company], CBS [Columbia Broadcasting Company], NBC [National Broadcasting Company], and so on. We had the same thing up in San Francisco where you had topflight political reporters. They're all gone.

VASQUEZ: So in this campaign with Rafferty, do you feel that the press was fair or . . . ?

HAAS: They were covering us. There's never been any way to make a judgment as to whether it was fair or unfair or anything like that. You'd have to set up some kind of a big jury system and run all the . . .

VASQUEZ: Do you know any cases where the media as a whole has been unfair to political candidates?

HAAS: I don't think there's any question about that. I'm sure that's happened, but by and large--I'm

speaking from all of these years of experience and coming from a journalistic background myself-- journalists are professionals. They're very sensitive to the fact that most of them are liberals. So they know they have to be careful that they don't do their liberal thing. That is to say, they have to bend over backwards to make sure that they don't give the appearance of being unfair.

VASQUEZ: They always give a balanced view, even when there isn't any balance to the view.

HAAS: Right. So at least they're desperately trying not to appear to be unfair. So the result is, by and large, they don't become unfair. I'll tell you, Nixon was right: "You won't have me around to kick around anymore." They went after that son of a bitch. I say they went after that son of a bitch because he's such a world-class son of a bitch. I don't know if you've been reading anything about him--his recent book. Jesus Christ! He's a buffoon.

VASQUEZ: But he's successful.

HAAS: I mean they went after him.

VASQUEZ: Why?

HAAS: They didn't like him at all. They didn't like him. He's a slimy son of a bitch. I hate him too. If there's anybody who is a despicable character. . . . Of course, the interesting thing is that when you look back at Nixon as a president. . . . Jesus! From my point of view God, he went to China. That was my thing. That son of a bitch had to go China, not my guys. They didn't go. We were the Cold Warriors. He was the guy who made the first step. He didn't go as far as Reagan has gone. Reagan didn't do anything to end the Cold War. The Russians have ended the Cold War.

VASQUEZ: But he'll get credit.

HAAS: Sure he will. Right, because he did respond in a proper way, from my point of view. I gave him credit, absolutely. He did it.

VASQUEZ: How do you . . .

HAAS: Nixon made the first move.

VASQUEZ: And to a country that was considered even more of a pariah than the United States, Red China.

HAAS: Right. With all of the racist overtones in addition to that. The "yellow peril" and all of that stuff.

VASQUEZ: Who was the campaign manager for the '68 Cranston campaign?

HAAS: That was Tom Moore.

VASQUEZ: Who did the fund-raising? Do you remember?

HAAS: Let's see.

VASQUEZ: Was Manning Post involved that year?

HAAS: Boy, that's a good question. Who the hell was the fund-raiser? Eugene L. Wyman was involved.

VASQUEZ: Bart Litton?

HAAS: Who?

VASQUEZ: Bart Litton.

HAAS: Well, he was one of our givers [contributors], but he never assumed the responsibility for that sort of thing. I really don't remember who the hell it was. We might have . . .

VASQUEZ: What was your role, exactly?

HAAS: I was the press secretary.

VASQUEZ: As a campaign, give me an outline if you will. This might be one way to do it. Compare the 1968 and the 1974 campaign. One was easier, I would imagine, than the other. What was your role in those campaigns? Was it the same role?

HAAS: Well, in the '68 campaign. . . . Was I the press secretary in 1974? I'm not even too sure I

was. By this time, I was getting out of that business, and we might have had somebody else as press secretary. But in effect, I was press secretary in absentia or whatever in 1974. I don't think I was the press secretary in 1974.

VASQUEZ: In 1968, what did you do?

HAAS: In '68, I wrote five hundred press releases on every subject under the sun and five hundred press memos.

[End Tape 6, Side A]

[Begin Tape 6, Side B]

HAAS: The press secretary in that era and just before that era was probably a lot different than the press secretary is today. You take a guy who was the press secretary for Leo McCarthy when he ran for governor the last time. I'm not too sure that was the title. He was called the "press secretary," a guy by the name of Kam Kuwata, who worked for me and who is an entirely different animal these days, because the press secretary's role has changed a lot.

In those days. . . . You asked what I did. Okay. In that era, the press secretary was the eyes and the ears and the mouthpiece for the

candidate and the campaign when that was required, instantly. Now, the eyes and the ears are required because the press secretary has to stay on top of what is happening. We operated in those days as if every moment was a newsworthy moment or conceivably could be a newsworthy moment. That is to say, you had to be aware of what the other guys were doing. And we had a spy out there checking on what he was doing.

VASQUEZ: Was it someone from the other campaign?

HAAS: Not in the campaign.

VASQUEZ: No?

HAAS: We might have had some spies in the campaign, but we had a fake radio reporter who was covering Rafferty's press conferences and that sort of thing?

VASQUEZ: And would call in to you?

HAAS: Right. Call in instantly and give me a report of what he said in the thing and so on. So that when Rafferty held a press conference. . . . And I assume Lyn Nofziger was doing the same thing, that was just standard practice. I didn't look around.

VASQUEZ: Did you ever know that there was someone in your

campaign that was a spy?

HAAS: We just assumed it. We never caught anybody, but you assumed that somebody was in it and that they were in the press conferences. It never bothered me.

VASQUEZ: It's just a matter of time before he even . . .

HAAS: No, it was already happening, so don't worry about it. It doesn't make any difference anyway. We have a different view of things in the Democratic politics. We really don't give a shit, because that's not the way we play.

As far as Nofziger and I are concerned, if I called him up and said, "Hey, just leave my guy alone, we've got somebody out there, and I'll leave your guy alone," it would have been fine. In fact, we wouldn't even have to come to that kind of agreement, because it never bothered me one way or another.

VASQUEZ: So you had someone to monitor each one of the press conferences?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: Did you have someone that monitored all the press and what the press was saying, to keep the pulse?

HAAS: That was a job that we did internally, basically,

although we had campaign structures all over the state whose job was to call me instantly whatever was on the front page of the San Diego Tribune or whatever.

VASQUEZ: That affected you and your campaigns?

HAAS: Right, so we had to know instantly. The big stories we were getting anyway, because we subscribed to the wire services. And I spent half of my life watching the wire services, and I spent the other half of my life watching television. I had in front of me a television console with three panels, so that I always had the three major stations on at all times, and I [would] click from one to the other. The minute some politics came on, I would zip to that station, and to this one, and so on.

Meanwhile, I was writing my press releases and writing speeches. The point that I'm trying to get across here is that this is a highly activist, highly instantaneous response type of a situation.

VASQUEZ: It seems pretty sophisticated for the time.

HAAS: Well, these were statewide campaigns and they were big campaigns. We spent a lot of money. I had a

fairly good sized staff of people who were helping me do all the stuff.

VASQUEZ: How big was the staff around that campaign for '68?

HAAS: Right in the headquarters, paid people? Maybe twenty-five. Then we would have people in San Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, maybe.

VASQUEZ: Could you run that kind of an intense campaign any more without professionals and only with volunteers?

HAAS: No. You couldn't do it then, either. In fact, with the exception of one guy who is now Cranston's press secretary, I wouldn't let a volunteer into my office even back in those days, simply because it's too difficult. The job, first of all, is too professional and it's too intense for a casual volunteer to come in and try to be a part of the machine, [rather] than just licking stamps and that sort of thing. There was a lot of shitwork that was done by volunteers--lots.

VASQUEZ: I ask you because a lot of people I've interviewed harken back to the days of the fully volunteer campaign organizations and work crews. They feel that good politics went out the window with the

campaign volunteers. Once you start paying people, corruption sets in.

HAAS: This has to be separated out. What they're talking about is organizational politics. When we had organizational politics, when we had precincts and precinct workers, you are talking about thousands of volunteers.

And you have, in Pacific Palisades, a local headquarters. We still have that here. This is an activist town. Pacific Palisades takes its Democratic politics and Republican politics seriously. We have a big ex-Bank of America office right up here in the main part of town, a huge office. At any given time, fifteen, twenty-five volunteers, and then when you need them, you got fifty volunteers.

In those days, the. . . . And that's what [Edmund G.] Jerry Brown, Jr., is trying to revive and Alan Cranston is trying to revive.

VASQUEZ: We've seen in recent races--take [the race for] mayor of San Francisco, a successful candidate, was able to mobilize the whole precinct-type shoe-leather machine.

HAAS: But this is a local election. A statewide

election, you can't do that. You're going to spend millions of dollars just keeping a structure in place, just providing them with materials and computer printouts and the rest of this stuff, and so on. You're going to be spending millions on that.

Now, in politics, theoretically you should do everything. You should do the organizational work. But when television came along, you had a choice. You had a choice, and the choice was no choice at all. You went to TV. You said, "Screw the organizational side of things. We ain't got the money for that. It doesn't pay off. It's useless. It doesn't get that many votes. We can't prove it. We've got to put money on television."

VASQUEZ: Was that a mistake?

HAAS: Well, I think it's part of the evolution of politics. I don't think people sat around consciously and decided to discard participatory politics. First of all, most politicians still believe in it, because they have to believe in it. At the assembly level, it's important. Even at the city council level. . . . These are big

districts compared to an assembly district, let's say. Assembly district is somewhat manageable.

Tom Hayden doesn't call me up everyday checking to see if I'm okay and all. He's my assemblyman. Hey, he has the same problem that everybody does in politics: trying to relate to 250,000 people. You can't get around to talking to 250,000 people.

It's tough, but there's no alternative. You must do organizational work at that level, because you're not going to get television. You can't buy television. You can't spend \$50,000 for a spot where only 2 percent of your voters are going to see the spot. The rest of it is being shown somewhere else. You can't buy radio spots, and you sure wouldn't spend money on newspaper advertising.

VASQUEZ: What works? Computer direct mailing?

HAAS: Right. So it's all direct mail and it's all organizational. So, yes indeed. At that level, they still do that.

VASQUEZ: How much were you spending?

HAAS: But even that is only a shadow of its former self. It used to be that when you talked about

registration and you talked about get out the vote, you're talking about getting everybody out on the street. Lu Haas, the press secretary, he hit the street on election day and so on. You emptied the headquarters to get out the vote. You were out there in the streets doing that thing. People believed that to the bitter end. I say bitter end because I haven't seen it for a long time.

VASQUEZ: When was the end?

HAAS: Nineteen seventy-two, [Senator George S.] McGovern. McGovern covered every precinct in the state of California.

VASQUEZ: What did stop them?

HAAS: I suppose that was the total collapse of the liberal movement. It died.

VASQUEZ: With McGovern?

HAAS: Yeah. It died with McGovern, and the "yuppies" became what they are today--"baby boomers" and whatever. And that type of politics disappeared. I use that roughly as a date. It probably died sooner than that. He just confirmed the death of it.

VASQUEZ: I want to talk a little about the McGovern

campaign, because I know you were involved. Before that there was another campaign that is very interesting. That's the 1970 campaign of Jesse Unruh for governor, against Ronald Reagan. What was your role in that?

HAAS: I was the press secretary.

VASQUEZ: Who was the campaign secretary? Who was the campaign director at the time?

HAAS: The campaign director in the primary, interestingly, was John Van de Kamp.

VASQUEZ: But he got changed, didn't he?

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: Why?

HAAS: Well, he was not what you would call a pro.

VASQUEZ: He was pretty young at the time.

HAAS: Yeah, he was young. He was inexperienced and he was not a pro. He was obviously interested in politics, or he wouldn't have gotten that job. That's where I first got acquainted with him. I came in right in the transition period.

VASQUEZ: So you weren't involved in the primary?

HAAS: No, I wasn't, and in fact, I came in. . . .

VASQUEZ: Where did you come from?

HAAS: I came out of the Cranston office. I went into a

number of political campaigns.

VASQUEZ: Let's stay with this one.

HAAS: Yes. Because that was part of my continual on-the-job training and my expertise in statewide politics. I was, on the one hand valuable for Jesse Unruh, because he knew I was the number one press secretary in the state of California. There just wasn't anybody with my experience and my ability. I say that calculatedly, because, as you know me, you know what a modest man I really am.

VASQUEZ: Phil Schott takes over the campaign. Is that right?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: Tell me about him.

HAAS: I don't remember a hell of a lot about him.

VASQUEZ: He was a real estate developer?

HAAS: Right, but he was a political activist and an old friend of Jesse Unruh from way back. I don't know much about him. I don't remember much about him. There's a lot of memorable things about the Unruh campaign. The most memorable thing had to do with an issue.

VASQUEZ: Which was it?

HAAS: I think I recounted that to you in the last time,

which was the start of our campaign when we went out to this home out in Hollywood.

VASQUEZ: Henry Salvatori's home?

HAAS: Henry Salvatori's home, and the issue was property taxes.

VASQUEZ: Right.

HAAS: I say that only because six years later the Democratic party got the shit kicked out of us on this issue. We've been suffering from it ever since.

VASQUEZ: You got on it too late.

HAAS: We never did it. No, we never did it. We never did what I said to McGovern in 1972. In 1970, we learned that it was an issue, and in 1972 I was still screaming--not to McGovern because it wasn't his issue, but I was giving him the background. The key issue in 1972. . . . I have the thirty-page memo that I wrote on California issues. The key issue in 1972--because I had my memory refreshed on this many times through my own memo to brief him--was property taxes. This looms as such a huge thing given what was happening in politics over all these years where we are now, this conservative, antitax stance and the failure

of the Democrats to sponsor this one when it was their baby. Jesse Unruh invented it!

VASQUEZ: And in fact, by 1970, Jesse Unruh was talking about the shortcomings of the Democratic party and how the Democratic party was going to have to change. Wasn't he saying things like, "We've got to balance the concerns of the majority with the concerns of the minority. We've got to go after issues that the middle class is concerned about, like taxes."

HAAS: He never stated it in those kinds of terms. We stated it in very positive terms, that property taxes were just out of sight, and by God we had to do something about it.

VASQUEZ: And then there was a . . .

HAAS: That was a promise, a Democratic promise. We didn't say it in an invidious or in a comparison sort of way, that the Democratic party is not standing this and so on. What we were saying was Ronald Reagan didn't stand for it. We were running against him and his rich friends who were benefiting from this tax structure.

VASQUEZ: You even had it calculated as to how many dollars per tax California was going to contribute to the

"Salvatori relief" on that, as you called it. I read some of that literature.

Tell me about the context. By 1970, Reagan's been in four years. The war continues and it continues to be a major issue. There's already a slowing down of the economy, not only at the state level but at the national level. What other contextual matters helped this campaign?

HAAS: It didn't matter.

VASQUEZ: It didn't?

HAAS: No, it didn't matter, because the issue was Jesse Unruh, and to a great, minimal extent it was Ronald Reagan.

VASQUEZ: So, regardless of what Jesse raised, was he unable to overcome his image?

HAAS: He was the issue.

VASQUEZ: Why was he the issue . . . ?

HAAS: And he started out with that handicap, and I disagreed with him. He started out to admit the handicap and to say, "That's all beyond me. That's all passed now. I'm a new person."

VASQUEZ: His was calculated.

HAAS: I was saying, "This is bullshit. You can't get

away with it."

VASQUEZ: Were you crafting the image and the language?

HAAS: No. No, I wasn't, because I'm going to tell you now what we did on opening day. What we did on opening day was, first of all, the thing that got all the spectacular headlines--as it should have, because it was a spectacular event: Going to the modest home in Hollywood, standing out there with the owner of the house with big boards saying, "What are his taxes worth?" and then going up to Henry Salvatori's. And then Henry comes out and says, "What the hell are you doing here, Jesse?" in his tennis gear.

VASQUEZ: And a few choice words as I understand.

HAAS: Yes. Wow, was he outraged, and so on. It was just so funny in retrospect.

VASQUEZ: Did it work, or did Reagan turn it against you?

HAAS: Oh, it worked, of course, because Jesse looked like the old Jesse. Anyway, what happened before we went out? We had a press conference in the headquarters. I mean we had coverage. In those days, like I was telling you, they were covering us. This was big stuff. We had ten cameras. We had national press there. We had a huge bus so

we could take the press with us on this tour. So here we are on this big press conference. And it was a biggie. And Jesse comes out, and there are three big panels, huge panels, much bigger than that [points]. These were like six-foot-tall panels. Each one was covered. There were three panels. Behind the panels were photographs: A photograph of "Big Daddy," 265 pounds, or 285 pounds, or whatever he was; another photograph of the slimmed down Jesse Unruh; and a third picture of [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy.

VASQUEZ: Why Bobby Kennedy?

HAAS: Well, because of the mantle. . . . We were playing on something that was still in the hearts of a lot of people, and he was very close to Bobby. There is no question about that. Whether it was ridiculous on how he could attach his star to that guy. . . . You see, he was trying to attach his star to that guy, because he was dealing with "Big Daddy." The statement that he's making at this press conference as he pulls down these things--what a dramatic effect--was "Big Daddy" is dead. There is a new Jesse Unruh. Here's the new Jesse Unruh. This is what

Jesse Unruh believes in and these are his values, and the Bobby Kennedy thing comes out. That's the setting. Now, nobody would do something like that without acknowledging the fact that Jesse was "Big Daddy." That was not a very pleasant thing for a press secretary or anybody else to have to deal with. The guys who did these and I disagreed with it.

VASQUEZ: Who were they?

HAAS: Allan Kreps and Michael Kaye. Michael Kaye is a very creative television guy, an advertising expert who got interested in politics and loved it. He spent a lot of time in politics, including our campaigns, too. The last thing he did, I guess, was for Senator [Bill] Bradley back in the New Jersey. But since then, he's been involved in a lot of politics. He's gotten in and out of political campaigns, because I think he throws up his hand and says. . . . Anyway, he's a very, very creative guy, and this was basically his invention.

Jesse was very concerned about doing the traditional thing in politics. He didn't want to look like what he called a "cigar store

Indian." He had this concept that this was what politicians looked like: They looked like cigar store Indians. Unfortunately, Jesse. . . . He should have been happy to look like it, because he was one ugly son of a bitch. He was a man with an oppressive persona. Obviously, it was so ingrained in the minds of the voters compared to this suave, good-looking, clever guy like Ronald Reagan, that he'd better come up with something else.

VASQUEZ: How did he come across to you?

HAAS: Reagan?

VASQUEZ: No. No.

HAAS: Jesse?

VASQUEZ: Unruh. Was he too hot for TV?

HAAS: No, he wasn't too hot for TV. He was just right for TV.

VASQUEZ: Why wasn't he able to use it to his advantage?

HAAS: I don't know that it was his TV image so much as it was the reputation that had built up around his image. The reputation of a typical politician. The wheeling, dealing, typical "Big Daddy," boss politician. All of the negatives of politics hung around his neck like an

albatross. He had all of them going for him, most of them with some justification.

Jesse was a dirt-hard liberal guy. I'm not diminishing his Democratic roots or anything like that. I'm just talking about a pro dealing with what his problem was, versus Ronald Reagan and versus the times.

Whatever the times were, they obviously were not our times--that is, Democratic times. The wheel had turned, and Reagan spelled the beginning of the end for us as far as statewide Democratic politics was concerned. It was all over. It was all over with the defeat of Pat Brown, and we were seeing the end of the Democratic era here in California.

VASQUEZ: Didn't Jesse anticipate or recognize that at this time? Did he do anything to try to change the discourse, the Democratic discourse in this campaign?

HAAS: Obviously, he was the wrong guy at the wrong place at the wrong time. He was not a good candidate for us. He just wasn't. I admired Jesse a lot for what he did as speaker and all the rest. His direction in the Democratic party

I think was accurate, and he showed his gut-level instincts of being on the right issue, the tax issue, and so on. Incidentally, we took that issue and we went through the whole campaign with it. We never let up, and we stood up in front of insurance company buildings. We did media event after media event all over the place. We went to oil companies and insurance companies. We'd say, "Here's an insurance company. Look at this building, a thirty-story building. The insurance company owns this and writes this whole building off, because there's something in the state law that says if the insurance company has . . .

VASQUEZ: Its headquarters in California . . .

HAAS: . . . its headquarters in California, the building is exempt."

VASQUEZ: It was only repealed not too long ago.

HAAS: Yeah. It just drew all kinds of crazy things in the tax law. They were crazy. They were all done by special interests. Most of them were put in there by Democrats. After all, it's been a Democratic state for all these years.

VASQUEZ: So even though you had Jesse Unruh writing. . . . He wrote a paper in 1968 in which he laid out

these new politics as he saw them.¹ You don't see that reflected in the campaign of 1970. The issues were the tax questions. He was attacking Reagan's tax reform package. At the same time that he was criticizing labor for, in his own words, "being less progressive, sometimes, in its positions than the National Association of Manufacturers." He was very much for public employee's right to strike in this campaign. He supported abortion, the right to abortion.

HAAS: He was a classical liberal.

VASQUEZ: A State Environmental Quality Control Board. . . .
These are all liberal issues?

HAAS: Absolutely liberal issues.

VASQUEZ: He was running these . . .

HAAS: The guy thought from two levels though, see. First of all, he looked upon himself and with some justification, as being the great reformer of the legislature. This was his proud achievement: that he reformed the legislature and upgraded the political process and the

1. Jesse M. Unruh, "A Politician Views the Issues," unpublished.

political system, based on making the legislature a more professional body--at the expense of the taxpayers, obviously, because he spent a lot of money on staffs, research, and . . .

VASQUEZ: And at the expense also of the citizen politician or the citizen involvement, the amateur.

HAAS: Right. I think it was a sound concept. I'm not saying this in a critical way. What I'm trying to do is to separate it out from whatever claims that he might have been making about being a reformer and all the rest of it. There wasn't any reform outside of the tax thing. That was reform. That was the reform issue. The rest of that stuff was sort of inside baseball.

Nobody really gave a shit about what he was doing to upgrade the legislatures. People don't trust politicians anyway. They probably thought he's just feathering their nests, and so on, if they were cynical about it, but they never really cared that much. It never became an issue. They all said, "He's probably doing a good thing there, and he is serious about being a legislature. These guys are serious people. They should have more staff, and they should be

able to stand up to the governor," and so on. So nobody really objected to any of that, but that doesn't cut any votes.

Here was Ronald Reagan who's been talking about line-item vetoes and so on. Now, that's inside government. Maybe we should have line-item vetoes for the president for all I know. I don't know, although most of the presidents that we've had, I wouldn't trust the sons of bitches, so I'm not too keen about it right at the moment. If one of my guys got elected. . . . Maybe he should, but I'm not interested in cutting anything out of the budget. I'm trying to increase the budget.

The point I'm trying to make is that whatever claims that he was making along those lines were only to make him upgrade his image as being a thoughtful leader, governmental leader. He was a political scientist, and he was trying to upgrade the whole realm of government and so on, which offset that whole "Big Daddy" image that he had. "Big Daddy" was something else. "Big Daddy" was the boss, which didn't go with that reform movement and all that. He had an

ambivalence there, a dichotomy which I'm sure he never really did resolve, although he worked all of his political life at producing results at what he did. And he did produce. Even in that lousy job of [state] treasurer, he turned that into something. He had that kind of ability to do that.

VASQUEZ: What was the campaign's strategy?

HAAS: The campaign strategy was to once again try to paint Ronald Reagan as a guy who was not for the common people. He was protecting the rights of the wealthy, and the people behind him were big oil companies and the power structure and all that. We were coming in as the dirt farmer from Texas and so on. We were going to reform the tax system and get fairness back and at the same time protect all those rights of the people who were on our side: the blacks, the Chicanos, and everybody else.

VASQUEZ: So it was still a "New Deal" coalition?

HAAS: Right. Just doing the typical Democratic thing, which is all we ever knew how to do and which is all we know how to do today.

VASQUEZ: And it didn't go?

HAAS: It didn't work and it hasn't worked for a long time. It wasn't just Jesse that wasn't able to make it work. Nobody's been able to make it work.

VASQUEZ: Cranston's been able to make it work?

HAAS: Yes, but he's not running for governor. Senator. . . . People sort out these things. When you run for governor you are visible, believe me. People pay attention to you. They know that a governor is important, and a senator does not do anything that important.

VASQUEZ: Tell me . . .

HAAS: That's correct too. That's a correct evaluation. Once again, the voters justify it. I'm on the side of the voter. I think the voter's right most of the time. They're right in making that kind of a judgment.

VASQUEZ: Which is?

HAAS: Which is that a governor is important and a senator is unimportant. A senator's got one vote. A governor does really big stuff. He vetoes the shit out of anything he wants to. He appoints judges. He appoints the whole governmental structure, and he has a voice that's

out there every single minute. He just goes like that [snaps finger] and the press rush into his office. A senator can go like that and nothing happens. Believe me, I know that, because I've been around a senator and I am a pro at getting attention.

VASQUEZ: Tell me, how much did Sam Yorty hurt Jesse Unruh's campaign?

HAAS: I don't know. I'm not aware of him hurting the campaign. In those days, we tended not to pay attention to a lot of that stuff, because we couldn't do anything about it. So you didn't pay attention to a Sam Yorty. You ignored him.

VASQUEZ: Let me make one correction. I think a while ago I said on tape that Art Seltzer took over the campaign. It was Phil Schott who took over the campaign.

HAAS: Right, Phil Schott.

VASQUEZ: Art Seltzer was a supporter and some of the help who raised money.

HAAS: Right. Well, that's the reason I didn't remember him. Of course, I know Phil Schott very well. When you said Seltzer, I thought it didn't sound right.

VASQUEZ: Did you employ any of the advertisement companies, groups, or consultants?

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: Hall and Levine Advertising, for example . . .

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: . . . that you used in 1972?

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: Spencer/Roberts was on the other side for Reagan, right?

HAAS: Yes, they were. No, I never got involved in that, and I was especially out of sync in this particular campaign, because I fought Michael Kaye on a lot of these issues, and I fought Allan Kreps on a lot of these issues. In other words, I was on the outside from a strategy point of view, because I didn't go along. . . . I went along with the tax strategy. That I liked very much. I thought that was great, but I didn't go along with a lot of the other strategy of the campaign.

I was a very outspoken, tough staff person. In other words, I never cringed at fighting for my point of view. My point of view right from the beginning was opposed to all the stuff we

were doing. I don't remember what it was, but there was one battle right after another with Michael Kaye and Allan Kreps. Allan Kreps was a very dominating, tough guy who tried to put everybody down under his thumb. He couldn't get away with that with me, because I was just as tough as he was. So we had a lot of run-ins, but there was no question about who was in. I may express my opinion and so on, but he was in charge.

VASQUEZ: What happened to the speeches you wrote for Jesse? Did you write speeches for Jesse?

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: Did they get changed?

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: No?

HAAS: Yes. I never had problems with speeches.

VASQUEZ: You were able to have your work reflect what the dominant campaign theory was at the time?

HAAS: Yeah. What we were doing on a day-to-day basis when there wasn't really any real problem about that. The big issues always dealt with what was going to be on television and so on. We didn't really have any. . . . There was nothing as far

as I know about the approach of our campaign on a day-to-day basis. It wasn't any different than any Democratic campaign that I had ever been in.

VASQUEZ: So you had no problem. Even though you disagreed with certain strategies in the campaign, you had no trouble justifying or squaring your role in writing language that would be acceptable to the candidate even though you didn't believe in the concept?

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: Given that, how does a political functionary--for lack of a better word right at the moment--like yourself, a political manager, player, image-maker. . . . How do you affect policy?

HAAS: It's a constant struggle when it's a struggle. When it's a struggle, because it's not always a struggle. With a campaign like Jesse Unruh's, it's a struggle to begin with, because you realize what you're up against.

You've got a tough proposition here, a very popular governor and a trend that was already evident against the statewide Democrats. You always have to keep sorting things out. You've always got to make sure that when you say the

trend's against Democrats, you're talking about statewide vote, not at the local levels, because we were still in good shape locally. It was always the statewide votes, the vote for president, the vote for governor. That's all. And senate.

As you know, the great exception was Alan Cranston. He was a great exception. Otherwise, we were losing our ass in everything in sight, and we still are. It's a miracle we didn't lose the last time. It wasn't a struggle, but political campaigns are, almost by definition, intense. People who get into it are intense people. You're competitive. You're fighters. And you have strong beliefs. So, there's always this testing of ideas and the struggle for how the strategy of the campaign is going to be.

From the basic ideological point of view I've never had much of a problem, because most of the guys I've worked for. . . . I wouldn't work for an asshole. If I thought he was off base from my way of thinking, I wouldn't work for him. I'm not a gun for hire. I'm not a professional, paid political consultant [that],

when somebody calls me up, I've got to work for the guy because I've got to make money at it. I never had to do it. I always had the luxury of working for people that I believed in.

VASQUEZ: And you had no problem working for Jesse Unruh?

HAAS: No, even though way back--and I'm talking about way back--ideologically, I was very much opposed to a fundamental belief that he had that went around the whole business of the influence of the Communist party in Democratic politics and in the labor movement.

VASQUEZ: He was very concerned with that?

HAAS: He was. I was a victim of it. I was on the other side. That actually started down at the University of Southern California when he was a hotshot in Vets and I was with the left-wing American Veterans Committee, AVC. I think it was called American Veterans Committee.

VASQUEZ: What were the differences between the two groups?

HAAS: Communism. We were commies. The AVC were a bunch of lefties. Lefties, forget it. Commie sympathizers, and so on. We wanted to end the Cold War.

VASQUEZ: This is in the early and mid-fifties, right?

- HAAS: Yeah. Hey, you've got to remember the time that this was going on. I'm sure that Jesse Unruh looks back and wonders himself. Even if he's up in heaven somewhere, he's still thinking about how crazy those years were. That was a burning issue within labor, within the Democratic party, and within society, generally. This piece of literature says, "This man is a communist."
- VASQUEZ: But by 1970, you had worked most of that out?
- HAAS: Oh, well, yeah. By that time it was a dead thing. Jesse wasn't going around pointing fingers. Because he would have never hired me-- because he must have had the book on me by that time--if he was concerned about it. I wasn't concerned about it, because that was in the past.
- VASQUEZ: Well, could any Democrat have beaten Reagan?
- HAAS: No. Oh God, no. I don't think so.
- VASQUEZ: So out of the Democrats who were available, Jesse made the best choice.
- HAAS: Well, that's neither here nor there.
- VASQUEZ: The times had changed?
- HAAS: No, it's neither here nor there because we have a primary system and he got chosen. That was no problem. And nobody was in the Democratic

primary in this state unless he is a "liberal."
You have to be a liberal to win the primary.

VASQUEZ: Did you have trouble raising money? Do you remember?

HAAS: There wasn't any money problem.

[End Tape 6, Side B]

[Begin Tape 7, Side A]

VASQUEZ: Now, in 1972, you went to work with the McGovern campaign. What was your role there?

HAAS: I was the press secretary once again. That's what I've done in every single campaign. I was the press secretary.

VASQUEZ: What was the context? What was the strategy?

HAAS: Well, first of all, when you're running a statewide campaign for presidential election, you are at the mercy of the national operation. There was very little you could do on your own.

There was a big difference, though, on the McGovern campaign, because we had this army of volunteers--an army of liberal volunteers. I stress liberal, because this is the left-wing core of the Democratic party that was doing this campaign. People like myself and other people who were doing the other aspects of the campaign

wouldn't be classified like these activists were. These were the remnants of the last enraged antiwar people.

VASQUEZ: What kind of organizations did they come out of?

HAAS: These were all what you call people right off the street--grass-roots people who came through the Vietnam War years and who were consumed only by one issue, which was the war. And McGovern came in there and that's what he was all about, that's what I was all about, and that's what everybody was all about in that campaign. So it didn't make any difference.

From one point of view, I say we were at the mercy of the national campaign. I'm not to set any strategy or anything like that. First of all, what was the strategy? The strategy was to run against the war. What else was there? He was the peace candidate. We were the peace people and so on. You didn't need a strategy. There wasn't anything like that.

VASQUEZ: But you weren't running against Nixon? You weren't running against [Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger? You weren't running against a warmonger?

HAAS: No. So there was no problem with what you were going to do. The problem for California, which has always been a problem in national politics, is they know they're going to lose California. Therefore, it's hard to get the man here. In other words, the key is to say, "Hey, we're California. We want to win California. You've got to help us win California. The only way you can win California is to get the candidate here." The struggle is always over the schedule, and the struggle is with the people who are running the campaigns back there saying, "For God's sake, we want to win California. We think we can do it with this antiwar thing," and so on. So that's sort of the framework of that.

What's interesting about the 1972 campaign was that this was the last hurrah of the antiwar movement. It was the last hurrah for the politics of that particular era that we were talking about, which was grass-roots politics.

I would come into the press operation. I'd come in at 7:00 in the morning just to make sure I didn't miss anything like that, and so on. The "peanut butter gang". . . . I call them the

"peanut butter gang."

VASQUEZ: Who was that?

HAAS: They were the activists. They had been up all night long running the mimeograph machines. During the day we had to run the mimeograph machines and the real hard-core activists were in there running the mimeograph machines all night long. I'd come in and the paper was piled up in the ceilings, and I'd reach over there and take a look at it and say, "What the hell have they done tonight?" What they've done tonight was another antiwar gathering someplace that they were using our machinery and all the rest of it to promote the antiwar thing whether or not it had anything to do with our campaign. There was a lot of that going on.

VASQUEZ: Is that right?

HAAS: In fact, we had one shocking episode. When I came in, I looked at this flier and I said, "Who in the fuck authorized this goddamned flier?" I mean it was outrageously to the left. I've forgotten exactly what it was, but it had no place in our campaign. These were really the far-out types who were doing these things. I

came charging into the campaign headquarters--the manager's office. Who the hell was it? Is it possible it was . . .

VASQUEZ: Miles Ruben?

HAAS: No, no. He's . . .

VASQUEZ: He was state coordinator.

HAAS: He was a big fund-raiser type. I'm talking about the operative. The guy who was running the campaign. Anyway, it was a guy like Phil Schott, or someone like that. It was possible he was involved in our campaign.

VASQUEZ: Could be.

HAAS: I don't know. I said, "What the hell is going on? Who put this thing out there? We're going to catch all kinds of flak on this goddamned thing." Sure enough, shit, man, it was 8:00 in the morning or 9:00 by this time and the phones are starting to ring in the press room demanding to know what the hell was going on: "Was the McGovern campaign going crazy? We got this flier . . ." and so on.

VASQUEZ: Do you remember what the flier said?

HAAS: No, I don't. It was just one of those crazy incidents which I was going to deal with in my

way, and the campaign manager knew about this thing and he was totally off base. It was just not anything that we were going to support, and I said, "Come on in and I'll give you a statement." So the television guys came in one right after another, and I stood up in front of the television cameras and repudiated what was the fact. I said, "This was not authorized." I lied because it had been authorized. I said, "We will not put up with this kind of stuff. We do not support this meeting," or whatever the hell it was.

All I'm doing is illustrating a point here, the point being that's what the McGovern campaign was all about. These red-hot antiwar activists These were the far-out types that were really at the core of the antiwar movement. You're listening to a guy who marched in Washington, D.C., just four or five years before that. I was a marcher. I was the press secretary for [Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare] Wilbur J. Cohen. I was marching against my president, Lyndon Johnson, and I was supposed to be working for the guy. Nobody shut

me up on the war, so that was not an issue, and I didn't care if I got fired or if I got caught.

So I wasn't really, exactly disturbed about it, but there are some things you do in a campaign and some things you don't do. I knew that was going to hurt us, so I had to repudiate it even though it had been authorized. All I was using it for was to illustrate what the political climate was and what this campaign was all about. This campaign was simply this enormous consuming interest in ending that war.

VASQUEZ: The campaign hired the firm of Hall and Levine, the advertising firm, and they set up, according to one history of the period, something called the "Task Force M," a special group to plan and coordinate all broadcast and print media strategies. How did you work with that group? Do you remember?

HAAS: I've never heard of it. It sounds kookie to me.

VASQUEZ: Is that right? Did California locals have a say in what was going on?

HAAS: I had nothing to do with any of that media stuff and so on?

VASQUEZ: What did you do?

HAAS: I would not have been involved. I was never consulted or anything like that.

VASQUEZ: What did you do?

HAAS: I did press work, to the extent that you can do any kind of press work in a national campaign. There's not much you can do, because unless you have the candidate, there's nothing to do. You can't write press releases about our appointing somebody chairman of the Orange County campaign, right, or we opened up an office someplace.

VASQUEZ: So without the candidate, there's no campaign?

HAAS: There's no campaign. You don't do a hell of a lot, and for that reason I try to stay out of presidential campaigns in California, where historically we've been screwed.

VASQUEZ: How effective was Charles Guggenheim in this campaign? Didn't he make some video spots?

HAAS: In our campaign?

VASQUEZ: Yes.

HAAS: I've forgotten whether he did or not. One of the big media things that we did was very effective. We had a telethon. That was a fantastically successful telethon. I assume that Guggenheim put that on.

I don't recall how that all came about and so on, but this was sort of a grass roots, telethon type of thing. We had all kinds of movie stars. You could get almost anybody in those days, because the war issue was so hot. We put on what was really a fabulous telethon to raise money, and for two weeks after that telethon our mailroom was just loaded with bags and bags of mail with dollar bills in it, fifty-cent pieces, \$5 bills, \$500 bills.

We raised a tremendous amount of money on that telethon. It was sort of a shocking display of the power of the issue on the one hand and also television on the other hand. Now, telethons have not been used in politics very often. I don't know why that is. It hasn't caught on. We've done a few.

VASQUEZ: Maybe because of the cost and it takes so much time. It's very long.

HAAS: That's right. It's very costly, but you see, you do it on a cheap station.

VASQUEZ: Are there cheap stations for political campaigns?

HAAS: Yeah. There are cheap stations out there.

VASQUEZ: The local ones? Smaller ones?

HAAS: Yeah, like Channel 13 [KCOP-TV], Channel 9 [KJH-TV], or whatever a cheap station is. Think about how many channels there are. Some of them are really cheap. However, you have to advertise and get free publicity around your telethon, otherwise, nobody's going to watch it. They don't watch those junk stations, right?

You can put it on some really rinky-dink television station, like maybe the Spanish-language station and so on. It wouldn't make any difference. Everybody can tune into it. If you can get the publicity and take out the ads to make sure people are watching the thing. So the big key was to get publicity around that and so on. But it did demonstrate the power of the issue, which was tremendous. Incidentally, it was not reflected, obviously, in the results of that election.

VASQUEZ: Why not?

HAAS: I'll tell you, there are a lot of disappointing things in politics. The failure of this issue is one of the crushing things in my life, in the sense that I was consumed as a pacifist-type person, an antiwar person.

My whole being was to be in politics, was to fight the Cold War, the concept of the Cold War, the notion that we were going to continue this enormous military buildup. That was my whole reason for being in politics. So when the McGovern campaign came along and the antiwar movement came along, I'm out there marching, being a part of it.

VASQUEZ: Why wasn't the Democratic party able to turn that issue into a winning issue?

HAAS: I don't know. I am absolutely to this day dumbfounded.

VASQUEZ: Let me ask you one more thing and then we'll move on back to state politics. How much did the fiasco of the vice-presidential choice of [Thomas F.] Tom Eagleton and his pulling out--and the offer [being made] to Edward Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, Abraham Ribicoff, Reuben Askew, and all of them turning him [McGovern] down, and finally ending up with [R.] Sargent Shriver. How much did that hurt the campaign?

HAAS: Occasionally you run across a press secretary in a presidential campaign from a big state who complains that there's nothing to do in a

presidential campaign and it's a waste of time. Occasionally you ask a question that shows how wrong you are. I was sitting there watching television. This is what I was paid to do. I had three television sets when this story breaks back in Saint Louis, right? Our guy [candidate] is up in South Dakota in isolation. They're up there having their big campaign strategy, kicking off the campaign and all the rest of it.

VASQUEZ: Were there any California people up there, do you know?

HAAS: Yes.

VASQUEZ: Who would have been there?

HAAS: Fred Dutton. The reason why I remember is because he's the story. I was watching this and I'm seeing this Eagleton on television, and this whole thing explodes right there in front of the television set.

The minute it was over, I grab the phone. We knew where the candidate was, and I got on the phone to South Dakota, somewhere up there. It was in the north. They were having a big strategy meeting up there in the resort. They were closeted. They were not to be disturbed or

anything like that, because they were in big meetings.

Incidentally, Eagleton was heading for Los Angeles. He was having a press conference in Saint Louis, and then he was heading for Los Angeles. So I got on the phone, and I knew I was going to have a bit of a problem because I didn't know that they were in isolation up there. So I got on the phone and I got the operator of this resort.

I said, "I need to speak to either Senator McGovern or Fred Dutton instantly. This is an emergency, and this is Senator Alan Cranston of California calling." I had no qualms about what I was doing. I knew that some Joe Blow from Los Angeles might not be able to get through, but Senator Alan Cranston of California put me through immediately.

Zing! I got Fred Dutton on the phone and I said, "Fred, I don't know if you know what the hell is going on, but we are facing a national disaster, and you had better straighten up this mess right now, because this guy has got to go." That was my message to him.

VASQUEZ: What was his response?

HAAS: Well, his response was, "Well, Lu, we're working on this." I said, "I'm telling you, I want you to know that when this guy hits Los Angeles they're going to tear him to shreds and they're going to tear McGovern to shreds and they're going to tear everybody to shreds. I'm going to be out there, and I'm going to deal with it the best way I can."

Anyway, I've forgotten the key point. I don't know whether he actually did come to California or not. My recollection is that he didn't. As to whether or not he did or didn't and whether I had anything to do with it, I don't know.

VASQUEZ: The question was how much did that hurt McGovern here in California? It killed him in other parts of the country.

HAAS: It killed him here, too. Well, it killed him as far as Lu Haas was concerned. That's what this is all about and what something like this was going to do, because the press was the controlling element in a story like this. They were the ones who were going to decide this

issue.

VASQUEZ: Whether it was an important issue or not?

HAAS: In my experience, it didn't make any difference. They were totally in charge. All I was telling them was, "I have spent my life in Los Angeles, in California. Let me tell you what is going to happen to George McGovern and to Eagleton on this issue." I said, "They are going to murder both of these people. They're going to murder them. They're going to tear them to shreds, and there's no way you can live with this in California or anywhere else in the country, as far as I know."

VASQUEZ: What was your solution?

HAAS: My solution was to get rid of Eagleton. That's what I said. "He's got to go." I told Dutton, "You can keep him, but you're going to kill this campaign." That was my analysis.

Any postelection analysis obviously is ridiculous, because I had already made the decision right on the spot that it was all over. There was nothing else you could do to try to minimize the damage, although that along with other miscalculations was fatal. Not that it

would have made any difference anyway, probably, because I don't think that the war issue. . . . Getting back to it, I don't know why the war issue didn't cut.

McGovern, I didn't think was what you'd call a weak candidate. He was a hell of a good person. He was a good candidate. He spoke well. He looked well. Look at the guy. He was a bomber pilot. He had a lot going for him. There was just no question about it--not to mention the overriding issue. He was a classical liberal.

Now, being a classical liberal may not have helped him, because this was 1972 and by now classical liberal was on the ropes, and I knew it.

VASQUEZ: Perhaps his economic policies being characterized as radical and something that would bankrupt the country.

HAAS: His \$1,000 for every family was a total disaster.

VASQUEZ: Where did that come from?

HAAS: That came from Gary [W.] Hart. That was his creation, and it was just unbelievably bad. You have to figure that it was his judgment, too. It wasn't just Gary Hart, because major issues like

that do get worked over by the candidate. The candidate is no goddamned puppet. He doesn't walk out there. He was the United States senator. He knew what the hell life was all about. It was just too far out, that's all. It was proven to be too far out.

VASQUEZ: Let's move to another campaign that you participated in. That's the 1973 campaign in Los Angeles for mayor, the mayoral campaign between Tom Bradley and Sam Yorty but which also included people like Jesse Unruh and Tom Reddin and Joel Wachs in the primaries.

HAAS: I was not involved in that.

VASQUEZ: You weren't?

HAAS: I was involved in the '69 campaign.

VASQUEZ: Not in the '73 for mayor?

HAAS: Right.

VASQUEZ: I see.

HAAS: In other words, I was not a paid staff person or anything like that.

VASQUEZ: Were you a volunteer then?

HAAS: Well, only in a marginal sort of way. You really can't volunteer a hell of a lot. You're either on the staff or you're not.

VASQUEZ: You were on the staff for the '74?

HAAS: 'Sixty-nine.

VASQUEZ: Right. The '69 race between Bradley and Yorty. Let's go back to that. Let's go back to that race.

HAAS: I was the press secretary.

VASQUEZ: Why did Tom get beaten?

HAAS: At that time, racism was a factor. I say that only because Tom Bradley was an unproven person. Now, once you got Tom Bradley elected, he has erased most of the racism that might be normally involved in a situation like this.

VASQUEZ: How did he do that?

HAAS: By conducting himself in an exemplary way to ease the feelings of the people who might not otherwise be racist or who now may even be overcompensating for racism and saying, "Well, this is one black I can vote for." That type of thing. He is an example of having to modify all statements about racism in politics. You just have to. . . .

Even though I feel that racism in politics is a reality. . . . One way or another, it's a reality. It can be a plus. Tom Bradley has

proven that it's a plus. It can be a plus. Hey, look at the guy's record. Right now he's almost as popular as he ever was, in spite of a lot of problems that he's been facing all of those years. The Los Angeles Times just got through polling on this issue and . . .

VASQUEZ: He's leading again.

HAAS: He's got Teflon, too.

VASQUEZ: In spite of being black?

HAAS: In spite of being black, and in spite of being the mayor.

VASQUEZ: In spite of the move to the right of the state?

HAAS: And in spite of all the problems that we've got, which are one hell of a lot of problems in this city when you look at the crime, drugs, traffic, and smog. If they laid all that stuff on Tom Bradley, he would be dead. He's gone. So. . . .

VASQUEZ: How has he been able to use that Teflon that you talked about? Mannerisms, what?

HAAS: It's a mystery. The Teflon is a mystery, except that Tom Bradley, not consciously, has never really gotten involved in these tough issues. The form of government that we have here somewhat removes him a little bit. Because you have a

strong city council and you have a commission form of government, so that there's a level of buffering, political buffering, there which sets the mayor aside, and the mayor is regarded mostly as a ceremonial head. Even though Tom Bradley presents himself as a leader, deep down people probably recognize that he doesn't do anything.

VASQUEZ: So he's not a threat?

HAAS: That's right. He cuts ribbons. He goes out and meets everybody. He's constantly on the move. He works sixteen hours a day, seven days a week being a decent guy, getting out and talking to people, and so on. He acts like an ideal city councilman deeply concerned with things and issues, but above it all in a practical sense. This is just sort of an analysis. It's a bit of a mystery how this happens, because you've got a Teflon mayor.

VASQUEZ: But this Teflon mayor couldn't become governor. Why?

HAAS: Well, I'm not too sure. Maybe at the state level racism may be more important, because first of all, Tom Bradley is not known all over the state. He's known locally and he's respected

locally and he's accepted locally. Statewide, I'm not about to read the voters, because I can't really get a sense of this sort of thing. There has always been a mystery about it. On the surface, he should have done a lot better than he did.

Now, my complaint about him in his campaign was that he backed away from his basic strength. He ran as a conservative and he never did line up the Democratic vote. When he went up to Fresno on his very first kickoff days, as I told you previously, he never went to see César Chávez. He went to see the growers.

I'll tell you, I was so enraged and so shocked that he would make such a serious mistake, but that's what the campaign was.

VASQUEZ: Would he have done a lot better if he had run as a liberal?

HAAS: I don't know. Probably not. In other words, I think the state is too far gone in the conservative sense for anybody to get elected governor. We've got another race coming up in 1990, and I'm not very sanguine about that. I'll tell you that. I don't care who the Democrat

is. I just don't feel that there's any trend operating here for 1990. Maybe by 1990 some discontent is going to start emerging.

VASQUEZ: It's only a year away.

HAAS: Yes, that's right. I don't know what it is, but even the Republican [Senator Pete Wilson] has started to kickoff his campaign, and he sounds like he's going to run on quality of life. Hey, our guy, if he's John Van de Kamp, is going to be running on the crime issue.

Incidentally, Leo McCarthy is going to announce that he's going to run. I just found that out. You and I know something that nobody else knows. I went on a hike this morning up in the canyons and ran into a woman who knows Leo McCarthy's guy, and she says he's going to announce like right now. So we've got Leo McCarthy, John Van de Kamp, and Dianne Feinstein. They'll kill each other. They'll just wipe each other out and Pete Wilson will probably . . .

VASQUEZ: Waltz right in.

HAAS: Anyway, that's neither here nor there. That's inside politics.

VASQUEZ: Well, senators trying to come back to the state haven't done too well, traditionally. Do you think Pete Wilson will have that problem if he runs for governor?

HAAS: I don't think there are any rules about the governor. First of all, he's going to have an enormous amount of money. He's going to have an incredible amount of money, because the Republican party is gearing up in a big way for 1990. They're worried about reapportionment. There was a story here [in the newspaper] that they're gearing up a national campaign on reapportionment.

VASQUEZ: They just barely got the Supreme Court decision on the fight they were having on the last reapportionment. They haven't really stopped fighting, have they?

HAAS: No. They've never stopped fighting on that one, because it's so crucial to the future of these parties. There's nothing else that comes close to it. It's so crucial.

VASQUEZ: It is the game, isn't it?

HAAS: Hey, all you do is take a look at this gerrymandering process and the gerrymandering

districts and you can see how it works. Whoever draws the lines has got a huge advantage. I'm not saying that it's the only advantage, but it's a huge advantage.

VASQUEZ: Let me ask you some general questions to end the interview. In your interview you've mentioned it several times, but maybe you'd want to summarize, what is your assessment of the role of electronic media in the last quarter century in California politics, and how does that change the rules of the game for running campaigns?

HAAS: Well, when you say "electronic media," you're only talking about television.

VASQUEZ: Primarily, yes.

HAAS: I happen to be a strong advocate of radio in politics--the use of radio, free radio.

VASQUEZ: Why radio?

HAAS: Because it's the one media that a statewide politician can get all of it that he wants for free. It is a twenty-four-hour-a-day medium that is really, or has been until recently, available to a politician. I trained Alan Cranston to use it. When I was running Alan Cranston's operations here, we had a radio program.

Anyway, you're divorcing radio. Radio. . . .
Basically, forget about it. Nobody pays any attention to radio anymore, including Alan Cranston, even though I trained him how to use it and I trained all of his people to use it. They all agreed it was the most important thing that he had going for him. But he doesn't have time for it. The reason he doesn't have time for it, you don't have time for radio, you don't have time for anything else is because you spend 90 percent of your time raising money for television. So when we talk about electronic media, forget about it, you're talking about television. Television dominates national and state politics to the exclusion of everything else.

VASQUEZ: How has that changed the nature of the political campaigns?

HAAS: Well, it's changed it to the extent that, first of all, you have to spend an enormous amount of time raising money. It used to be that candidates didn't raise the money themselves. They had the Gene Wymans, and the other guy that I've mentioned before. . . . I've forgotten his name now,

the home builder [Mark Boyer].

Anyway, we always had a hard-core group of wealthy people who raised the money, and usually your finance chairman was responsible for raising the money. Now the candidate is responsible for raising the money. You have a finance chairman, but don't ask me what he does.

Well, there's a certain substructure that does do a little thing. You have to have people put on parties, do the catering, send out the invitations, and all that. But the real money-raising is done by the candidate, and he does it mostly on the phone and with one hell of a lot of one-on-one sessions for breakfast, lunch, cocktails, dinners, this and that.

VASQUEZ: Who formulates his policy papers?

HAAS: It's almost all done on the telephone.

VASQUEZ: It takes the greater part of his time.

HAAS: When Alan Cranston hits the deck in Los Angeles, he rushes to the phone. He has got a yellow pad like yours with one hundred telephone numbers on there. He knows before he hits Los Angeles who he's going to start calling all around the state. He is calling people for money. That's what he

does most of the time when he's running for office. I use the number 90 percent. It may be a little excessive, because he has to do a hell of a lot of traveling and all that.

VASQUEZ: It's considerable.

HAAS: But traveling I don't count as part of the game, although it is, obviously. You have to go to San Francisco, you have to go to Sacramento, and so on. The only reason you're going to San Francisco, though, is to raise money, you see. So the travel time does take up a lot of time. The totality of the things is a high number. Ninety percent may be excessive.

VASQUEZ: Does it get any less once you are elected?

HAAS: No. Alan Cranston is gearing up right now. He has paid staff people. He has a paid, national staff person and all the rest of it and will be so far ahead of everybody by 1992 in his campaign chest. He is working on his 1992 campaign, and he started that two years ago.

VASQUEZ: When does a politician today or an elected officeholder have time to develop ideas and to formulate policy?

HAAS: He doesn't.

VASQUEZ: So, again, you get another expert, another professional?

HAAS: Well, you have a framework, first of all, as far as a senator is concerned. You have a certain framework that you have to live with. First of all, you have to live within the framework of your committee assignments. It's okay if you're from the state of California. It's a big state, and we've got every kind of an issue that there is.

So you're involved in practically every single issue nationally, except foreign affairs, perhaps, because you don't have foreign affairs at the local level. But you get involved in them because . . .

VASQUEZ: In the case of Alan Cranston you do because he's very active on . . .

HAAS: Well, not only that, but you have the Contra problem. So within the political framework, when we come out here, by god, the people who are opposed to the war down at Nicaragua and our liberal friends who are all for the Sandinistas and are opposed to the Contras. . . . We deal with that. But that has nothing much to do with legislation. It becomes a political issue.

The thing he has to deal with, first of all, are his California issues. California farmers expect the United States senator back there, the Democrat and the Republican, to protect . . .

VASQUEZ: California agribusiness.

HAAS: California agribusiness, our interests: The rice subsidy, the cotton subsidy, and all the rest of it. He has to do that. So that is the framework I'm talking about. Now, that framework is pretty broad in California, because we have so many different interests. We have defense. One of our biggest industries is defense. We have the ports up and down the state. We have advanced technology, Silicon Valley, computers and electronic industries.

There's a huge structure of interests that you have to take care of one way or another. You can't do it; your staff has to do that. They have to be on top of that. When the electronics industry needs something, they don't go to Alan Cranston, except indirectly. They go to the staff people. They know that you deal with Cranston through staff. Staff message is the issue.

It's almost a fait accompli. Not totally, because if there's something controversial going on--for example, farm labor--Alan Cranston may be doing something for the farmers, but it's not going to be on farm labor. It's not what they want, because he's going to protect as best as he can protect César Chávez's interest in farm labor.

That's an example of the modification of somebody who is not a captive of a particular special interest group. If it flies in the face of what you believe in, someone like that, you're not going to do it.

VASQUEZ: Getting back to what we were discussing, how does he . . .

HAAS: So what he does is he concentrates on the issues that he wants to concentrate on. Usually, they tend to be global issues, like war and peace, which is the one that has consumed him. Hey, you don't have to worry about Alan Cranston being up on that issue. That's why he's the senator.

There's nobody who needs to instruct him on the Middle East issues, on Israel especially. First of all, he comes out as a pro-Israel per-

son. Every Democrat in the state of California is pro-Israel. But he also has to know the issue. He's on top of it. He can talk about it. He can make a speech about it. He can answer press questions.

So he does spend a lot of time on a narrow band of what are his issues, what become the dominant issues whether he likes it or not. He has to have a position on taxes. He has to have a position on the deficit. There are some things he can't escape because they simply dominate what he's back there for, and he has to vote on these issues in any case. He doesn't duck them. He votes. He has to keep up that voting record.

So that's the framework, you see, of what goes on in the life of a politician.

VASQUEZ: In more general terms, I'm wondering what changes are brought by or wrought by the role of media in political campaigns that politicians at the state level are just going to have to learn to live with?

HAAS: Well, let me reiterate that I did answer that question. When you talk about television, commercials are what you're buying. Do you want

to ask me a different type of a question? Are you talking about free media? Free television?

VASQUEZ: What I'm really trying to get at is how all this attention of free media, paid media, whatever media, how that has cut into or changed the nature of how you run a political campaign at the grass roots?

HAAS: There are no grass roots. Television has taken over the grass roots.

VASQUEZ: That's exactly what I'm trying to get at.

HAAS: Television destroyed the grass roots because the politician no longer needs grass roots. He only needs one thing, which is television, television commercials. He doesn't even need free TV. The reason I'm stressing this is because I have a different point of view and I haven't been able to sell this point of view to any politician.

My point of view is this: I said, "Alan, you are spending all of your time raising money. I can't even schedule free media for you, because you don't have time for free media. We don't have time to do it. Now, you're going out tonight . . . "

[End Tape 7, Side A]

[Begin Tape 7, Side B]

HAAS: "If you give me the evening, I'll get you \$10,000 of free media. You're going to get \$5,000, and for that \$5,000 you can't even buy yourself a spot. I'm going to put you on television. I'm going to put you on radio, I'm going to get you a newspaper interview, a picture, in the time that you're taking to go out in Beverly Hills to spend a whole evening out there to raise \$5,000." That's my concept. In other words, what I'm saying to these politicians--and I haven't been able to sell this--you need a balance. You should use a balance. Obviously, you have to have paid television, and you can get paid television, but not to the exclusion of the whole campaign.

VASQUEZ: Is the problem that people want the television they can control and paid television gives you that?

HAAS: Right, and it's so expensive that you have to spend all of your time raising money. Of course, it's like a drug. You never get enough. You never get enough of it. You know that commercial is on the air, you know it's out there somewhere. You may not see it yourself because

you're so busy running around to parties raising money, but you know it's out there.

But my proposition makes a lot of sense. My claim is that I can give you more exposure than you will get for the equivalent amount of time in fund-raising.

VASQUEZ: But you haven't been able to sell this to him?

HAAS: No.

VASQUEZ: Why?

HAAS: Because they think it's a gamble.

VASQUEZ: They want the sure thing.

HAAS: They want the sure thing. The sure thing is a thirty-second or a twenty-second spot that they know is going to be on the air at a certain time.

Now the wheel is beginning to turn a little bit. Alan Cranston and Jerry Brown and other people who are supporting this idea, I guess, they're talking about going back to organizational-type politics. Jerry Brown is going to raise one million dollars a month. That's bullshit. He'll never raise that. That's his claim. If he doesn't raise it, I guess, [he will think] he's a failure. He'll take himself out of that

job. They're going to spend it on registration, get out the vote, and organizational work, getting back to people that we should have never let go of in the first place.

VASQUEZ: Do you think it will matter? You think it will make a difference?

HAAS: First of all, I don't believe in that. That is to say, the only way that you're going to reach anybody is through the mass media. You've got 25 million people. I guess we're 26 million, maybe. There's no way that you can do that in an organizational way to reach those people. What I'm saying is black people watch television, too. Chicanos watch television. The Vietnamese refugees watch television. Everybody is watching television. You've got to be on television. There's no question about it.

VASQUEZ: You've had a long career and a lot of experience in running campaigns, and I'm sure you've participated on some level or another in the discussions about campaign reform. What conclusions have you come to on that issue?

HAAS: It's a fraud. I don't know what campaign reform is. You'll have to tell me what it is.

VASQUEZ: Well, some people argue that . . .

HAAS: It's a catch phrase. What is the reform? The reform is that most people want to take money out of politics, right?

VASQUEZ: That's the reform most people are referring to, putting politics in the hands of the . . .

HAAS: There's only one way to take it out.

VASQUEZ: And how is that?

HAAS: Totally prohibit it and have the government put up the money.

VASQUEZ: Do you have problems with that?

HAAS: No. We went back to Washington, and that was practically the first bill that Alan Cranston introduced sixteen years ago.

VASQUEZ: What happened?

HAAS: The same thing that has happened to campaign reform year after year after year. It doesn't go. It won't even get out of committee. It won't even get a hearing.

The bill won't even get a hearing. Alan Cranston gave up. He went back there with campaign reform. It may have been one of the first bills that he introduced. He was dedicated to campaign reform and fought for years for this

but couldn't get it.

VASQUEZ: Is it a disinterest to any forces against it?
What's the problem? It keeps coming around.

HAAS: The incumbent politician likes the present system. He doesn't want to be equated with somebody who's going to try and get his job and to have the government pay that person to take his job away from him.

VASQUEZ: That's pretty clear?

HAAS: That is all there is to it.

VASQUEZ: Tell me, if you will, what is your theory of politics, and what has your experience confirmed?

HAAS: First of all, it is the reality of our life. Everything in our life is dependent on the political system. Whatever the condition of the political system is, that's kind of irrelevant. So it's important is what I am saying. The government can send me to war. They can kill me. They can have me killed. They can destroy my family. I can be killed by criminals because the government didn't control criminals. My children could be destroyed by drugs, and so on, because of government. So it is the dominant force in your life, even if you don't know that

it is. You can't make a move without the government having something to do with your move. You drove over here from Monterey Park, and you know all the way you were driving through government-controlled roads, signals, traffic, smog, and all the rest of it.

Now, our political system, as far as I can see, is the best in the world. As bad as it is, it's the best in the world. The son of a bitch has worked for two hundred years, and it's worked well. It's one hell of a system. It's not a system. Will Rogers says, "I don't belong to an organized party. I'm a Democrat."

So it's not what you would call a system that we think of. A system is supposed to work. It's always broken up, but how you fix it I haven't the foggiest idea. I don't think it can be fixed. I think it's inherently chaotic, evolving, and mixed-up.

I think it's unfortunate that life has sort of tainted it. The taint is money. But from a philosophical point of view, that's what has tainted the whole of our life: money. We have been corrupted as a society by money, by consumer

goals. And politics is part of that corruption. Only part of it, because from my point of view, all of our life is corrupted by consumer values where other values have been lost or are being lost so that we have those kinds of problems facing us.

[End Tape 7, Side B]